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ABSTRACT

NON-BEING & MEMORY:
A CRITIQUE OF PURE DIFFERENCE IN DERRIDA AND DELEUZE

By
Frank Scalambrino
August 2011

Dissertation supervised by Daniel J. Selcer
The psychology philosophy split has restricted viable readings of today‟s
psychological research. My project (within the philosophy of psychology) is to provide
these readings. Specifically, in this dissertation I analyze the data and the interpretations
of a large number of contemporary memory research articles. I use these articles to
support my claim that Immanuel Kant misunderstood what in the Critique of Pure
Reason he labeled “affinity.” Further, Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze inherit this
Kantian misunderstanding by way of G.W.F. Hegel‟s attempt to eliminate it. Put another
way, the component in question is that which grounds the post-structuralist justification
for “pure difference,” and the wider context of this discussion is Plato‟s problem of nonbeing. That is, Kant‟s reading of affinity and Derrida‟s and Deleuze‟s respective
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readings of pure difference all function as failed attempts to solve the problem of nonbeing.
Taking Plato‟s Parmenides and Sophist as points of departure, I show how each of
the above-mentioned thinkers, including Aristotle, fails to meet Plato‟s criteria for, i.e.
solve, the problem of non-being. I then use contemporary memory research for the sake
of enunciating my own solution to Plato‟s problem. The critical structure of my
discourse is directed at Derrida and Deleuze, then, as a critique of their readings of pure
difference, and this is to accentuate the difference between my response to the problem
and theirs.
Kant‟s misunderstanding of memory committed him to an ontological filledduration illusion. On the one hand, my reading of contemporary memory research
depicts being as bound by memory. On the other hand, memory‟s binding is governed by
play, i.e. memory as being‟s play-ground. And, gaps can be noticed by regarding shifting
engagements of procedural memory or memory‟s cycling, though these gaps are often
covered over by priming and habitual scripts. Hence, just as these gaps justify calling
ontological filled-duration illusory, these gaps also constitute my solution to the problem
of non-being. I paraphrase the fruit of solving the problem: Your being is not persisting;
it is pulsing. Perhaps the largest impact of my solution is to be found in ethics.
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PREFACE

I had already been trained in formal logic when, for the first time, I watched a
man die. I was majoring in psychology at Kenyon College and working in the emergency
department of a trauma center in Canton, Ohio. Witnessing such experiences I became
persuaded of the idea that there is a difference between thoughts about death and the
experience of death. Perhaps this is why I became so enthusiastic when I first learned of
the philosophical problem of non-being.
So, what is the problem of non-being? In order to understand this problem, start
with the question itself: What is non-being? This question has perplexed philosophers
because all answers seem self-refuting. In other words, since when you answer this
question, an answer is being given, the answer cannot refer to non-being. Put simply, this
would be like telling a fish that has never been out of water that “dry” is the opposite or
negation of the water the fish currently experiences. The words are all understandable;
yet, the fish neither knows dryness, nor has the fish become different through an
awareness of dryness.
The problem of non-being is especially unique, then, because this self-refutation
goes all the way down to the term “non-being” itself. In fact, for this reason some
philosophers hold that the problem of non-being cannot be a problem at all. Likewise,
they say the question “what is non-being?” is not a real question. On the one hand, nonbeing does not refer to anything. On the other hand, you cannot decide upon an answer
to the question without taking non-being to be something and attempting to negate that
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thing. Hence, this is the very problem of non-being. That is, what is non-being, and how
can this question be answered given the topic about which it supposedly asks?
When philosophers attempt to solve the problem, rather than merely dismiss it,
they usually do so by distinguishing between being and becoming, and then consider nonbeing to refer to the difference between the two. As I will show in this dissertation,
Immanuel Kant came closest to date to solving the problem by positing a third non-entity,
i.e. the thing-in-itself, as different from the object which is experienced and the various
experiential stages of its becoming. So, Plato pointed to the path and Kant cleared the
way to the formulation of a solution. However, Kant fell short of solving the problem,
and philosophers in his wake have, to date, not corrected his shortcomings.
There is a significant list of philosophers who have attempted to solve the
problem of non-being. Moreover, given the unique perplexity of the problem, I engage a
number of these thinkers in order to provide a proof for my solution. After all, the
thinkers with whom I disagree about non-being are eminent philosophers, e.g. Aristotle,
G.W.F. Hegel, Jacques Derrida, and Gilles Deleuze. Hence, I thought it prudent to do
more than just claim these thinkers are wrong in regard to non-being.
Also, when facing such seemingly impenetrable perplexity, philosophers often
inquire regarding the value of the problem, of the question, or of its solution. In other
words, what is at stake regarding non-being? As I will show in this dissertation, Plato
considered this question important because you cannot understand being until you
understand non-being. So, what is at stake with the problem of non-being is being. This
is a powerful claim, i.e. if you cannot solve the problem of non-being, then you do not
understand what being is. I affirm both the perplexity of the problem and its value. In
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fact, I find the solution‟s paradigm shift to be particularly interesting, i.e. when you
understand the solution to the problem, you understand being, and thereby your being,
differently.

xxi

“The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition
is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.”1
~Alfred North Whitehead
“[P]hilosophy without the history of philosophy is, if not blind, at least dumb…”2
~Wilfrid Sellars
“What then will you do about philosophy?
3
Where will you turn, while these difficulties remain unresolved?”
~Plato, (Parm 135c)

Chapter One: Part I – Introduction: The Problem of Non-Being
Dissertation Overview
The topic of this dissertation is the problem of non-being. I address this topic in
order to criticize the contemporary readings of “pure difference” put forth by Jacques
Derrida and Gilles Deleuze as their solutions to the problem of non-being. The method
with which I address the topic, and thereby provide a critique of pure difference, may be
divided into two treatments. The first treatment is negative; negative because I show that
– based on the criteria for solving the problem of non-being – neither Derrida‟s nor
Deleuze‟s reading of pure difference solves the problem. The second treatment is
positive; positive because I solve the problem of non-being.
§1 Part I Overview – The first part of the dissertation contains (1) an explication
of the problem of non-being, (2) a reading of pure difference according to Derrida and a
reading according to Deleuze, and (3) the negative first treatment showing that neither
version of pure difference solves the problem of non-being. Now, the explication of the
problem necessarily invokes a number of philosophers. Yet, as the explication is for the
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sake of the single problem of non-being, these thinkers may be merely regarded as so
many attempts to articulate solutions.
The series of thinkers to be encountered then includes: Plato, Aristotle, Immanuel
Kant, and G.W.F. Hegel. The manner in which these thinkers treat the problem of nonbeing provides the context for reading pure difference in Derrida and Deleuze. As I will
show, specifically Plato provides the first formal statement of the problem, and he
himself offers a rendition of (what may technically be referred to as “pure”) difference to
solve the problem. However, Kant is the thinker of all these mentioned who came closest
to date to solving the problem of non-being. Moreover, I take both Derrida and Deleuze
to be post-Kantian thinkers. Hence, I invoke Aristotle and Hegel in regard to non-being
to help the reader grasp the manner in which Derrida and Deleuze appropriate Plato’s
difference in their post-Kantian attempts to solve the problem.
None of the three thinkers upon whom I focus in the dissertation, i.e. Kant,
Derrida, and Deleuze, solve the problem of non-being. Yet, I chose these three thinkers
because, on the one hand, Kant cannot be avoided as his structure of experience
constitutes the greatest advance on the problem. And, on the other hand, with the benefit
of post-Hegelian hindsight, Derrida and Deleuze stand as the most sophisticated
opponents to anyone who would contend to solve the problem of non-being. This is the
case because in order to argue against Hegel‟s dialectic Derrida and Deleuze opt for a
return to Kant‟s structure of experience. With Kant‟s structure of experience as their
point of departure, Derrida and Deleuze are then able to employ the ideas of Plato and
Aristotle in regard to non-being, i.e. difference and potentiality, toward overcoming
Hegel‟s dialectic.

2

Whereas the Hegelian dialectic was supposed to eliminate the need to posit Kant‟s
idea of the “thing-in-itself,” it was Kant‟s structure of experience which necessitated him
– as I will show – to posit the thing-in-itself in the attempt to solve the problem of nonbeing. So, in returning to Kant to overcome Hegel, Derrida and Deleuze replace the idea
of the thing-in-itself with the idea of pure difference. And, whatever else one may say
about Hegel‟s dialectic, Hegel‟s dialectic constitutes his attempt to solve the problem of
non-being. Hence, pure difference – as I will show – functions for Derrida and Deleuze
as an attempt to solve the problem of non-being.
It is not mere coincidence that after more than 2,000 years, the most sophisticated
attempts to solve the problem of non-being repeat – albeit differently – the idea a
character in Plato‟s dialog the Sophist put forth as an answer, i.e. pure difference. This is
yet more support for the claim that Derrida and Deleuze stand as the most sophisticated
opponents to anyone who would contend to solve the problem of non-being. That is,
looking back over 2,000 years of philosophy, Derrida and Deleuze were able to
incorporate the most viable ideas regarding non-being toward returning to what has
always seemed the most viable solution. It is, in my opinion, remarkable that Plato could
articulate a problem which would stand unbreached for over 2,000 years; and, he
seemingly was able to anticipate the limit of what could be offered as a solution as well.
§2 Part II Overview – The second part of the dissertation, then, contains my
solution to the problem of non-being. My solution adheres to the same criteria
enumerated in Plato‟s formal statement of the problem and adhered to by his successors
such as, for example, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Derrida, and Deleuze. As I noted above,
then, in returning to an idea of difference in the attempt to solve the problem of non-
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being, Derrida and Deleuze take Kant‟s structure of experience as their point of
departure. Now, the aspect of Kant‟s innovative structure of experience which I contend
kept him from solving the problem derives from a – perhaps excusable for the 18th
century – misunderstanding by Kant of psychology. Namely, of what Kant refers to as
the three original sources or powers of the mind, Kant did not recognize these sources as
rooted in memory. Hence, standing on Kant‟s shoulders, I solve the problem of nonbeing by revealing Kant‟s sensation and imagination as rooted in and functions of
sensory memory and working memory respectively.
There is a longstanding prejudice amongst philosophers regarding memory. Put
generally, philosophers tend to think of sensation as devoid of memory, and to think of
imagination as more powerful than memory. Furthermore, despite their criticisms of
phenomenology both Derrida and Deleuze adhere to this psychological prejudice.
Though contemporary psychologists researching memory do not share this prejudice,
neither do they attempt to solve philosophical problems. Therefore, on the one hand, I
support my change to Kant‟s structure of experience by citing contemporary memory
research. On the other hand, whereas the post-Kantian readings of Derrida and Deleuze
fail to solve the problem of non-being, my post-Kantian reading informed by both
contemporary memory research and the work of Derrida and Deleuze solves the problem
of non-being.
This, then, is the positive aspect of my critique. Rather than provide just a
different idea, such as pure difference or the thing-in-itself, my solution to the problem
provides a different relation, and a different perspective, by solving the problem. Yet, it
is, of course, possible, as I will show in the conclusion of the dissertation, to construct an

4

idea from the results of my solution (Deleuze should be happy). What is more, I believe
this idea I have constructed is original in regard to the literature. You can be the judge
after you read the dissertation. Lastly, though the manner in which this solution to the
problem of non-being might fit in with some portion or with Plato‟s dialogs as a whole is
not a concern which I will pursue in this text, I conclude the dissertation with a brief
discussion of the new vista of being which my solution to the problem of non-being
provides. I also provide a brief discussion of the value of such a vista.
The Relations amongst Becoming, Being, and Non-Being
“Socrates: „Is any one of the manys what someone says it is, then, any more than it is not what he says it
is?‟ Glaucon: „No, they are like ambiguities [enigmas and puzzles]…‟
Socrates: „Then do you know how to deal with them? [my emphasis] … Surely, they can‟t be more than
what is or not be more than what is not, for apparently nothing is darker than what is not or clearer than
what is.‟
Glaucon: „Very true.‟
Socrates: „We‟ve now discovered, it seems [my emphasis], that the many conventions of the majority of
people about beauty and the others are rolling around as intermediates between what is not and what purely
is.‟”4
~Plato (Rep 1997, 479b-e)

§3 The Context of the Problem – The purpose of this section of the Introduction is
to establish the context for introducing the problem of non-being. 5 I take Plato (c. 428-c.
348 B.C.) to have achieved the most precise Ancient statement of the problem of nonbeing. The dialogs widely considered to take the problem of non-being as a central
theme are the Parmenides and the Sophist. And, I take Plato‟s statement of the problem
in the Sophist as the first formal statement of the problem. What is more, Plato‟s Sophist
includes the anticipation of various attempts to solve the problem indicating why each of
the attempts fails as a solution. Though the value of initially returning to Plato, then, is
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more than merely organizational, it should be acknowledged that Plato was able to
organize the problem of non-being by indicating two impasses such that any attempt to
solve the problem must overcome. Despite the care Plato took in outlining the intricacy
involved, what one may consider to be Plato‟s solution – as I will show in the next
section – is unsatisfactory. However, his statement of the problem still holds such that it
may be used as a touchstone to gauge any progress toward a solution.
§4 Platonic Background to the Problem – Before stating the problem of nonbeing found in the Sophist, a brief discussion of Plato‟s Book V of the Republic provides
a wider context for understanding the problem of non-being. There Plato suggests a
distinction is to be made between Being, Becoming, and Non-Being.6 (Rep 1997, 479c-e)
And, according to Plato, an explanation of this distinction is not something to be easily
given. Plato associates the difficulty with enigmas or puzzles (αἰλίγκαηη).
Recall that in the beginning of Book V (Rep 449a) Socrates is encouraged into a
“digression” which, among other things, passes through the “divided line” (Rep 509d511e) of Book VI and culminates with the “Cave Allegory” (Rep 514a-520a) of Book
VII. This digression is supposed to discuss the differences between citizens and the
training as propaedeutic which separates the philosopher from the others. Noburu
Notomi‟s The Unity of Plato’s Sophist links the digression of the Republic just mentioned
with the digression of the Sophist, and in this way, though Notomi does not pursue the
connection, the problem of non-being is further supposed to be linked to the training and
discovery of the philosopher.7 Recall also, Plato takes pains to note in the Cave allegory
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that to the prisoners in the cave the philosopher‟s discourse may sound ridiculous (Rep
517a). Yet, if the philosopher is capable of solving the enigmas and making the journey,
then this discourse leads from “the realm of becoming” inside the cave to the “realm of
being” outside the cave [ἀπὸ ηνῦ γηγλνκέλνπ ἐπὶ ηὸ ὄλ] (Rep 521d). Further, then, as
prefatory, the standard Plato passage to quote if discussing Becoming is Timaeus §28.
There Plato states,
As I see it, then, we must begin by making the following
distinction: What is that which always is and has no
becoming, and what is that which becomes but never is?
The former is grasped by the understanding, which
involves a reasoned account. It is unchanging. The latter is
grasped by opinion, which involves unreasoning sense
perception [Plato‟s emphases].8 (27d5-28a3)
I quote this passage here for its relevance, though I will discuss it momentarily.
§5 The twofold task in working out the question of non-being – At this point it is
worth pausing to briefly reflect on the term “Becoming.” As you can see from the Greek
above, gignomenou is related to the verb gignesthai [γίγλεζζαη] and the noun genesis
[γέλεζηο].9 So, the Greek translated here as “becoming” points to notions of “origin” and
“source” and a “beginning” such as a “manner of birth,” “production,” “generation,” or
“coming into being.”10 Moreover, Francis Macdonald Cornford (1874-1943) in his book
Plato’s Theory of Knowledge: The Theaetetus and the Sophist precisely links becoming,
and the distinction between being and becoming, from the Republic with the distinction
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as it is further discussed in the Sophist. 11 What is more, in his article “Plato on NotBeing,” Gwilym Ellis Lane Owen (1922-1982) among the Republic and Theaetetus lists
the Parmenides, the Euthydemus, and the Cratylus as dialogs which
use such locutions as „what is not‟ without ever asking
whether these are capable of coherent use. The Sophist by
contrast proceeds on the view that if and only if we can
understand the proper use of „what is not‟ … shall we
understand philosophically the situations those expressions
are commonly invoked to explain. 12
Owen‟s insight not only indicates the value of solving the problem of non-being, it points
back to the very nature of enigmatic discourses – beyond even the Republic – and the
puzzles regarding Being, Becoming, and Non-Being.
Suddenly it does not seem so obvious that discerning the distinction between
becoming and being – as was supposed in the Republic – makes one a philosopher.
Rather, the task of discerning being itself is now caught up in the problem of non-being.
As Plato characterized the relation between being and non-being in the Sophist, to get
clear about the one is to get clear about the other (Soph 250e-251a). And, were this
perplexity the case – which I take it to be – in regard to being, then it would pertain, of
course, to not just Plato‟s dialogs but the study of philosophy itself. Moreover, the
reasons for which I will discuss below, it seems as though Plato never put a solution to
the problem of non-being in writing. Attempting to solve the problem of non-being, the
final answer put forward by Theaetetus is “difference,” i.e. difference as non-being.
Below I will show why this attempt does not solve the problem of non-being. As Ronald
Polansky put it in his Philosophy & Knowledge: A commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus,
11
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We certainly should doubt that the Sophist completes the
account of nonbeing unless it also completes the account of
being… Rather than completing these accounts, the
stranger says so much as necessary to show that not-being
is something (and perhaps he says nearly as much about it
as humanly can be said).13
As both Owen and Polansky point out, then, beyond the difficulty of the problem of nonbeing, the coupling of Being and Non-Being is often either missed by Socrates‟ students,
or they are not up to the task.
§6 Plato’s Solution – In sum, one way to generally account for the above
indicated lack of sophistication in the dialogs other than the Sophist is to suggest – as is
suggested in the Apology (28e & 30a-b)14 – that “to live the life of a philosopher” is “to
examine myself and others.”15 In this way, philosophical discourse truly is an examining
and an attending to (care, concern for) the “souls” involved in the discourse. So, the
discourse reveals as much as the souls involved can power. (Cf. Soph 258b6) Inevitably,
then, there will be discussions where topics surface – such as non-being – without the
interlocutors having the capacity to plunge into the depths of the topic(s).16 The
concluding language of Republic Book V itself provides a good example.
On the one hand, perhaps Socrates ironically couches the problem in a way
appropriate to his particular interlocutor. On the other hand, perhaps Socrates honestly,
as befitting a midwife, 17 can only remember within the context which his interlocutor is
able to establish. At the conclusion of Book V, according to Socrates, whoever discerns
the difference between becoming and being discerns the difference between a lover of
13
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opinion (θηινδόμνπο) and a philosopher (θηινζόθνπο). Now, there appear to be two
words in play here, other than “love of.” Yet, the term “sophia” is elusive and enigmatic,
e.g. consider the double entendre of wisdom/cleverness or simply the question: what is
wisdom? If the first two terms are to be understood, then it seems as though a third term
also requires understanding despite the inability to count it as a separately perceived term.
Similarly, working on the difference between the two terms becoming and being, some of
Socrates‟ interlocutors fail to attend to the third term, i.e. they pass over – without
noticing or attempting to solve – the problem of non-being. Hence, as the Eleatic visitor
explains in the Sophist, until you examine your soul sufficiently to be able to solve the
problem of non-being, you do not know the difference between either of the two terms
above – Being and Becoming or Philosopher and Sophist –; for “the sophist is a clever
rogue who will not be got out of his hole.”18 (Soph 1895, 239c5)
§7 Dependency of reckoning with being upon reckoning with non-being – You
might ask, then, about a context other than Plato‟s dialogs: To what sort of mistake does
not having a solution to the problem of non-being lead? It is not so much what should be
thought as what should not be thought about non-being. In other words, treating nonbeing as a part of being leads to what Kant would call a “transcendental illusion.” A
classic example can be found in Jean-Paul Sartre‟s Being and Nothingness: An Essay in
Phenomenological Ontology. According to Sartre, “The explanation of the world by
means of becoming, conceived as a synthesis of being and non-being, is easily given.”19
As such, Sartre treats non-being as a thing that can be part of a synthesis. The point here

18

Plato, Sophist, Benjamin Jowett, tr. (New York: Echo Library), 62-64. Hereafter cited Soph 1895.
Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology, Hazel Barnes, tr.
(New York: Citadel Press, 2001), 93.
19

10

is that in contexts other than Plato‟s dialogs, philosophical discourse still contends with
non-being.
The influence of Aristotle, in particular his Metaphysics, on Western philosophy
is unquestionable. In fact, were I to put this provocatively I might say it was Aristotle‟s
false solution to Plato‟s Puzzle of non-being which produced the image in which the
history of philosophy may be found. This, of course, assumes a widely held belief that
the history, and perhaps the “Western tradition,” of philosophy began with Aristotle. 20
As I will show below, Aristotle lost sight of non-being by conflating non-being with notbeing, and then taking hypothetical becoming – which is a form of not-being – as ground
of experience. The result was a logical rendering of being as inherent substance, which,
of course, assumes a god‟s eye point of view.
The problem with Aristotle‟s assumption of a god‟s eye point of view is that it
reduces ontological negation to logical negation. Notice, for example, as Ronald
Polansky points out,21 according to Aristotle: God thinks but does not know. If this is the
case, then God does not know the principle of non-contradiction.22 However, if it is not
the case that God knows, and is therefore affirming the principle of non-contradiction by
thinking in a way to be governed by, the principle of non-contradiction, then it must be
the case that God is governed by the principle of non-contradiction. Yet, this, of course,
is tantamount to turning the principle of non-contradiction into God; such a rendition of
God should sound contradictory indeed. In other words, the principle of noncontradiction is not God; hence, Aristotle‟s reduction of ontological negation to logical
20
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negation overly narrowed his perspective, and subsequently Aristotle lost sight of nonbeing.
It is in this way that the “history of Western philosophy” has hitherto been unable
to think the relation between the ideas of Being, Becoming, and Non-Being. Re-thinking
Aristotle‟s reduction of ontological to logical negation became a preparatory task to be
completed by Kant‟s “Copernican revolution.” So, a brief discussion of Aristotle in this
dissertation has become inevitable. First, discussing Aristotle goes toward clarifying the
mistaken frame promulgated under the name “Aristotle” through which a significant
amount of historical philosophical thinking engaged the problem of non-being. Second,
the Plato I quoted above regarding Becoming at Timaeus (27d5-28a3) already highlighted
the perplexity in discerning an idea of Becoming in relation to Being and Non-Being. As
Plato indicated there, it is always from within the stability of that which is, i.e. being, that
any negative relation to being can be discerned. Certainly of “that which becomes but
never is” you may say “it is not.”23 Within the Aristotelian paradigm, then, process
philosophy‟s concern with becoming is a concern with not-being. Hence, in particular,
then, Deleuze‟s reading of process philosophy expresses an attempt to rethink Aristotle‟s
reduction of ontological negation for the sake of rethinking Becoming.
Whereas discussing Plato is a return to the origin of the problem‟s formal
statement, discussing Aristotle is a return to the initial shift of context – or frame or
paradigm – away from Plato‟s statement of the problem; and, it was this shift which
clouded thinking the relation between the ideas of Being, Becoming, and Non-Being. So,
what hangs in the balance with Aristotle‟s shift – what is at stake, what is the value of
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discussing the return to Aristotle‟s shift? Answering this question requires you look at a
different aspect of the same evidence, as it were, to notice that ultimately Aristotle‟s
reduction of ontological negation to logical negation assumes – but does not justify – a
notion of ontological persistence. This assumption receives its contemporary articulation
by grounding being in time. Though, if reckoning with being is contingent upon
reckoning with non-being, and if Aristotle was mistaken to reduce ontological negation to
logical negation, then the assumption of persistence turns out to – wrongly – be justified
by a logical understanding of negation, and the mistaken idea about being derives
precisely from a mistaken idea of non-being. Put another way, grounding being in time
begs the question.
Recall that above I referred to becoming as “hypothetical,” because, as pure,
becoming never is, i.e. you cannot even step in such a river “once.” Becoming is not
Being. One way to characterize this is to say the being of your discursive mind is
displaced from the becoming (its and non-discursive becoming), and thereby unable to
grasp becoming qua becoming. But still, becoming is not being. Hence, a major
difference between non-being and becoming is lost in the process of Aristotle‟s shifting
the problem, i.e. becoming‟s relation to being allows for it to be discussed.
So, Aristotle‟s reduction of ontological negation to logical negation must be rethought while keeping in mind Plato‟s perplexing insight that you do not encounter the
same problem in attempting to discuss becoming as you do when you attempt to discuss
non-being.24 In this regard, Kant‟s Copernican revolution will be successful. As Kant
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points out, simply stating “nihil” is far too heavy handed a style. You cannot just declare
it and move on as if it were something which could simply be “unbound.” The nuance to
which I adhere in discussing the subtleties encountered in approaching the problem of
non-being, then, is to follow Plato and make an initial distinction between not-being and
non-being.25 Not-being with a “t” is taken to refer to the power of logical negation, and
not-being in regard to the physical relates to being as becoming relates to being. I
elaborate on this more below.
Given the perplexities of the problem of non-being and the difficult, though
unavoidable, task of encountering Aristotle‟s paradigm shift, in this introduction, I will
first show Plato‟s statement of the problem of non-being in the Sophist. In showing the
problem I will also show the two perplexities or impasses you encounter, as discussed by
Plato, when you attempt to solve the problem. Second, I will show Plato‟s proposal of
difference as a solution. Finally, I will show how Aristotle‟s arsenal, 26 i.e. his logical
apparatus for making distinctions, renders a reading of not-being as a solution to the
problem of non-being. As you will see, it is Aristotle who formalizes a strategy for
mistakenly grounding being in time and equating non-being with death. This, then,
should be sufficient for an introduction to such a complicated problem, i.e. it should
provide you with a foothold for the “heavy going” which will follow.
§8 Final introductory statement of orientation – Lastly, before getting underway,
let me conclude this section of the Introduction with some last words of orientation. It is
important to keep in mind that there is a significant amount of specificity involved in
and Non-Being, Aristotle thinks the relation between Being and Becoming by way of (privative) degrees of
logical negation. I will continue to clarify what I mean here below.
25
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Plato‟s criteria for solving the problem of non-being, i.e. his criteria can be used to grade
attempts to solve the problem. So, grasping the specificity should further help you
navigate the entirety of the discussion. For example, in Chapter 2 I will support my claim
that Kant‟s critical philosophy in general, and specifically his Critique of Pure Reason,
represents the furthest advance to date on the problem by showing how Kant was the first
thinker to successfully overcome the first of two impasses which Plato requires be
overcome if you are to solve the problem. Further, I will support my claim that Kant
failed to solve the problem of non-being by showing how he failed to overcome the
second impasse of Plato‟s two impasses. These are also the criteria with which I expect
my solution to the problem to be judged.
Despite the breadth of thinkers, then, I seek to maintain a focus on the problem
throughout, and emphasize areas of overlap which constellate the multiple thinkers
involved. Hence, I do not consider the breadth of thinkers excessive. For example, in
order to justly treat Kant‟s achievement in regard to Plato and Aristotle on the problem of
non-being, I will devote the entire chapter to discuss the salient points from Kant‟s
Critique of Pure Reason. And, by salient, here, I mean salient in regard to the problem of
non-being, i.e. Kant‟s structure of experience. Also, I will return to Aristotle to explicate
both Derrida‟s discussion of the “Metaphysics of Presence” and Deleuze‟s attempts to
rethink Kant‟s structure of experience. Moreover, given their prominence in regard to the
problem of non-being, a discourse with Plato and Kant will persist throughout the
dissertation, and in contradistinction to Kant, I will provide a rendition of Hegel‟s attempt
to solve the problem of non-being for the sake of establishing all the pieces needed to
provide a reading of pure difference in Derrida and Deleuze as their attempts to solve the
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problem of non-being. And, by relating these two different readings of pure difference
back to Plato‟s criteria for solving the problem, I will show how both Derrida and
Deleuze fail to solve the problem of non-being.
Lastly, you may also use the significant amount of specificity involved in
Plato‟s criteria for solving the problem of non-being to orient yourself to this dissertation.
In other words, regarding the structural overview of the dissertation, the first part of the
dissertation may be thought of as my work on the first impasse of the problem of nonbeing, and the second part, the second impasse. Moreover, the order of the first part of
the dissertation follows the logical and historical direction in treating the problem of nonbeing. Again, the major figures I will discuss on the way to Derrida and Deleuze are
Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel. This is certainly a hefty list. Yet, I am only looking at
these figures in regard to the problem of non-being. If it seems outlandish to you, then
feel free to consider the names – of these thinkers – as mere signs referring to strategies
for solving the problem of non-being. You may consider them as if the names were mere
mnemonic devices for remembering possible approaches to solving the problem. As you
will see, beyond merely adhering to the same criteria in regard to the thinking of these
thinkers, there is a considerable amount of overlap, i.e. they are actually dealing with the
same problem.
Plato‟s Puzzle of the Sophist – The Problem of Non-Being
“Visitor: „Come on, pull yourself together for us as well as you can and try it
– since you‟re young. Try to say something correct about that which is not,
without attaching either being, one, or numerical plurality to it.‟
Theaetetus: „I‟d have to have a strangely large amount of enthusiasm for the project
to try it myself after seeing what you‟ve gone through.‟”
~Plato (Soph 1997 239b-c)
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§9 Two aporia en route to solving the puzzle: What is non-being? – What is nonbeing? Plato‟s response to this question circa 360 B.C. is embedded in his dialog the
Sophist, specifically in a passage of his text between 238c to 239c.27 I have divided this
passage into three parts which I refer to respectively as (1) the complicated nature of the
problem of non-being, i.e. the first perplexity or impasse of the problem of non-being, (2)
the paradoxical nature of the problem of non-being, i.e. the second perplexity or impasse
of the problem of non-being, and (3) what I refer to as “Plato‟s Puzzle” of non-being.
Together these three parts constitute Plato‟s formal statement of the problem of nonbeing.
§10 First Perplexity – Where Plato‟s passage picks up, the Eleatic visitor and
Theaetetus are in dialog concerning not-being. The Eleatic visitor to Theaetetus states,
[W]e maintain that you may not and ought not to attribute
being to not-being? … Do you see, then, that not-being in
itself can neither be spoken, uttered, or thought, but that it
is unthinkable, unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable?
(Soph 1895, 238c)
[Σπλλνεῖο νὖλ ὡο νὔηε θζέμαζζαη δπλαηὸλ ὀξζῶο νὔη‟
εἰπεῖλ νὔηε δηαλνεζῆλαη ηὸ κὴ ὄλ αὐηὸ θαζ‟αὑηό, ἀιι‟
ἔζηηλ ἀδηαλόεηόλ ηε θαὶ ἄξξεηνλ θαὶ ἄθζεγθηνλ θαὶ
ἄινγνλ;]
In response, Theaetetus agrees with the visitor. Now, I consider this a concise statement
of the complicated nature of the problem of non-being and of what I call, “the first
perplexity” of the problem. That is, in responding to the question: What is non-being?
Since we cannot attribute being to any non-being worthy of the name, it seems the
solution cannot be spoken, thought, or described. In the effort to make this problem
clearer, notice how when we speak of, think of, or describe non-being, non-being is being
27

I discovered this way of parsing the relations to non-being independently of: John E. Boodin, “Time and
Non-Being,” Psychological Review: Monograph Supplements, 6.3, (1904), 109-119. Moreover, on the one
hand, Boodin finds the two moments to be the “logical” and the “metaphysical,” and on the other, Boodin
is not interested in solving the problem of non-being. He merely discusses two moments of non-being.
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spoken of, being thought of, or being described. Moreover, because being cannot be
attributed to non-being, of non-being we cannot even say “non-being.” This is the
difficulty in the problem of non-being indeed. And the common response when faced
with such difficulty is to suggest non-being is “ineffable.”28 The next part of the passage
from the Sophist indicates the problem with such a response.
Yet, it is valuable to note, before moving on to the next part of the passage, that
this much of the problem of non-being from the Sophist was already stated in Plato‟s
earlier text29 Parmenides.30 The question is posed in the Parmenides:
When we say something is not, are we saying that in a way
it is not, but in a way it is? Or does this „is not‟ signify
without qualification that what is not is in no way at all and
does not in any way partake of being?31 (Parm 163c5-8)
As you can see, the latter option is the problem of non-being thus far presented from the
Sophist. In summary form, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe (1919-2001) put it
thus, “Parmenides‟ argument runs:”
It is the same thing that can be thought and can be
What is not can‟t be
What is not can‟t be thought.32
Anscombe‟s syllogism serves as a good example of a logical statement of the problem of
non-being. As such, her syllogism is summarily appropriate for the first part of the
Sophist passage. Moving, then, to the next part of the passage illustrates the problem
with both such a logical statement and the claim of ineffability noted above.
§11 Second Perplexity – The second part of the Sophist passage indicates what I
refer to as the paradoxical nature and “the second perplexity” of the problem of non28

Cf. Marsilio Ficino, Icastes, Michael J.B. Allen, tr. Masilio Ficino’s Interpretation of Plato’s Sophist,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 230-231.
29
Cf. Leonard Brandwood, The Chronology of Plato’s Dialogues, (Cambridge University Press, 1990).
30
Cf. Lewis Campbell, The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1867).
31
Plato, Parmenides, Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan, tr., Plato Complete Works, (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing, 1997), 394. Hereafter cited as Parm.
32
G.E.M. Anscombe, From Parmenides to Wittgenstein, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), 3.
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being. Where the second part picks up Theaetetus seems to believe he understands the
problem of non-being as evidenced by his agreement with its statement by the Eleatic
visitor. Yet, the Eleatic visitor complicates the problem further by changing the
standpoint from the perspective of someone who would attempt to prove non-being to the
standpoint of someone who would attempt to refute non-being. For anyone attempting to
refute the notion of non-being “is compelled to contradict himself as soon as he makes
the attempt.” (Soph 1895, 238d) The Eleatic visitor clarifies, “For I, who maintain that
not-being has no part either in the one or many, just now spoke and am still speaking of
not-being as one; for I say „not-being.‟ Do you understand?” (Soph 1895, 238d) In this
way, the Eleatic visitor points to the paradoxical nature of the problem of non-being, i.e.
both attempting to prove and attempting to refute non-being immediately leads to
contradiction.
Further clarifying this paradoxical nature, the visitor reminds Theaetetus, “a little
while ago I said that not-being is unutterable, unspeakable, [and] indescribable: do you
follow?” (Soph 1895, 238e) It is as if the Eleatic visitor is asking: What are we
discussing if non-being cannot be discussed? Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) refers to
such a perplexity as the “supreme paradox of thought,”33 because one sets out to think,
say, or write, what cannot be thought, said, or written. In this way, neither a logical
rendition nor the claim of ineffability suffices to solve the problem of non-being. Both
are rather more like restatements of the problem.
Allow me to reflect upon what has just been stated by gesturing toward
conversations to come later in the dissertation. The contemporary post-Kantian way to
discuss the “paradoxical nature of the problem of non-being” falls generally within the
33

Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, (Princeton University Press, 1985), 37.
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purview of the question of “non-discursivity.” That is, taking the mind to be discursive
in its functioning, non-discursivity is supposed to refer to whatever must be beyond the
mind‟s reach. This further accentuates the Kierkegaard quote above. That is, shifting to
the context of the question of non-discursivity allows for the examination of the paradox
of thinking about what cannot be thought. In other words, the claim that the term “nondiscursive” is not an oxymoron can be supported in a number of ways, but due to the very
nature of discursivity, the viable theoretical options must be hypothetical.
§12 Non-discursivity, a vocabulary term – Non-discursivity, as the other of
discursivity, then, may be considered in one of the following two fashions. (1)
Discursivity may be thought of as an effect of something non-discursive. In other words
if you consider some bit of evidence as an effect (or expression) of a necessary precondition without the condition itself being able to be thought as other than condition,
then the condition may be said to be non-discursive. (2) Non-discursivity may be thought
of as somehow too excessive for the discursive mind to capture, i.e. the non-discursive
might exceed the discursive mind such that the mind cannot think it.
Whereas those who affirm non-discursivity think it in one of the two above
fashions, those who deny non-discursivity consider notions such as “pre-conditions,”
“excessivity,” and “relationality” to be just as much products of the mind such that “nondiscursivity” can never mean anything other than more discursivity; thereby they
consider it an oxymoron. Notice how this discussion of non-discursivity mimics the
above discussion of the paradoxical nature of the problem of non-being. Hence, it is
valuable to mention the notion of discursivity here because within the more general
discussion of non-discursivity the thinkers whom I will later examine may be mapped
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specifically regarding their strategy for solving the problem of non-being. That is,
whereas Kant and Deleuze affirm, Hegel and Derrida deny, non-discursivity.
§13 Plato’s Puzzle – The third part of the Sophist, then, noted above pertains to
the conclusion of the passage by Plato with what may be read as an invitation to solve a
puzzle. The Eleatic visitor declares, “until we find some one or other who can speak of
not-being without number, we must acknowledge that the Sophist is a clever rogue who
will not be got out of his hole.” (Soph 1895, 239c5) Plato‟s invitation to solve the puzzle
of non-being is an invitation to accept the first two parts noted above as criteria for
solving the problem of non-being. Hence, these three parts together constitute a formal
statement of the problem of non-being.
§14 Introductory exposition of the general strategy for solving the puzzle –
Lastly, then, as an early indication I take the following quote, reportedly concerning
Gorgias, as an example of a plausible strategy for solving what I call the “problem of
non-being.” That is, the following is an approach to the problem of non-being which
does not fall victim to “immediate contradiction.” In other words, the most viable
strategy for solving the problem of non-being is an approach attributed to Plato‟s
contemporary Gorgias (c. 485-c. 380 B.C.).
Though Gorgias himself, it should be noted, did not provide a solution to the
problem, the strategy he suggested was to broadly distinguish between two types of nonbeing, associating one with experience and one with thought, i.e. distinguishing between
non-being and not-being. This distinction allows for the experience of non-being even
though whoever would experience it could not express it. Concerning Gorgias,
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In what is entitled On the Nonexistent [On Not-Being]34 or
On Nature [Gorgias] proposes three successive headings:
first and foremost, that nothing exists; second, that even if
it exists it is inapprehensible to man; third, that even if it is
apprehensible, still it is without a doubt incapable of being
expressed or explained to the next man [my emphases].35
As can be seen in the above quote, distinguishing between the standpoints of experience
and thought allows one‟s discourse to focus on types of relations rather than on entities in
relations. Notice, this allows for the expression that non-being is inapprehensible without
the immediate contradiction highlighted above. However, as the quote also captures, it is
still not clear what this inapprehension might look like in experience. For example,
certainly unconsciousness is not experienced, but it is not non-being. Hence,
inapprehension is necessary but not sufficient to describe an experiential relation to nonbeing.
To sum, thus far I have described the problem of non-being, and I have indicated
the general strategy I take to be appropriate for its solution. If the problem of non-being
can be solved, then, the following seem to be required. First, a discursive expression of
non-being, i.e. not-being, is insufficient as a response to the problem because it either
entails merely logical negation – being about concepts and thought not about being – or it
encounters what Plato‟s Eleatic visitor described as the “immediate contradiction” of
being an expression of not-being. Second, approaching non-being through experience
seems to be the best strategy. However, the necessary inapprehension of non-being
further entails the requirement of awareness of the inapprehension. In this way, for
34
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example, the notion of consciousness is far too narrow to be up to the task of solving the
problem of non-being. Hence, the solution to the problem of non-being will involve
looking for non-being in experience not in concepts or logic, and it will involve an
awareness of the (experiential) structure which allows for being.
In this way, contra Gorgias non-being will be able to be explained by describing
where to look in experience for the decisive inapprehension. And, though what I am
about to say in this paragraph regarding Kant will not be fully clear until the end of the
next chapter, it was Kant who fully tapped the beauty of this Gorgian strategy – making
the crucial distinction in his Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes
into Philosophy between logical and real, i.e. experiential, negation. 36 In fact, Kant is
adhering to Gorgias‟ strategy when he locates the thing-in-itself after appearance by
regressing back “down” the trajectory of experience from the unity of an object of
experience. Hence, the (non-discursive) thing-in-itself will be Kant‟s solution to the
problem of non-being. Further, as Derrida and Deleuze return in different ways to Plato‟s
positing of difference as a solution to the problem, they will be returning to Plato‟s puzzle
by way of Kant, i.e. pure difference will replace the thing-in-itself as the solution to the
problem of non-being for Derrida and Deleuze.
Irony Transcends Language: The Platonic Idea of Difference in Itself
In this last section on Plato, I touch on some of the remaining passages of the
Sophist. My purpose for addressing these passages is to specifically show, on the one
hand, the response to the problem of non-being found in the Sophist, i.e. Difference. On
the other hand, I argue there may be another, i.e. more ironic, interpretation which reads
36
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Plato‟s Sophist as providing a solution different from Difference. Again, based on
Plato‟s own criteria, neither solution is satisfactory. However, I must note that I find
what might be Plato‟s ironic solution to the problem of non-being to be brilliant. In order
to achieve the purpose of this section, I initiate a discussion of dialectic which will
continue throughout the first part of the dissertation. For the sake of clarity, I will use
upper case letters when referring to formal Being and Non-Being, and lower case letters
when referring to the being and non-being supposedly “beyond” the forms.
§15 Ontological Emergence – There are, of course, multiple definitions of
dialectic depending upon which thinker you consult. Suffice to say, then, I begin with a
quite general notion of dialectic as the “process of organizing thought” to be further
specified throughout the dissertation. Recalling the distinction made in Timaeus §28,
quoted above, the process of organizing thought may begin with either the understanding
or with sense perception. To begin, then, I provide an example from Plato in which he
begins dialectic with an image, i.e. sense perception, before considering other ways to
begin the process of organizing thought as potential solutions to the problem of nonbeing.
Following Plato, then, imagine a light descending from the sky. The source of the
light is being and the darkest darkness furthest away from being is non-being. Moreover,
neither being nor non-being – though for different reasons – as Plato points out in the
Republic passage I quoted above, can be “seen.” Keeping with the metaphor of vision: it
is as if, at the level of brightness which is bright enough – without being too bright – for
vision there are the forms of which anything can be. So out of the darkness of what is not
being (anything), things begin to be as they emerge into the light of the forms – non-
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being, becoming, being. In this way, the forms govern both what can be and what can be
thought. Though, of course, not a solution to the problem, a metaphorical employment of
the forms is possible at the outset so as to orient to the problem. Such is the example of
movement from darkness into light. Hence, you can think Being and Non-Being, which
means there is a form or idea pertaining to each, but you must keep in mind that these are
merely the forms.
I mention this metaphor because I think it nicely captures the aspect of formal
relation involved, and this aspect provides depth to the criteria Plato established for the
problem‟s solution. In other words, though you are attempting to think about being and
non-being, the act of thinking itself indicates the level of light which is neither the pure
brightness of being nor the pure darkness of non-being. Here again, then, you see – even
with this less rigorous, i.e. metaphorical version – a restatement of the paradoxical nature
of thinking Non-Being.
The above image indeed conjures a complicated dialectic. Yet, there are only two
aspects of the identifying movement of thought, i.e. dialectic, which need be pursued in
this introduction. First, the aspect of relationality involved in thinking Being and NonBeing, and second, an overview of dialectic as it relates to this relationality. I will
engage the issues of dialectic and relationality more thoroughly in later chapters. So, for
now, notice by invoking a discussion of the forms in relation to being and non-being
there are three terms to be dealt with at this level of generality. In order of the
descending light metaphor: being, the forms, and non-being. Yet, since it is with the
forms or Platonic Ideas that one is able to think, it is as if the movement begins in the
middle of these terms.
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It is neither irrelevant nor tangential to recall here that Plato never explains how a
prisoner becomes unchained in the Cave Allegory. Within the dialectical movement of
the forms, then, there is a form of Being and a form of Non-Being, and organizing these
forms allows one to think, for example, of Being and Non-Being. A question which you
should already be able to answer – given Plato‟s criteria above – is whether the Being and
Non-Being which can be thought are being and non-being. Of course, they are not.
Here, then, the image I am producing – following Plato –, the brightness of the sun :
being :: the darkness of the cave : non-being, is itself a way to organize that with which
you can think of as Being and Non-Being, i.e. the forms. Hence, either images or forms
can begin a movement of organization toward providing a vision of Being and NonBeing. Yet, this vision, as vision – whether imaginal or symbolic – will paradoxically
always fall short of an unmediated view of being and non-being.
Notice, then, dialectically there are a number of ways to set up the three terms in
relation to one another, and depending upon how you set up the terms, the movement
through these terms will look differently. After discussing the perplexity of “what is not”
[ηὸ κὴ ὄλ] (236d9-242ba) and the perplexity of “what is” (242b6-251a4) in the Sophist,
Plato addresses both the relationality amongst the terms involved in, and the different
beginnings of the dialectical process of, organizing these relations. Plato initiates this
discussion with what he calls the “five great kinds” (Soph 251a5-259d8) which are:
Movement (or Change) [θίλεζηο], Sameness [ηαὐηόλ], Rest [ζηάζηο], Difference [ἕηεξνλ],
and Being [ηὸ ὂλ].
So, of the three terms – being, the forms, and non-being – I will now examine a
formal (symbolic) beginning to the dialectic. My examination follows along the same
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path as Plato‟s discussion in the Sophist. Moreover, perhaps it makes sense to consider
the starting point of dialectic a form, rather than a beyond the form, since it is the forms
which are supposed to allow for the thinking in which the beginning (of dialectic) is
thought.37 Whatever his rationale – the dialog does not speak to it – Plato begins with the
form of Being, and Movement (or Change) and Rest (or Non-Change) follow since the
form of Being either moves or does not, i.e. Being may be thought of as at rest or in
motion.
Building to his conclusion, at 252d8 Plato invokes what will come to be known as
the Law of Non-Contradiction: “I suppose it‟s ruled out by very strict necessity that
change should be at rest and that rest should change [my emphasis].” (Soph 1997, 252d5)
From here a discussion is begun regarding the relation between the forms. The Eleatic
visitor notes, “Since some will blend and some won‟t, they‟ll be a good deal like letters
of the alphabet. Some of them fit together with each other and some don‟t.” (Soph 1997,
253a) Just as, according to the Eleatic visitor, it takes a grammarian to “know which
kinds of letters can associate” and a musician to know which musical notes “mix and
which ones don‟t,” (Soph 1997, 253b) the dialectician will know how the forms associate
with one another. It is important to note that Plato culminates these comments regarding
dialectic and the forms noting that the entire discussion is in the service of attempting to
“get away with saying that which is not.” (Soph 1997, 254d1)
Next, from Being, Motion, and Rest come Difference and Sameness (Soph 249c8254d15). Accordingly, “So that which is [Plato‟s emphasis] isn‟t both change and rest;
it‟s something different [my emphasis] from them instead.” (Soph 1997, 250c) And,
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from here, it follows that a distinction must be made. The difference between the forms,
e.g. Movement and Rest, is not the form of Difference itself. That is, there is a difference
between “participation” in the form of Difference and the form of Difference itself.
Whereas participation in the form of Difference pertains to relationality, the form of
Difference itself emerges as a dialectical term, i.e. one of Plato‟s “five great kinds.” The
forms are different from each other, but they are not all the form of Difference. Hence, in
this way, you can state the pervasiveness of the form of Difference by saying that the
forms “participate” in the form of Difference. Moreover, this is why Difference must be
one of the great kinds, because without Difference there would be no plurality (Soph
256d-e).
Keep in mind that on the one hand, this is mere formality. Yet, on the other hand,
this is the formality which governs thought. With the distinction, then, between the form
of Difference – which emerges in the dialectical movement of organizing thought – and
participation in the form of Difference – which governs plurality and relationality –, it is
possible to think the form of Being and then think the form of Non-Being as Different. It
is as if, participation : Movement :: Sameness : Rest, and though these forms participate
in Being, they are Different than Being.
§16 Formal Opacity of the dialectic – Now, here is the importance of the
paradoxical nature of non-being and what I call the dependency of reckoning with being
upon reckoning with non-being. On the one hand, being allows for the forms, so a
possible snare is to think that the form of Being is being itself. As you can see, it
certainly seems – tautologically – true. Yet, as you are thinking it, the Sameness that you
think, of course, derives from participation in the form of Sameness. This should be a
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sign that you are “in” the forms. Yet, are the forms not in being? Notice the difficulty,
i.e. the perplexity, here. This will be cleared up by looking not at being but at non-being.
This is why I refer to this aspect of Plato‟s problem as the “dependency of reckoning with
being on the reckoning with non-being.” That is, until you solve the problem of nonbeing, you are caught in the sophist‟s snare. You can only see what the sophist shows
you, i.e. Being and Difference – neither of which is being or non-being, and both of
which are forms, i.e. Ideas. Such then is a value of solving the problem of non-being, a
different reckoning of being emerges.
§17 Participation v. In-Itself – Now, none of what I have just said is controversial
in itself. For example, some commentators, such as Michael Frede (1940-2007), hold
that the achievement of Plato‟s Sophist is found in its ability to illustrate that not-being
can be said. 38 However, be this as it may, rather than solve the problem of non-being,
“not-being” shifts the focus to the problem of discerning the relational function of logical
negation. 39 This is why Job van Eck suggests, “the theory of falsity and negation we find
in the Sophist is a masterpiece of logical analysis.” 40 According to Paul Shorey, in the
Sophist absolute being and non-being “remain a mystery” (Cf. Soph 251a, d, 254c);
moreover, “the Sophist merely fixes the practically necessary conventions of logical
discourse about them (251a).”41 Hence, despite, or rather in addition to, the accuracy of
the above claims, Plato is working with a distinction which may point beyond logical
analysis. That is, as I will show, logical negation pertains to participation in the form of
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Difference, i.e. not-being, and it is still an open question at this point whether Difference
in itself will emerge as a non-logical negation which solves the problem of non-being.
Put another way, I am here rehearsing Plato‟s distinction between “in themselves”
[αὐηὰ θαζ‟αὑηά] and “with reference to others” [πξὸο ἄιια],42 also referred to as standing
alone and in relation,43 in regard to the forms. This distinction is quite important because
it succinctly states the results of dialectically moving through Plato‟s “great kinds” on the
way to solving the problem of non-being, and the difference between two types of
difference. This important distinction – which I will return to throughout the dissertation
– is the distinction between the “ἐλαληίνλ” (enantion) of difference in relation to others
and the “ἕηεξνλ” (heteron) of difference in itself.44 It is in this way, that difference, i.e.
the form of Difference in itself, came to be considered a potential solution to the problem
of non-being.45 Neither logical analysis nor the difference between the forms which
allows for their participation in Being, then, ἕηεξνλ points to an examination of the form
of Difference by itself. Hence, beginning the dialectic with the form of Being in itself,
you arrive at the form of Difference in itself, and as different from Being, Difference
receives consideration as a solution to the problem of non-being.
§18 Heteron v. Enantion – Now, depending upon how you respond to the
problem of non-being, it is, of course, possible to believe ἕηεξνλ has only one function;
such is the belief that ἕηεξνλ reduces to ἐλαληίνλ. From such a mistaken view some have
even suggested that difference in itself is merely a dream. However, ἕηεξνλ may be
42
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viewed a different way. For example, if the forms govern discursive thinking, then the
form of difference in itself, i.e. ἕηεξνλ, might point “beyond” the forms to non-being. As
such, you could say that the form of difference standing alone is a discursive attempt to
say non-discursive non-being. Though such an attempt fails to solve the problem of nonbeing, since it does not meet Plato‟s criteria for the solution, it does indicate the
persistence of the problem even when moving into a purely logical plane or from a
logical perspective. In other words, you may still be securely “in” the forms, and yet,
perhaps, have access to an outside of the forms by way of the form of Difference, and
remember it was via dialectic that you arrived at the form of Difference in itself. So,
even if Plato‟s Sophist is taken to achieve the goal suggested by the above commentators,
Plato‟s Sophist may also be taken to provide an ironic solution to the problem of nonbeing. As such, it is as if the Sophist is an aporetic dialog46 indeed – the place to look for
the resolution of its central problem is outside the text (!).
To be clear, I have just discussed a formal beginning to dialectic following Plato
in the Sophist which moves through his “great kinds” to arrive at the form of Difference
in itself. And, in this way I am providing an interpretation of Plato‟s Sophist such that
Difference is not Plato‟s solution to the problem of non-being. Rather, this interpretation
takes Difference (in itself) to point outside the dialectic. This could be Plato‟s (ironic)
solution to the problem of non-being because, since it does not state a solution, i.e. it does
not say non-being, it does not violate the above criteria Plato enumerated for the
problem‟s solution.
So, what I am suggesting – keeping in mind descriptors such as ineffable – is that
Plato‟s dialog may mimic the dialectical arrival of Difference in itself as a term. Were
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this the case, a reference to the outside of the dialog would be tantamount to a reference
to non-discursivity, and looking through the form of Difference would be like looking
through the dialog. Hence, the dialog dialectically organizes your thinking culminating
with Difference in itself as the purported formal, dialogical, solution. The solution would
be ironic because it does not meet the criteria that the dialog itself establishes. In this
way, its very failure to solve the problem of non-being ironically suggests the mechanism
for the problem‟s solution – “look through” the form of Difference in itself to see what is
different from the forms (more on this below).
To sum thus far: as Plato himself indicated (discussed further just below), a
solution to the problem of non-being is required to gain the ultimate insight involved in
regard to any “beyond” in relation to the forms. In this way, Plato‟s thesis of the
dependency of reckoning with being upon reckoning with non-being should now be clear.
It is by striving to solve the problem of non-being that you come to consider an “outside”
to the forms, and being – not the form of Being – is outside the forms. Hence, the way I
would organize Plato‟s terms – my dialectic in Platonic terms –, then, would be: The
Platonic Idea [ἰδέα] itself points “beyond” the (logical) relational certainty between the
forms [εἰδῶλ], and as the great Kinds [γελῶλ], the forms allow for a determinant
translation of becoming [γέλεζηο]. Further, from a formal beginning to dialectic, I would
take the beginning and the end of the dialectical movement, i.e. Being and Non-Being, to
be Ideas which point outside of the dialectic in a non-determinative way. As such, after
solving the problem of non-being, it is possible to speak of Non-Being, so as to reference
non-being while being mindful that the reference is itself not non-being.
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§19 Prolêptic: Anticipation of what is to come – Yet, at this point it still remains
an open question whether the form of Difference serves such a purpose. On the one
hand, because I think it does not serve such a purpose, I might seem to be siding with
Derrida, but really I am not. On the other hand, since Deleuze pursues the project of
using Difference to solve the problem of non-being, I might seem to be fully disagreeing
with him, but really I am not. Hence, my position will be made clear through the rest of
the dissertation.
Having above discussed beginning a dialectical movement with an image and
with a form or Idea of Being, now consider the last option: what if you suppose the
dialectic starts with the very beyond the forms which you are attempting to think? To
support a claim that a dialectical movement can begin with a beyond the forms, you
might reference the first exercise above, i.e. the metaphorical use of light and dark,
suggesting that starting the dialectic with sense perception itself shows that there is an
outside of dialectic toward which Ideas can point. As such, the exercise of supposing the
dialectic to start with an outside to dialectic may look similar – think Gorgias here – to
beginning with sense perception.
§20 Initiating Dialectic with a supposed Beyond – So, now, consider the exercise
of attempting to start the dialectic from an outside: If you suppose being to be outside the
forms, then you may refer to the forms in general as Non-Being. (Cf. Parm 162a) In
other words, per this exercise the forms are different than being. Yet, beyond this
supposition: if once the dialectic is engaged, the dialectic can only produce forms, then
considering that which allows for the forms as something different from the forms,
encounters the impasse that perhaps the dialectic has led to the form of difference rather
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than something different from the forms. Hence, this supposition does not advance
toward a solution to the problem because the dialectical result may still be formal.
Rather, this exercise leads to the same results as the exercise of beginning the dialectic
“in” the forms, i.e. with a form. What the dialectic churns out may be Being not being, or
it may be Difference, rather than being or non-being.
Put another way, supposing the dialectic starts from outside the forms is
tantamount to using the forms to recognize that where the forms begin in the dialectical
movement is actually the second step after an undifferentiated first step. However, not to
be escaped, the dialectical undertow in turn differentiates the first step as a form, i.e. the
form of Being. Since the dialectic‟s organizational mechanism of identification depends
on using the forms, there is no non-formal way to engage the dialectic. Or, at least, there
is no way to produce a non-formal result upon engaging the dialectic. Hence, if you are
to avoid the formal closure of the dialectic‟s undertow, you must discover a way for the
content of the dialectic to point outside the dialectic. Consider the following passage.
Re-invoking the image here from the Sophist, which echoes a passage noted
above from the Republic,47
The sophist runs off into the darkness of that which is not
[Plato‟s emphasis] … and he‟s hard to see because the
place is so dark. … But the philosopher always uses
reasoning to stay near the form being. He isn‟t at all easy
to see because that area is so bright and the eyes of most
people‟s souls can‟t bear to look at what‟s divine [my
emphasis]. (Soph 1997, 254a-b)
Having “descended,” then, from being, the form of Being is one of the great kinds; the
form of Non-Being is not. Yet, there is a form with which you think otherness such that
you can indicate Non-Being as the other of (the form) Being. This form is the form of
47
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Difference, i.e. ἕηεξνλ, and, hence, of the great kinds, only Difference seems to fit the bill
of dialectical content which might point outside the dialectic.
As such, it can be argued that the undifferentiated starting point is
undifferentiated because it is a starting point which is different from itself – i.e.
Difference in itself. Though this uses reasoning and “stays near the form,” it turns out
that whether the starting point is being or Difference is undecidable. What is more, if
Difference is being, then what is Being? Hence, through this exercise of attempting to
start the dialectic from the outside, you should see that dialectic can be used to organize
the forms and to point beyond the forms, but not to express any “outside” of dialectic.
Rather, dialectic must claim that it both begins and ends with the forms or that it only
organizes forms. And, this because even supposing a non-dialectical or a non-discursive
starting point, dialectic consumes, i.e. subsumes, your starting point. So, from a
dialectical standpoint the “non” of non-dialectical – and also of non-discursive – should
really be a “not” because it does not have the status of the non which the problem of nonbeing takes to refer to the negation of being. Rather, it has the status of referring to a
negation of the form, i.e. Being.
§21 Non-being: What’s at stake? – So, this exercise also speaks to the value of
solving the problem of non-being, i.e. Plato‟s dependency of reckoning thesis. A value of
solving the problem of non-being: non-being is that which the tyrannical movement of
the dialectic cannot capture. Or, better put, since dialectic renders all of its terms formal,
non-being escapes the dialectic. Hence, the most salient results of the above thought

35

exercises are twofold. On the one hand, you can see the tyrannical nature of dialectic.48
As such, suddenly all three of the supposed beginnings to the dialectic – sense perception,
an Idea, an outside of dialectic – are in danger of being aspects of, i.e. already within, the
dialectic. On the other hand, you can see how it is possible to treat a form as an Idea so
as to point outside the dialectic (from within the dialectic). Whereas formal relation is
logical, the “pointing” use of an Idea in relation to the non-discursive is heuristic. Yet,
combining these two results: you have also seen that once you attempt to understand that
to which the Idea “points,” then you are again caught in a dialectical undertow which will
churn out forms deriving their meaning, and ultimately the meaning of your Idea, from
(internal) relations amongst the forms. However, as Plato indicates, there is hope, and a
way to escape the sophist – you just need to solve the problem of non-being.
Allow me to restate the above using the vocabulary with which this section began.
You might say, the form Being appears to be determinative due to a sort of dialectical
eclipse. In other words, the form of Being dialectically appears to be being itself. So,
using the form Being as an Idea does not work as well as using the form Non-Being, but
as you have seen, Non-Being is not a major or “great” form. Rather, Difference, i.e.
ἕηεξνλ, must be used from within the dialectical movement in place of Non-Being. In
this way, the Idea of Difference may be used ostensively to ostensibly point outside of,
and escape, the dialectical undertow.
Put differently, Difference in itself as different from itself, eclipses non-being
differently than the way Being eclipses being. Whereas the difference internal to Being
which allowed for its motion is eclipsed in Sameness, i.e. Being is the same as itself, the
48
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difference internal to Difference, e.g. Difference is different from itself, allows for the –
albeit paradoxical – formulation of Difference as a solution the problem of non-being.
Hence, you see the derivation of the concern for the non-discursive which provokes such
thinkers as Kant, Heidegger, and Deleuze, among others. That is, if Difference in itself
by being different from itself points outside the discursivity of the forms, then nondiscursivity becomes a viable topic for consideration in discovering a solution to the
problem of non-being.
§22 The Sophist as ironic dialog – Lastly, as promised above, here is my reading
of the Sophist in regard to the problem of non-being. I read the Eleatic visitor as clinging
to dialectic and the use of reason. I think the philosopher, then, is supposed to be somone
who is ultimately capable of disciplining the principle of reason within their own
thinking. This, of course, as the Republic indicates is predicated upon discipling your
appetites so as to be able to gain a foothold toward disciplining reason. Now, what
remains an open question is whether the Eleactic visitor‟s discourse is to be taken as
ironic, i.e. is he planting a seed at a level of depth in the soul of Theaetetus which is not
too deep for Theaetetus to nourish with thought? As indicated above, I take this question
to mimic a question at the level of the reader/Plato discourse, i.e. I read the Sophist as
Plato‟s production of an image which, if the reader nourishes it with thought, is capable
of invoking the solution to the problem of non-being. In my opinion regarding such a
piece of Plato‟s thought, this is a marvellous accomplishment in itself because it forces
you to acknowledge non-discursivity, i.e. a non-subsumable operation occurring outside
the text. Yet, it certainly does not explicitly state the solution to the problem of nonbeing.
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I grant that a consideration of Difference is a fruitful exercise toward a solution to
the problem, but as the Eleactic visitor‟s comments betray, his overcoming of Parmenides
– by being able to (logically) say “not” – is not a solution to the problem of non-being.
Recall that the Eleactic visitor says:
Nobody can say that this that which is not, which we‟ve
made to appear and now dare to say is, is the contrary of
that which is. … With regard to that which is not, which
we‟ve said is, let someone refute us and persuade us that
we‟ve made a mistake – or else, so long as he can‟t do that,
he should say just what we say. He has to say that the
kinds blend with each other, that that which is and the
different pervade all of them and each other, that the
different shares in that which is and so, because of that
sharing, is. But he won‟t say that it is that which it shares
in, but that it is different from it, and necessarily, because it
is different from that which is, it clearly can be what is not
[Plato‟s emphases]. (Soph 1997, 259a-b)
In this passage, the Eleatic visitor mentions twice (as Plato emphasizes) that he and
Theaetetus say the not is. This is the not that at the end of the passage he says Difference
can be. So, it seems to me, the Eleatic visitor is himself noting that they have not solved
the problem of non-being. Theaetetus does not seem to find a problem in what the
Eleatic visitor is saying. In other words, Theaetetus (lacking the soul for it?) cannot
refute the Eleatic visitor, so he cannot call the “we” into question. He must say what the
Eleatic visitor says; he must accept whatever the dialectic churns out for him. After the
passage above, Theaetus is reduced to saying, “True.” (Soph 259b6) Then, as in the
passage just quoted above and in the passage I refer to as “Plato‟s Puzzle,” the Eleatic
visitor, again – Plato, again – prompts Theaetetus – the reader – “if anyone doesn‟t
believe these contrarieties, he has to think about them himself and say something better
than what we‟ve said.” (Soph 1997, 259b7-8)
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Further, notice were you to call something into question about what they‟ve said,
it would not be to question the internal logic – not a challenge to the Law of NonContradiction –; it would be to question Difference as the solution to the problem of nonbeing. In other words, the Difference that is being said – whether for the Eleatic visitor,
Theaetetus, Plato, Derrida or Deleuze – does not solve the problem of non-being.
Specifically, it fails to overcome the second impasse of the problem.
Who knows? Perhaps Plato knew the answer to the problem of non-being. He,
however, did not put it in writing. Perhaps, he thought – incorrectly – it could not be put
in writing. For years now I have been in awe of Plato. I have communicated more than
once both that my mind will never equal Plato‟s and that Plato‟s mind towers over mine.
Yet, since Plato never put the answer in writing, I believe I deserve the credit for solving
the problem. After all, it is a matter of faith whether you believe Plato had the solution to
this problem or not. Hence, I deserve the credit for putting the solution in writing, so
readers can “see” the answer for themselves.
§23 From Plato and Gorgias to Aristotle – To conclude the sections of this
introduction regarding Plato, notice that in relation to the position taken to be held by
Parmenides and his student Zeno, namely that that which is not cannot be spoken or
thought, Plato and Gorgias represent two putative refutations. 49 Plato‟s approach has
been taken to highlight the formality of the Eleatic position, and thereby accentuate
logical negation or formal Difference in refutation. Gorgias‟ approach has been taken to
point to an other to formality which cannot be apprehended, and thereby seeks to refute
the Eleatic position by highlighting a distinction hitherto apparently overlooked. In
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standard style I have referred to these readings of Plato and Gorgias as putative
refutations of Parmenides or solutions to the problem of non-being by associating them
with the locus of their supposed non-beings, i.e. conceptual and experiential, respectively.
It falls then to Aristotle to organize this trinity of positions through a process of dialectic.
In the following sections I will discuss how Aristotle organized these thinkers so as to
formulate his own answer. As you will see, Aristotle‟s articulation of his own solution is
ultimately the maintaining of Plato‟s answer and a Gorgias informed positing of notbeing.
In order to demonstrate Aristotle‟s relation to this trinity it is necessary to discuss
a bit of his terminology. On the one hand, certainly the immense scale of Aristotle‟s
thought, though combined with the scope of my purpose, necessitates that I be prudent.
On the other hand, it would be an oversimplification to merely point here to “matter” as
the opposite of “form” or “potentiality” as the opposite of “actuality.” Aristotle‟s
position is indeed more subtle. Hence, in the remaining sections of this introduction, I
will discuss Aristotle‟s attempt to solve the problem of non-being. I will focus on
Aristotle‟s own attack on Parmenides and Zeno, and I will show how Aristotle sought to
overcome the supposedly inapprehensible, according to Gorgias, nature of that which is
not.
This discussion of Aristotle will be fruitful in multiple ways. First, it will speak
directly to the movement from Plato toward a contemporary reading of difference and the
problem of non-being. Second, it will provide a deeper reading of dialectic, which I have
merely generally referred to thus far as a means to organize thought, and this is further
important because it speaks to the method of all the remaining thinkers to be discussed in
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regard to non-being. In fact, I devote the entirety of a chapter between Kant and the
Derrida and Deleuze chapters to the very issue of dialectic as the relation between
thinking and non-being. Third, in formulating their putative solutions both Derrida and
Deleuze rely heavily on Aristotle, specifically his response to Zeno in Physics Book VI.
Lastly, all three of these aspects, enhanced by looking to Aristotle, further provide a more
rigorous rendition of what it might mean to “look through” an Idea to see into otherwise
inapprehensible experience or “outside” the forms.
Aristotle‟s Paradigm Shift: Aristotle‟s Reading of the Problem of Non-Being
“[T]here is a sophistic turn of argument, whereby we draw our opponent into the kind of statement
50
against which we shall be well supplied with lines of argument.”
~Aristotle (Top 111b31-33)

Aristotle provides his reading of Parmenides and the problem of non-being in the
culmination and conclusion of the Metaphysics, i.e. Book XIV. There, “Twill ne‟er be
proved that things which are not, are.”51 (Meta 1958, 1089a3) stands as Aristotle‟s
articulation of the Parmenidean expression of the problem of non-being. Aristotle
contextualizes the problem as pertaining to plurality suggesting that for Parmenides
despite the appearance of plurality, “all things that are” must be one, i.e. “being itself.”
(Meta 1995, 1088b36) Aristotle then asks a series of directed questions which culminate
in a transition from asking about non-being to asking about not-being – moving from (a)
directed questions to (b) a paraphrase of the Parmenidean position to (c) a topic change
with which Aristotle articulates his attempt at a solution to the problem of non-being.
However, Aristotle does not acknowledge the shift he invokes. Rather, he directs the
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questions as if merely clarifying the vague Parmenidean statement which he chose as
exemplary. Yet, this transition constitutes his point of departure for both criticizing the
Parmenidean denial of non-being and propounding his own solution to the problem of
non-being.
Aristotle begins his questioning of the Parmenidean doctrine by asking,
firstly, if „being‟ has many senses (for it means sometimes
substance, sometimes quality, sometimes quantity, and at
other times the other categories), what sort of one [or unity,
i.e. ἕλ] are all the things that are, if non-being is to be
supposed not to be? [πνῖνλ νὖλ ηὰ ὄληα πάληα ἕλ, εἰ κὴ ηὸ
κὴ ὄλ ἔζηαη;] (Meta 1995, 1089a8-10)
The possibilities Aristotle entertains here are telling,
Is it the substances that are one, or the affections and the
other categories as well, or everything – so that the „this‟
and the „such‟ and the „so much‟ and the other categories
that indicate each some one thing will all be one? (Meta
1995, 1089a10)
In this way you can see how suddenly Aristotle is asking not about that which is not
(non-being) but about the not that is (not-being). Under the assumption that the problem
is about plurality, Aristotle‟s version of the problem of non-being becomes: “of what sort
of non-being and being do the [plurality of] things that are consist?” (Meta 1995,
1089a15) Moreover, Aristotle has effected a transition with which he is able to draw
discussants toward the kind of statements against which he is well supplied with lines of
argument.52 In this and the next section, I will comment on this strategy in general,
concluding with his solution. I will begin, then, by explaining what I refer to as
Aristotle‟s “matrix of opposition.”
§24 Aristotle’s Matrix of Opposition – The texts involved here are Categories
chapters 7, 10, and 11 and Metaphysics Book X chapters 3 and 4. Aristotle holds that
52
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there are four (4) kinds of opposition [ἀληίθεηκαη]53: (a) contraries [ἐλαληία]; (b) relatives
[ηὰ πξόο ηη] (and their correlatives or reversals [ἀληηζηξέθνληα]); (c) possession and
privation (or lack) [ἕμηο θαὶ ζηέξεζηο]; (d) affirmation and negation [θαηάθαζηο θαὶ
ἀπόθαζηο] (or contradictory predication [ἀληηθάζεηο]).54 Notice, though Aristotle uses
ἕηεξνλ to help define some of the above terms, ἕηεξνλ (in) itself does not appear within
his matrix of opposition. With reference here to the Platonic language noted above, it is
as if the “in itself” – in regard to difference – has been reduced to the “with reference to
others.” So, though Aristotle appears to respect so many differences, he (also) defaces
difference. Yet, more importantly, it is Aristotle‟s matrix of opposition which will
determine his reading of non-being, and as such, it will be not-being not non-being upon
which he ultimately works. In other words, the problem of non-being for which Aristotle
proposes a resolution will no longer be the problem as articulated in Plato‟s Sophist.
In order to see the shift which occurs with Aristotle, notice that contrary
opposition involves the term ἐλαληίνλ which is the very term opposed to ἕηεξνλ in the
above discussion of Plato‟s forms. In other words, whereas ἐλαληίνλ was taken to be
difference in relation to others, ἕηεξνλ was taken to be difference in itself. Given the
reading of Aristotle I am providing here, you should not be surprised to read Aristotle say
in the Metaphysics X §4, “there is also a greatest difference, and I call this contrariety.”
(Meta 1995, 1055a5) The Greek here, of course, for contrariety is ἐλαηίσζηλ. And,
notice what Aristotle says he means by “greatest.” “(a) that is greatest which cannot be
exceeded, and (b) that is complete outside which nothing proper to it can be found [my
emphasis].” (Meta 1958, 1055a10-12)
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In other words, there is no opposition outside the greatest contraries, i.e.
contradiction. So, the other types of opposition in the matrix, then, fall within the scope
of contrariety as the greatest difference. This should be taken as sufficient evidence that
Aristotle is either not concerned to think about difference in itself or he has somehow
shifted its meaning away from Plato. Hence, on the one hand, Aristotle‟s matrix of
opposition is an expansion of Plato‟s ἐλαληίνλ. On the other hand, as Aristotle reads nonbeing by way of his matrix of opposition he is working on what ἐλαληίνλ referred to in
Plato, and that is not-being. Were my goal to merely show that Aristotle does not solve
the problem of non-being I would stop here. However, given the influence of Aristotle‟s
reading of the problem of non-being it is valuable to see both how Aristotle reads the
problem of non-being and exactly what he offers as a resolution.
§25 Aristotle’s strategy regarding the problem – It is worth mentioning that I read
Aristotle‟s strategy for accomplishing a shift from non-being to not-being as following
the same strategy he encouraged his students to adopt as a debating technique. In his
Rhetoric II, §§22-23, Aristotle suggests using the different types of opposition as so
many amongst possible topoi with which to construct arguments. He suggests the virtue
of these topoi is their simplicity in structuring a topic. For example, of all the ways X
and Y may or may not relate, saying “X and Y are opposites” is a simple way of
identifying X and Y in relation to each other. And the value of such effects, Aristotle
notes in the Rhetoric, is that they “charm the crowd‟s ears more finely.” 55 (Rhet 1395b30)
So, Aristotle‟s Rhetoric is worth mentioning here because, as it seems to me, this
is precisely how Aristotle reads his predecessors on the problem of non-being. In regard
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to Parmenides, Zeno, Gorgias, and anyone who might oppose the principle of
(non)contradiction, Aristotle‟s readings range from that of unsympathetic to that of straw
man. As there is no topoi for difference in itself, Aristotle does not consider that any of
his “opponents” could be attempting such an enunciation. For example, Aristotle in his
On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias provides a reading as if Gorgias were completely
unsophisticated. In other words, Aristotle reads him literally. As such, Aristotle, after
providing some paraphrases of Gorgias, simply states, “Now it does not at all follow from
what he has said that nothing is.”56 (MXG 979a34) Aristotle then suggests both of
Gorgias “and others” – for whom Aristotle does not even provide a paraphrase – that
their “proof” is “refuted thus: if what is not is, it either is simply, or else it is in a similar
sense something that is not.” (MXG 979a35-36) In other words, Aristotle has already
determined that what is not must be read through his matrix of opposition. 57 As will
further be shown, his treatment of Parmenides and Zeno is quite similar.
§26 Being, Unity, and Voice – Returning to Aristotle‟s reading of Parmenides
with which this section began, it logically follows for Aristotle that if you are asking
about the different ways in which “being” is meant, then you are inquiring about, on the
one hand, predication, i.e. the categories, and, on the other hand, you are inquiring about
iteration, i.e. the various voicings of the word itself. So, first, in regard to the categories
as that which is predicable, is there a relation of ontological dependence across the
categories which suggests some ultimate “thing” of which the categories are predicated?
Rather than merely “sometimes mean substance, sometimes quality, etc.” is there a
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meaning to which “is” somehow always refers? Second, as the last question already
indicates, considering the various voicings of the word itself invokes a discussion of
synonymy and homonymy, i.e. univocity and multivocity or equivocity. (Cf. Cat 1a) Is
each voicing of the term “being” similar merely in voicing alone, or is there a meaning
which unifies each voicing? Lastly, on the one hand, these two inquiries might resolve
with the same answer, e.g. being itself or the One. 58 On the other hand, somehow
Aristotle must avoid committing to an infinite regress on either question, i.e.
categorization or iteration.
Though Aristotle considers this question regarding whether being and unity have
some “underlying nature” to be the “hardest inquiry of all,” (1001a3) it is tempting to
simply say that it is being itself which unifies the categories. However, to do so gives
rise to the question of how such unity would occur, e.g. are the categories unified by all
being species of the genus being? 59 Aristotle explicitly denies this option, noting:
it is not possible that either unity [ηὸ ἓλ] or being [ηὸ ὄλ]
should be a genus of things; for the differentia of any genus
[γέλνο] must each of them both have being and be one, 60
but it is not possible for the genus to be predicated of the
differentia taken apart from the species … so that if unity
or being is a genus, no differentia [δηαθνξὰ] will either be
one or have being. But if unity and being are not genera,
neither will they be [first] principles. (Meta 1995, 998b 2327)
So, notice first and foremost that, again, he has moved from considering being and unity
or the one to a discussion of plurality. (Meta 1001a3-1001b26) Aristotle‟s implicit
critique here suggests Parmenides treats being as a genus, and as such cannot account for
the differences between individuals, i.e. plurality of being. In noting, then, that the
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differentia – that which differentiates one member of a species from other members
within the same genus – must both be and be a unit, Aristotle directs attention away from
genera and toward individual iterations. Hence the question: in each case (unity) of
something that is (being) what is the relation across the iterations? This is a question of
vocity, i.e. univocity or multivocity because Aristotle wishes to preserve the different
individuals without losing coherency of meaning. (Meta 1001a29-b1) So, what is the
relationship across the various iterations of “is”? Does “is” mean something different
every time it appears?
One of the more celebrated phrases from Aristotle‟s Metaphysics occurs in Book
IV §2, “There are many senses in which a thing may be said to „be‟, but they are related
to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and are not homonymous.” 61 (Meta 1995,
1003a33) I will use this statement as a point of departure for answering the above
questions regarding vocity and multiple iterations, but first I will discuss this passage as it
clearly shows the paradigm shift which the problem undergoes from non-being to notbeing in the thinking of Aristotle. Consider Aristotle‟s explication of the celebrated
quote:
so „being‟ is used in various senses, but always with
reference to one principle [ἀξρή]. For some things are said
to „be‟ because they are substances; others because they are
modifications [(affections) πάζε] of substance; others
because they are a process toward substance, or
destructions or privations [ζηεξήζεηο] or qualities of
substance, or productive or generative of substance or of
terms relating to substance, or negations of certain of these
terms relating to substance [my emphases]. (Meta 1933,
1003b6-9)
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This passage captures the notion of focal meaning to be discussed next and sets up
Aristotle‟s application of privation as a kind of opposition, i.e. “negation,” applied to a
term relating to substance which equates difference in itself with non-being. As I will
discuss below, Aristotle‟s use of principle here [ἀξρή] will be his way of attempting to
navigate Gorgias‟ criterion of inapprehensibility or imperceptibility.
However, at this point it is enough to note that with the above Aristotle believes
he has provided proof for the following conclusion – which is actually the very next
sentence of the above quote:
It is for this reason that we say even of non-being that it is
non-being [emphasis in Ross translation]. δηὸ θαὶ ηὸ κὴ ὂλ
εἶλαη κὴ ὂλ θακέλ. (Meta 1995, 1003b10)
You can see that Aristotle‟s Greek uses “κὴ ὂλ” and Ross translates it accordingly as
“non-being.” Yet, noticing the previous sentence‟s reference to the negating of terms,
Hugh Tredennick‟s Loeb translation reads, “not-being is not-being.” (Meta 1933,
1003b10) I suppose it would even be appropriate – in this Aristotelian context – to write,
“non-being is not-being.” What I have in mind here is that since Aristotle takes nonbeing to be a mistaken or pseudo problem deriving from the Parmenidean and Platonic
incorrect, i.e. non-Aristotelian, interpretations of being, you can take Aristotle here as
fully conducting his business, as it were, in the light. In other words, since Aristotle is
talking about statements containing terms relating to substance, Aristotle seems quite
candid about the fact that he is not trying to solve the problem to which “κὴ ὂλ” refers in
Parmenides and Plato. Hence, Aristotle has transformed the problem from that which is
not (non-being) to the problem of the not that is (not-being).
Returning to the various iterations of being, then, Aristotle‟s celebrated
Metaphysics Book IV §2, quote, “There are many senses in which a thing may be said to
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„be‟, but they are related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and are not
homonymous” (Meta 1933, 1003a33) speaks directly to the question of vocity. Though
“is” is not a genus, it is appropriate – following G.E.L. Owen – to speak of a “focal
meaning”62 in regard to the various iterations of being. As Aristotle indicated in Book
VII, “there are several senses in which a thing is said to be primary: but substance is
primary in every sense.”63 (Meta 1995, 1028a32) It is important to note that it is in this
way – through predication of individuals in regard to substance – that Aristotle has
appropriated Plato‟s language of θαζ‟αὑηό, i.e. in itself. In other words, rather than direct
the language of in itself at universals, Aristotle directs the language of in itself
predication at individuals. 64 On the one hand, this is consistent with his Posterior
Analytics where Aristotle notes, “One thing belongs to another in itself [θαζ‟αὑηό] … if it
belongs to it in what it is.” 65 (Post An 73a34-5) On the other, it will be remembered that
“to predicate of an individual” is not to name it. 66 In this way, θαζ‟αὑηό predication in
Aristotle becomes “essential” predication – the in itself as the essence of what it is –
opposed to “accidental” [θαηὰ ζπκβεβεθόο] predication. Analogously, then, the
distinction between a “this” and a “such” can be seen, “thises are items that are
indivisible and one in number in the category of substance [Lewis‟ emphasis].” 67
In sum, after contextualizing the problem of non-being in Parmenides as a
problem regarding plurality, Aristotle reformulated the question to ask: “of what sort of
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non-being and being do the [plurality of] things that are consist?” (Meta 1995, 1089a15)
With this question as point of departure Aristotle‟s paraphrase of the Parmenidean
position amounts to this: “The [above] question evidently is, how being in the sense of
substances is many [emphasis in Ross translation].” (Meta 1995, 1089b8) Notice
Aristotle has moved from Parmenides on non-being to plurality to substances in the
plural. So it will be a discussion of substance with which Aristotle will respond to the
problem of non-being, and I will focus on this discussion in the next section.
§27 Aristotle on plurality – Coming full circle, as it were then, recall at
Metaphysics X §3, Aristotle described plurality in the following way:
The one and the many are opposed in several ways, of
which one is the opposition of the one and plurality as
indivisible and divisible; … And the one gets its meaning
and explanation from its contrary, the indivisible from the
divisible, because plurality and the divisible is more
perceptible than the indivisible [my emphases]. (Meta
1995, 1054a20-27)
Pulling this all together, following the model of the focal meaning of the multiple
iterations of being, a plurality of perceptibles are predicated not as so many iterations of
universal being but as so many iterations toward the essence of an individual substance.
“We have now outlined the nature of substance, showing that it is that which is not
predicated of a subject, but of which all else is predicated.” (Meta 1995, 1029a7)
Moreover, “the question which both now and of old, has always been raised, and always
been the subject of doubt, viz. what being is, is just the question, what is substance?”
(Meta 1995, 1028b2-4) Hence, the Parmenidean being as one has become substance
individually encountered as essentially one (individual). It is each individual which is
one. Plurality is saved, and Aristotle has separated substantiality from universality.
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§28 Aristotle on heteron – Lastly then, having just discussed the opposition
between the one and the many – quoted directly above – Aristotle explains where he
locates difference, i.e. ἕηεξνλ, in regard to plurality as plurality of individual substances.
Not only, then, is this precisely how Aristotle enunciates his understanding of non-being,
but this is also precisely how Aristotle responds to – Parmenides‟ student – Zeno in
regard to change and motion. Addressing the one and the many (or plurality) by way of
his matrix of opposition Aristotle explains,
To the one belong, as we have indicated graphically in our
distinction of the contraries, [i.e. the matrix of opposition,]
the same and the like and the equal, and to plurality belong
the other [ηὸ ἕηεξνλ] and the unlike and the unequal [my
emphasis]. (Meta 1995, 1054a30)
Notice, then, what Aristotle has accomplished. In this section I argued – or rather
“described” since Aristotle is pretty explicit about his interpretive violence – that with the
notion of focal meaning Aristotle shifts the understanding of being as either a genus or a
universal – whether either Parmenides or Plato actually held these positions is a different
question68 – to an understanding of being as substance. (Cf. Meta 1028b2-4)
In this way, I showed you how Aristotle appropriated Plato‟s language of
θαζ‟αὑηό, i.e. in itself, toward directing the problem of non-being away from universality
toward substantial plurality – again, whether Plato actually held such a view of
“universality” is a different question. I also showed you ἕηεξνλ‟s conspicuous absence
from Aristotle‟s matrix of opposition. Now, I will continue showing you how Aristotle‟s
application of his matrix of opposition to individual substances goes toward his solution
for the problem of non-being. Yet, keep in mind, as the above constitutes Aristotle‟s shift
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of the problem from non to not being, Aristotle certainly does not solve the problem of
non-being.
Priority & Privation: Reckoning, Counting, and Being
“Visitor: „So it has to be possible for that which is not to be, in the case of change and also as applied to all
the kinds. That‟s because as applied to all of them the nature of the different makes each of them not be, by
making it different from that which is.‟ [Plato‟s emphases]”
~Plato (Soph 1997, 256d-e)

§29 Aristotle’s solution to the problem of non-being: Death (unqualified
destruction) – The passages I will be examining in this section may be considered as
further textual evidence supporting my claim that Aristotle‟s reading shifted the problem
of non-being to a problem regarding not-being. However, the focus of this section is to
show the mistaken way in which Aristotle‟s reading resolves the problem of non-being.
Toward this end I will continue showing you how Aristotle‟s application of his matrix of
opposition to individual substances goes toward reinstating difference as ἕηεξνλ, and you
will notice this Aristotelian use of ἕηεξνλ pertains to a specifically designated kind of
not-being, i.e. a derivation from the logical structure of his matrix of opposition. What I
am doing here, then, is picking up the thread of a question Aristotle began in Metaphysics
Book XII which he takes his discussion of Parmenides in Book XIV to resolve. The
thread begins with Aristotle asking, “One might raise the question from what sort of „notbeing‟ generation takes place; for not-being has three senses.” (Meta 1995, 1069b27) As
Hugh Tredennick indicates in his Book XII footnote, the three senses concern (1) “the
negation of various predications,” (2) “falsity,” and (3) “unrealized potential.” 69
Now, there are, of course, a number of ways to organize these three “senses,” and
though Aristotle does not acknowledge it in Book XII, he takes the question of not-being
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in regard to generation – as a type of change – to be a different iteration of the problem of
non-being. This is clear by the culmination of the thread in Book XIV. To follow
Aristotle‟s own organization, then, is to cross reference types of change, the privative
type of opposition, and his understanding of priority all in a trajectory of convergence
such that his shift from non to not being overlaps with his demonstration of the type of
not-being which pertains to generation. What makes this clear, for example, in Book
XIV is Aristotle‟s comment that “since non-being in the various cases has as many senses
as there are categories [(1)], and besides this the false [(2)] is said not to be and so is [(3)]
the potential, generation proceeds from the latter [my emphasis].” (Meta 1995, 1089a27)
In general, then, showing Aristotle‟s arguments along this trajectory will show the
mistaken way in which his reading resolves the problem of non-being. In particular it
will show how Aristotle‟s reading of the opposition between potentiality and actuality as
privative provides his response to the problem of non-being.
So, in order to fully understand his response, it is also necessary to understand
how Aristotle argues for the priority of actuality in the above mentioned opposition with
potentiality. 70 In Metaphysics IX §8 Aristotle holds that actuality precedes potentiality in
account [ιόγῳ] (Meta 1049b12-17), time [ρξόλῳ] (Meta 1049b17-1050a3), and being
[νὺζίᾳ] (Meta 1050a4-11). Hence, the meaning of this section‟s title: privation and
priority provide Aristotle with three types of not-being which coincide with the ways in
which actuality is prior to potentiality. His various negations of predications and falsity
pertain to priority in account. Any negation of being, as negation of actual substance
having priority to its potential for change or destruction, pertains to priority in being. As
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already indicated, this will be his response to the problem of non-being. Lastly, his
treatment of priority in time is a little less straight forward than the other two.71 Suffice
to say at this point, counting as a potentiality constitutes a type of not-being. For
example Aristotle says, “Time is not number with which we count, but the number of
things which are counted.”72 (Phys 1995, 220b9) The relevance and efficacy of
Aristotle‟s account of priority in time, then, derive from his use of it to criticize Zeno‟s
attempt to defend Parmenides. Moreover, a brief examination of his discussion of time
will be beneficial for later chapters, i.e. 3 and 4. Therefore, in addition to priority in
account and being, I will also address the sense in which time is not-being.
Whereas at Categories §14 Aristotle distinguished between “six kinds of
change”73 (Cat 15a14-15) – those being: generation, destruction, increase, diminution,
alteration, and change of place –, in On Generation and Corruption, Aristotle
distinguishes between “unqualified” and “qualified” “coming-to-be and passing-away.”74
(GC 318b13-318b17) The first two of the six kinds of change, then, from Categories §14
pertain to unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away, and the last four kinds of change
pertain to qualified coming-to-be and passing-away. And, in Physics Book I §7 since he
is discussing “becoming,” i.e. γίγλεζζαη, Aristotle brackets destruction and separates the
other kinds of change into “absolute becoming” which is generation or “coming into
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existence,” and the other kinds of change as “coming to be this or that.” (Phys 1957,
190a33)
§30 Aristotle’s Assumption: Persistence – Now across these different groupings
of change, the distinguishing feature around which they revolve is the question of
persistence. For example, Aristotle explains that “in all cases of becoming there must
always be a subject – the thing which becomes or changes, and this subject, though
constituting a unit, may be analyzed into two concepts and expressed in two [opposed]
terms [my emphases].” (Phys 1995, 189b34) This subject is the infamous Aristotelian
ὑπνθείκελνλ, i.e. hypokeimenon. According to Liddell and Scott it means “to underlie, as
the foundation in which something else inheres, to be implied or presupposed by
something else [my emphases].” 75 This is important because, on the one hand, Aristotle
will need to employ the entirety of the apparatus I pointed to in the introduction of this
section to argue for the ὑπνθείκελνλ. In other words, arguing for the hypokeimenon
invokes Aristotle‟s matrix of opposition, actuality and potentiality, analogical reasoning,
and priority of actuality. On the other hand, destruction as unqualified passing-away gets
its meaning from the claim that the ὑπνθείκελνλ no longer persists. “Thus perishing
[destruction] is change to not-being.”76 (Phys 1995, 224b9) Again, this requires moving
through Aristotle‟s apparatus of argumentation to fully understand his claim. However,
you can already see how Aristotle is poised to mistakenly equate non-being with death.
Arguing for a subject that persists across change, then, Aristotle suggests “the
subject [ὑπνθείκελνλ] is numerically one [ἓλ] thing, but has two conceptually distinct
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aspects.” (Phys 1957, 190b24) As Aristotle explains it, “the actual change itself takes
place between the terms of an antithesis,” (Phys 1957, 190b33) i.e. the two conceptually
distinct opposed terms. In fact, Aristotle justifies his positing of an underlying subject
which persists through the process of change by regarding the binary opposition‟s two
terms in the following way,
considering one of its terms taken singly as competent, by
its absence or presence, to accomplish the whole change.
… And of this „underlying‟ factor we can form a
conception by analogy; for it will bear the same relation to
concrete things in general, or to any specific concrete thing,
which the bronze bears to the statue before it has been
founded [my emphasis]… (Phys 1957, 191a9)
The reason analogy is possible here is because “the two terms of the opposition itself
stand on a different footing from each other.” (Phys 191a19) Specifically in this case the
terms are privative. In other words, given the presence [παξνπζία] or absence [ἀπνπζία]
of an identifying aspect, Aristotle suggests that you may truthfully affirm or negate the
presence or absence of the related privation. This is somewhat complicated, so let me
provide an example.
Socrates changes. For example, he looks different in middle age than he did in
his youth. Yet, Aristotle maintains that the individual who was Socrates in youth is still
Socrates in middle age, despite his changes. How? This invokes a discussion of
Aristotle‟s famous four causes [ἄηηηα]. (Cf. Post An 74b5) Briefly, so as to not get too far
afield, consider Physics Book II §3. Here, invoking ἐλαληίνλ, i.e. logical difference,
Aristotle notes, “the same cause is often alleged for precisely opposite effects. For if its
presence [παξνπζία] causes one thing, we lay the opposite to its account if it is absent
[ἀπνπζία].” (Phys 1957, 195a12) So, there is an initial logical distinction between what
is present and what is absent, and with this distinction Aristotle is able to deduce that
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which is inapprehensible. What is more, due to the analogical justification Aristotle is
working with, despite its absence in regard to perception Aristotle deduces the presence
of a persisting inapprehensible subject, i.e. ὑπνθείκελνλ. The four causes, then, are: (1)
the agent or initiator of change [ἀξρὴ], i.e. the efficient cause; (2) the essence, “the whole
or synthesis or form” [ὅινλ θαὶ ἡ ζύλζεζηο θαὶ ηὸ εἶδνο], i.e. the formal cause; (3) “the
for the sake of which” [ηέινο], i.e. the final cause; and, (4) the “substratum”
[ὑπνθείκελνλ], i.e. the material cause. 77 (Phys 195a15-25) Aristotle also discusses the
four causes in his philosophical lexicon at Metaphysics V §2 (Meta 1013a-1014a).
Moreover, of the four causes, or “becauses,” at Physics II §7Aristotle notes, “in many
cases three of these „becauses‟ conicide.” (Phys 1957, 198a25) In this way, the formal,
efficient, and final causes may be grouped together in opposition to the material cause,
and this opposition provides the ground for various analogical relations to the opposition.
Aristotle suggests it is key, if one is to overcome Parmenides, that you
“distinguish matter and privation.” For Aristotle holds that “the matter, accidentally is
not, while the privation in its own nature is not.” (Phys 1995, 192a4-5) As Aristotle
explains it,
we distinguish between „matter‟ and „privation‟ (or absence
of form) … privation as such, is the direct negation or nonexistence of the form of which it is the privation. So that
matter, though never existing in isolation, may be pretty
well taken as constituting the „concrete being‟ of which it is
the basis, but privation not in the least so.78 (Phys 1957,
192a5-7)
In this way, whereas informed matter is apprehended through perception, absence as
inapprehensible is arrived at by analogy. Rather than “look through” the Idea in itself of
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ἕηεξνλ, Aristotle provides his justification with an analogy based on privation in regard
to that which has priority. Likewise will be the mechanism for arriving at matter in itself
and privation in itself. Lastly, Aristotle provides an extended definition of privation at
Metaphysics Book V §22. Of his treatment there it is worth noting, “There are just as
many kinds of privations as there are of words with negative prefixes.” (Meta 1995,
1022b33) Hence, again the efficacy of Aristotle‟s separation of substantiality from
universality or being from thinking is that you can think of not-being despite an entitiy‟s
being. In fact, it is from the priority of an entity‟s being that you can analogically think
its not-being, and that by way of privation. Further, this may be taken as Aristotle‟s
attempt to resolve or deny the descriptive criterion of ineffability regarding non-being,
i.e. according to Aristotle non-being can be said analogically as privation.
§31 Aristotle on Analogy – The celebrated Aristotle on analogy (ἀλαινγία) quote
appears at Metaphysics IX §6. It is also here that Aristotle explains the potentiality
actuality opposition.
What we mean can be plainly seen in the particular case by
induction; we need not seek a definition for every term, but
must grasp the analogy: that as that which is actually
building is to that which is capable of building, so is that
which is awake to that which is asleep; and that which is
seeing to that which has the eyes shut, but has the power of
sight; and that which is differentiated out of matter to the
matter; and the finished article to the raw material. Let
actuality be defined by one member of this antithesis, and
the potential by the other. But things are not all said to
exist actually in the same sense, but only by analogy – as A
is in B or to B, so is C in D or to D ; for the relation is
either that of motion to potentiality, or that of substance to
some particular matter [my emphases]. (Meta 1995,
1048a35-b8)
Mary Hesse suggests, “these metaphysical analogies seem to be primarily concerned with
the understanding of metaphysical terms. Thus they are examples of the introduction of
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novel language by means of analogy [Hesse‟s emphases].” 79 The value of analogy here,
then, is that you may arrive at the inapprehensible by way of analogy from the
apprehensible. This is quite similar to Physics I §9 (192a27-34) where Aristotle explains
that privation in relation to matter in itself may be thought along a continuum of
actualization. In other words, regressing toward the more privative from an apprehended
individual, i.e. informed matter, the continuum spans the point at which form and matter
separate. In this way, you can supposedly think matter in itself though you cannot
perceive it – you cannot perceptibly apprehend it.
Pushing the distinction between matter and privation that Aristotle deemed
important for overcoming Parmenides, privative opposition provides access to Aristotle‟s
reworking of ἕηεξνλ. Privative opposition yields a distinction between an in itself
[θαζ‟αὑηό] as matter and an in itself as not-being, i.e. “the privation in its own nature is
not-being.” (Phys 1957, 192a4-5) Therefore, on the one hand, as Norbert Luyten pointed
out,
We can say that matter, as opposed to substantial
determination, cannot be anything more than mere
determinability. … Thinking this through, one seems
compelled to say that such mere determinability must
exclude any determination. In other words, it [matter] has
to be pure indetermination [my emphasis]. 80
On the other hand, since “potentiality and actuality are different … it is possible that a
thing may be capable of being and not be, and capable of not being and yet be [emphases
in Ross translation].” (Meta 1995, 1047a19) The capacity or potential involved here
though inapprehensible to perception yields its presence as absence to reason by analogy.
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This is precisely how Aristotle‟s attempt to solve the problem of non-being produced an
ambiguity between matter in itself as not-being and privation in itself as not-being. In
order to clear up this ambiguity Aristotle assigns privation in itself to the non-becoming
kind of change, i.e. destruction. Hence, this is the argumentation with which Aristotle
mistakenly equated non-being with death, i.e. destruction.81
§32 From Actuality and Analogy to Potentiality and Persistence – In order to
keep all this clear it is important to discuss the manner in which actuality for Arisotle is
thought to be prior to potentiality. To begin with, the terms involved here are δύλακηο,
i.e. potentiality, ἐλέξγεηα, i.e. activity or actuality, and ἐληειέρεηα, i.e. unfolding or
activity toward perfecting its end. There is evidently a significant debate regarding how
to translate and relate these terms.82 However, it is not necessary for me to enter into this
debate here. The below may be understood without resolving their terminological debate.
Moreover, as Zev Bechler points out, “that the connection between the potential and the
actual in Aristotle‟s ontology is strictly logical is readily seen by the fact that no physical
principles are ever considered in inferring either from the other.”83 Also, Aristotle‟s
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description of potentiality is clear enough to support the claim that potentiality exceeds
actuality;
we say that potentially, for instance, a statue of Hermes is
in the block of wood, and the half-line is in the whole,
because it might be separated out, and even the man who is
not studying we call a man of science, if he is capable of
studying. (Meta 1995, 1048a33)
Potentiality, then, clearly exceeds84 actuality in that whatever becomes actual had the
potential to become in various ways other than it actually did. The implicit claim, i.e. the
assumption of persistence, is supported in the same analogical way ideas of potentiality
and matter were supported. In other words, the absence as presence of a hypokeimenon
allows for the assumption of persistence. Further, Aristotle may also
mean by potentiality not only that definite kind which is
said to be a principle of change in another thing or in the
thing itself regarded as other, but in general every principle
of movement or of rest. For nature also is in the same
genus as potentiality; for it is a principle of movement –
not, however, in something else but in the thing itself qua
itself. (Meta 1995, 1049b4-1049b9) (Cf. Cat 14a27-14b8)
So, actuality precedes potentiality in account [ιόγῳ] (Cat 1049b12-17), time [ρξόλῳ]
(Cat 1049b17-1050a3), and being [νὺζίᾳ] (Cat 1050a4-11). As Aristotle concluded, “We
have distinguished the various senses of „prior‟, and it is clear that actuality is prior to
potentiality.” (Meta 1995, 1049b4-1049b9) Aristotle amplified, “it is obvious that
actuality is prior in substance to potentiality; and as we have said, one actuality always
precedes another in time right back to the actuality of the eternal prime mover.” (Meta
1995, 1050b2-1050b6) Put another way, “In all the productions of nature and art what
exists potentially is brought into entity [into being] only by that which is in actuality.” 85
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(GA 734a30-31) Hence, these passages confirm Aristotle‟s claim regarding the priority
of actuality.
The particular combinations of privation, then, with (1) priority of being, (2)
priority of time, and (3) priority of account reveal the three not-beings in play here. First,
matter in itself, or – what logically amounts to the same – the hypokeimenon, is absent
compared to the present form matter combination which constititutes the perceived
substance. Second, privation in itself as destruction is absence as not-being, i.e. the no
longer being present of the already absent hypokeimenon. This is privation from
proximate to remote to unqualified passing-away. Third, in so far as potentiality is
predicated of apprehended substance as inapprehensible, then potentiality is an
intellectual product rationally constructed to indicate absence. Though the opposition
involved is logical, and the supposition involved is rational, still the lack of
correspondence between physicality and logic highlights the idea of potentiality as
lacking being in comparison with actuality. This is like the difference between all maps
and the territory they are supposed to describe. 86 Every map qua map is not – is different
than – the territory. In sum, the three terms involved here are: potency, annihilation, and
intellectual identification. Furthermore, intellectual identification, as I have been
gesturing above, is opposed to identification through perceptual apprehension. This is
further confirmed in Aristotle‟s comments from Metaphysics Book IX §9 and §10:
“Potentiality is discovered from actuality (and therefore it is by an act of construction
that people acquire the knowledge) [my emphasis].” (Meta 1995, 1051a29-1051a33)
Hence, “The terms „being‟ and „non-being‟ are employed firstly with reference to the
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categories, and secondly with reference to the potentiality or actuality of these or their
opposites.” (Meta 1995, 1051a34-36)
§33 Aristotle v. Zeno – Lastly, then, Aristotle‟s attack on Zeno both completes his
attack on the Eleactic understanding of non-being and sheds further light on the
ontological lack assigned to counting and time. 87 (Cf. IL 969a27-33) What, then, is
Zeno‟s contribution to the Eleatic reading of non-being? As Plato put it in the
Parmenides, on the one hand, “Can something that is in some state not be so, without
changing from that state? – It cannot.” (Parm 162b-c) On the other hand, “So everything
of the sort we‟ve described, which is both so and not so, signifies a change. … And a
change is a motion.”(Parm 162b-c) Hence, “if it is nowhere among the things that are –as
it isn‟t, if in fact it is not – it couldn‟t travel from one place to another.” (Parm 162c-d) In
this way, Zeno‟s puzzle is presented here as: Change and motion are supposed to involve
non-being; but if an object is not being, then the object cannot change or be in motion.
Hence, there can either be no non-being, or there can be no change and motion.
This as Zeno suggests at the beginning of the dialog is the way he hopes to defend
the Parmenidean notion that all is one. (Cf. Parm 128d) If you hope to save plurality over
oneness, then you must have some account of not-being – this one is not that one – so as
to account for plurality, but if you believe in not-being, then you must reject change and
motion. Notice, this is perfectly reasonable, if there is no object, i.e. the object is not,
then the object cannot be in motion or be changing. Aristotle resolves this puzzle with
his idea of potentiality, and, this is yet another way you can see his idea of potentiality in
his attempt to say what is not, i.e. solve the problem of non-being.
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Aristotle advertises Physics VIII, §8, as a solution to Zeno‟s paradox of motion, 88
and paraphrases “Zeno‟s argument” in the following way:
before any distance can be traversed half the distance must
be traversed, that these half-distances are infinite in
number, and that it is impossible to traverse distances
infinite in number … in the time during which a motion is
in progress we should first count the half-motion for every
half-distance that we get, so that we have the result that
when the whole distance is traversed we have counted an
infinite number, which is admittedly impossible. (Phys
1995, 263a5-263a10)
Aristotle indicates he has solved the apparent perplexity here because, “we put forward a
solution to this difficulty turning on the fact that the period of time contains within itself
an infinite number of units.” (Phys 1995, 263a11) Now, at this point, neither his
paraphrase of Zeno‟s argument nor his solution seem to have much to do with the
problem of non-being. However, both of these relations become apparent as soon as
Aristotle discusses motion in terms of potentiality. According to Aristotle,
In the act of dividing the continuous distance into two
halves one point is treated as two, since we make it a
beginning and an end; and this same result is produced by
the act of counting halves as well as by the act of dividing
into halves. But if divisions are made in this way, neither
the distance nor the motion will be continuous; for motion
if it is to be continuous must relate to what is continuous;
and though what is continuous contains an infinite number
of halves, they are not actual but potential halves. If he
makes the halves actual, he will get not a continuous but an
intermittent motion [my emphases]. (Phys 1995, 263a2330)
Notice, then, “what is continuous” is “potential,” and as potential, it is infinite. The two
aspects brought to the fore here are notions of positionality and variability in
measurement. Just as the referential content of “two minutes from now” depends upon
when you read it, so does the placement of concreteness or the determination of a unit
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depend on what one measures.89 And, this is precisely how counting pertains to notbeing.
Jacob Klein in his Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra poses
the question provocatively:
The continual practice of counting and calculation
gradually fosters within us that familiarity with numbers
and their relations which Plato terms „arithmetic and
logistic art‟ (ἀξηζκεηηθή ινγηζηηθή [ηέρλε]) which enables
us to execute any operation of counting or calculating we
wish. But those numbers which we have at our disposal
before we begin counting or calculating and which must
clearly be independent of the particular things which
happen to undergo counting – of what are these the
numbers? [Klein‟s emphases]90
That these numbers lack being enables them to be used in the manner of “Zeno‟s
argument” noted above. Each determination of a now is a counting, and therefore not an
actual continuity. 91 It is not time which persists but the persistence that is counted which
is time. This persisting subject is, of course, the ὑπνθείκελνλ, i.e. hypokeimenon.
However, recall that the logical structure of the justification of time as potentiality is the
same as that in the justification for the existence of the ὑπνθείκελνλ. Looking at
potential, then, whether as measurement, or ground of being is like looking through a
Platonic Idea at what is not (an Idea). Yet, as Aristotle‟s apparatus of privation, priority,
and analogical reasoning show, it certainly is a rational construction as supposition which
is accounting for these not-beings in Aristotle.
§34 Priority & Privation – In conclusion, in this section I have shown the
mistaken way in which Aristotle resolves the problem of non-being. Since for Aristotle it
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is by way of privation from the priority of an entity‟s being that you can analogically
think its not-being, analogically posited not-being, such as potentiality, is taken as that
which allows for change – Parmenides trampled. Similarly despite Socrates‟ changes in
appearance, Socrates as a specimen of substance is supposed to persist. Here focal
meaning of predication coincides with subject persisting through change to account for
“how” the individual who was Socrates in youth is still Socrates in middle age, despite
changes. In this way, a difference between a substantial and a non-substantial change
emerges, and substantial change involving the greater privation is taken to be non-being.
Despite the implicit critique, then, that Aristotle‟s apparatus functions like a
reverse engineered post hoc justification – as if saying, “it is through analogy that I
constructed this, therefore its analogical reasoning is its justification” – Aristotle‟s
resolution to the problem of non-being contains even greater faults. As the previous
section showed, Aristotle is not working on the problem of non-being as found in Plato‟s
Sophist. And, as this section showed, Aristotle‟s apparatus, as logical, fails to indicate a
non logical negation of being. In this way, Aristotle‟s reading of non-being collapses the
Non-being, Becoming, Being triad from Socrates‟ Republic Book V exchange with
Glaucon, noted previously, into Being and Becoming with not-being to account for
change. As a result, it is an unqualified change, i.e. destruction, which he mistakenly
posited as a solution to the problem of non-being, since otherwise there is only being and
becoming. Having, on the one hand, just examined not-being as it relates to priority in
being as Aristotle‟s resolution to the problem of non-being, i.e. his response to
Parmenides and Plato, and, on the other hand, just examined not-being as it relates to time
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as Aristotle‟s response to Zeno, the next and final Aristotle section examines not-being as
it relates to priority in account.
Dialectic : Discovery :: Demonstration : Justification
§35 Aristotle & Priority of Logos, Dialectic v. Demonstration – By the end of this
section I would like for you to understand the difference between dialectic and
demonstration according to Aristotle, in particular how they differ in regard to starting
points. This difference is involved in each of the remaining thinkers to be discussed. I
have already gestured toward stating this difference. However, this section constitutes an
extended examination. As such, a number of the threads which I will tie together here
have already been introduced. The primary thread for this section, then, is priority in
account, and this is because demonstration and dialectic differ from one another in regard
to the kind of account that is prior in each case. Roughly put, though both begin with
assumptions, demonstration begins with axioms and dialectic begins with problems.
Demonstrations are taken to be pedagogical and pertain to providing justification for
holding a belief or position. Dialectic is taken to be exploratory, in the sense of
discovering first principles, through a process of organizing thought based on initial
assumptions for the purpose of testing those assumptions. In this way, whereas deductive
arguments are formulated in both demonstration and dialectic, induction is taken to
pertain more to dialectic. Put another way, on the one hand, the ideas with which
demonstrations begin are ideas taken to be somehow constitutive in regard to the beings
demonstrated. That is, one‟s demonstrations are successful because the ideas involved in
the demonstration are correct in regard to the object of demonstration. On the other hand,
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the ideas with which dialect begins are regulative. 92 Because you are seeking to know,
you organize your thinking by regulating the ideas with which you think. The final
distinguishing difference between demonstration and dialectic which I will explore in this
section is their different relations to experience. 93
Looking at the passages where Aristotle explicitly refers to the beginnings of
demonstration and dialectic provides a better understanding of the difference involved.
The relevance of a passage from the Prior Analytics requires it be quoted in full,
The premise of demonstration differs from the premise of
dialectic in that the former is the assumption of one
member of a pair of contradictory statements (since the
demonstrator does not ask a question but makes an
assumption), whereas the latter is an answer to the question
which of two contradictory statements is to be accepted.
This difference, however, will not affect the fact that in
either case a syllogism results; for both the demonstrator
and the interrogator draw a syllogistic conclusion by first
assuming that some predicate applies or does not apply to
some subject.94 (Pr An 23b24-24a34)
This passage supports my claim above that both demonstration and dialectic begin with
assumptions. It also supports my claim that dialectic begins with problems or questions.
In regard to demonstration, then, on the one hand, “hypotheses are the origins of
demonstrations.” (Meta 1995, 1013a16) On the other hand, “By the starting points of
demonstration I mean the common beliefs, on which all men base their proofs.” (Meta
1995, 996b26-30) That is, “all demonstrative sciences use the axioms. … The axioms are
most universal and are principles of all things [emphasis in Ross].” (Meta 1995, 997a10)
So, in attempting to better understand the starting points of demonstrations, there seems
92
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to be some discrepancy regarding their status as assumptions.95 Approaching from a
different set of quotes might help.
According to Aristotle in the Topics a demonstration proceeds from premises
which “are true and primitive, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally
come through premises which are primitive and true.”96 (Top 100a26) Yet, “Dialectic
does not construct its syllogisms out of any haphazard materials, such as the fancies of
crazy people, but out of materials that call for discussion.” (Rhet 1356b35) In fact,
“dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries.”
(Top 101b3-4) So, you can see that the starting ground for demonstration is to be more
solid, so to speak, than dialectic. And, given the stronger language of the Topics, why
maintain that the principles with which demonstration begins are assumptions? Aristotle
makes this clear in the Posterior Analytics noting,
I call principles in each genus those which it is not possible
to prove to be. Now both what the primitives and what the
things dependent on them signify is assumed; but that they
are must be assumed for the principles and proved for the
rest [my emphases]. (Post An 76a32-34)97
Hence, “it is impossible that there should be a demonstration of everything.” (Meta 1995,
1006a10) This helps clear up the relationship between dialectic and demonstration nicely
because it is – as noted above – dialectic which provides the “principles of all inquiries.”
So, the regulative use of ideas chosen “out of materials that call for discussion” helps to
identify more solid starting points for demonstrations from principles which seem
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adequate enough to be considered constitutive, i.e. indicative or demonstrative, of the
materials in question.
In this way, a hypothesis is a proposition you assume for the purpose of
demonstration. 98 And, as such, you can see how commentators, for example Jonathan
Barnes, suggest demonstrations are ultimately pedagogical. Pointing to the more solid,
axiomatic, beginnings of demonstration Barnes holds, “the theory of demonstrative
science was never meant to guide or formalize scientific research; it is concerned
exclusively with the teaching of facts already won”; moreover, “it does not describe how
scientists do, or ought to, acquire knowledge; it offers a formal model of how teachers
should present and impart knowledge [Barnes‟ emphases].” 99 This last part of Barnes‟
comment gestures toward the other distinction with which I compare demonstration and
dialectic, i.e. the contexts of justification and discovery. 100 As Aristotle points out in the
Physics,
When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have
principles, causes, or elements, it is through acquaintance
with these that knowledge and understanding is attained. …
therefore, in the science of nature too our first task will be
to try to determine what relates to its principles. The
natural way to do this is to start from the things which are
more knowable and clear to us and proceed toward those
which are clearer and more knowable by nature. (Phys
1995, 184a10-17)
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Commenting on this very passage, Wolfgang Wieland suggests, “In the context of inquiry
into principles this means: we start with the thing which is already known to us, but
which we wish to know with a knowledge derived from principles.”101
Now I chose to quote Wieland not just to continue bolstering my appeal to the
authority of various respected commentators, but also because his language broaches the
topic of what is other than “knowing derived from principles.” Notice in the above
passage with which Aristotle opened the Physics, his language points to the different
starting points which seem to suggest either having or not having the principles required
for demonstration.102 Given Aristotle‟s emphasis earlier on priority in actuality and
account, ignorance will turn out to be having the wrong or inappropriate first principles.
(Post An 77b20-77b27) Even if your first principle is correct in one science, it may not
function in another; for example, geometers are said not to concern themselves with
whether shapes are good or evil. Again, dialectic, then, is required to organize thought so
as to bring about appropriate first principles. If you cannot justify, then you seek to
discover the first principles with which you can demonstrate knowledge.
§36 Aristotle on justifying your discovery – As G.E.L. Owen (1922-1982) points
out in his “Tithenai ta Phainomena,” dialectic begins with phenomena in that
“phenomena” may refer to opinions or products of perception. 103 So, on the one hand,
dialectic may begin with opinions related to the material which calls for discussion. On
the other hand, dialectic may begin with experience. The former road is that of logical
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analysis of the propositions involved, e.g. “It is clear then that in every problem we must
look to the … relations of the subject and predicate; for all deductions proceed through
these.” (Pr An 44a36-7)104 In regard to the latter road, then, “it is the business of
experience to give the principles which belong to each subject.” (Pr An 46a24)
Now logical analysis can play a role in the former because it is possible to
articulate a starting point for dialectic by reading your predecessors through a regulative
idea. In other words a regulative idea may be used as a heuristic. 105 And, this is when
the process of discovery resembles the process of invention. Recall, according to
Aristotle in the Poetics,
Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs
to something else; the transference being either from genus
to species, or from species to genus, or from species to
species, or on grounds of analogy [my emphasis].106 (Poet
1457b6-9)
Further, “a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars.”
(Poet 1459a8-9) This makes Aristotle‟s arsenal composed of causes, opposition, analogy,
etc. even more comprehensible in that it contextualizes Aristotle‟s efforts in regard to the
invention and discovery of principles with which to secure knowledge for
demonstration. 107
Consider for example, a celebrated passage from Aristotle‟s De Anima,
Suppose that the eye were an animal – sight would have
been its soul, for sight is the substance of the eye which
corresponds to the account [εἰ γὰξ ἦλ ὁ ὀθζαικὸο δῷνλ,
ςπρὴ ἂλ ἦλ αὐηνῦ ἡ ὄςηο αὕηε γὰξ νὐζία ὀθζαικνῦ ἡ θαηὰ
ηὸλ ιόγνλ], the eye being merely the matter of seeing;
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when seeing is removed the eye is no longer an eye, except
in name – no more than the eye of a statue or of a painted
figure.108 (Anim 412b17-21)
First off, this is, of course, an analogy (the eye : sight :: living creature : soul). Yet, it is
worth pausing on this term logos, i.e. ιόγνο. For example, Smith‟s translation above
renders θαηὰ ηὸλ ιόγνλ as “corresponds to the account” and W.S. Hett‟s Loeb translation
has “in the sense of formula.” 109 What you do not want to miss is that “logos” is a third,
if you count eye and creature as one and two. So, once you grasp the analogy, for
example, by starting from either the eye or the creature, you can later start from the logos
by naming the ratio involved. For example, rather than ask, how does a dog relate to an
eye, you can ask, “Does a dog have a soul?” On the one hand, you are using the term
whose meaning the analogy has provided. On the other hand, the meaning of the term
you are using is its ratio among the other terms in the analogy. In other words, you may
use the idea of soul to regulate your thinking about entities such as dogs. 110
Moving now to an examination of the experiential gateway into dialectic, in Book
II §2 of his De Anima Aristotle suggests “what is clear and more familiar in account
emerges from what in itself is confused but more observable by us.” (Anim 413a11)
And, “This brings us to the crucial distinction between the aestheta and the noëta in
Greek, the sensibilia and the intelligibilia in Latin,”111i.e. sensibility and intelligibility.
To see how regulative ideas are at work here consider an example from Aristotle‟s
Metaphysics. According to Aristotle, “some matter is perceptible and some intelligible
… and intelligible matter is that which is present in perceptible things not qua
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perceptible, i.e. the object of mathematics.” (Meta 1995, 1036a9-12) How something
may be present, then, in a perceptible thing not by perception is through dialectic. That
is, you make assumptions about the perceptible matter, say a perceived object, and
depending upon how well these regulative ideas fit with what you already know, the
ideas may be incorporated as further formative of the object‟s identity – an intellectual
identification.112
Notice how this functions toward Aristotle‟s attempt to overcome Gorgias. If
apprehensible is perceptible, then intelligible – as opposed to perceptible – is Aristotle‟s
way of perceiving not-being, i.e. through a type of intellectual apprehension. Remember
the idea involved here is an assumption. So, on the one hand, the idea itself is a kind of
not-being akin to the manner in which counting is a not-being noted in regard to Zeno
and time above. 113 On the other hand, not-being as an idea derived from a type of logical
opposition may be supposed in the perceived object as potentiality. To the extent the
supposition fits with knowledge about the object – does it move?; does it change? – the
potency of an object perceived may be credited to a kind of intellectual apprehension or
identification, dependent upon intellect, which is not the apprehension of perception
which Gorgias is taken to have had mind. It is, perhaps, actually easier just to follow the
logic involved here. The logic which enables Aristotle‟s move is modus tollens. Let A
stand for apprehensible, and let P stand for perceptible. If P, then A. Not A, therefore
not P. It may be said, then, that the principles detected intellectually relate to the object
in a regulative way. As such, Aristotle may claim to have overcome Gorgias‟ criterion of
(perceptual) inapprehensibility – yet, to no avail for the problem of non-being.
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§37 Aristotle’s solution to the problem of non-being – At this point the difference
between the starting points of dialectic and demonstration should be clear, including the
manner in which dialectic provides starting points for demonstration. To conlude,
consider Aristotle‟s response to the problem of non-being one more time. According to
Aristotle, “Change from subject to non-subject is perishing [εἰο νὐρ ὑπνρείκελνλ
θζνξά].” (Phys 1957, 225a17) The destruction of the ὑπνρείκελνλ, i.e. hypokeimenon, is
taken to be the extreme of privation which is, according to Aristotle, non-being. I have
sufficiently argued the fact that the negation involved here is governed by Aristotle‟s
matrix of opposition. Moreover, as you should be able to see now: the extreme of
privation is an assumption, the persistence of the ὑπνρείκελνλ is an assumption, and
potentiality as persisting indication of the ὑπνρείκελνλ is an assumption. Further, the
absence taken to indicate the presence of a persisting ὑπνρείκελνλ amounts to an
invention which Aristotle justifies through his analogical apparatus, etc. (Cf. Phys 195a)
Recall, according to Aristotle, “It is necessary, as we say, to presuppose for each
thing that which is it potentially [my emphasis].” (Meta 1995, 1089b32) And, as one
commentator put it, “The non-existent object can exist potentially (δπλάκεη) … This
account provides a reply to Parmenides‟ rejection of non-being.”114 Hence, “Potentiality
is discovered from actuality (and therefore it is by an act of construction that people
acquire the knowledge) [my emphases].” (Meta 1995, 1051a29-1051a33) And, it is from
the above assumptions that Aristotle is able to conclude, “Thus perishing [destruction] is
change to not-being.” (Phys 1995, 224b9) Again, the heavy logical hand of Aristotle‟s
demonstration of non-being misses the subtle problem in Plato‟s Sophist. Hence,
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Aristotle arrived at “three senses of not-being,” i.e. potency, annihilation, and intellectual
identification from his logical apparatus.
Aristotle‟s On Interpretation comment now seems predictably (logically)
prescient, “Perhaps, indeed, the necessary and not necessary are first principles of
everything‟s either being or not being, and one should look at the others as following
from these.”115 (Interp 23a19-24) To sum, in his attack on Parmenides, Aristotle moved
from (a) being and unity or the one to (b) plurality to (c) individuals in plurality to (d) the
way in which individuals are thought about to (e) the way in which you think about
negation, and in combining (d) and (e) he constructed his attempt to solve the problem of
non-being, or rather, provide a demonstration of non-being.
Introductory Summary
The above should constitute an “introduction” to the problem of non-being. As
you move through the dissertation, then, remember the criteria stated for the solution of
the problem by Plato in the Sophist. You should remember the different starting points
for dialectic. I will focus on the topic of dialectic specifically in the chapter after Kant.
This topic permeates the dissertation. To this end, the distinction between regulative and
constitutive ideas – which truly will not reach its zenith of formalization until Kant – will
also factor largely in later discussions regarding non-discursivity. Be sure to remember
how I use “not-being” to signify logical not or negation, as opposed to non-being. And,
as I move through the chapter on Kant, you will recognize the manner in which he seems
to be following the suggestion of Gorgias toward arriving at non-being. Both of the
chapters dealing with Derrida and Deleuze will refer back to both Plato and Aristotle
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from this Introduction. What I have above referred to as the “dependency of reckoning”
thesis, or the manner in which discerning being depends on solving the problem of nonbeing, will be returned to in the chapter on Deleuze and at the end of the dissertation.
Ultimately, there are two aspects which Kant, Hegel, Derrida, and Deleuze all
mistakenly adopt from Aristotle. The first is Aristotle‟s paradigm shift. This, of course,
will not be fully clear until you are reading about it in the following chapters. Given the
peculiarity of Kant‟s position, he, again, will come closest to escaping Aristotle‟s shifting
of the problem. However, and this brings me to the second aspect adopted by these
thinkers from Aristotle, Kant‟s belief in the priority of imagination in regard to memory
kept him from escaping Aristotle‟s paradigm. I will briefly discuss the origin of
imagination‟s priority in Aristotle in the next chapter. Yet, given the structural overhaul
Kant provides to Aristotle‟s thought, the issue is really with Kant and no longer with
Aristotle regarding imagination and memory.
To sum, the next chapter is concerned to articulate Kant‟s attempt to solve the
problem of non-being, and also to make clear Kant‟s structure of experience. This is
important because it is with – as is consistent with Gorgias‟ suggestion – Kant‟s novel
structure of experience that he advances upon a solution to the problem. The chapter
after Kant is concerned to explicate two formal and mistaken approaches to the problem
of non-being. First, I provide a formal logical reading of negation toward illustrating the
manner in which formal logic fails to solve the problem. In essence I have already made
this claim above in regard to ἐλαληίνλ, etc. However, I will briefly take some space at the
beginning of chapter after Kant to explicitly support this claim. Possibly a large barrier
for many people, unfortunately, is that they – following Aristotle‟s Metaphysics – might
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try to read me as if I am denying the principle of non-contradiction. I am not. Rather, I
am giving to the principle of non-contradiction, what belongs to the principle of noncontradiction. I do not think the principle of non-contradiction is God. Without lapsing
into a less rigorous way of expression, I would like to say being – as revealed by nonbeing – exceeds the jurisdiction of the principle of non-contradiction.
Given the influence, reminiscent of the provocation to discuss Aristotle, of Hegel,
I will also explicitly discuss Hegel in regard to dialectic and non-being after the chapter
on Kant. On the one hand, the Hegel Kant combination is much like the Aristotle Plato
combination. Hence, many of those who adopt or address the views of Kant or Plato –
such as Derrida and Deleuze – do so by way of Hegel or Aristotle, respectively. On the
other hand, Hegel offers a response to the problem of non-being, and it is fruitful to
recognize how it both fails to solve the problem and yet is influential. Chapters 4 and 5
are concerned to articulate the accounts given by Derrida and Deleuze, respectively, of
pure difference. I will also examine comments made by Derrida and Deleuze specifically
in regard to non-being. I will briefly sum and conclude the chapters of Part 1 before
beginning Part 2. Part 2 will contain its own much briefer Introduction. Suffice to say
here that, following the title of the dissertation, Part 1 is concerned with non-being, and
Part 2 is concerned with memory. Further, in Part 2, I will present a reading of multiple
findings from contemporary memory research. I will conclude the dissertation
connecting Part 2 with Part 1, explicitly critiquing pure difference in Derrida and
Deleuze, and presenting my solution to the problem of non-being.
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“Plato employed the expression „Idea‟ in such a way that we can readily see he understood by it something
that not only could never be borrowed from the senses, but that even goes far beyond the concepts of the
understanding … our reason, however, now no longer finds itself in its original state, but must laboriously
recall the old, now much obscured, ideas through a recollection (which is called philosophy).”
~Immanuel Kant116
“The inaccuracy of scales used for commercial measurements, according to civil law,
is discovered, if we let the merchandise and the weights exchange pans.
So the partiality of the scales of reason is revealed by the same trick...”
~Immanuel Kant117
“The pleasure of believing what we see is boundless, as we wish our souls to be…”
~Percy Bysshe Shelley118

Chapter Two: Non-Being and the Thing-in-itself
Introduction and Justification for Chapter 2 Sections and Objectives
“There is a saying among philosophers, „You can philosophize with Kant or against Kant,
but you cannot philosophize without him.‟” 119 In the spirit of this famous Lewis White
Beck quote, I begin here with Immanuel Kant. And, the specificity of my purpose for
invoking Kant precludes the involvement of the entire Kantian oeuvre. Specifically,
then, this chapter regarding Kant contains three main sections which correspond to the
three aspects I will discuss from the “A” and “B” editions of Kant‟s Critique of Pure
Reason [Kritik der reinen Vernunft] (1781/1787) – Kant‟s “Copernican revolution,” the
structure of experience, and the thing-in-itself. In the Preface of the B edition Kant
divides his Copernican revolution into two parts. Generally speaking, the three parts of
the Critique of Pure Reason just noted which I discuss in this chapter pertain to Kant‟s
Copernican revolution itself, its first part, and its second part respectively. Also, I have

116

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, tr. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 395, (A 313/B 370). Translation modified. Hereafter cited CPR 1998.
117
Immanuel Kant, Dreams of a Spirit Seer,. Emanuel F. Goerwitz, tr. (New York: The Macmillan Co,
1900), 85.
118
Percy Bysshe Shelley, “Julian and Maddalo,” The Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley. (Boston:
Phillips, Sampson, and Company, 1857), 552.
119
Lewis White Beck, “Introduction: Kant and his Predecessors,” Critique of Practical Reason and Other
Writings in Moral Philosophy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), 1.

79

added a brief section for the sake of explicating an important principle for reading Kant.
I refer to this principle as the principle of perspective within Kant‟s system.
Concerning the problem of non-being, after Plato and Aristotle Kant is the thinker
whom I credit most with changing the way the problem is understood. In other words,
Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason provides a sophisticated vocabulary and a unique
structure of experience with which to engage the problem of non-being. In particular, the
two distinctions, derived from Kant, which provide a new vista to the problem of nonbeing are the discursive/non-discursive and experiential/conceptual distinctions. 120 These
distinctions are, of course, intimately connected to both Kant‟s articulation of the
structure of experience and his discussion of the thing-in-itself. Together Kant‟s
structure of experience and his two innovative distinctions provide a unique
understanding of what may be called the “ground of experience.” This concerns me
because I believe the ground of experience is the key to solving the problem of nonbeing.
Kant presents an interesting case in the history of Western philosophy because –
as I will show in this chapter – Kant‟s structure of experience yields his innovative
distinctions by providing a new way of accounting for order and change in experience.
Central to his account of experience is the role he attributes to imagination. Yet,
ultimately, I see Kant‟s privileging of imagination as at the cost of properly depicting the
role of memory in the structure of experience. Whereas, imagination receives the status
of a “condition for the possibility of experience,” memory is depicted as solely in the
service of imagination. Hence, imagination has a constitutive role, and memory does not.
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For Kant memory is solely a concern for empirical psychology. So, whereas Kant‟s
structure of experience and the distinctions which derive from it advance significantly
toward solving the problem of non-being, his privileging of imagination at the cost of
memory kept him from solving the problem. Rather, resulting from the central role he
attributes to imagination, and perhaps still under the spell of Aristotle‟s paradigm shift,
Kant was led to wrongly posit the thing-in-itself as his solution to the problem of nonbeing. Similarly, thinkers in Kant‟s wake who adopt his structure of experience suffer
the same ontological commitments from which Kant posits the thing-in-itself.
In this chapter, then, I will discuss Kant‟s innovative distinctions and his
privileging of imagination within the wider discussion of his parts of the Copernican
revolution – the structure of experience and the thing-in-itself. However, by the end of
this chapter I will not have fully shown the role I attribute to memory in the structure of
experience. Given the complexity of memory‟s involvement in experience, I devote the
entirety of the chapter after Derrida and Deleuze to memory. Though by the end of this
chapter, I will have presented an outlining sketch of the role I attribute to memory by
discussing Kant‟s structure of experience. Further, my claim that the Kantian structure of
experience which privileges imagination should be recast with a more potent and vibrant
role for memory should be supported by this chapter, and by the end of the dissertation
my recasting of the structure of experience in light of contemporary memory research
should fully show the role I attribute to memory. Ultimately this recasting of the
structure of experience precludes the misguided ontological commitments which lead to
various versions of the thing-in-itself.
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Before proceeding with my discussion of the Critique of Pure Reason, a few
comments should be made by way of disclaimer. In 1993, echoing a claim already made
by Karl Ameriks in 1982,121 Günter Zöller states, “Over the past twenty-five years,
scholarship on Kant has taken on colossal proportions, effectively defying summary
assessment and manageable presentation.”122 Yet, and in fact, there is not to be found a
concise summary of the structure of experience in the Critique of Pure Reason.
However, what is most important by way of disclaimer is the realization that there will
always be various strategies and alternative readings available in regard to the Critique of
Pure Reason. Commentators have written from two volumes on the first half of the
Critique123 to two quite different editions of a book on one thesis in the Critique124 to a
seventeen page article on one word which Kant uses in the Critique125 to an almost five
hundred page book on the shortest section of the Critique,126 etc.127 Given that my
purpose for invoking Kant is primarily confined to his structure of experience, I set out to
show salient alternative readings only when textual support from Kant is wanting or
when – even with textual support – the issue‟s complexity requires I show alternative
readings for the sake of explication. This is my method for presenting Kant in light of the
colossal nature of the secondary literature.
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Regarding translations of Kant‟s German Kritik der reinen Vernunft, I am
consulting my German editions, the Norman Kemp Smith, the Werner S. Pluhar, and the
Paul Guyer translations. As such, there is really only one German term I need to
comment on at the outset, i.e. “Erkenntnis.”128 Whereas Kemp Smith translates this term
as “knowledge,” Pluhar and Guyer translate the term as “cognition.” Moreover, the
German term “Wissen,” which also appears in the Critique, is translated as “knowledge”
by all three translators. The author of A Kant Dictionary, Howard Caygill, preferring the
translation of Erkenntnis into “cognition” notes, “Cognition is with occasional exceptions
(such as CPR A 69/B 94) distinguished from both knowledge and thinking.” 129
Though it is now standard to translate Erkenntnis in Kant as cognition instead of
knowledge, 130 the issue is more complicated than just a swapping of terms. For one
thing, as Karl Ameriks points out, there are times when it is appropriate to translate
Erkenntnis as knowledge.131 According to Ameriks, the business of translating
Erkenntnis must be understood with “the proviso” “in German the correlates for
„knowledge‟ here, [quoting Kant at (B 147)] viz., „Erfahrung’ and „Erkenntnis,‟ function
more like our term „cognitive state,‟ since they can be false, although their standard form
is to purport to be true.)”132 Further, Rolf George, consulting a dictionary from 1793,
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suggests in his “Vorstellung and Erkenntnis in Kant,”133 the verb form of Erkenntnis, i.e.
“erkennen” “may be translated as „to come to know‟ or „to know‟.”134 Yet, some
commentators such as Rudolf A. Makkreel and Predrag Cicovacki suggest the English
term “knowledge” should be reserved for cognition of a higher sort, i.e. “cognition that
has attained certainty by being part of a rational system.” 135
As I shall discuss below, there are multiple species of cognition in the Critique of
Pure Reason. For example, a particular cognition may be an intuition or a concept, and a
concept may be empirical or pure. Further, the experience of an object is equivalent to
having a determinate cognition of the object, and will count as knowledge of the object.
In this way, my strategy will be to look at the context in which the term Erkenntnis is
being used, and if the term refers to cognition in the specific sense equivalent to having a
determinate cognition of the object, then I will read Erkenntnis along with Kemp Smith
as “knowledge.” Otherwise, I follow Pluhar and Guyer in reading Erkenntnis as
“cognition.” Moreover, I will often show the German text when quoting Kant. It is
ultimately my hope that by the end of the chapter, the specificity of my purpose for
delving into the Critique of Pure Reason, and the clarity of my discussion will preclude
the significant confusion which might otherwise result from the complex issues to
consider in translating the German term Erkenntnis.
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Kant‟s “Copernican Revolution” is a Regulative Idea
“[T]he soul is in a way all existing things.”
~Aristotle (Anim 431b20)

Though Kant himself did not refer to his project as a “Copernican revolution,” 136
it is customary to speak of, and begin with, his Copernican revolution, or his Copernican
turn, in philosophy. 137 So, I will use the customary quotation from Kant on the way to an
articulation of his structure of experience. According to Kant,
It has been previously assumed138 that all our knowledge
must conform to objects. [Bisher nahm man an, alle unsere
Erkenntnis müsse sich nach den Gegenständen richten;]
But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by
establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means
of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure.
[aber alle Versuche über sie a priori etwas durch Begriffe
auszumachen, wodurch unsere Erkenntnis erweitert würde,
gingen unter dieser Voraussetzung zu nichte.]139
We must therefore make trial whether we may not have
more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose
that objects must conform to our knowledge. This would
agree better with what is desired, namely, that it should be
possible to have knowledge of objects a priori, determining
something in regard to them prior to their being given. We
should then be proceeding precisely on the lines of
Copernicus' primary hypothesis. Failing of satisfactory
progress in explaining the movements of the heavenly
bodies on the supposition that they all revolved round the
spectator, he tried whether he might not have better success
if he made the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain
at rest. A similar experiment can be tried in metaphysics, as
regards the intuition of objects.140 (CPR 1996, B xvi)
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The suggestion with which the Kant quote begins is that pre-Kantian thinkers assumed
(human) cognition and thereby (human) knowledge must conform to the way objects are.
To put this in the singular: to know an object is for your knowledge to conform to what
the object is. Being precedes knowing. The “failure” of this assumption, according to
Kant, is that no amount of experience can make the connection between knowing and
being a necessary one. Analogously, this is the perennial problem discussed when
contrasting induction and deduction. Though you may have experienced myriad swans,
all of which were black, it neither follows that all swans are black nor that the next swan
you experience will be black.
In the larger discussion of metaphysics this concern may be characterized in terms
of the relationship between order, change, and experience. The relationship between
order and change may be thought through the cosmological distinction between the
eternal and the perishable; the ontological distinction between the necessary and the
contingent; or, the logical distinction between the analytic and the synthetic. 141 That is,
since, necessity is a requirement for knowledge. If it is not necessarily the case that the
next swan you experience will be black, then – despite past experience – you do not know
that swans are black. You may certainly think or infer that the next swan you experience
will be black. Or you may harbor the opinion that all swans are black, but without
awareness of a necessity involved, you do not know. As evidenced by skeptical concerns
such as those found in the writings of David Hume,142 pre-Kant‟s Copernican revolution,
the way of thinking about order, change, and experience leaves a gap between necessity
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and experience. In other words, if there is necessary order beyond changing experience,
then how is one to become aware of the necessity? What inside of experience shows that
there is order outside of experience? Or as Kant once put it, “How am I to understand the
fact that, because something is, something else is?” (NM 239) Since, “Experience does
indeed tell us what is, but not that it must necessarily be so and not otherwise,” (CPR
1996, A 1) experience is in danger of turning out to be inductive, and all deduction in
danger of resting on induction. Changes in experience may lead you to use the words
“cause” and “effect,” but this does not mean that the cosmos is ordered by cause and
effect. Without an Archimedean point of necessity, the proposition that “being precedes
experience,” from which is derived the proposition “being precedes knowing,” are both
nothing more than opinions.
Kant‟s Copernican revolution begins, then, by supposing objects must conform to
“our knowledge [Erkenntnis].” This performs what Henry Allison refers to as “a
„paradigm shift‟ from a theocentric to an anthropocentric model [of thinking]” which he
unpacks as “also a shift from an intuitive to a discursive conception of cognition” and “a
shift in our understanding of what counts as knowing.”143 Kant, then, locates the
necessity required for knowledge in the logical necessity of general or formal logic. He
takes general logic to “correspond quite precisely with the division of the higher faculties
of cognition.” (CPR 1998, A 131/B 169) In this way, Kant has located the Archimedean
point as a point within the mind, and because this necessity involved derives from general
logic, Kant is able to speak of “our” knowledge. Logic as the ground of understanding
means a universality of understanding akin to logical validity. This is an attractive aspect
of Kant‟s project. Yet, the resulting ontology is often too much for theorists to admit,
143

Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, xv-xvi.

87

and Kant‟s solutions get passed over. That is to say, with the Copernican revolution it is
necessarily the case that the propositions “being precedes experience” and “being
precedes knowing” are merely opinions, i.e. they cannot be based on experience. Hence,
an examination of Kant‟s structure of experience is needed to explore its ontological
commitments and identify the aspects of the mind responsible for these commitments. It
is my claim that Kant‟s structure of experience results in an ontology which came closest
in the history of Western philosophy to solving the problem of non-being.
Kant‟s relation to his predecessors – especially that of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
– is well documented.144 In fact, Kant himself suggested that “the Critique of Pure
Reason might well be the true apology for Leibniz, even against those disciples [of
Leibniz] who heap praises upon him.” 145 Despite avowed differences the following quote
from Leibniz is strikingly similar to Kant‟s quote above which announces his Copernican
revolution.
[N]othing enters our minds naturally from outside, and it is
a bad habit of ours to think as if our souls received some
messenger species or had gates and windows. We have all
the forms in our minds, for all time even, because the mind
always expresses all its future thoughts, and already thinks
confusedly everything it will ever think distinctly. Nothing
could be taught us whose idea was not already present in
our minds as the matter from which this thought was
formed. That is what Plato understood so well when he put
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forward his doctrine of reminiscence [i.e. anamnesis,
recollection].146
Beyond Leibniz‟s locating “all the forms” in the mind, his similar sounding declaration to
that of Kant‟s Copernican revolution begins and ends with references to memory. On the
one hand, Leibniz seems to suggest a habit of thinking may be responsible for false
notions regarding the soul, and this notion in itself is reminiscent of a statement by
Nicolas Malebranche who held that “when we reason, the memory acts; and where there
is memory, there can be error.”147 On the other hand, Leibniz seems to suggest Plato‟s
theory of recollection, which Kant explicitly refers to as the activity of “philosophy”
itself, (CPR 1998, A 313/B 370) might be thought of along the lines of what
contemporary memory research refers to as spreading activation and elaboration. 148 That
is, suspending judgment on any notion of innateness in Leibniz‟s work, his movement of
Plato‟s forms into the mind and the subsequent attempt to work out a theory of memory is
not only viable but intimately related to Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason beyond even his
Copernican revolution.
Arthur Schopenhauer‟s (1788-1860) homage to Kant‟s Copernican revolution
helps indicate the ontological commitments resulting from such a revolution. In his The
World as Will and Representation [Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung], Schopenhauer
declares,
“The world is my representation”: this is a truth valid with
reference to every living and knowing being, although man
alone can bring it into reflective, abstract consciousness. If
he really does so, philosophical discernment has dawned on
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him. It then becomes clear and certain to him that he does
not know a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a
sun, a hand that feels an earth; that the world around him is
there only as representation, in other words, only in
reference to another thing, namely that which represents,
and this is himself. If any truth can be expressed a priori, it
is this; for it is the statement of that form of all possible and
conceivable experience, a form that is more general than all
others, than time, space, and causality, for all these
presuppose it.149 (WWI 3)
Thinking of Leibniz‟s “all the forms” in the mind as forms of “all possible experience”
Kant‟s Copernican revolution, beyond epistemologically establishing the inseparability of
perception from conception, established an epistemologically enclosed ontology. What I
mean is that for Kant in order to experience an object there must be an object to
experience. Yet, object formation necessarily requires the process of conforming to
concepts such as – those Schopenhauer notes – space, time, and causality such that
without these concepts the object would not be as such. Kant‟s ontology, or his
“Metaphysics of all metaphysics,” 150 as he called it, is further perplexing in that it is the
“end of metaphysics” which is supposed to derive from Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason
and specifically his Copernican revolution. On the one hand, then, it seems contradictory
to speak of Kant‟s ontology or ontological commitments. On the other hand, what I
mean by Kant‟s ontology, by way of his ontological commitments, is precisely the
reconciling of the metaphysics of metaphysics with the end of metaphysics.
Upon completing the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant wrote a
letter to his friend Marcus Herz stating, “This sort of investigation will always remain
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difficult, for it includes the metaphysics of metaphysics.” 151 It was, of course, in the
second edition Preface that Kant formulated the initial assumption of the Critique in
relation to Copernicus, and it is in the subsequent paragraph to the announcement of the
Copernican revolution that Kant mentions the end of metaphysics in conjunction with
“things in themselves.” In this subsequent paragraph, then, Kant deems the Copernican
revolution a success (CPR B xviii) and divides the Copernican revolution into two parts.
The first part includes the notion that objects must conform to our concepts (CPR B xix),
and Kant declares the second part to indicate “that with this power to cognize a priori we
shall never be able to go beyond the boundary of possible experience, even though doing
so is precisely the most essential concern.” (CPR 1996, B xix-xx) Further, this second
part is where Kant first mentions the thing-in-itself in relation to the Copernican
revolution stating, “our rational cognition applies only to appearances, and leaves the
thing in itself uncognized by us.” (CPR 1996, B xx) These indications of Kant‟s
ontological commitments culminate in Kant‟s restatement of the Copernican revolution in
terms of the thing-in-itself.
Suppose, now, we find that the unconditioned cannot be
thought at all without contradiction if we assume that our
experiential cognition conforms to objects as things in
themselves, yet that the contradiction vanishes if we
assume that our representation of things, as these are given
to us, does not conform to them as things in themselves, but
that these objects are, rather, appearances that conform to
our way of representing. Suppose that we find,
consequently, that the unconditioned is not to be met with
in things insofar as we are acquainted with them… but is to
be met with in them insofar as we are not… [First two
emphases Kant‟s; last emphasis mine]. (CPR 1996, B xx)
There are three ways to extradite Kant‟s ontological commitments here, and only the
third reconciles the metaphysics of metaphysics with the end of metaphysics.
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These three are: First, perhaps spatial and temporal properties are instantiated in
the mind by concepts, but also are properties of things-in-themselves. In this way,
perhaps the properties of things-in-themselves cause their instantiation in the mind. As a
general statement this interpretation may be attributed to Adolf Trendelenburg152 (18021872). Second, perhaps things-in-themselves, at least, contain primary properties of space
and time, and the secondary properties are added as a priori concepts from categories of
the understanding. In this way, space and time may be thought in the thing-in-itself
without attributing causation to it. Both of these strategies for distinguishing between
Kant‟s epistemology and ontology attribute being beyond physical experience, i.e. they
contain metaphysical claims. Moreover both of these strategies negate what has been
gained by the Copernican revolution.
The first strategy denies the stalemate in metaphysics to which Hume responded
and which prompted Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason in the first place, and the second
strategy turns Immanuel Kant into John Locke. To suppose either of these strategies to
be correct is to suggest there was never a reason, historical or otherwise, for the Critique
of Pure Reason to be written. The third strategy, then, posits the thing-in-itself as some
version of non-being, i.e. the thing-in-itself is posited as the solution to the problem of
non-being. Only this strategy resonates with the Copernican revolution. This is neither a
negative theology of the thing-in-itself nor an attribution of any properties whatsoever to
the thing-in-itself. Rather, Kant is faced with following problem: All that is is known
through experience by conforming to concepts of cognition. Beyond concepts of
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cognition, i.e. the uncognized, being cannot be attributed, i.e. it cannot be said that it is or
that things are. Hence, Kant is ontologically committed to attribute being to that which
can be experienced, and to deny being to what is beyond concepts of cognition.
Otherwise, he takes the position of either of the first two strategies above and his
Copernican revolution becomes internally inconsistent. Furthermore, the third strategy
reconciles the end of metaphysics with the metaphysics of metaphysics by solely doing
epistemology, and in allowing the epistemological stance to close the book on
metaphysics through its ontological commitments alone by making the negative
metaphysical claim precluding other metaphysical claims. Put another way, by
epistemologically enclosing ontology, positive ontological claims become
epistemological claims, and negative ontological claims derive from one epistemological
question: What is non-being? In sum, working on what Kant referred to as the problem
of the unconditioned and the uncognized, Kant attempted to solve the problem of nonbeing by positing the thing-in-itself.
Now those who rarely adventure away from the cavernous depth of focusing on
merely one thinker, and those who rarely focus at all might think that these questions –
such as “what is non-being?” – are of little import to the world, i.e. the grating and
derogatory claim that they are merely “academic.” However, this could not be further
from the truth. On the contrary, it was a peculiar prejudice of the early twentieth century
to distinguish sharply between the thinking of the practitioners of physical science and
the thinking of philosophers, i.e. philosophers of science and philosophers of mind,
psychology, religion, etc. By the end of the twentieth century, the news had finally
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reached the majority that one could no longer sharply distinguish between theory and
practice.
Similarly, and thankfully, even the distinction between analytic and continental
philosophers in the twenty-first century seems to be merely nominal or a matter of taste.
In other words, as Tom Rockmore articulates it in his book, In Kant’s Wake: Philosophy
in the twentieth century, directly and indirectly “the complicated development of
twentieth-century philosophy … can largely be understood as a series of reactions to
Kant.”153 In fact, Albert Einstein154 (1879-1955), Niels Bohr155 (1885-1962), Erwin
Schrödinger156 (1887-1961), Werner Heisenberg 157 (1901-1976), and Kurt Gödel158
(1906-1978) avowedly take Kant as their point of departure, and quantum physics itself
may be characterized as a concern to establish an interrogation site – post the Copernican
turn – at the limits of what can be experienced.159 In Gödel‟s own words, “the agreement
described between certain consequences of modern physics and a doctrine that Kant set
up 150 years ago in contradiction both to common sense and to the physicists and
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philosophers of his time, is greatly surprising.” 160 And, as Carsten Held notes, “the key
idea of Kant‟s epistemology” can be found “throughout Bohr‟s works … Bohr, therefore,
independently reproduces Kant‟s Copernican turn toward transcendental idealism. And
this turn is the more remarkable as it is not initiated by philosophical reflection, but
provoked by the problems of quantum theory.” 161 Hence, in the twentieth century while
some philosophers were busy bickering in regard to their team names, i.e. analytic v.
continental, 162 other philosophers in Kant‟s wake were busy building atomic bombs. 163
Certainly these questions are not merely “academic.”
“[R]efusing to sit still and be measured … as if the atom were an impulsive
thing,”164 Heisenberg‟s uncertainty principle, published in 1927, Bohr‟s notion of
complementarity, formulated in 1927, and Gödel‟s incompleteness theorems, published
in 1931, in many ways reflect the undecidability associated with the thing-in-itself. 165 As
H.J. Paton asks in his commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason,
The development of physics forces on our minds the
contrast between appearance and reality, between the world
as it seems to common sense and the world as it is to the
scientific observer. This in turn gives rise to further
reflections. If what is obviously real to common sense
becomes mere appearance to the deeper insight of the
scientist, may there not be a still deeper insight to which the
real as known by the scientist is merely the appearance of a
reality beyond?166
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From these Kantian concerns developed by the physicists, the relationship between
observation and evidence, i.e. a different understanding of the meaning of the
inseparability of perception from conception, began to emerge. 167 The sound bite echoed
from the voice of Norwood Hanson (1924-1967), “seeing is a theory laden enterprise.”168
And, figures such as the later Karl Popper169 (1902-1994), Willard Van Orman Quine 170
(1908-2000), Thomas S. Kuhn171 (1922-1996), and Paul Feyerabend 172 (1924-1994),
among others, may be seen as concerned to promulgate an understanding of scientific
observation as theory-laden so as, in part, to dispel notions of pre-theoretical evidence or
pre-theoretical ways seeing.173 The influence rippled into the late twentieth century and
can be seen in the work of philosophers such as Donald Davidson 174 (1917-2003), Gilles
Deleuze175 (1925-1995), Richard Rorty176 (1931-2007), and Jacques Derrida177 (19302004), among others. In the very least, these twentieth century insights stand on the
shoulders of Kant‟s Copernican revolution. Surely Kant‟s predecessors provided an
167
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alphabet of ideas, but for the anthropocentric spelling out of phenomena to be read as
experience, Kant is to thank for the idiom.
The Kantian Structure and Trajectory of Experience
“Do I contradict myself?
Very well then, I contradict myself,
(I am large, I contain multitudes).”178
~Walt Whitman, Song of Myself, 51, lines 7-9

The purpose for this section of the chapter is to show Kant‟s structure and
trajectory of experience. This is valuable because moving from a schematic
representation of Kant‟s structure and trajectory of experience I am able to regressively
focus in, as it were, on Kant‟s discussion of the ground of experience. Given what Kant
says about the ground of experience I am able to indicate his error in choosing
imagination as the power responsible for grounding experience. He should have chosen
memory. Further, in the process of regressively focusing in on the ground of experience I
am able to discuss the importance of Kant‟s distinction between the discursive and nondiscursive content of experience. Hence, this section proceeds by way of regressive
focus toward the ground of experience such that it is separated into two parts.
First, following Kant, I will discuss the components of the structure of experience
as if discussing species of the genus experience. As such, Kant‟s first division is between
sensibility and understanding. After following out this division I will have presented a
skeleton of the structure of experience by indicating the progression of powers involved
in an experience from initial point to terminal point along with their respective modes of
representation. Second, I will discuss the ground of experience by discussing the
ultimate synthesis which is necessary for experience. This, of course, is the synthesis of
178
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sensibility and the understanding. Kant discusses this synthesis in the section of the
Critique titled the Transcendental Deduction. After having discussed the Transcendental
Deduction, then, I will be able to fully show both the structure and trajectory of
experience and the ground of experience in Kant.
The Critique of Pure Reason is a veritable terminological cornucopia.
Consequently, constellating Kant‟s cant can confound commentators. As a guiding
thread, however, the origin of some of Kant‟s terminology coupled with the structure of
the Critique itself lead to a coherent rendering of his discussion of experience. I trace the
origin of Kant‟s terminology to three general sources. An ancient debate within the
Socratic schools, specifically the issue of assent to true knowledge as figured between the
stoics and the skeptics, i.e. “from the Stoic-Academic debates about epistemology from
the third and second centuries BCE.”179 Also, I trace a cluster of terms to Leibniz and a
contribution to Kant‟s understanding of logic from the Port Royal Logic (1662) [La
logique, ou l’art de penser] published by Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694) and Pierre Nicole
(1625-1695).
Regarding Ancient Stoic epistemology Cicero (106-43 BC) recounts the four
stage process of the Stoic doctrine as demonstrated by Zeno of Citium 180 (c. 334-262
BC), founder of the Stoic school – the “Stoa poikilê,” i.e. “the painted porch.” According
to Cicero,
Zeno used to demonstrate this with gestures. When he had
put his hand out flat in front of him with his fingers
straight, he would say: “An impression [phantasia, i.e.
θαληαζία] is like this.” [visum huius modi est] Next, after
contracting his fingers a bit: “Assent [ζζγθαάζεζηο] is like
179
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this.” [adsensus huius modi est] Then, when he had
bunched his hand up to make a fist, he would say that that
was an “apprehension” or “grasp.” [θαηάιεςηο] (This
image also suggested the name he gave to it, katalêpsis,
which hadn‟t been used before.) Finally, when he had put
his left hand on top, squeezing his fist tight with some
force, he would say that scientific knowledge was like that:
a state none but the wise enjoyed – though as for who is or
ever was wise, even they [the Stoics] aren‟t in a rush to
say. 181
Cicero‟s quote describes the Stoic notion of grasping an appearance by way of
impression, i.e. phantasia, in an apprehension, i.e. katalêpsis. The biographer Diogenes
Laertius in his The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers notes first that for the
Stoics, perception “is an impression produced on the mind, its name being appropriately
borrowed from impressions on wax made by a seal.”182 Impressions, then, are
“comprehensible and incomprehensible” which correspond with the two types of
impressions, i.e. katalêptic or non-katalêptic. (LOP 276) Moreover, to assent to an
impression is to judge it affirmatively. Hence, the Stoic is to affirm only a katalêptic
impression and suspend judgment on non-katalêptic impressions.
Now, during this early period in the history of the Stoa, skepticism183 had become
the mode of Plato‟s Academy [Ἀθαδεκία] under the direction of Arcesilaus (316-242
BC). Cicero describes a debate between the heads of the two schools, i.e. the stoic Zeno
of Citium and the skeptic Arcesilaus. According to Cicero, Arcesilaus considered the
idea of not holding opinions to be valuable, and as such thought the wise person should
withhold assent, i.e. suspend judgment. So, the skeptic asked the stoic what the wise
181
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person should do just in case the wise person “couldn‟t apprehend anything,” i.e. should
the wise person suspend judgment?
The stoic responds by denying such a case to be possible because there is always
“an impression from what is, stamped, impressed, and molded just as it is.” 184 As
rebuttal the skeptic proposes two scenarios in which the wise person, rather than
apprehend nothing, encounters supposed indiscernible apprehensions such as twins or
apprehensions in abnormal states such as dreaming.185 The skeptic proposes these
scenarios so as to illustrate an instance without clear [enargês] and distinct [ektypos]
criteria, thereby undermining the possibility of affirmatively judging an appearance, i.e.
assenting to a katalêptic impression.186 The story, of course, does not end there. Yet,
before showing the relevance of the story for Kant‟s terminology, there is another salient
part.
Judgment remained a major point of contention between the stoics and the
skeptics even by the time of the third leader of the stoic school, Chrysippus (c. 279-206
BC). Chrysippus‟ innovative contribution to the debate was to borrow ideas from
Epicurus (c. 341-270 BC). Though lost in history, Epicurus wrote a treatise titled On the
Standard or Canon [Πεξὶ θξηγεξίνπ], the name referring to a stick or rule with which to
measure or set limits. Laertius tells us this book contained the Epicurean criteria for
truth. (LOP 435) Now, “Chrysippus adopted two of Epicurus‟ three criteria, senseperception and prolêpsis, i.e. πξόιεςηο. These two criteria appear to be subdivisions of
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Zeno‟s single criterion, katalêpsis („apprehension‟).”187 Whereas, Zeno of Citium
receives credit for the term katalêpsis, Epicurus receives credit for the term prolêpsis, and
this term – prolêpsis – has been assimilated into Latin as both notion (notio) and
anticipation (anticipatio).188
Epicurus, in contrast to the Academy of Plato, the Lyceum of Aristotle, the
Cynosarges of the cynics, and the Stoa of Zeno, conducted his hedonistic school in his
garden just outside Athens, whereby his school name, “The Garden.” Indeed, Epicurus
was neither stoic nor skeptic, for example, he held, “If you resist all the senses, you will
not even have anything left to which you can refer, or by which you may be able to judge
of the falsehood of the senses which you condemn.” (LOP 476) Hence, the senses and
that by which one is able to anticipate, i.e. achieve prolêpsis, may be used so as to
correctly assent, i.e. judge of appearances. It is in this way, that the stoics, under the
direction of Chrysippus, formulated a richer account of experience with which to enhance
their epistemology and respond to the skeptics. 189
In his Against the Logicians, Sextus Empiricus (c. 160-210 AD) notes the
“Skeptical Method” is directed not merely at stoics or hedonists but at all
“Dogmatists.”190 Further, Sextus in his Outlines of Skepticism enumerates various
skeptical methods with which to combat dogmatists beginning with the methods
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proposed by the skeptic Pyrrho (c. 360-270 BC). In general, Pyrrhonian skepticism may
be said to follow a principle of interpretation. 191 In other words,
[the Pyrrhonists] affirmed that facts are not by nature such
as they appear to be, but that facts only seem as such; and
they said, that what they doubt is not what they think – for
their thoughts are evident to themselves, but the reality of
the things which are only made known to them by their
sensations. (LOP 408)
As a clear example, out of the ten modes of Pyrrhonian skepticism consider that the
“sixth mode has reference to the promiscuousness and confusion of objects; according to
which nothing is seen by us simply and by itself.” (LOP 411) Or the first mode,
according to Sextus,
we are not able to prefer our own appearances to those
produced in the irrational animals. So, if the irrational
animals are no more convincing than we are when it comes
to judging appearances, and if different appearances are
produced depending on the variations among animals, then
I shall be able to say how each existing object appears to
me, but for these reasons I shall be forced to suspend
judgment on how it is by nature.192
Finally, of the modes in total Sextus boasts,
That every object of investigation can be referred to these
modes we shall briefly show as follows. What is proposed
is either an object of perception or an object of thought,
and whichever it is it is subject to dispute. … Now, will
they say that the dispute is decidable or undecidable? If
undecidable, we have it that we must suspend judgment; for
it is not possible to make assertions about what is subject to
undecidable dispute. But if decidable, we shall ask where
the decision is to come from [my emphases].193
Asking for the origin, of course, Sextus contends will also lead to undecidability. In sum,
Sextus says, “no object is ever perceived independently and entirely by itself.” (LOP 413)

191

Cf. Frank Scalambrino, “The Ubiquity of Interpretation: Truth and the Unconscious,” Proceedings of
the Ohio Philosophical Association, 5, (2008), (http://www.ohiophilosophy.org/).
192
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, tr., (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), 22.
193
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, 41-42.

102

That is, “Those things which are known in relation to others are unknown of themselves
[my emphasis].” (LOP 412)
Both terminologically and strategically, in determining his structure and trajectory
of experience, Kant borrows from the Socratic Schools, as evidenced by the above
depiction of the stoic-skeptic debate. The terms dogmatism, apprehension, the
incomprehensible/comprehensible contrast, the conception of judgment in relation to
experience, the awareness of prolêptic features in experience, and the unknowable nature
of things in themselves all make their way into Kant‟s structure of experience. What is
more, Kant‟s Copernican turn may be thought of as the unification of the stoic, skeptic,
and Epicurean contributions regarding epistemology. In other words, the point at which
Sextus leaves off the debate amongst the Socratic schools, Kant enters the scene and
grants each faction their initial premise with his Copernican revolution.
Strategically, Kant has maneuvered his epistemological stance so as to
incorporate the components upon which the debate amongst the Socratic schools hinged,
while at the same time formulating an initial premise which precludes choosing any one
position in the debate over another. In other words, things in themselves cannot be
known – to the skeptics, there are some contributions from the senses of which one can
neither apprehend nor have knowledge, i.e. a katalêptic grasp – to the stoics, and the
manner in which one comes to judge the objects of experience, and thereby having
knowledge of them, is through some prolêptic function of the mind – to the Epicureans.
Hence, Kant‟s structure of experience moves from the unknowable thing-in-itself through
the senses, which combining with imagination forms an appearance [θαληαζία], and into
the logically structured understanding where the object of knowledge is grasped and
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known. The wise person – the sage – for Kant is one who uses reason critically to reflect
upon this structure and trajectory so as to formulate and to assent to scientific principles –
formulating a canon – regarding experience rather than mere opinion.
The Critique of Pure Reason is riddled with references to the Socratic schools,
including specifically epistemological references to the stoic-skeptic debate (A 569/B
597) and Epicurus (A 853/B 881); in addition, there are references to both Diogenes
Laertius (B xi) and Cicero (A 689/B 717).194 For example, in a section titled, “On the
impossibility of a skeptical satisfaction of pure reason that is divided against itself,” Kant
begins the section by noting, “The consciousness of my ignorance (if this is not at the
same time known to be necessary) should not end my inquiries;” on the contrary,
according to Kant, such “is rather the proper cause to arouse them. All ignorance is
either that of things or of the determination and boundaries of my cognition.” (CPR 1998,
A 758/B 786) Shortly thereafter Kant references David Hume as a modern proponent of
skepticism, and notes, “The first step in matters of pure reason, which characterize its
childhood, is dogmatic. The just mentioned second step is skeptical, and gives evidence
of the caution of the power of judgment sharpened by experience [my emphasis].” (CPR
1998, A 761/B 789) For Kant, the “nomadic” skeptics preferred undecidability to any
“permanent cultivation of the soil.” (CPR 1998, A ix)
Before Kant, with Kant, and in Kant‟s wake, it seems tenable, then, to link the
thing-in-itself with skeptic undecidability. Recall, Sextus took pains to indicate that the
justification for skeptical suspense of judgment derives from the “undecidability,” or the
“undecidable” quality, of any judgment which would purport to determine the identity of
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the thing-in-itself. In this way, it is as if the skeptics are wielding the power of non-being
against their fellow Socratics. And, in unifying the positions of the debate into one
epistemological position Kant has embraced the thing-in-itself as undecidable.
The division into undecidable, on the one hand, and the necessary, certain, clear,
and distinct, on the other, may be clearly seen in Kant‟s structure and trajectory of
experience. In general, the structure of experience is divided in two. Kant says, “Only
this much appears to be necessary by way of introduction or anticipation, namely, that
there are two stems of human knowledge, sensibility [Sinnlichkeit] and understanding
[Verstand], which perhaps spring forth from a common, but to us unknown, root.” (CPR
2003, A 15/B 29) Whereas, I refer to Leibniz to help explicate the first stem, I will refer
to logic in general to explicate the second stem.
Kant deals with the “unknown root” in his “Transcendental Analytic” section of
the Critique, specifically the “Transcendental Deduction.” In fact, an initial glance at the
structure of the Critique of Pure Reason will help facilitate a discussion of the stems of
knowledge and the structure and trajectory of experience. Following the Kant scholar
Howard Caygill, I have included a schematic representation of the “Table of Contents” of
the Critique of Pure Reason. This graphic provides an at-a-glance look at the structure of
Kant‟s text which largely coincides with what I refer to as the structure and trajectory of
experience.
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Figure 2.1195
The “Transcendental Doctrine of Elements” is the section of the Critique devoted to
describing the elements of the structure and trajectory of experience. As the above
schematic of Kant‟s text shows – from left to right – in order to suppose objects of
experience must conform to “our knowledge,” there is a movement from the
“Transcendental Aesthetic” to the “Transcendental Logic.” Kant tells us this division
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may be described as the division between “lower” and “higher” cognitive faculties,
respectively, (CPR 1998, A 130/B 169) and this division indicates the sections which
deal with the undecidable, on the one hand, and the necessary, certain, clear, and distinct,
on the other, i.e. the aesthetic and the logic respectively.
The Transcendental Logic section of the Critique is further divided into two
sections, i.e. the “Transcendental Analytic” and the “Transcendental Dialectic.” Whereas
in the Transcendental Analytic Kant discusses the complex operation of applying the
categories within an experience, in the Transcendental Dialectic Kant discusses the
application of the categories both within and outside experience. 196 Lastly, regarding
Figure 1.1, the Analytic of Principles may be thought of as the center hub of the
architectonic structure of the experience. Were I to assign an exact point, I would place
the point between the “Deduction of the Categories,” a.k.a. the “Transcendental
Deduction,” and the “Schematism.” That point for Kant acts as a crossroads where he
branches out into multiple views of the entire architectonic. I will have further explained
this in the Interlude below. For now, I will explain how the trajectory of experience may
be thought of as a movement of limiting from the passive lower faculties which are
“near” in relation to the thing-in-itself to the active higher faculties which are “remote” in
relation to the thing-in-itself. I borrow the terms near and remote from Leibniz, as it is
perhaps Leibniz to whom Kant owes the most for his description of the bottom of the
structure of experience.
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Aesthetic, “in its original Greek form (αηζζεηηθόο), means anything that has to do
with perception by the senses, and this wider connotation was retained by Kant.”197
Consider a highly readable passage – worth quoting at length – from Kant‟s Lectures on
Logic, specifically what has come to be known as the Jäsche Logic,
The first degree, then, of perfection of our knowledge as to
quality is its clearness. A second or a higher degree of
clearness is distinctness. This consists in the clearness of
attributes. We must first distinguish logical from aesthetic
distinctness in general. Logical distinctness rests on the
objective, aesthetic on the subjective clearness of attributes.
The former is a clearness by means of concepts, the latter a
clearness by means of intuition. The latter kind of
distinctness, then consists in a mere vividness and
intelligibility, that is, in a mere clearness by means of
examples in concreto (for much may be intelligible which
is not distinct, and conversely much may be distinct which
is yet hard to understand, because it reaches back to remote
attributes, the connection of which with intuition is only
possible through a long series) [all emphases Kant‟s]. 198
The limiting movement of the trajectory of experience perfects subjectively in aesthetic
distinctness by means of intuition and objectively in logical distinctness by means of
concepts. The former is the first stem of sensibility, and the latter is the second stem of
the understanding – both of which are dealt with in the Transcendental Aesthetic and
Transcendental Logic, respectively. Whereas the understanding may act upon itself and
produce abstract results, experience is the condition sine qua non of sensibility, i.e. there
is intuition only where there is experience. In order to make experience objective, then,
the product of sensibility must be combined with the understanding in a further limiting
process. Hence, this process resulting in the experience of an object, i.e. objective
knowledge, must begin with subjective experience, i.e. by way of subjective experience.
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Not only do the stems differ, then, in their perfections, but they also differ in their
negations. In his Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into
Philosophy, Kant makes the following distinction:
Two things are opposed to each other if one thing cancels
that which is posited by the other. This opposition is twofold: it is either logical through contradiction, or it is real,
that is to say, without contradiction [Kant‟s emphases].
This first opposition, namely logical opposition, is that
upon which attention has been exclusively and uniquely
concentrated until now. … The second opposition, namely
real opposition, is that where two predicates of a thing are
opposed to each other, but not through the law of
contradiction. … Its meaning is the same as that of
negation (negatio), lack, absence – notions which are in
general use among philosophers – albeit with a more
precise determination which will be specified later on. (NM
211)
The difference between the two negations relates to the intelligences in which they reside.
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant refers to these intelligences as discursive and
intuitive, i.e. non-discursive. In other words, sensibility contains non-discursive aspects,
but the understanding is solely discursive. (Cf. CPR A xvii & B 93)
Now, in order to respect Kant‟s distinction between negations, I use the term
“not” when referring to logical distinction and the term “non” to refer to what he calls
“real” negation. Recall this may be read as Kant‟s appropriation of Gorgias‟ strategy
noted in the Introduction and invokes the terms ἐλαληίνλ and ἕηεξνλ. What is more, Kant
was correct to indicate that attention had been focused solely on the “not” form of
negation before his teachings. Moreover, I will continue to press this distinction in the
next chapter, i.e. the difference between not-being and non-being. However, for the
purpose of understanding Kant‟s structure and trajectory of experience, it is important to
recognize the different stems – as Kant refers to them – of sensibility and understanding,

109

their different perfections, and their different negations. With this information in place, I
can now discuss the structure and trajectory of experience beginning with sensibility,
moving to the understanding, and finishing with the unknown root which combines them.
I have already indicated that – in an experience – the structure of experience
amounts to a limiting structure. “Accordingly, the understanding limits sensibility, but
without therefore expanding its own realm.” (CPR 1996, A 288/B 344) As such, the nondiscursive is limited first by sensibility and then by the understanding into an objective
experience resulting in knowledge of the object of experience. When Kant refers to a
multiplicity prior to its limiting, he refers to the multiplicity as a “manifold.” Note, the
adjective mannigfaltig literally means many [mannig] creases or folds [faltig], and the
noun das Mannigfaltige, then, refers to a diversity or multiplicity in so far as it refers to a
grouping of potential intuitions. For example, Kant will say,
[E]very appearance contains a manifold, so that different
perceptions are in themselves encountered in the mind
sporadically and individually, these perceptions need to be
given a combination. Hence, there is in us an active power
to synthesize. This power we call imagination; and the act
that it performs directly on perceptions I call apprehension.
For the imagination is to bring the manifold of intuition to
an image. (CPR 1996, A 120-121)
Here Kant tells us the manifold of intuition contains a multiplicity which must be limited
so as to fit, so to speak, into an image. Thus, the limiting at the intuitive level is a
limiting of potentials within and across the groupings which constitute an appearance
once apprehended.
Post apprehension of an appearance, a regression to a singular intuition – by the
mental operation of mathematics – arrives at a manifold in the singular intuition itself.
Once the image is further processed by the active stem of understanding, the image is
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further limited so as to fit the appropriate concepts and be an object of knowledge. The
beginning of the limiting within the structure of experience may be referred to as the
“bottom” of the structure, and the top of the structure of experience which accounts for
the limiting may be referred to as the “top.” As I will show, Kant seems to have been
influenced by Leibniz in his thinking about both the bottom and top of the structure of
experience. The guiding question here: If the bottom of the structure of experience is
most near the thing-in-itself, then how are we to think of the manifold at the very bottom
of the structure of experience?
The section of the Critique of Pure Reason titled “On the Amphiboly of Concepts
of Reflection” is widely read as Kant‟s distancing himself from Leibniz. It is there that
Kant famously claimed Leibniz “intellectualized appearances” just as Locke “sensualized
all of the concepts of understanding.” (CPR 1996, A 271/B 327) To answer the guiding
question, then, I will examine the way in which Kant criticizes Leibniz‟s intellectualizing
of appearances. Kant‟s criticism both draws from Leibniz and answers the guiding
question. Kant‟s strategy here is to use the sensibility/understanding distinction in
general and the discursive/non-discursive distinction specifically to criticize Leibniz‟s
principle of the identity of indiscernibles and then Leibniz‟s principle of determination.
Kant notes that Leibniz, “compared all things with one another merely by
concepts”; in this way he “naturally found among them no differences other than those by
which the understanding distinguishes its pure concepts from one another.” (CPR 1996,
A 270/B 326) In other words, regarding Leibniz Kant thought that “Appearance was for
him the representation of the thing-in-itself, although a representation different in logical
form from cognition through understanding [Kant‟s emphasis].” (CPR 1996, A 270/B

111

326) Kant is here saying that Leibniz did not consider appearance to contain the nondiscursive. Though, interestingly, Kant seems to have derived his reading of nondiscursivity precisely from Leibniz. Kant makes a complicated but rewarding move here.
In order to fully understand what Kant accomplishes it is important to provide an
example from Leibniz.
According to Leibniz, God‟s perfection entails that he does not create in a
haphazard way. Now, combined with the principle of sufficient reason, i.e. “nothing
takes place without a sufficient reason,”199 it is possible to “understand in a wonderful
way how a kind of divine mathematics or metaphysical mechanism is used in the origin
of things.”200 That is, God “acts perfectly” like a Geometer or “a good architect who
makes the most advantageous use of the space and the capital intended for a building.” 201
This should help illuminate Leibniz‟s two principles which Kant criticizes, i.e. the
principle of the identity of indiscernibles and the principle of determination. Leibniz‟s
principle of the identity of indiscernibles holds that “there are not in nature two real,
absolute beings, indiscernible from each other, because, if there were, God and nature
would act without reason in ordering the one otherwise than the other.” 202 From this
principle it follows for Leibniz that “each singular substance expresses the whole
universe in its own way,” i.e. “every substance is like an entire world, and like a mirror of
God … as the same city is represented differently depending on the different positions
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from which it is regarded.”203 Despite, then, Leibniz‟s mortality, given these principles,
“it is possible to make some general remarks touching the course of providence in the
government of things.”204 It is to such affairs that the principle of determination pertains.
Leibniz‟s essay, “On the Radical Origination of Things,” 205 is instructive here.
Given the complexity involved in Leibniz‟s following game analogy, I quote him at
length. My comments afterward connect the principle of determination with the
aforementioned work from Leibniz so as to explicate the difficult notion of nondiscursivity in Kant.
[O]nce it is established to be such as it is [by God], it
follows that things such as they are will come into being.
… There is always a principle of determination in nature
which must be sought by maxima and minima; namely, that
a maximum effect should be achieved with a minimum
outlay, so to speak. And at this point time and place, or in
a word, the receptivity or capacity to the world, can be
taken for the outlay, or the terrain on which a building is to
be erected as commodiously as possible, the variety of
forms corresponding to the spaciousness of the building
and the number and elegance of its chambers. The case is
like that of certain games in which all the spaces on a board
are to be filled according to definite rules, but unless we
use a certain device, we find ourself at the end blocked
from the difficult spaces and compelled to leave more
spaces vacant than we needed or wished to. Yet there is a
definite rule by which a maximum number of spaces can be
filled in the easiest way [my emphases]. 206
This is like the games where blocks are to be specifically organized or any game where a
chaotic dispersion of species is organized. From the initial moment of encounter to the
point of organization it may be said that there is a rule (or series of rules) for moving
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from the first point to the second. It is in this way that God is like a Geometer for
Leibniz. Yet, as a divine Geometer the components with which God works are infinite.
Similarly, once having assumed that being involves more
perfection than nonbeing, or that there is a reason why
something should come to exist rather than nothing, or that
a transition from possibility to actuality must take place, it
follows that even if there is no further determining
principle, there does exist the greatest amount possible in
proportion to the given capacity of time and space (or the
possible order of existence), in much the same way as tiles
are laid so that as many as possible are contained in a given
space [my emphases].207
Given all the above principles, then, with which God governs creation, Leibniz is able to
draw an analogy between God‟s creating and the playing of a game. The focus here is on
time and space.
According to Leibniz, the vastness of God‟s creating is such that time and space
are infinite. Yet, from our (human) perspective it is as if we – with our physical eyes –
see merely the finite consecutive tiles on a game board comprised of time and space, each
tile – each thing – of which is like a looking glass into infinity. William Blake (17571827) is perhaps appropriate here, “To see a world in a grain of sand, and heaven in a
wild flower, hold infinity in the palm of your hand, and eternity in an hour.”208
Space and time, then, for Leibniz are like the tiles on the game board which, when
compared to the infinite vastness of God‟s creation, derive their reality more from their
relation to each other than their determination of coordinates for us – even though they
do determine coordinates for us. It is as if God‟s vastness is somehow folded into each
tile we experience. For example, a different intellect – an intellect with a different
“receptivity or capacity” – could determine, i.e. understand, different sized tiles by
207
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parsing God‟s vastness differently. Put another way, space and time are ideal and derive
from the attempt of a finite mind to experience the infinite mind of God. With God as
most real, time and space are ideal, not real. According to Leibniz, “By the word thing
we mean that which appears, hence that which can be understood.”209 Moreover, it is
“not necessary for that which expresses to be similar to the thing expressed.” 210
The thing is perspectival. Leibniz draws an analogy, as the view of a city from
above “differs from the almost infinite horizontal perspectives with which it delights the
eyes of travelers who approach it from one direction or another,” so “the appearance of
parts differs from the appearance of their positions.”211 In other words, we reify or
hypostasize time and space by treating them as real due to our inability to fully grasp the
mind of God or God‟s creation. Though things are infinitely divisible, they need not
have an infinite number of parts – which would be a determination by our mind – because
the number of parts depends on the type of mind “looking” at the thing. Leibniz puts this
beautifully in saying, “there always remain in the abyss of things parts which are still
asleep.”212 It is as if the universe itself – insofar as we can still speak of an “in-itself” – is
a phantasm in the mind of God. The universe conceived as a sensorium or imaginarium
of the mind of God.213 Such a notion might call to mind Isaac Newton‟s (1643-1727)
reference in Optics, to God‟s “boundless uniform sensorium … [God] being everywhere
present to the things themselves.”214 (Bk 3, pt 1, q28)
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Non-discursivity, then, refers to the “parts which are still asleep” “in the abyss of
things,” and these parts will always remain asleep for a (human) mind like ours. For
Kant, “Space is not a discursive or, as is said, general concept of relations of things in
general, but a pure intuition.” (CPR 1998, A 25/B 39) Similarly, “Time is no discursive,
or as one calls it, general concept, but a pure form of sensible intuition. Different times
are but parts of one and the same time.” (CPR 1998, A 32/B 47) Whereas Leibniz seems
to stress the relationality of each tile in his metaphoric example, Kant seems to stress the
singularity of each tile. Kant has space and time as conditions for the possibility of
intuiting the manifold which is itself a limiting of the abyss. Yet, even the limiting
contains the non-discursive within each singular intuitive grasp contributing to the
manifold of sensibility in which an appearance can be apprehended – an unimaginable
depth. Hence, for Kant, we can never know the thing-in-itself.
Kant draws a distinction between the thing-in-itself and an appearance in space
and time. Space and time remain contributions from our mind, and the manifold at the
“bottom” of the structure of experience may be described as an abyss containing parts
which remain asleep to the experiential apparatus of our mind. In sum, moving from the
unknowable thing-in-itself toward the object of experience moves along a limiting
trajectory through the forms of intuition – space and time – to a manifold of sensibility
which will be further limited as an appearance is apprehended in the process of
combining the two stems of sensibility and understanding.
Nietzsche‟s seemingly prescient remark is appropriate here: “when you look long
into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you.”215 (§146) If you might see a world in a
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grain of sand, what do you see when you turn that gaze toward you? Where are you in
this structure of experience, i.e. in the structure with which you experience? Insofar as
the limiting involved along the trajectory of experience is also a unifying, you might
imagine the figure of a cone whose convergence points to you in the structure of
experience. The term used by Kant is apperception, and Leibniz coined the term in his
New Essays on Human Understanding [Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain]
(1765) commenting on John Locke‟s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
(1690).
Within the structure of experience there are two types of syntheses which can
occur – the synthesis combining the stems of knowledge in an experience or a synthesis
which is merely intellectual, i.e. not involving intuition. Kant calls the first a figurative
synthesis and the second an intellectual synthesis. (CPR 1998, B 152) So, the
combination which occurs between the two stems, i.e. sensibility and understanding is
performed by the power of imagination. Further, the unity to which the synthesis points
– like the converging in a cone – is the transcendental unity of apperception. (CPR 1998,
B 141) In the New Essays, Leibniz says, “The apperception of that which is in us
depends upon attention and order.”216 Like following along the chain of words in this
sentence, out of paying attention to the order of the flowing appearances emerges an
awareness of that which is paying attention, and that is you.
In other words, the figurative synthesis is not a one to one synthesis; it is a
limiting of a multiplicity, i.e. a manifold of sensibility that is unified. Whereas
perception for Kant – like a series of tiles from Leibniz‟s game board – consists in a
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series of appearances each of which comes with an awareness of you as the (empirical)
apprehender of the appearance, the unity of apperception is the (non-empirical) unity of
these perceptions. In Kant‟s words, on the one hand there is the “flow of inner
appearances” called “inner sense or empirical apperception,” and on the other hand, there
is the numerical identity across the appearances in the flow, i.e. the unity which means all
these appearances relate to me [Kant‟s emphases]. (CPR 1996, A 107) This numerical
identity is the unity of pure – as opposed to empirical – apperception. (CPR A 107) And,
this unity “precedes all cognition of the object, as the intellectual form of that cognition.”
(CPR 1996, A 129) Hence, apperception “is an act of spontaneity; i.e. it cannot be
regarded as belonging to sensibility,” and it produces the representation “I think that must
be capable of accompanying all other representations [Kant‟s emphasis].” (CPR 1996, B
132)
Now though the structure of experience – with its converging trajectory – takes
place between the thing-in-itself and the “I think,” it is still not clear how the “I think”
accompanies all of the structure‟s representations. This can be cleared up by looking at
the way Kant conceived of discursive cognition. In brief, discursive thought is
judgmental. Pure apperception is spontaneous, which means between the two stems – the
passive sensibility and the active understanding – pure apperception involves the stem of
the understanding in the structure of experience. Similarly, according to Kant, “We can
… trace all actions of the understanding back to judgments, so that the understanding in
general can be represented as a faculty for judging.” (CPR 1998, A 69/B 94) Moreover,
“judgment is nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity
of apperception.” (CPR 1998, B 141) Borrowing a phrase from Arnauld in his Port
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Royal Logic, “Man is an intellectual cause, in relation to that which he does with
judgment.”217 Hence, it is through judgment, then, that the I think can accompany all
representations. And, according to Kant, “in every judgment I am always the
determining subject of that relation that constitutes the judgment.” (CPR 1998, B 407)
Now, judgment in the Critique of Pure Reason may be parsed in a number of
ways. In regard to the subjective/objective distinction, I follow Béatrice Longuenesse in
characterizing the difference between these judgments as subjective coordination and
objective subordination.218 The value of this distinction will be seen below in my
discussion of the Transcendental Deduction. Suffice to say for now, the flow of
appearances are coordinated in a subjective judgment and subordinated to a concept in an
objective judgment.
The standard way to parse Kant‟s judgments, then, is by way of the various logics
to which the different judgments relate. The two different logics in the Critique of Pure
Reason are general logic and transcendental logic. (CPR 1998, A 77/B 102) According
to Errol Harris, Kant‟s hope for the transcendental logic “is to give an account of the
experience of an objective world in terms of the necessary synthesis effected … a priori
in the act of cognition, as the condition of apprehending any object whatsoever.” 219
Further, according to Kant, general logic, as the logic (ινγόο) of Aristotle, (CPR 1998, B
viii) abstracts from the content of objects and deals only with the forms of thinking. It is
divided into analytic and dialectic. Analysis, i.e. Aristotelian demonstration, rests on the
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principle of non-contradiction, and dialectic rests on the use of syllogism.
Transcendental logic pertains to the form of experience and of objects, i.e. the logic of the
conditions for the possibility of experience. It is concerned with the a priori concepts of
objects, i.e. the construction of objects not the content. Synthesis, then, in transcendental
logic provides the basis for the connections which allow for the representation of an
object of experience. Synthesis in general logic allows for inferences.
Because I am interested in the structure of experience, I am interested in
transcendental logic more than general logic. To be specific about this interest, I will
refer back to the Kant quote above from his Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative
Magnitudes into Philosophy. There Kant distinguished between real and logical
opposition. (OM 211) As its name implies, “logical opposition” pertains to general logic.
This is the logic, then, in which – according to Aristotle – “it will not be possible for the
same thing to be and not to be.” (Meta 1995, 1006b19) However, it is real opposition
which pertains to the structure of experience. Examining the structure of experience and
its transcendental logic, then, the specific judgments I will look at will be judgments of
perception and judgments of experience. These judgments involve both stems of
knowledge and their synthesis. After pausing here to summarize the ground covered thus
far, I will discuss the judgments by way of the synthesis of the two stems discussed by
Kant in his Transcendental Deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason.
For ease of reference I refer to the “three standpoints” which are involved in what
I have been discussing thus far. Retaining, perhaps, something of Leibniz‟s
perspectivism noted above, Kant explained that “Every concept may be regarded as a
point which, as the station for an observer, has its own horizon, that is, a variety of things
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which can be represented, and as it were, surveyed from that standpoint [my emphasis].”
(CPR 2003, A 685/B 686) The three standpoints, then, are the experiential, the
conceptual, and the performative or apperceptive. The experiential covers the structure
of experience from the bottom to the determination of the object of experience. This
standpoint is best thought in conjunction with sensibility. The conceptual covers the
structure of experience pertaining to the understanding broadly designated. Lastly, the
performative, or the apperceptive, pertains to the transcendental unity of apperception.
The performative standpoint is best thought of by the aspects with which it hangs
together, i.e. the revelation of the “I think” performed by the transcendental synthesis of
imagination or the performance of judgment by the “I think.” These standpoints are quite
helpful because just referring to the stems and their combination muddles the influence of
imagination in each of the stems prior to combination. For example, the standpoints are
helpful in discussing the Transcendental Deduction below. Moreover, Kant has an
experiential standpoint whereas those before him do not. This is because the experiential
standpoint is opened up by the Copernican revolution, and the experiential standpoint
includes non-discursive content. And, these aspects of the experiential standpoint just
noted advance significantly toward solving the problem of non-being.
Before discussing the combination of the two stems of knowledge – sensibility
and understanding – I pause here to summarize the large amount of terminology covered
thus far. I have already indicated the top and bottom, 220 as it were, of the structure of
experience. Sensibility is composed of the pure forms of time and space. They are
considered pure because they are contributions from mind, not from experience. That is,
they constitute the way in which the mind determines an intuition – like sizing a tile in
220

For Kant‟s use of this language see (A 44/B 61).

121

Leibniz‟s example. The multiplicity captured by these intuitions, then, is limited, and
these intuitions taken together comprise a manifold to be apprehended as an appearance.
Sensation provides the matter for these forms; the appearance, then, contains the nondiscursive.
Kant explains the next stage in the trajectory of experience as follows:
[T]here is in us an active power to synthesize this manifold.
This power we call imagination; and the act that it performs
directly on perceptions I call apprehension. For the
imagination is to bring the manifold of intuition to an
image; hence it must beforehand take the impressions up
into its activity, i.e. apprehend them [my emphases]. (CPR
1996, A 120)
I delve further into this below. However, it is important to note here that the above
covers the components of the beginning of the structure and trajectory of experience.
Pertaining to the powers of the mind, Kant designates three original sources of all
experience. According to Kant there are
three original sources (capacities or faculties [or powers] of
the soul), which contain the conditions of the possibility of
all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any
other faculty [or power] of the mind, namely sense,
imagination, and apperception [Kant‟s emphasis]. (CPR
1998, A 94/B 127)
So far I have, at least, indicated all of these powers above. What remains is to discuss the
specific ways that these conditions for the possibility of all experience relate to one
another – I will delve into this below.
With the exception of apperception (as it is a higher power of the mind), the
above summarizes the lower cognitive faculties. Hence, I quote here Kant‟s own
summary of the higher cognitive faculties. Kant explains,
These are: understanding, the power of judgment, and
reason. In its analytic that doctrine accordingly deals with
concepts, judgments, and inferences, corresponding exactly
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to the function and the order of those powers of mind,
which are comprehended under the broad designation of
understanding in general [Kant‟s emphases]. (CPR 1998, A
131/B 169)
So, what is “broadly designated” as – the stem of – “the understanding” consists of the
power of understanding, the power of judgment, and the power of reason. The function
of understanding – using the term to refer to one of the higher cognitive faculties – is
conceiving, the function of judgment is judging, and the function of reason is inferring.
Now, these three higher faculties taken together (broadly designated as
understanding) perform the function of thinking, 221 and this thinking can take place in
combination with input from sensibility or without input from sensibility. These three
powers taken together can also perform the function of knowing in which case input from
sensibility is necessary. 222 Kant indicates the subtle difference in explaining the power of
judgment,
All judgments are accordingly functions of unity among my
representations, since instead of an immediate
representation a higher one, which comprehends this and
other representations under itself, is used for the cognition
of the object, and many possible cognitions are thereby
drawn together into one. We can, however, trace all action
of the understanding back to judgments, so that the
understanding in general can be represented as a faculty for
judging. … Concepts, however, as predicates of possible
judgments, are related to some representation of a still
undetermined object. (CPR 1998, A 69/B 94)
Here Kant recalls the emphasis I have laid upon judgment above. Recall the combination
of sensibility and understanding is a requirement for empirical knowledge. (CPR 2003, A
15/B 29) Insofar as I will be pursuing the experiential standpoint, I will not be examining
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a number of the aspects just noted. Yet, the above goes toward summarizing the
components of the structure and trajectory of experience.
Lastly, then, by way of a summary before discussing the complex Transcendental
Deduction, since all of the powers just mentioned above have different modes of
representation, it is possible to provide an summary figure here. Kant is most explicit
regarding representations as he looks back and summarizes his broadly designated
understanding of the Transcendental Analytic before he discusses the use of pure reason
in the Transcendental Dialectic. I quote Kant at length here as he summarizes the “terms
properly suited to each species of representation…”
Here is their progression [All emphases are Kant‟s]: The
genus is representation in general [Die Gattung ist
Vorstellung überhaupt] (repraesentatio). Under it stands
the representation with consciousness (perceptio). A
perception [Perzeption] that refers to the subject as a
modification of its state is a sensation [Empfindung]
(sensatio); an objective perception is a cognition
[Erkenntnis] (cognitio). The latter is either an intuition or a
concept [Anschauung oder Begriff] (intuitus vel conceptus).
The former is immediately related to the object and is
singular; the latter is mediate, by means of a mark, which
can be common to several things [Dingen]. A concept is
either an empirical or a pure concept [empirischer oder
reiner], and the pure concept, insofar as it has its origin
solely in the understanding (not in a pure image of
sensibility) [(nicht im reinen Bilde der Sinnlichkeit)], is
called notio. A concept made up of notions, which goes
beyond the possibility of experience, is an idea or a concept
of reason [die Idee, oder der Vernunftbegriff ].223 (CPR
1998, A 320 /B 376-377)
In what may be taken as Kant‟s very own summary of the structure and trajectory of
experience, 224 then, Kant summarizes the above progression at the end of the Doctrine of
Elements noting, “Thus all human knowledge begins with intuitions, proceeds from
223
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thence to concepts, and ends with ideas.” (CPR 2003, A 702/B 730) Given Kant‟s
reference to the above list of terms as constructed according to genus and species, I have
constructed Figure 1.2 to provide an at-a-glance image for the reader.
Representation
w/o Cs
ø

w/ Cs
Perception
(Subjective)
Sensation

(Objective)
Cognition
Intuition

Illustration of
Critique of Pure Reason
(A 320/B 376-377)

Concept

Empirical

*Notion has its origin solely in the understanding.
** A concept made up of notions which goes
beyond the possibility of experience is
a concept of reason or an idea.

Pure
Notion*
Idea of Reason**

Figure 2.2
I will now discuss the Transcendental Deduction toward fully describing the structure of
experience in the Critique of Pure Reason.
The Thing-in-itself ex priority of Being: Kant‟s Transcendental Deduction
“Everything profound loves a mask; the profoundest things of all even have a hatred of image and
parable…
Every profound spirit needs a mask: what is more, around every profound spirit a mask is continually
growing, thanks to the constantly false, that is to say shallow interpretation
of his every word, his every step, of every sign of life that he gives.”225
~Nietzsche, Beyond Good & Evil §40
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The Critique of Pure Reason was first published in mid July of 1781, and from
the earliest reviews such as the “Göttingen Review,” which appeared in January of 1782
to the present day the Transcendental Deduction has received heavy criticism. 226 This
includes, of course, the perhaps most famous of the reviews by – Kant‟s friend, the
“Sorcerer of the North” – Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788).227 As one of Kant‟s
friends, Hamann had been receiving proofs of the Critique from Kant, and as a result he
had already completed a review by the end of July 1781. In fact, though he wrote two
reviews in total, given his friendship to Kant and his style of criticism his most scathing
criticisms were only published posthumously.
In his first review, Hamann suggests that by Kant outdated metaphysics “is
suddenly transformed from a two-thousand-year-old arena of endless strife into a
systematically arranged inventory of all that we possess by means of pure reason.”228
Hamann further suggests that Kant proceeded “ass first” using “the weapons of light to
spread the kingdom of darkness.” 229 As Hamann‟s second review (1784) makes clear, he
takes issue first and foremost with Kant‟s distinguishing between sensibility and
understanding only to have such “learned troublemaking” culminate in a “meaningless,
rutting, unstable, indefinite something = x” pointing directly to the Transcendental
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Deduction. 230 Hamann‟s position, however, should have been already clear to Kant as
Hamann had written to him in a 1759 letter, “I must almost laugh at the choice of a
philosopher to try to change my mind. I look upon the finest logical demonstration the
way a sensible girl regards a love letter … [Hamann‟s emphasis].”231 Contemporary
criticisms of Kant‟s Critique, though rhetorically more moderate, point to the same
difficulty of the Transcendental Deduction, i.e. how to put sensibility and understanding
back together again.
The influence of the reviews from Kant‟s contemporaries can be seen in Kant‟s
subsequent writing: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics [Prolegomena zu einer
jeden künftigen Metaphysik] (1783), his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science
[Metaphysiche Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft] (1786), and in the second (B)
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1787). In fact, Kant explicitly asks in the
Prolegomena for the anonymous reviewers to show themselves, as it were, and enter into
an open debate. 232 (Proleg 130) Acutely aware of his public reception, in the Preface to
the second edition of the Critique Kant summarizes the four major changes made from
the first edition.
(1) the misunderstanding in the Aesthetic, chiefly the one in
the concept of time; (2) the obscurity in the
[Transcendental] Deduction of the Concepts of the
Understanding; (3) the supposed lack of sufficient evidence
in the proofs of the Principles of Pure Understanding; (4)
the misinterpretation of the paralogisms advanced against
rational psychology. (CPR 1998, B xxxviii)
230
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The second and fourth revisions, i.e. (2) the Transcendental Deduction and (4) the
paralogisms, amount to quite substantial revisions. In fact, commentators refer to the two
different Transcendental Deductions as the “subjective” or “psychological” deduction of
the 1781 first edition and the “objective” or “linguistic” deduction of the 1787 second
edition.233 Kant himself, however, thought of the revisions as merely a difference in their
“method of presentation.” (CPR 1998, B xliii) To stress this last point even further, in
the Preface to his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Kant insists, “There is no
more to be done, or to be discovered, or to be added here.”234 Despite this, of course, the
following year in the second edition of the Critique Kant substantially revised the
Transcendental Deduction to such an extent that commentators treat it as a separate
deduction.
Since its first publication, then, the Transcendental Deduction has remained a
focus of scholarship and considered variously, for example, as the “very heart of the
Critique of Pure Reason,”235 the “mystery,” or as “the jungle.”236 Moreover, it seems as
though commentators span all the logical possibilities in regard to preference and the two
editions of the deduction. Primarily, there are those who reject both editions on various
grounds; those who prefer the first edition, e.g. Schopenhauer and Heidegger; those who
prefer the second, e.g. many contemporary commentators; and, those who, like Kant
consider the difference between the two merely stylistic. 237 Influenced by Hans
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Vaihinger‟s (1852-1933) comments from 1902 238 a number of commentators have
suggested the “Transcendental Deduction” is a “patchwork.” By this, these
commentators literally mean that it is a “patchwork, of different arguments composed at
different times and representing very different points of view.” 239 The suggestion here is
that the deduction is out of order and so badly bungled by Kant that it is unsalvageable,
and perhaps should be looked upon as modest eyes look upon a love letter. There at least
seems to be general agreement that the “Transcendental Deduction is central to the
Critique,” and Kant‟s project in the Critique “to explain how synthetic judgments are
possible a priori”240 stands or falls with the deduction.
The problem of the Deduction may be seen clearly in juxtaposing the following
two quotes from Kant. On the one hand, referring to the sections of the Critique which
correspond with sensibility and the understanding, Kant states that transcendental logic
“has lying before it a manifold of a priori sensibility, offered to it by transcendental
aesthetic. Transcendental aesthetic offers it this manifold in order to provide it with a
material for the pure concepts of understanding.” (CPR 1996, A 77/B 102) On the other
hand, “Pure concepts of the understanding,” Kant notes, “are quite heterogeneous from
empirical intuitions (indeed, from sensible intuitions generally) and can never be
encountered in any intuition. How, then, can an intuition be subsumed under a category,
and hence how can a category be applied to appearances…? [Kant‟s emphases]” (CPR
1996, A 137/B 176)
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In regard to the former combination problem, Kant is restating what
commentators refer to as the “blindness thesis” and the “emptiness thesis.” That is, the
two stems of knowledge are sensibility and understanding, “Through the former, objects
are [intuitively] given to us; through the latter, they are thought.” (CPR 2003, A 15/B29)
Moreover, “Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind
[my emphases].” (CPR 1996, A 51/ B75) In regard, then, to the latter combination
problem, Kant introduces some “third” component which is the infamous “=x” (CPR
1998, A 250) or “transcendental object.” The =x may be seen as Kant‟s attempt to
characterize a sort of conceptual prolêptic within his structure of experience. The
transcendental object – as the condition for the possibility of an object – is meant to solve
the latter combination problem by supposing that it shares properties with both sensibility
and understanding. You can imagine commentators suggest this is an ad hoc insertion by
Kant to solve the otherwise unsolvable problem. Notice, however, this ad hoc aspect of
Kant‟s deduction pertains to the second strategy. The first strategy might still be viable
were there a way in the first strategy to deal with this heterogeneity problem of the
second strategy. A number of thinkers have tried to work this out.
The most popular candidates for salvaging Kant‟s deduction are: apperception,
judgment, and imagination. 241 Commentators privilege, then, specific passages related to
these candidates. For example, H.J. Paton (1887-1969) privileges judgment and believes
the section prior to the Transcendental Deduction to be the “key.” 242 This section is titled,
“On the Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding.” To be clear, it
is common among Kant scholars to refer to this section as the “Metaphysical Deduction,”
241
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since Kant referred to it as such in concluding the Transcendental Deduction of the
second edition Critique. (CPR 1998, B 159)
Now, as Arthur Melnick points out, “In the first edition Transcendental Deduction
of the Categories Kant does not mention the logical functions of judgment. In the second
edition (the B edition) the deduction can be said to be dominated by the logical functions
of judgment.”243 Dieter Heinrich suggests this may be accounted for by supposing Kant‟s
purpose to change from the first edition to the second believing he had solved his
objective problem sufficiently by the first edition. In other words, the second “objective”
deduction “makes the validity of the categories intelligible,” and “the subjective side
investigates their relation to the cognitive faculties in us which must be presupposed if
these categories are to be used [my emphasis].”244 In this way, the second edition
deduction demonstrates that the categories of the understanding are valid, and the first
edition deduction demonstrates how such validity is possible.
As Paton reminds, “the categories are not innate ideas, but ways in which the
mind must judge, or ways in which thought must unite the manifold of sense,” i.e. “ways
in which all objects of thought must be united.” 245 Hence, one can see the emphasis of
judgment in reading the second edition deduction, and one can see the way in which a
successful second edition still requires a successful first edition. Even if Kant is able to
show that the categories have validity, the main problem of the deduction, i.e. how
sensibility combines with understanding is left unsolved. All this supports the claim that
despite the two types of strategies, any attempt to salvage the deduction must eventually
243
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confront what Kant refers to as the “indispensable function” of the imagination. (CPR
1998, A78/B 103)
As my way into discussing the Transcendental Deduction, then, I will discuss the
deduction from the perspective of logic. This approach is most efficient as it makes the
deduction comprehensible first, so as to allow a more focused examination afterward.
This neither equates my comprehensible rendering of the deduction with a reading of
Kant as successful in the deduction, nor does it suggest that I believe Kant to be
successful in the subjective deduction. Ultimately I harbor a deep and significant respect
for the mind that constructed the Critique of Pure Reason. However, I believe, for
whatever reason, Kant picked the wrong power of the mind to privilege, i.e. he gave too
much credit to the imagination. Treating the deduction, then, from the perspective of
logic uses both edition deductions without privileging either. However, the approach
does emphasize judgment – over apperception or imagination – as is to be expected from
the perspective of logic. After this treatment of the deduction from the perspective of
logic, I will then focus on the first edition deduction. I focus on the first edition
deduction because I follow Kant in thinking of this deduction as not only the groundwork
for both editions but also of the structure of experience itself.
According to Kant, “We can … trace all actions of the understanding back to
judgments, so that the understanding in general can be represented as a faculty for
judging.” (CPR 1998, A 69/B 94) Further, there are three types of judgments to which
we can trace back – synthetic a posteriori, analytic a priori, and synthetic a priori. Now,
a posteriori means after or from experience, i.e. dependent upon experience, and a priori
means prior to experience, i.e. independent of experience. Synthetic (ζύλ-ζεζηο) refers to
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the bringing of two positions or points together, and analytic (ἀλά-ιύζηο) refers to taking
apart. Hence, analytic a priori judgments are those judgments which do not require
experience to be considered valid.
To judge that all bachelors are unmarried males, for example, is to take apart the
concept “bachelor,” or, more specifically, it is to formulate a categorical judgment by
taking apart the concept. This categorical judgment can be reformulated into a different
type of judgment. Consider the judgment: if a person is an unmarried male, then the
person is a bachelor. This is an example of an a priori analytic hypothetical judgment.
These judgments are a priori because given the concept of “bachelor” alone I do not need
to validate these judgments by looking at experience. Rather, I can check to see if my
judgment is valid merely by understanding the concept itself, i.e. independent of
experience. As a priori judgments are independent of experience, there is no need for
analytic a posteriori judgments because in an analytic judgment I already have all I need
in the concept alone for validation.
Synthetic a posteriori judgments, then, are judgments dependent on experience,
i.e. they necessarily involve intuitive input from sensibility. In fact, these are the
judgments which are constitutive of an experience. By bringing the results of sensibility
together with a concept from the understanding, I synthesize a judgment of experience.
In this way, the link between sensibility and understanding in an experience concerns
synthetic a posteriori judgments. Lastly, synthetic a priori judgments are those
judgments made independently of intuitional input from experience. Now, these may be
of two different types. There are synthetic a priori judgments which regard the products
of synthetic a posteriori judgments and those which regard the products of a priori
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analytic judgments. The former type of judgment is to be used for scientific discovery,
and the latter is typical of pure reason – which Kant wished to critique. Referring back
to my comments made above, pure reason is exemplary of the (mistaken) dialectical use
of formal logic. And, though the ideas derived from such use of the broadly designated
understanding can be regulative, they should not be considered constitutive.
For example, the ontological proof for the existence of God begins with the
concept that God is perfect. On the one hand, the proof analyzes this concept, and just as
“unmarried male” may be analyzed out of the concept of bachelor, “not lacking in any
way” may be analyzed out of the concept of perfect, i.e. complete. On the other hand, the
concept of “lack” may be analyzed out of the concept of non-existence, since to not exist
is considered to lack existence. The results, then, of these analyses are combined in a
synthetic a priori judgment – a priori because intuitional input has not been required to
get this far in the proof. Now then, there are a number of ways to synthesize the analytic
results. Taking each analytic judgment up as a hypothetical judgment, a chain argument
can be formed: If God is perfect, then God does not lack in any way (or attribute), and if
God does not lack in anyway, then God (does not lack existence) exists. Put
symbolically:
PC
[Judgment 1: Analytic a priori]
CE
[Judgment 2: Analytic a priori]
 PE
[Judgment 3: Synthetic a priori]
The first two judgments are analytic a priori and the third judgment – the one that
combines the first two – is a synthetic a priori judgment. Though this is a logically valid
argument, this process without intuitional input – in fact precisely because it lacks
intuitional input – can ever only provide a logical view of God, i.e. a view of God from
the conceptual standpoint. Such a process results from a use of “pure reason.” Now,
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synthetic a priori judgments which involve synthetic a posteriori judgments are the types
of judgments involved in making experimental predictions. They are the types of
judgments involved in judging about experience, not merely conceptuality.
It is important to note how these judgments, then, fit into the overall structure of
experience. Kant provides a reminder just prior to entering into the Transcendental
Deduction noting that “cognition of any understanding, or at least human understanding,
is a cognition through concepts; it is not intuitive, but discursive.” 246 (CPR 1996, A 68/B
93) This is important because despite the fact that all use of concepts is discursive, there
is a distinction to be made. On the one hand, there is the solely discursive use of
understanding, and on the other hand, there is the use of understanding which, though
discursive, includes non-discursivity by way of intuitions. Hence, the synthetic a priori
judgments which involve only a priori judgments are solely discursive, and synthetic a
priori judgments which involve a posteriori judgments include non-discursivity.
This is just one way to see the importance of Kant‟s distinction between the
discursive and the non-discursive. For the sake then of examining the experiential, as
opposed to conceptual, parts of the structure of experience – and therewith the form of
negation which pertains to the experiential part of the structure of experience – I will be
looking at the function of synthetic a posteriori judgments. These are the judgments
which contain the non-discursive; these are the judgments which combine the products of
sensibility with the understanding; and these are the judgments upon which Kant focuses
in the Transcendental Deduction. In fact, the Transcendental Deduction refers to the
section of Kant‟s text titled “Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding,” and
Kant says of “the categories: they are concepts of an object as such whereby the object‟s
246
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intuition is regarded as determined in terms of one of the logical functions in judging.”
(CPR 1996, B128) See Figure 2.3. Hence, the Copernican revolution culminates in the
determination of an object by way of the pure concepts of the understanding, i.e. the
synthesis of sensibility and understanding through judgment.
Kant’s Logical Table of Judgments (A 70/B 95)
I.
According to Quantity of Judgments
Universal
Particular
Singular
II.
According to Quality
Affirmative
Negative
Infinite

III.
According to Relation
Categorical
Hypothetical
Disjunctive
IV.
According to Modality
Problematic
Assertoric
Apodictic

Figure 2.3
Before discussing the relation between the forms of judgment and the pure
concepts of the understanding, it is important to reflect upon the consequences of what
Kant has accomplished thus far. Kant suggests the following relations “of thought in
judgments”: in a categorical judgment “a relation of the predicate to the subject,” and the
categorical judgment considers only “two concepts”; in a hypothetical judgment “the
relation of ground to consequence,” and the hypothetical judgment considers two
judgments; in a disjunctive judgment “the relation in a divided cognition, of all of the
division‟s members to one another,”247 and a disjunctive judgment considers “several
judgments.” (CPR 1996, A 73/B 98) Regarding logical form, i.e. general logic, every
judgment must contain one of the three aspects from each of the four groups in Figure
247
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2.3. Hence, a matrix could be devised to work out all of the possible combinations within
the “Table of Judgments.” Such a matrix would begin to look like Figure 2.4.
Categorical (IIIa) rendering of
Quantity (I a&b) with Quality (II a&b)
Beginnings of a matrix of
Quality
Quality
judgments.
Affirmative
Negative
Universal
All S are P.
No S are P.
Quantity
Particular
Some S are P.
Some S are not P.
Quantity

Figure 2.4
A visual representation of the beginnings of a matrix of judgments shows that the internal
kernel, i.e. Kant‟s Archimedean point, of the mind‟s power of the understanding is the
“Square of Opposition.” 248 Compare Figure 2.4 with Figure 2.5.

Figure 2.5
248

I would like to point out here, that this is solely my interpretation. I have never heard anyone make this
claim. But, after spending more time than I would care to admit (hence the motivation for this footnote) in
attempting to make sense of what Kant is saying across multiple texts, it dawned on me that he was using
one of my favorite bits to teach in Principles of Thinking courses, i.e. the “Square of Opposition.”
Afterward, my reading (below) of the relation between the Table of Judgments and The Table of Categories
followed quickly after.
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So, why is all this important? This is important because since formal or general
logic is able to characterize the relationship between sensibility and understanding, Kant
has ushered in the possibility of valid synthetic a priori judgments regarding experience.
By having objects of experience conform to the logical functions of judgment – think the
Copernican revolution here –using the same logical functions to think about experience
then has the possibility of sustaining the validity which was involved in the forming of an
experience. This is because the objective validity has to do with the form not the content,
so Kant divides out beforehand the content which would confound this emphasis on form.
In other words, synthetic a priori judgments might be valid so long as the reason
employed is not pure.
In regard to the objective determination of an object of experience in general,
then, the categorical judgment of affirming all of the apprehended manifold, i.e. the
limiting of the manifold of sensibility in a manifold of apprehension, is “=x,” i.e. an
object of experience. Since this =x is a “predicate” of a categorical judgment combining
sensibility with understanding, it is perhaps easier to show via predicate logic the
determining process of subordinating judgments by way of moving from one form of
judgment to another in a chain of analytic a priori judgments. For example, for any x, if
x is an A, then x is a B; if x is a B, then x is a C; if x is a C, then x is a D, etc.
(x)(AxBx), (x)(BxCx), (x)(CxDx), etc.
Though this apprehension of intuition from sensibility is inductive, the form of
apprehension itself is deductive. So, structurally Kant is on solid ground to begin
dialectic. In other words, the objective side of his story is successful in showing that the
process of determining the object ensures the objective validity of the object as such. In
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fact, this is the same process I outlined above in dealing with the Ontological Argument
for the existence of God, but the difference in this case is that the synthesis is experiential
not solely conceptual. I will say more about this distinction just below. The important
thing to remember thus far is that the objective side of this process is a process of
conception involving the power of understanding and terminating at the point of
conception, i.e. recognition in a concept. Hence, regarding the objective side of the
combination of sensibility and understanding, the =x represents the combination in the
determination of an object through judgment.
Now, I have just indicated that the experiential synthesis resulting in the
combination of sensibility and understanding is a logical combination. However, this
formulation is not yet precise enough. A distinction should be made between the form of
the combination of sensibility with understanding and the content. I have shown above
that the forms of the connections involved in the combination of sensibility with
understanding are logical, i.e. they are the logical forms of judgment itself, and thereby
ensure that the combination will have objective validity. However, this regards just the
form of the combination. Validity regarding the content of that which is apprehended
from sensibility is more difficult to see. Kant argues for the validity of the content in two
ways. First, he continues to push the possibility of a logical derivation by further
specifying the concepts of the understanding which are involved by way of the forms of
judgment prior to even the determination of the object of experience in a concept. This
way is made more explicit in the second edition Transcendental Deduction, especially
§26, yet perhaps Kant had it in mind, though not stated as such, in the first edition.
Second, Kant‟s other way of arguing for the validity of the content coincides with the
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first edition Transcendental Deduction. There Kant focuses on the subjective processes
involved in providing content to the determination of the object of experience. This
involves the “three-fold synthesis of imagination.” Yet, Kant‟s ultimate decision
regarding how to validly ground the content appears in both edition Transcendental
Deductions of the Critique of Pure Reason, and this decision has tremendous
consequences for his system.
In trying to ground the validity of the content of experience elsewhere than in
logic, Kant points to an “empirical law.” In the first edition, there is one empirical law
regarding the manifold of sensibility and a corresponding rule to be found in the threefold synthesis of imagination. Kant calls the former law, “the law of affinity,” and he
calls the latter rule, the “rule of association.” (CPR 1998, A112-113) In the second
edition, specifically §19 Kant maintains the law of affinity, and Kant changes the status
of association from a rule to a “law of association.” (CPR 1998, B 142) As Kant would
have it, these laws are intimately involved with imagination. Yet, given the names of
these laws and from the perspective of the 21st century, it is difficult to construct any
narrative suspense here. In other words, as you may be able to anticipate, these laws are
laws of memory. The fact that Kant in the 18th century was not able to see them as such
meant that he was not able to close the door on metaphysics as he would have liked.
Indeed, had he recognized these laws as indications of the power of memory he would
have been able to solve the problem of non-being.
You might wonder why this problem of combination is so troubling for Kant. In
fact, this problem is the Achilles heel of Kant‟s system. Why can‟t Kant just resort to
some generalization like the real is rational, and then just include question begging as
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valid for determining the content of experience? It is because here is precisely where
Kant must pay his debt for the Copernican revolution. He cannot now just assume that in
the object‟s conforming to the mind‟s modes of knowing that the mind is also conforming
to the object as it really is. If the program of the latter option were viable, then there was
no need for the program of the former, etc. Which is why Kant, here, is acknowledging
the consequences of memory in affinity and association, and he takes himself to be
justified in commenting on the identity of the ground of these consequences since he is
dealing with the empirical content of experience. He acknowledges the lawful regularity
produced by this ground, and in fact grounds the validity of the content of the
combination of sensibility with understanding on this regularity. Yet, he ultimately takes
the power of imagination to be more primary in the trajectory of experience, the
trajectory which results in an object of experience.
I discuss Kant‟s thoughts on the relationship between imagination and memory in
the final section of this chapter along with a more extensive treatment of Kant‟s
grounding of subjective validity, i.e. the how of the combination of sensibility and
understanding. For now, I will address the first way indicated above which Kant employs
to argue for the validity of the content of the combination of sensibility with
understanding. It is here for Kant that the concepts of the understanding, i.e. the
categories, along with the forms of judgment play a leading role. What this means can be
seen in the relation between the Table of Judgments and the Table of Categories.
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Kant’s Transcendental Table of Categories (A 80/B 106)
[Concepts of the Understanding]
I.
Categories of Quantity
Unity
Plurality
Totality
II.
III.
Categories of Quality
Categories of Relation
Reality
Of Inherence and Subsistence
Negation
(Substance & Accident)
Limitation
Of Causality and Dependence
(Cause & Effect)
Of Community (Reciprocity
between Agent & Patient)
IV.
Categories of Modality
Possibility - Impossibility
Existence - Non-existence
Necessity - Contingency

Figure 2.6
As Kant puts it in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,
All determinations of the general concept [my emphasis] of
a matter in general must be able to be brought under the
four classes of [pure concepts of] the understanding, those
of quantity, of quality, of relation, and finally of modality –
and so, too, [must] all that may be either thought a priori in
this concept, or presented in mathematical construction, or
given as a determinate object of experience [my
emphasis].249
Notice Kant is talking about determinations of the general concept. This general concept,
as evidenced by the second part of the above quote, acts as a sort of hub or central hinge
in the architecture of the mind. The concept of an object in general functions in
describing all that may be thought a priori in the concept, conceived in terms of
mathematics, or given in experience. 250 In relation to the Square of Opposition, the
question might be: How can the movement from a form of judgment which determines an
object in general to a form of judgment from which derives a “determinate object of
249

Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Michael Friedman, tr., 11-12.
This list of three options indicates the treatment of the general concept by Derrida, Deleuze, and
Scalambrino, respectively. This will be clear by the end of the dissertation.
250
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experience” relate to the Square of Opposition? The answer is in the Table of Categories
so long as you start at the bottom of each class and work your way up to the top.
Recall from the Transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique that after assuming the
Copernican revolution,
The effect of an object on the capacity for representation,
insofar as we are affected by it, is sensation. That intuition
which is related to the object through sensation is called
empirical. The undetermined object of an empirical
intuition is called appearance [Kant‟s emphases]. (CPR
1998, A 20/B 34)
This process involves the three-fold synthesis of imagination along with the forms of
judgment and the concepts of the understanding. For example, take Quantity from the
above tables. The initial judgment is a singular categorical judgment such that the
totality of the intuitive input apprehended from sensibility is singularly reproduced as an
appearance, i.e. an undetermined object of empirical intuition. The singular judgment
involves unity because the stage of apprehension in the three-fold synthesis limits the
sensible manifold, and the reproduction singularly represents the totality which was
apprehended from the sensible manifold.
Like pinching a cloth into a fold, the totality of that which constitutes the fold is
represented as a unity. This unity constitutes the empirical perception of an appearance.
From there, this appearance may be further determined by moving up the class to
particular judgments by regarding a plurality of appearances in a strand of associated
appearances. The movement from a singular judgment to either a particular or universal
judgment is both the movement of fully determining an appearance as an object of
experience and the movement from the subjective validity of the singular judgment to the
objective validity which may be found in the particular or universal judgments. In order
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to make a judgment which is particular or universal, then, a plurality of appearances must
be involved. Once a plurality of appearances are involved, a particular or universal
judgment, which results in the recognition of the plurality in a concept =x, necessarily
entails the unity of the plurality, in so far as the very subsumption under the concept has
unified the plurality.
The logic is the same here as what I just went over regarding empirical unity. Just
think of a plurality of pinches in a cloth tied together – at one unified spot – like a bindle
on a hobo stick for carrying along whatever mysterious content strikes your fancy. Now,
this unity is conceptual unity. In fact, the unification of the plurality of appearances
constitutes entrance into conceptuality – it is retrospectively that you are no longer blind
to the ladder steps of plurality and totality upon which you have just climbed. Likewise,
in order to grasp this unity you must climb into the logic of relations, and in doing so, you
enter the Square of Opposition. Relations in this part of the structure of experience are
no longer governed by empirical laws. Rather, this conceptual part of the structure of
experience is governed by the law of non-contradiction. Lastly, since perceptions “are
representations accompanied with sensation,” (CPR 1998, B 147), another way to
characterize the difference between the singular judgment and the other two types of
judgment is to follow Kant‟s teaching from the Prolegomena §18 and refer to the singular
judgment as a “judgment of perception” and the other judgments – due to their
determinacy in regard to the Square of Opposition – as “judgments of experience.”
(Proleg 130) I will comment further on this in the next section.
Now despite the logical consistency demonstrated above, the deeper problem of
the Transcendental Deduction remains. As I noted previously, Kant‟s comments
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regarding this problem are ambivalent. At times he would have his readers believe there
was never a need to reformulate the deduction, and at other times he would have his
readers believe the first deduction could be overlooked. Yet, to be sure, the how of all
synthetic judgments in regard to experience is still at stake. Kant has not shown how the
manifold of sensibility is to be combined with understanding. He has only shown that if
it were to be combined, then logical validity could be conferred upon judgments
regarding experience. So as to see what hangs in the balance, recall that formal logic is
the discursivity of thought, and therefore does not account for the non-discursive in
experience. Some commentators – and possibly Kant himself – want judgment to
account then for the act of combining sensibility with understanding, but judgment,
again, is a power of understanding. In other words, judgment only spans the gap – as
discursive power of the understanding – in regard to that with which it is homogeneous.
Judgment deals with cognitions, i.e. concepts and other judgments. Yet, perhaps,
judgment points to a power which fully spans the gap between sensibility and
understanding. In the second edition deduction Kant does say, “judgment is nothing
other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception.”
(CPR 1998, B 141) Before plunging into this deeper problem of the deduction, it is
important to be clear about the purpose of such an expedition.
I have just shown the general outline – within the scope of my project – depicting
how Kant is successful in establishing the objective validity of the combination of
sensibility with understanding. What remains is to work out the how problem which
Kant attempted to solve in the first edition Transcendental Deduction of the Critique. In
other words, whereas judgment objectively determines the manifold of sensibility,
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imagination subjectively determines the manifold of sensibility. In an experience, then,
judgment depends upon imagination to further along the trajectory of experience
culminating in the experience of an object. As I have dealt with judgment above, I will
deal with imagination below. The guiding question is, namely: How is the non-discursive
of sensibility carried over into a judgment so that such judgments are experiential and
not merely conceptual? Not only is this the problem of the first edition Transcendental
Deduction, but this problem characterizes the problem of experience in general.
In other words, somehow Kant must account for the non-logical involved in
experience, or else Kant has leveled the distinction with which he was to critique pure
reason. As such, it would be as if in entering the labyrinth of logic by way of the
Copernican turn Kant was unable to find his way back out. Hence, I will treat this
question as a guiding thread to investigate Kant‟s proposed solution in the first edition
deduction. Kant refers to his proposed solution as the “three-fold synthesis” of
imagination. Lastly regarding my purpose for treating of this three-fold synthesis below,
this investigation of the three-fold synthesis accomplishes the following in regard to my
overall project: first, investigating the three-fold synthesis provides the remaining pieces
to the structure and trajectory of experience by describing the difficult to describe
connection between sensibility and understanding; second, the three-fold synthesis
indicates how the success of the Critique of Pure Reason hinges upon the power of
imagination; finally, following Kant‟s distinction between a logical and a real relation,
i.e. the conceptual and the experiential standpoints, an investigation of the three-fold
synthesis shows why Kant from an experiential standpoint was required to posit the
thing-in-itself in response to the problem of non-being.
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Brief Interlude: Three Standpoints of the Architectonic
It is worth pausing here to make a few observations about the ground just covered
in the structure of experience, and draw some important conclusions. In the structure and
trajectory of experience, once the blindness thesis no longer holds, i.e. upon entering
conceptuality, the acquired vision, as it were, with which you can look back over the
synthesis of which you were previously blind is not the vision of perception but the
vision of apperception. I referred to this product of Leibniz‟s influence on Kant above as
“the top” of the structure of experience. Whereas, perception pertains to the empirical
appearance, apperception pertains to the unity of the perceptions. Kant truly seems to
enjoy employing the pattern of unifying multiplicities. The purpose of this interlude is to
briefly discuss these two aspects of the structure of experience. First, I will comment on
the rhetoric of specification that Kant relentlessly employs and which figures throughout
the architecture of the Critique of Pure Reason. Second, I will comment on the
perspectival capacity for which the advent of conceptuality allows.
It requires, perhaps, multiple readings of the Critique in addition to scavenging
across sections to figure the faculties of the mind. Yet, doing so reveals that the genusspecies structure is so pervasive throughout the text251 that the Critique of Pure Reason
may be thought of a as fractal of the genus-species character. In fact, Kant‟s critique of
pure reason is designed to provide a Canon for reason. According to Kant,
Such a critique is accordingly a preparation, if possible, for
an organon, and, if this cannot be accomplished, then at
least for a canon, in accordance with which the complete
system of the philosophy of pure reason … [can] be
exhibited. (CPR 1998, A 12/B 26)
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Cf. (CPR A 656/B 684) and (CPR A 658/B 686).
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Hence, scavenging across sections of the Critique in a mode of discovery using the
genus-species character as a heuristic, I was able to put together what may be thought of
as Kant‟s Canon for reason.
When viewing Figure 2.7, you must keep in mind the movement of the figure goes
from largest multiplicity at the bottom to unity in the notion of a Canon at the top. This is
a schematic, then, of the entire limiting trajectory and structure of experience. Above
apperception in the schematic indicates where thought has the capacity to become
involved with itself alone, i.e. pure reason. Therefore, I will be focusing in the area
around apperception to discuss different ways of considering, i.e. viewing, the “complete
system of the philosophy of pure reason,” as Kant put it just above. My concern, of
course, is not the “complete system,” though I point out the manner in which it can be
understood. Rather, I am concerned with just one of these different ways of considering
the system, i.e. the experiential aspect of Kant‟s system.
Kant’s Canon in the Critique of Pure Reason
Power of the Mind
Function in Regard to Experience
Reason Principles (cf. A 299/B 356)
Understanding Rules (cf. A 126)
Apperception Judgments (cf. B 141)
Imagination Syntheses (cf. A 78/B 103)
Sensibility Sensible Manifold (cf. A 77/B 102)

Figure 2.7
I have already indicated that I take there to be three main standpoints in Kant‟s
system of pure reason, and each “as the station for an observer, has its own horizon, that
is, a variety of things which can be represented, and as it were, surveyed from that
standpoint [my emphasis].” (CPR 2003, A 685/B 686) The three main standpoints of the
Critique of Pure Reason I refer to as “the experiential,” “the conceptual,” and “the
performative” or “apperceptive.” First, the experiential is the standpoint from which I
have been discussing the structure and trajectory of experience thus far, covering the
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structure of experience at bottom to the terminal point where the object of experience is
determined. This standpoint is best thought in conjunction with sensibility. Second, the
conceptual covers the structure of experience pertaining to the understanding broadly
designated or in general. According to Kant, “If the understanding in general is
explained as the faculty of rules, then the power of judgment is the faculty of subsuming
under rules, i.e., of determining whether something stands under a given rule.” (CPR
1998, A 132/B 171) Kant explains that “the power of judgment is a special talent that
cannot be taught but only practiced.” (CPR 1998, A 133/B 172) Despite the caveat, Kant
indicates that an analysis of principles “teaches” the power of judgment “to apply to
appearances the concepts of the understanding, which contain the condition for rules a
priori.” (CPR 1998, A 132/B 171) And, here comes the multiplicity into a unity pattern
again.
Just as a multiplicity of rules is unified into a principle, Kant concludes, “If the
understanding may be a faculty of unity of appearances by means of rules, then reason is
the faculty of the unity of the rules of understanding under principles.” (CPR 1998, A
302/B 359) It is in this way that reason “never applies directly to experience or to any
object but instead applies to the understanding, in order to give unity a priori through
concepts to the understanding‟s manifold cognitions.” (CPR 1998, A 302/B 359) Hence,
“One can call all cognition through which I can cognize and determine a priori what
belongs to empirical cognition anticipation.” (CPR 1998, A 166) This anticipation is
structured by principles which have developed from the practice of using judgment in
regard to experience. Anticipation, then, is both a hallmark of the conceptual standpoint
as a prolêptic and the way in which synthetic a priori judgments are made. Because
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there is continuity from the rules of combination to the principles with which reason
operates, synthetic a priori judgments, then, are possible. Kant‟s comments here both
indicate the possibility of viewing the understanding broadly designated from some
standpoint as separate and offers further justification for Figure 2.7.
The last of the three standpoints, then, is what I have referred to as the “top” of
the structure of experience, i.e. the performative, or the apperceptive. This standpoint
pertains to the transcendental unity of apperception. I refer to it as the performative to
reflect a double sense in the reference. On the one hand, Kant has indicated that the
transcendental unity of apperception is also known as the “I think” (§16, B 132) or “I am,
which accompanies all my judgments and actions of my understanding.” (CPR 1998, B
xl) On the other hand, according to Kant this “I, of which one cannot even say that it is a
concept … accompanies every concept;” 252 that is, “Through this I, or He, or It (the
thing), which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of
thoughts =x, which is recognized only through the thoughts that are its predicates…”
(CPR 1998, A 346/B 404) Whereas the previous =x marked the spot of the unity of the
(transcendental) object, this =x marks the spot of the unity of the (transcendental) subject.
(Cf. CPR A 109)
For Kant since, “I cannot cognize as an object itself that which I must presuppose
in order to cognize an object at all,” (CPR 1998, A 402) apperception is alêtheatic (cf.
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It is interesting to note Nietzsche‟s association of the apperceptive I with a passage from the New
Testament. Consistent with Kant‟s depiction here, Nietzsche – at the beginning of the Preface to On the
Genealogy of Morals, [Walter Kaufman, tr. (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 15] – suggests “We are
unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge – and with good reason.” Especially the reference of good
reason seems to point to Kant and further the transcendental status of the apperceptive I. Nietzsche follows
this with an explicit reference to Matthew 6:21. And, in Matthew 6:22 you find, “The eye is the lamp of
the body; so then if your eye is clear your whole body will be full of light.” [Translation from: New
American Standard Bible, (Anaheim: Foundation Publications, 1995).] Also, cf. the lamp metaphor here
with Nietzsche‟s famous declaration in the Gay Science, §125.
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αιήεηα),253 and in the teaching of Friedrich Wilhelm J. Schelling, regarding this I or
transcendental self, “one cannot say of the self that it exists, precisely because it is beingitself [Schelling‟s emphasis].”254 This is of notable import regarding Schelling‟s concern
with non-being. Schelling thinks,
If the I were to vanish, then nature would have absolutely
no meaning. It is there only to limit the I, not something in
its own right similar to the I and just as substantial, but
rather precisely as something that is pure „Not-I‟ which
really is in its own right a non-being. The I, in the primal
act of positing [sic] itself, sets this nonbeing in an
incomprehensible manner in opposition to itself… [my
emphases] 255
Regarding the former hand, then, it appears as though the I performs the “acts” of the
understanding. 256 Like the copula in a judgment (x is y). Regarding the latter hand,
gathering itself from its acts in the world, though perhaps always already there, the I is
revealed by the unification of sequences of mental (psychical) performances in the world.
It is this – following J.G. Fichte257 – to which Schelling refers as the “act of positing
itself.” Apperception, then, may be seen as its own standpoint from which to view Kant‟s
system, i.e. differently from both the experiential and the conceptual purviews. 258 In fact,
it is tempting to associate Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel (1770-1831), and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854) with the
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Cf. Karl Leonard Reinhold, “Eight Letter: Continuation of the preceding letter: The Master Key to the
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apperceptive, conceptual, and experiential standpoints respectively. However, such a
claim would take me too far afield to support.
The trajectory moving up the structure of experience, then, begins with sense and
moves through imagination to the terminal point from which a number of standpoints for
regarding Kant‟s system derive. This terminal point itself belongs within imagination.
Hegel in Faith and Knowledge refers to this point as “the organic Idea of productive
imagination” which “stands in antithesis to the empirical manifold, either determining it
or reflecting on it.”259 Referring to the structure of the text – see Figure 2.1 above –, this
is the point between the Transcendental Deduction and the Schematism. Referring to the
reviews of the Critique of Pure Reason noted above, this is the =x. Specifically, this is
the =x which marks the unity of the object in the structure of experience.
Recall the blindness and emptiness theses. According to Kant, “Thoughts without
content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind [my emphasis].” (CPR 1996, A
51/ B75) The subjective unity of =x stands as the initial point of vision, i.e. nonblindness, in considering the performance of an experience. The objective unity of =x
stands as the initial point of vision in considering an object of experience. When looking
back, as it were, over the trajectory leading up to the objective unity of =x, this is =x as
determining the object of experience. When =x stands opposed to the empirical manifold
in a relation of reflection, because you are reflecting on the object not experiencing the
object, then, despite its current non-blindness, =x is empty. In sum, you find the
experiential standpoint (1) when the objective =x culminates an object of experience in a
judgment of experience; you find the conceptual standpoint (2) when the objective =x
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G.W.F. Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, Walter Cerf and H.S. Harris, tr. (New York: SUNY Press, 1977),

92.
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initiates (reflective) conceptual analysis as the subject term in an analytic judgment; and,
you find the apperceptive standpoint (3) at the copula of these judgments.
It is also possible to contrast Kant‟s standpoints with one another. From the
apperceptive standpoint, for example, Kant can say that perception “is properly only a
determination of apperception.” (CPR 1998, A 368) Notice, this is a different view of
perception than the one from the experiential standpoint I noted earlier. From the
experiential standpoint, perception is the (performance of) the three-fold synthesis of
imagination. What is more, Kant describes apperception as, “The supreme principle for
the possibility of all intuition in reference to understanding,” and noted that “everything
manifold in intuition is subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of
apperception.” (CPR 1996, B 136) From here Kant says, “If, however, I investigate more
closely the relation of given cognitions in every judgment … then I find that a judgment
is nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of
apperception [Kant‟s emphasis].” (CPR 1998, B 142) Hence, the apperceptive standpoint
provides a view of judging which relates the structure of experience to the transcendental
subject.
Yet, Kant explains that the “ascent to ever higher conditions to approach
completeness in them” is a “need of reason.” (CPR 1998, A 309/B 365) And, further,
“Reason is driven by a propensity of its nature” (CPR 1998, A 798/B 826) not by the
transcendental subject, i.e. the apperceptive I. The insight here highlights the manner in
which inference seems to “work on its own.” It is as if the procedure of applying reason
so as to draw inferences functions with or without a focus of attention. Now, in my
opinion, if you wish to understand the relations amidst the constellation of Kant‟s
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philosophy and philosophy in Kant‟s wake, keeping this principle of perspective in mind
is imperative. By keeping the three standpoints in mind you are able to recognize, for
example, the difficulty of putting Hegel and Heidegger into dialog is the difficulty of
putting the conceptual and apperceptive standpoints into dialog. 260 With this separation
between the views you can see that the difference between logic and being is the
difference between a technology in the mind with a life of its own and the host of being
upon which it is parasitic.261
To sum, consistent with Kant‟s declaration, “All our cognition starts from the
senses, goes from there to the understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which there is
nothing higher to be found in us to work on the matter of intution.” (CPR 1998, A 298/B
355) I have shown thus far in the chapter how a multiplicity of sense is unified into a
series of multiple appearances, i.e. a multiplicity of imagination. The multiplicity of
imagination is then unified into a series of objects of experience, i.e. a multiplicity of
appearances subsumed under concepts of the understanding. The mechanism, of course,
for subsuming these concepts was judgment. Kant, then, has it that a multiplicity of
judgments as rules for combining concepts may be unified into a series of principles.
Post the blindness thesis, i.e. post entering into conceptuality there is also a retrospective
depicting of the trajectory of experience. 262 The three views I have commented on above
are the determining, the reflecting, and the apperceptive i.e. the experiential, the
conceptual, and the performative respectively. To draw a summary analogy, the
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experiential : the conceptual and apperceptive :: the affecting influences of an object : the
effecting influences of an object. Furthermore, I have stressed that once experience is no
longer within sight, then the emptiness thesis is encountered. In this way, the conceptual
standpoint may be considered empty in so far as it pertains to a reflecting beyond the
experience which provided the =x standpoint for reflection. In other words, from the
conceptual standpoint, what the x equals is undecidable.
The Thing-in-Itself & Imagination
I begin this section of the dissertation by investigating the three-fold synthesis of
imagination which allows for the combination of sensibility and understanding. The
three-fold synthesis is viewed from the experiential standpoint. So when Kant discusses
this synthesis he does not presuppose unity of apperception or reason‟s dialectical
inferring. In terms of the Transcendental Deduction, the three-fold synthesis regards the
combination of the content of an experience as opposed to the form which is regarded by
judgment and apperception through the categories of the understanding. Therefore, the
three-fold synthesis of the first edition Critique is considered the subjective, rather than
the objective Transcendental Deduction. Kant is dealing here with the problem for which
imagination, as his solution, is an “indispensable function of the soul.” (CPR 1998,
A78/B 103)
In other words, if Kant were to say that the concept of an object of experience
were waiting, as it were, in the mind for the object to come into contact with the senses,
then Kant would be proposing a version of innate ideas. Not wanting this, Kant must
come up with a way to transform that which is provoking an object of experience into the
dimension of conceptuality. This regards the subjective side of the Deduction, and not
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the objective side. Kant avoided proposing a version of innate ideas on the objective side
of the Deduction – as indicated above – by claiming that judgment is a procedure
developed from practice. In addition to the subjective side problem here, Kant needs to
similarly account for the way concepts are applied to an absent object of prior experience.
Recalling, then, the three “original sources” which “contain the conditions of the
possibility of all experience,” i.e. “sense, imagination, and apperception [Kant‟s
emphases],” (CPR 1998, A 94/B 127) Kant, of course, picks the one in the middle –
imagination. With this strategy Kant focuses on the imagination as the ground from
which consequently proceeds the combination of sensibility with understanding. Hence,
Kant will transform the non-discursivity of the sensible manifold, by way of a three-fold
synthesis of imagination, into an object of experience. As I will show, imagination spans
both the subjective and objective sides of the Deduction, and as continuous, then, guards
against the loss of non-discursivity due to the ultimate heterogeneity between the two
stems which imagination combines.
To begin, then, consider all the possible outcomes in the attempt to combine
sensibility and understanding. First, the intuitive product of sensibility may be
determined in general with merely subjective validity. This is what Kant refers to as a
judgment of perception in the Prolegomena. (Proleg 130) Second, the intuitive product
of the sensibility may be determined in such a way as to yield objective validity. This is
what Kant refers to in the second edition Preface of the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR
1998, B 11-12) and in the Prolegomena (Proleg 130) as a judgment of experience.
Lastly, the intuitive product of the sensibility, if the understanding “has no concept ready
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for the given intuition,” 263 may be paused in its relation to the concept of an object in
general, i.e. without being determined by it. This is what Kant refers to in the Critique of
the Power of Judgment as a reflecting judgment or a judgment of reflection.264 Though
these possibilities regarding the combination between sensibility and understanding are
specified under the genus of judgment, the specific difference is determined by the
function of the power of imagination.
That is, what Kant refers to as the three-fold synthesis (CPR A 97) in the first
edition Transcendental Deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason determines the type of
judgment for the subject. It is not, and cannot be, the other way around. The “changing
free play of sensations,” from which the intuitive product of sensibility is derived, “is not
grounded in any intention.” 265 (CPJ 208) According to Kant, the subject cannot force a
judgment beyond the capacity limitations of imagination. In looking at the three-fold
synthesis of imagination, then, be sure to focus on the way in which imagination, through
synthesis, grounds the object of experience. Put another way, regressing from the object
of experience down the structure and trajectory of experience in the attempt to arrive
back at the object‟s origin, one cannot proceed beyond imagination. Proceeding beyond
imagination, one encounters the blindness thesis.
So what is this three-fold synthesis of the imagination? It is important to
remember this is one synthesis with three parts, i.e. one process with three stages. 266
According to Kant, the three parts of this synthesis are: First, “the apprehension of the
representations, as modifications of the mind in intuition”; second, “the reproduction of
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them in the imagination”; and, third, “their recognition in the concept [Kant‟s
emphases].” (CPR 1998, A 98) The terminal point of this trajectory is the concept in
which the apprehended representations are “recognized,” in one form of judgment or
another. What then is the initial point of this trajectory? The initial point is the product
of the receptive sensibility upon being affected in an experience. Kant notes, “I ascribe a
synopsis to sense, because it contains a manifold in its intuition.” (CPR 1998, A 98)
Kant‟s prose moves fast, and, in particular, here it is important not to disregard the
synopsis of sense or treat it as a synthesis.
Were it not a gross overgeneralization to equate Robert Brandom with the 20 th
century division of Analytic philosophy and Edward Casey with the division of
Continental philosophy, I might suggest both the Analytic and Continental schools of
philosophy misunderstand this particular teaching of Kant‟s. In commenting on Kant‟s
Critique, Brandom, blurring the distinction between receptivity and spontaneity, makes
explicit the mistake of considering the synopsis to be itself a synthesis. The synopsis is
not a synthesis, but the synopsis is necessary (but not sufficient) for there to be a
synthesis of imagination. For example, because Brandom refers to the synopsis as a
synthesis, “there is synthesis in intuition and imagination also [my emphasis]” by way of
chain argument, i.e. synthesis occurs in both stems, and “synthesizing activity is an
aspect of judgment,” he arrives at the misleading conclusion – central to his project –
“Thus all our cognitive activity consists of judgment and aspects of that activity.” 267 In
explicitly making the mistake of referring to the synopsis as a synthesis, the regrettable
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result follows that the value of non-discursivity in Kant is lost on Brandom, i.e. for him
the mind is totally discursive.
Brandom, however, is in good company as Edward Casey similarly misattributes
synthesis to the sensible manifold. Conflating the initial passive point of the trajectory of
experience with the initial active part of the three-fold synthesis Casey suggests,
[Running-through] is a moment expressly singled out by
Kant as well as by Husserl, both of whom designate it with
the same verb: “durchlaufen.” For Kant, it represents the
basic action of “synopsis,” the lowest-level synthesis of the
sensible manifold as effected by apprehension [my
emphasis].268
It seems to me Casey‟s mistaking of synopsis for synthesis reflects a Husserl-like
overvaluing of intentionality, and such an overvaluing of intentionality under values the
non-phenomenal peripherality of the synopsis. It may also be the case that Casey thinks
of the three-fold synthesis as three syntheses, as evidenced by his use of the descriptor
“lowest-level” in regard to synthesis. In either case, the consequence: Casey‟s comments
regarding memory, “what Kant called „reproductive‟ imagination in its empirical
employment involves the mere combination of what is already presented in the sensible
manifold,”269 constitute a misreading. In the first stage of the three-fold synthesis, i.e.
apprehension, only several aspects – or tiles, recalling Leibniz‟s metaphor – are
maintained from the synopsis of the sensible manifold.
If you forget the separation between sensibility and understanding, both the depth
and the value of Kant‟s structure and trajectory of experience are lost. Kant insists, “Our
cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind,” and “through the former an
object is given to us, through the latter it is thought.” (CPR 1998, A50, B74) Hence, at
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the beginning of the Metaphysical Deduction Kant notes that Transcendental Logic “has
a manifold of sensibility that lies before it a priori, which the transcendental aesthetic has
offered to it;” (CPR 1998, A 76-77/B 102) he is referring to the synopsis just
(structurally) prior to the three-fold synthesis of imagination. As Longuenesse notes, “it
is one thing to have present to mind an intuition „containing a manifold,‟ quite another to
apprehend this manifold „as‟ manifold.”270 Loosely characterized by James Ward,
“Objective experience, structurally regarded, is … from end to end a synthesis of what he
[Kant] termed „a manifold‟.”271 In other words, it must be remembered that the trajectory
of experience is a limiting one. Recalling Leibniz‟s tile game here, the non-discursive
exceeds our discursive intellect.
Heuristically you might approach an idea of such excessivity by way of way of
analogy from the specificity of a concept of understanding regressively to the synopsis of
the manifold in sensibility and beyond; yet, since what is exceeded is the very framework
with which we are able to think, we cannot even think the non-discursive by way of
relation to our framework, i.e. “relation” is itself a part of the framework. Albeit no
image can do justice to the excessivity involved in non-discursivity, a figuration of the
limiting trajectory of experience may be helpful here. Think of the manifold of
sensibility, an appearance, and the concept which determines that appearance in terms of
increasing clarity and distinctness. Such as structure coupled with the limiting trajectory
of experience might be thought of as a cone rotated so an X-axis runs through its tip. As
such a movement from left to right toward the focal point of the cone may be thought of
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as the trajectory from the initial point of the manifold of sensibility to the terminal point
of the cone tip determining concept. Consider Figure 2.8 below.

Figure 2.8
Figure 2.8 is meant to represent the state of the manifold of sensibility, the subsequent
three-fold synthesis of the imagination, and the laws involved across the trajectory.
The structure and trajectory of experience within the purview of the experiential
standpoint begins with the synopsis of the manifold of sensibility moving through the
three-fold synthesis of imagination to the determination of the object of experience in the
objective unity of =x. As indicated in Figure 2.8, examining the laws governing the
synopsis of sense and the synthesis of imagination yields the correct reading of the
structure and trajectory of experience. I quote Kant at length here given the importance
of the quote. According to Kant – post the Copernican revolution – there are three
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original sources of experience, “namely sense, imagination, and apperception [Kant‟s
emphasis]. (CPR 1998, A 94/B 127) Now, according to Kant,
On these are grounded 1) the synopsis of the manifold a
priori through sense; 2) synthesis of this manifold through
the imagination; finally 3) the unity of this synthesis
through original apperception [Kant‟s emphases]. (CPR
1998, A 94/B 127)
Notice, apprehension as part of the three-fold synthesis is not included with synopsis by
Kant, but rather appears to coincide with imagination under Kant‟s heading “2)”.
Further, each one of these grounds has its own law. Whereas you might expect a
temporal law regarding sensibility, the law governing synopsis is actually “affinity.”
(CPR A 113) The law governing the (three-fold) synthesis is “association.” (CPR A 123)
And, the law governing the unity of the synthesis, i.e. the reference through judgments to
apperception, is “non-contradiction.” (CPR A 151/B 191) The synopsis hangs together
by the law of affinity, and the initial “fold” of the three-fold synthesis must “run through”
the synopsis in a certain way. “For apprehension is only a placing together of the
manifold of empirical intuition; and we can find in it no representation of any necessity
which determines the appearances thus combined to have connected existence in space
and time.” (CPR 2003, A 177/B 219) Rather, their “connected”-ness derives from their
affinity.
Notice the rhetoric of specification at work in the following Kant quote. Devoting
less than a page to apprehension Kant notes,
Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which
however would not be represented as such if the mind did
not distinguish the time in the succession of impressions
[my emphasis] on one another; for as contained in one
moment no representation can ever be anything other than
absolute unity. (CPR 2003, A 99)
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First, notice how the quote indicates that time itself derives from “the succession of
impressions” which is unified in a moment. Here is the genus-species figure again.
Apprehension, taking place in time, will be reproduced into a series of appearances to be
unified by apperception via recognition in a concept =x. Notice how this coincides with
the three original sources and the laws Kant noted above. This describes the first two
stages of the process Kant calls the three-fold synthesis of imagination. It is instructive to
consider Kant‟s language here.
Kant‟s first mention of the three fold synthesis occurs in The Metaphysical
Deduction, i.e. the section just prior to the Transcendental Deduction. Recall, this section
is titled by Kant, “On the Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the
Understanding.”272 There – in the translation of Paul Guyer and Allen Wood – Kant
says, “the spontaneity of our thought requires that this manifold first be gone through,
taken up, and combined in a certain way in order for cognition to be made out of it.”
(CPR 1998, A 77/B 102) Here is Kant‟s German: Allein die Spontaneität unseres
Denkens erfordert es, dass dieses Mannigfaltige zuerst auf gewisse Weise
durchgegangen, aufgenommen, und verbunden werde, um daraus eine Erkenntnis zu
machen.273
Concerning “taken up;” J.M.D. Meiklejohn translates “aufgenommen” as
“received into,”274 and the cluster of related terms involved here are “absorbed,”
“affiliated,” “recorded.” Similar to Guyer and Wood, Werner Pluhar translates the term
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as “taken up.” In the Transcendental Deduction, then, using different terms Kant‟s
language alludes to the earlier passage of the Metaphysical Deduction:
Now in order for unity of intuition to come from this
[synopsis] manifold (as, say, in the representation of
space), it is necessary first to run through and then to take
together this manifoldness, which action I call the synthesis
of apprehension… (CPR 2003, A 99)
This is the passage mentioned by Casey above. 275 The German reads:
Damit nun aus diesem Mannigfaltigen Einheit der
Anschauung werde, (wie etwa in der Vorstellung des
Raumes) so ist erstlich das Durchlaufen der
Mannigfaltigkeit und denn die Zusammennehmung
desselben notwendig, welche Handlung die Synthesis der
Apprehension nenne…276
This running through which Brandom and Casey conflate with the synopsis – recall the
long Kant quote two paragraphs above – is the distinguishing of time in the succession of
impressions which sense has placed in succession, governed by affinity. Running
through belongs to apprehension, not synopsis. This is easy to miss, but it is the very
reason why Fichte considered time to be imaginary. That is, time is determined in
apprehension by imagination in the process of the three-fold synthesis, and hence, for
Fichte “only for imagination is there time.” 277
Comparing the German passages above, Kant‟s verbs at A 77 become nouns at A
99. That is, what Kant refers to at A 77 as to be gone through becomes the running
though at A 99. This describes apprehension in relation to the synopsis of sense. This
next comparison is less obvious. At A 77 Kant‟s “aufgenommen” becomes “die
Zusammennehmung,” from received into or taken up at A 77 to take together or gathering
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together in A 99. This gathering together does include a change from sense or impression
to image. In other words, imagination must produce an image, but the production of this
image derives from what has been apprehended from sense. Like the change of pitch in a
voice, the two different pitches are parts of the same one breath. So, this production by
imagination is a re-production of what has been apprehended. Which is why Kant says,
“the reproductive synthesis of the imagination belongs to the transcendental acts of the
mind [therefore]… let us call this power the transcendental power of imagination.”278
(CPR 1996, A 102) In other words, reproduction is the first sign of imagination as an
original source or power of the mind, recall (A 94/B 127) above.
So, the other side of imagination as an original source or power of the mind is the
productive imagination. These two sides of imagination or two imaginations show how
Kant establishes a continuity of power which spans the gap between sensibility and
understanding while spanning the gap between the empirical and the pure. Referring
back to Kant‟s metaphorical introduction at (A 2-3/B 6), John Sallis refers to this
transition “from one kind of ground to another” as a transition from “ground to flight” 279
indicating this second ground to which imagination has lifted as the point of departure of
reason, i.e. the conceptual standpoint. The conceptual purview requires a “schema” as its
initial point of departure. Moreover, “A schema is, in itself, always only a product of the
imagination.” (CPR 1996, A 140/B 179) When the conceptual purview is coupled with
that of the experiential, i.e. when sensibility is combined with understanding in an
experience, the productive imagination provides this schema – derived from the workings
of sensibility and the first two folds of the three-fold synthesis. When the conceptual
278
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purview regards itself, i.e. it is not coupled with the experiential, this exemplifies pure
reason. As such, the schema is still produced by imagination; however, the schema is
“provided by logic.” (CPR 1996, A 406/B 433) Hence, whereas the product of the
reproductive imagination is empirical, i.e. empirical appearances, the product of the
productive imagination in regard to objective unity is “the nonempirical object, i.e. the
transcendental object = x.”280 (CPR 1996, A 109)
Kant uses the formulation “=x” seven (7) times in the Critique of Pure Reason.
The first six refer to objective unity of an object of experience, and the seventh refers to
the subjective unity of apperception. Of the first six, four of the uses appear in the five
page section Kant devotes to “Recognition in the Concept,” i.e. the productive
imagination‟s role in the three-fold synthesis of imagination. Remember the three-fold
synthesis takes place in the first edition Transcendental Deduction. Notice what Kant
believes he has accomplished, and how he thinks he accomplished it.
The three-fold synthesis is all of imagination, so the reproductive imagination
deals with the empirical aspects of sensibility, and the productive transforms them into
something judge-able by apperception so as to be explicated by the understanding
broadly designated, i.e. including reason. By placing this movement within the
continuity of one power, i.e. imagination, Kant thinks he has solved the heterogeneity
issue, derived from sensibility‟s stem of knowledge compared to the understanding‟s
stem of knowledge, by combining them with the original power which resides between
them – imagination.281 Now this is actually a viable strategy. However, Kant would
have done better if he could have found some power of the mind residing within all of the
280
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original sources, rather than merely situated between them. Moreover, Kant‟s choice of
imagination as the power to combine the stem containing non-discursivity, i.e. sensibility,
with the discursive stem, i.e. understanding, committed him to posit a thing-in-itself.
And, it was precisely this commitment which kept Kant from solving the problem of nonbeing.
Though it will require the entirety of Chapter 8 for me to ground my criticism of
imagination in Kant‟s first Critique, I can generally state my criticism here within the
context of what I have said above. There are two objectives for the remainder of the
chapter, then; to expand my comments on the relation of imagination to memory in
Kant‟s thinking, and to indicate the connection between imagination and the thing-initself within the context of the experiential standpoint. Ultimately, I believe Kant
overlooked the importance of memory in the structure of experience, and this committed
him to positing the thing-in-itself from the experiential standpoint. In his defense, and
considering passages in the critique such as the one reporting on the laws of affinity and
association, Kant was not concerned to fully articulate the ground of experience. He was
concerned to critique the use of pure reason. Yet, it seems to me Kant did not see the full
import of the laws of memory whose position in the structure of experience he indicated.
Regarding memory in Kant‟s Critique, psychologist Herbert Nichols (1852-1936)
made the following observation.
I would call attention to one of the most unique facts in all
of literature, (one I have nowhere seen mentioned), namely
that in Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason … the subject of
memory is not once referred to, nor even the word memory
or its equivalent once used, not even incidentally
throughout. … [Kant] actually builds up his system of mind
utterly without memory. 282
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I certainly concur with the spirit of Nichols‟ comment. Of course, much has been learned
about memory from the late 18th century to the 21st, so perhaps Kant cannot be faulted for
not recognizing the potential in his system regarding memory. Yet, it is remarkable that
of the usual German words for memory, i.e. “Gedächtnis” and “Erinnerung,”
“Gedächtnis” does not appear at all in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Now the word
“Erinnerung” may be translated as “recollection,” “remembrance,” or “reminiscence;”
and, Erinnerung appears nine (9) times in the Critique. Once Kant offhandedly uses it to
refer to Plato‟s theory of recollection (anamnesis) – (A 313/B 370) –, twice he uses it to
refer to the power of memory when he is just listing powers of the mind – both occur at
(A 649/B 677) –, and the remaining times Kant uses this term in direct communication
with the reader, e.g. “to remind,” “a reminder,” etc. Yet, Kant discussed memory outside
of the first Critique, mainly in his Anthropology. So, it is possible to figure a view of the
relation between imagination and memory to Kant‟s mind. Therefore, I will comment on
those passages here to support my claim that Kant privileged imagination over memory
prior to addressing the relation between imagination and the thing-in-itself.
Despite the conspicuous absence of memory from Kant‟s Critique of Pure
Reason, it cannot be suggested that the possibility of featuring memory instead of
imagination never crossed Kant‟s mind. Kant was aware of Leibniz‟s Monadology (A
266/B 322); yet, where Kant attributes succession of appearances to imagination, Leibniz
in the Monadology §26 explicitly refers it to memory, e.g. “Memory provides the soul
with a kind of consecutiveness, which resembles reason but which is to be distinguished
from it.”283 Further, in Kant‟s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View284
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[Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht] Kant specifically considers both imagination
and memory, in sections §31 and §34 respectively. Kant published this work in 1798, i.e.
eleven (11) years after the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, and six (6)
years before his death in 1804. When considering memory in his Anthropology, i.e.
section §34, Kant uses the term “Gedächtnis.” However, it is important to note the title
of this section in which Kant discusses memory, it is “On the faculty of visualizing the
past and the future by means of the power of imagination.” So, Kant treats memory here
as a subsection of using the power of imagination to “visualize.”
What is more, section §31 is titled, “On the productive faculty belonging to
sensibility according to its different forms,” and in this section Kant considers the
subsections regarding the “faculty of association” and the “faculty of affinity.” In fact, he
considers both apprehension and reproduction from the three-fold synthesis of the
Critique, and he labels them “imaginatio plastica” and “imaginatio associans”
respectively. (Anth 284)285 Oddly, he acknowledges that imaginatio associans “produces
a habit in the mind,” (Anth 285) but he seems to consider “habit” a minimally effective
storehouse both controlled by the power of imagination and for the power of imagination.
(Anth 284) Hence, it seems safe to say, not only that Kant privileges imagination over
memory, but Kant even considers association and affinity to derive from imagination, not
memory. From the perspective of the 21st century memory research, he was, of course,
wrong.
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As Wayne Waxman would have it in his Kant’s Model of the Mind, thinking of
faculties of the mind in regard to unfolding and self-affection, basically all that there is in
experience is imagination, and in encountering constraints, space, time, and the law of
non-contradiction result; further – following such a ubiquity of imagination reading –,
with imagination as pre-discursive apperception, it is as if imagination later imagines
itself as you along with your existence. 286 Whereas the Aristotelian model of theocentric
mind has been characterized as thinking thinking thinking, 287 with Waxman it is as if the
description of the Kantian model of anthropocentric mind should be imagining imagining
imagining.288 Waxman also holds that what otherwise would be thought of as memory is
thought of as imagination in Kant‟s Critique.289
Such a reading – as Waxman‟s – may not be as farfetched as it might initially
appear. In his discussion of productive imagination in the Anthropology Kant points out
that imagination‟s “offences” range from the “unbridled” to the “perverse.” Kant, then,
provocatively claims, “The inventive power of imagination produces a kind of
intercourse with ourselves” which he considers “incurable: except through marriage
[Kant‟s emphasis].” (Anth 290) What is important here is that Kant clearly thinks
powers of the mind can affect themselves – compare the comment regarding apperception
from the Critique at (CPR B 68). So, toward supporting Waxman‟s accentuation of
Kant‟s privileging of imagination, Kant can be taken to hold a self-activity/self-affection
reading of imagination. Yet, importantly, Kant does not consider memory capable of
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such self-activity. Moreover, it is in the Anthropology where Kant explicitly indicates the
difference between memory and the reproductive imagination. 290
Memory is distinguished from the merely reproductive
power of imagination in that it is able to reproduce the
former representations voluntarily, so that the mind is not a
mere plaything of the imagination [Kant‟s emphasis]. (Anth
291)
In the language of the 21st century memory research: Kant is not aware of the power of
unconscious memory, i.e. the manner in which memory can affect itself and function
without the subject‟s awareness. Lastly, of “forgetfulness (obliviositas),” in such a state,
Kant claims “the head” is “empty like a barrel full of holes.” (Anth 293)
As I mentioned above both Kant and Martin Heidegger considered the “unknown
root” which combines sensibility with understanding to be (a complex performance by
the) imagination. 291 And, given the comments of the Anthropology above, it seems Kant
could not have considered memory the “unknown root” responsible for combining the
stems of sensibility and understanding. For Kant, imagination “as an original source” “of
the conditions for the possibility of all experience” (CPR 1998, A 94/B 127) is necessary
prior to the functioning of memory.
This privileging of imagination may be characterized by suggesting: imagination
– for Kant – must convert the sensible products into something which can be
remembered. Ultimately, however, such an understanding of memory is too narrow.
Yet, Kant is not the only philosopher to think of the relation between imagination and
memory in such a way. Though an exhaustive history including the proponents of this
relation between imagination and memory is outside the scope of this dissertation, the
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pervasiveness of this relation prompted Casey to refer to it as the “classical sequence of
„first perception-then memory,‟ [Casey‟s emphases]”292 Notably, then, before Kant:
Aristotle293 (384-322 BC), Thomas Hobbes294 (1588-1679), John Locke295 (1632-1704),
Nicolas Malebranche296 (1638-1715), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz297 (1646-1716), George
Berkeley298 (1685-1753), David Hume299 (1711-1776), Étienne Bonnot de Condillac 300
(1715-1780), and Thomas Reid 301 (1710-1796) amongst others, and in Kant‟s wake,
Heidegger (1889-1976), Deleuze (1925-1995), and Derrida (1930-2004), amongst others,
fundamentally agree with imagination‟s priority over memory in the structure of
experience. Given the Copernican revolution, Kant‟s twist to the classical sequence
might read something like “first imagination, as a condition for perception, then
perception and memory.”
If I may venture a speculative interpretation here, I would suggest that Kant
preferred to go with imagination over memory for two reasons. One, it is difficult to
separate the notion of memory from ideas of a power used solely for the purposes of
storage and looking into past experience. Two, imagination is conveniently ambiguous
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as to where it is grounded. So, you can move up the trajectory of experience in the
purview of the experiential standpoint establishing imagination as a ground, then you can
switch over to the apperceptive view, and because of imagination‟s ambiguity, it cannot
be determined whether imagination derives from empirical workings or the self-activity
of being. In comparison, it seems more clear that memory is bound to empirical
workings. This, of course, is neither to say that the power of memory out of empirical
workings does not function to reveal being, i.e. memory as the ground and catalyst of
ontological emergence, nor is it to suggest being is diminished in anyway if memory is in
fact bound to empirical workings.
Addressing the thing-in-itself, then, it is fair to say that Kant‟s thing-in-itself is
infamous. 302 The thing-in-itself is the most easily, and most frequently, criticized aspect
of Kant‟s philosophy, especially by those who do not take the time to understand what
Kant actually says in the Critique of Pure Reason.303 It would take me too far afield to
discuss all the ways which the thing-in-itself has been criticized. Rather, my interest here
is to pinpoint the two commitments due to which Kant posited such a controversial entity.
Or, put another way, what in Kant‟s structure of experience required him to talk about the
thing-in-itself? I approach this question with the heuristic of the three standpoints –
experiential, conceptual, and apperceptive. I have already indicated Kant was not the
first to use the expression “thing-in-itself [Ding an sich].” Above I have quoted Leibniz
and Newton, among others, using the same phraseology. Moreover, there is, of course, a
history of thinking in regard to the thing-in-itself. For example, pointing to a Platonic
origin, Giorgio Agamben and Juliana Schiesari declare,
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[T]he expression, “the thing itself” (ηό πξᾶγκα αὐηό) …
[is] a formulation that remained so determinate as the
indication of the task of philosophy itself, that one finds it
again more than two thousand years later, like a watchword
passed from mouth to mouth, in Kant, in Hegel, in Husserl,
in Heidegger.304
Moreover, this language of “in itself” should conjure for you Plato‟s language of
θαζ‟αὑηό and the problem of “looking through” an Idea – both discussed in the
Introduction. However, like the history of imagination, Kant‟s Copernican revolution –
as a new beginning – not only provides a different vista of imagination and the thing-initself, but also Kant‟s revolution in thinking provides a new vista of the problem of nonbeing. I address this new vista in the next chapter.
To the thing-in-itself, regarding the structure of the text – compare with Figure
2.1 above – in the final major division of the Transcendental Logic, the Transcendental
Dialectic, and specifically in the section titled “Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason”
Kant discusses “The Antinomy of Pure Reason [Der Antinomie der reinen Vernunft].”
Antinomy here brings forth the “against” of “anti-” and the “law” of “nomos,” which
coupled with the double genitive in “of pure reason,” suggests something of a paradox. It
is as if reason, specifically the “demand of reason” (CPR 1996, A 409/B 436) for totality
i.e. systematic completeness, transgresses its governing law regarding these antinomies.
It is in this way that speculation into unknown matters may seem reasonable, despite
exceeding the bounds of (even possible) experience.
This is the way in which the =x as transcendental object becomes equated with the
thing-in-itself. As the schema provided by productive imagination to meet the demands
of reason for systematicity, the productive imagination provides the thing-in-itself as a
transcendental object, i.e. the condition for the possibility of the trajectory of experience
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Giorgio Agamben and Juliana Schiesari, “The Thing Itself,” Substance, 16.2, (1987), 19.

174

as seen from the conceptual standpoint. This then, is the way to arrive at the thing-initself from the conceptual standpoint. Yet, the way to arrive at the thing-in-itself which I
am primarily concerned with is from the experiential standpoint.
Having already assumed objects must conform to our knowledge, i.e. the structure
by which we come to know an object, Kant refers to any concern for what is “outside”
the structure by which we come to know an object as a “cosmological” concern. From
the experiential standpoint for instance, beginning at =x, if you attempt to regress back to
the origin of the sensation(s) which resulted in your experience of a particular object, you
will not be able to proceed beyond the limit of that which allows ultimately for our
knowledge in the first place. For Kant, regardless of standpoint, this final frontier is
imagination.
Put another way, begin with any object of experience, and regressively trace the
series within that to which it was supposed objects must conform, i.e. to the structure by
which we come to know an object. Regressing along this series out to the limit of the
cognitive capacity which allows for experience, at the ground you encounter sensibility
governed by affinity. Yet, the Grundkraft or fundamental power which performs the
apprehension of a manifold out of the synopsis of the sensible manifold is, for Kant,
imagination. As we are blind to what initiates the series along the trajectory of
experience, the three postulates of origin coincide with the three standpoints in the
architectonic. From the conceptual standpoint the postulated initial point is thought to be
“noumenal,” as opposed to “phenomenal.” From the experiential standpoint, the
postulated initial point is thought to be the thing-in-itself, as opposed to the appearance.
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Lastly, from the apperceptive standpoint, the initial point is postulated – following
Schelling – as the Not-I or non-being.
Regarding the thing-in-itself, paradoxically, Kant tells us, “what things may be in
themselves I do not know – nor do I need to know, since, after all, I can never encounter
a thing otherwise than in appearance.” (CPR 1996, A 277/B 333) Kant has already told
us imagination is a condition for the possibility of appearances. However, it seems now
that dividing imagination out of the appearance leaves us with a remainder – the thing-initself. As Nicholas Rescher describes it “To be fully objective and authentic, an
appearance must be an appeance of something [Rescher‟s emphasis]; there must be an
underlying something that does the appearing, that grounds it in a nonphenomenal [my
emphasis].”305 Yet, if we need to divide out imagination in order to arrive at the thing-initself, then there cannot, of course, be an image of the thing-in-itself.
Likewise, having moved back down the trajectory which must be traversed to
experience an object, concepts of the understanding are not applicable, and – what is
more – in arriving at the bottom of the structure of experience the sensible intuitions of
space and time have been regressively divided out of the appearance as well. So, it
cannot be said that the thing-in-itself is in space or time. Despite its name, suddenly, the
thing-in-itself seems to be ineffable. Furthermore, for Kant being experienced requires
the unity provided for by our experiential apparatus. Since the experiential apparatus has
been regressively divided out, about the thing-in-itself it cannot be said that it is, i.e., it is
not. Hence, the difficult problem for Kant, i.e. how to describe the origin of experience
when that origin lacks being? This, of course, for Kant after Aristotle‟s paradigm shift is
the problem of non-being.
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Now, the apperceptive standpoint may look out over the landscape of
conceptuality – using pure reason –, or it may look out over experience – regressively, cf.
the A edition Deduction. As I have established above, in both cases, the ground for Kant
is some version of imagination i.e. either a product of or the power of imagination
respectively. My question can be stated in the following way: From the experiential
standpoint, how does Kant’s decision to make imagination the Grundkraft commit him to
the thing-in-itself as his solution to the problem of non-being?
Wilhelm Wurzer (1948-2009) illuminated thoroughly the imaginal dimension in
Kant‟s works – so to him I turn briefly to answer the above question.306 In his Filming
and Judgment307 Wurzer posits “filming” to articulate the covering or, to use the
phraseology I prefer, “Lêtheic (cf. Λήζε) flowing” of images whose river like flowing at
the ground of experience covers over the thing-in-itself. Wurzer uses an excerpt from the
Epicurean Lucretius‟ On the Nature of Things [De Rerum Natura] to punctuate a
unification of Kant‟s imagination and his own notion of “filming.” Wurzer translates the
following from the poem of Lucretius,
… I now begin to teach you about images, so-called. A
subject of most relevant importance. These images are like
a skin, a film, peeled from the body‟s surface, and they fly
… Let me repeat: these images of things [rerum
simulacra]308 … you might call them film, or bark. (F&J
xiii)
Playing again on the double entendre derived from a phonetic focus on the word “site,”
Wurzer explains, “Philosophy, suddenly, shall have awakened on a radically different site
306

Though I was not able to fully articulate my thesis prior to Dr. Wurzer‟s death, I was fortunate enough
to have shared a good number of conversations with him. I am grateful for those conversations and his
influence.
307
See Wilhelm S. Wurzer, Filming and Judgment, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1990). Hereafter cited
F&J.
308
Cf. Eva M. Thury, “Lucretius‟ Poem as a Simulacrum of the Rerum Natura,” The American Journal of
Philology, 108.2, (1987), 273.

177

through the medium of film.” (F&J xiii) Note, it is important not to hypostasize this
“site,” i.e. equate it with a world such as the penchant of certain French psychoanalysts
and phenomenologists. Filming points to the instability of images in regard to becoming,
not being. Therefore, though it is correct to speak of standpoints or (virtual) dimensions,
it is incorrect to speak of imaginary and symbolic orders or worlds. You may gain access
to a standpoint, but the world as constantly becoming, non-discursively exceeds even my
designation of it here.
As Wurzer taught, “Filming deconstructs the dialectic empire in the genealogy of
metaphysics … it emerges in a philosophical discourse for which judgment is no longer
under the spell of the identity of reason and ground.” (F&J 2) In this way, Wurzer is
working at describing a moving figure – making a film – casting Kant‟s ground of
experience by suspending the conceptuality involved in the power of judgment. Notice
this is intimately related to one of the ways discussed in the Introduction regarding
entering the dialectic (empire). With such an aesthetic suspension of judgment a “shift
from an epistemic to an aesthetic spacing allows imagination the freedom to reflect upon
a different grounding, one that lets Anschauung be.” (F&J 33) By stopping short of the
conceptual standpoint, once again “It is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence
and the world are eternally justified [Nietzsche‟s emphasis].”309
Regarding the thing-in-itself from a non-conceptual standpoint, then, Kant‟s
following remark fully establishes the thing-in-itself as his response to the problem of
non-being from the experiential standpoint: “we cannot have cognition of any object as
thing in itself [Gegenstande als Dinge an sich selbst], but can have such cognition only
309
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insofar as the object is one of sensible intuition, i.e. an appearance. [Objeckt der
sinnlichen Aunschauung is, d.i. als Erscheinung.]” (CPR 1996, B xxvi) Hence,
otherwise an absurd proposition would follow, viz. that
there is appearance without anything that appears [my
emphasis].” [Denn sonst würde der ungereimte Satz daraus
folgen, dass Erscheinung ohne etwas wäre, was da
erscheint.] (CPR 1996, B xxvii)
In reference to the distinction between “logical” (conceptual) and “real” (experiential)
negation discussed by Kant in his Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative
Magnitudes into Philosophy (NM 211), the antinomous positing of a thing-in-itself
pertains to the conceptual standpoint and logical negation. The imaginal-re-productive
positing of a thing-in-itself pertains to the experiential standpoint in Kant and real
negation. In this way, then, from the conceptual standpoint Kant‟s solution to the
problem of not-being (with a “t”) is the noumenon. 310 From the experiential standpoint,
Kant‟s solution to the problem of non-being (with an “n”) is the thing-in-itself.
To sum in concluding, I have shown you the structure and trajectory of experience
in Kant. I have pointed out the three standpoints, i.e. the experiential, the apperceptive,
and the conceptual. I have indicated the purview of these standpoints, and their relation
to negation. I have presented Kant‟s distinction between logical and real negation. I
have associated Kant‟s types of negation with the conceptual and experiential
standpoints. Thereby, I have precisely located the discussion of the problem of nonbeing in regard to Kant‟s system generally and his structure of experience specifically. I
have indicated his privileging of imagination over memory. I have shown his
commitment to the solution of the problem of non-being – negation from the experiential
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standpoint – which results from his privileging of imagination. Therefore, I have shown
how the thing-in-itself is Kant‟s attempt to solve the problem of non-being.
In the remaining chapters of Part I (the non-being part) of the dissertation, I will
show the evolved and compounded reading of Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason which
Derrida and Deleuze encounter – Chapter 3. I will then relate Derrida and Deleuze to
Kant‟s system by indicating from where in the structure of experience they attempt to
locate pure difference, i.e. their points of departure. Derrida takes the high ground, as it
were, the conceptual standpoint, and Deleuze takes the low ground, i.e. the experiential
standpoint. I, then, show how pure difference functions for each of them respectively as
a response to the problem of non-being. In the chapters of Part II (the memory part) I
will critique pure difference in Derrida and Deleuze by drawing them together with Kant
and solving the problem of non-being. I have already indicated above how I will
accomplish this. Affinity and association in Kant should refer to memory not
imagination.
By my lights memory is the continuous power traversing the structure of
experience. Using contemporary memory research, I will show you memory as the
Grundkraft. And, with memory as the fundamental power in the structure of experience
(not imagination), I eliminate the need for not only pure difference but also the thing-initself. You should already be able to see not only by the logic of my overall move in
looking back on this chapter – so long as I am able to account for memory as the
Grundkraft – but also by the consistency of my overall argument: I have found the
solution to the problem of non-being.
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“So we won‟t agree with somebody who says that denial signifies a contrary. We‟ll only admit this much:
when „not‟ and „non-‟ are prefixed to names that follow them, they indicate something other than the
names, or rather, other than the things to which the names following the negation are applied.”311
~Plato, Sophist (257b-c)
“[T]hink through mediation and then give a little credit to the Greeks.
The Greek explanation of the theory of being and nothing,
the explanation of „the moment,‟ „non-being,‟ etc. trumps Hegel.”312
~ Søren Kierkegaard, Repetition §1
“It is so difficult to find the beginning.
Or, better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning.
And not try to go further back.”313
~Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty §471

Chapter Three: Dialectic and Difference – Apprehending Non-Being
Introduction and Justification for Chapter 3 Sections and Objectives
There are two overarching goals for this chapter. First, I provide standard logical
treatment of the various types of propositions as possible ways to state non-being. As
you should be able to predict, neither the propositions – piecemeal or whole –, nor their
respective logical negations solve the problem of non-being. Second, I provide a reading
of G.W.F. Hegel‟s dialectic with explicit reference to Kant‟s structure of experience from
the previous chapter. As if providing the transitional form of Aristotle‟s
demonstration/dialectic divide bridging the previous two chapters with the subsequent
two chapters. This chapter, then, like the Introduction contributes material to the topic
which could stand at the beginning of both the Derrida and the Deleuze chapters. I
decided to put the material in a separate chapter to decrease redundancy. Hence, on the
one hand, this chapter does not require the length of the previous chapter. On the other
hand, this chapter is designed to decrease the length of both of the subsequent chapters.
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Historically, a number of influential thinkers appear between Kant and Derrida
and Deleuze. Though an exhaustive treatment of all the thinkers appearing between them
is beyond the scope of my project, I have selected key figures to historically substantiate
what the combination of the previous two chapters coupled with the subsequent two
chapters, respectively, should logically substantiate. The thinkers with which I will deal
in this chapter include: Hegel and Jean Hyppolite. Hegel is important because, as will be
clear in the next two chapters, contemporary French philosophy in general, and
specifically the philosophy of Derrida and Deleuze, is widely considered a reaction to the
philosophy of Hegel. What is more, the reactions of Derrida and Deleuze indicate an
attempt to overcome Hegel which is grounded in a return to Kant, specifically Kant‟s
structure of experience. Hyppolite is important because contemporary French
philosophy‟s return to Kant was largely fueled by Hyppolite‟s book Logic and Existence
(1952). In regard to my discussion of Kantian standpoints, in their reaction to Hegel‟s
dialectic Derrida and Deleuze represent unique – “post-structuralist” – returns to Kant‟s
conceptual and experiential standpoints respectively.
Recall Plato‟s two impasses generally coincide with the conceptual and
experiential standpoints of Kant‟s structure of experience. I read Kant‟s Copernican
revolution as in itself going far toward overcoming Plato‟s first impasse. Yet, ultimately,
the strength of Kant‟s structure of experience resides in its ability to think nondiscursivity. As such, Kant‟s structure of experience overcomes Plato‟s first impasse.
Further, then, I read Kant‟s thing-in-itself as his attempt to overcome the second of
Plato‟s two impasses. However, ultimately Kant‟s thing-in-itself falls short of providing
a solution to the problem of non-being.
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Similarly, I have divided the post-Kantian influences into two groups of two to
represent what I see as the post-Kantian oscillation between the two impasses of the
problem of non-being. I refer to this movement as an oscillation because it is as if after
Kant‟s progress to the second impasse of the problem, Hegel‟s attempt to sublate Kant‟s
structure of experience results in a return to the first impasse. I see the work of Derrida
and Deleuze, then, as resulting in a return to the second impasse. To make sense of this
return to the second impasse I show the movement from Hegel through Hyppolite to
Derrida and Deleuze. This chapter, then, further serves as a bridge connecting Kant‟s
structure and trajectory of experience, the problem of non-being, and pure difference.
Can Non-Being Be Stated Symbolically? – A Thoughtful Experiment
“the ability to contradict [is] the attainment of a good conscience.”314
~Friedrich Nietzsche, The Cheerful Science (§297)

Those who ridicule discussing the topic of non-being usually do so by appealing
to logic. 315 On the one hand, they – such as Rudolf Carnap – suggest lacking logical
rigor one may lapse into making “pseudo-statements.”316 On the other hand, those who
resist providing a logical reading – the likes of Martin Heidegger – defend such an
approach suggesting, “the nothing is more original than the (logical) „not‟ and
negation.”317 Notice how this exchange mimics the so called digressive section of Plato‟s
Sophist and the two impasses indicated there. First, there is the charge that a certain type
314
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of statement should not be made. Second, the final answer provided in the text makes
just such a pseudo-statement in suggesting that non-being is (difference). As I contend,
correctly solving the problem of non-being shows that both Carnap and Heidegger are
correct in that pseudo-statements should be avoided, and logical negation cannot assume
the appropriate relation from which to reveal non-being. Moreover, it may be suggested
that Heidegger merely lacked the contemporary vocabulary with which to provide a nonpseudo-statement solution. In other words, with the solution to the problem of non-being,
neither Carnap nor Heidegger loses ground by affirming each other‟s statements noted
above.
In this brief section, then, I seek to show how the logical negations involved miss
the problem of non-being. This discussion hearkens back to Aristotle from the
Introduction. Yet, this discussion should be relevantly different as it explicitly engages
the problem from a formally logical perspective. In other words, I take Carnap‟s
challenge seriously. Though I find Heidegger‟s style to be excellent and enchanting, by
not resorting to pseudo-statements I hope to show I have truly solved the problem. As
this section, then, goes toward illustrating that logical negation is insufficient to think
non-being, I will begin with straightforward examples from formal logic. That is, I will
illustrate various logical negations as they are found in propositional logic. I chose to use
propositional logic as it is the approach to investigating symbolization which will be
viewed as involving the least amount of smoke and mirrors. Hence, even non-experts in
logic should be able to recognize both that this approach treats the topic logically and
also fails to account for non-being. In concluding this discussion I will also briefly
discuss predicate logic as faring no better on the topic.
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I will proceed, quite simply, by showing the different standard form propositions
emphasizing their delineation into components, and I will show the various ways to
negate the components toward discovering which negation should be associated with
non-being. Moreover, it should be noted that it is unnecessary for me to consider
paraconsistent logic. As Anscombe‟s syllogism318 stated in the Introduction clearly
indicates, neither the problem of non-being nor the (non-pseudo) statement of non-being
requires what calls for paraconsistent logic, i.e. taking a contradiction as point of
departure.319 It should be further noted that in saying this I have also breached the
difference between my approach and the generally referred to – and perhaps misnamed –
“Buddhist” approach to non-being. For example, Graham Priest in his Towards NonBeing: The logic and metaphysics of intentionality seeks to indicate the appropriateness
of paraconsistent logic320 to an idea of non-being as expounded in texts generally
considered “Buddhist.”321
Standard
Letter
A
E
I
O

Standard Form Propositions
Subject
Predicate
Quantifier
Term
Copula
Term
All
S
are
P.
No
S
are
P.
Some
S
are
P.
Some
S
are not
P.

Quantity

Quality

Universal
Universal
Particular
Particular

Affirmative
Negative
Affirmative
Negative

Figure 3.1
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Now then, considering Figure 3.1, there are a number of possible components to
be negated, and, this is, moreover, an exercise in the Square of Opposition. Whereas,
quantity pertains to what amount of the subject is predicated, quality pertains to whether
that which is predicated is predicated affirmatively or negatively of the subject. Put
another way, some quantity of S is or is not (affirmative or negative) considered to
belong in the group of P. Hence, as you can see, negating an affirmative quality gives
you a negative, and negating a negative gives you an affirmative – switching between A
and E or between I and O. Yet, since none of the standard letter propositions refer to
non-being, negating quality does not yield non-being.
The same is the case with quantity. On the one hand, to perform a complete
opposition, i.e. a contradiction, switches between standard letters A and O or standard
letters I and E. On the other hand, mere negation instead of contradictory negation refers
the letter in question to the two letters other than the contradictory: negating a quantity of
A might refer to I or E; negating E might refer to A or O, etc. Notice, this type of
negation fails for the same reason. Hence, such a logical attempt to solve the problem of
non-being is a dead end. Yet, there are still more components to negate.
Negating the subject and predicate terms themselves is a more fruitful exercise.
Other than the terms, only the copula remains to negate. It just so happens that there is a
specific way to reference the negation of a term; it is called a “term complement” or just
“complement.”322 What is more, you state it by placing “non-” in front of the term to
complemented. Hence, the complement of S is non-S. Yet, despite its prefix, its
description rules it out in regard to non-being.
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The “non-” is actually taken as an attempt to include everything else that is not
whatever the “non-” prefixed. This everything else, of course, must be read as referring
to logical entities only. In other words, if given the choice of Being, Becoming, or NonBeing and asked to which one should you associate the above iteration of “everything,”
then the answer you would give is Being, since – given these options – there are no
entities to speak of other than those which are Being.323 The force of this insight is
twofold. First, it mimics Aristotle‟s idea of priority in account. That is, the meaning of
“term complement” derives from its participation in a language (game). In other words,
it is not supposed to refer to any “outside” in regard to its own structure. Second, it
shows that the logical notion of being a complement, a fortiori, cannot solve the problem
of non-being. Not only is the “non-” of a term complement “within” being, it derives its
meaning from its relation to other entities, not from its non-being. It is worth noting that
a number of psychoanalysts precisely make this mistake of equating the subject term with
Being.
How about negating the copula? Certainly this seems to be the right approach.
After all, “the copula” refers to the “is.” Yet, notice that in this context you cannot get
the copula by itself in order to negate it. It is as if there is a terminological priority, and
you must get outside the terminology. Hopefully you can remember the Introduction
well enough to notice that this difficulty is the same as the difficulty which pertains to
attempting to, and needing to, look outside or beyond the forms. Hence, turning to logic
to attempt to solve the problem of non-being encounters and cannot proceed beyond its
own inability to see being.
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This leaves one lunging from a logical ledge to posit the negation of either the
language (game) or logic to arrive at non-being. However, beyond the difficulty of
getting fully clear on what negating the totality of language or logic might be like, neither
non-linguistic nor non- (or il-) logical successfully state non-being.324 Recalling the
dependency of reckoning with being on reckoning with non-being from the Introduction,
formal logic is stalemated by the same issue which stalemated Plato‟s forms in the
Sophist. Oppositions and negations between beings do not result in the opposition or
negation of being.
Summarily appropriate, then, is John Neville Keynes‟ (1852-1949)
Definition of Formal Logic – Formal logic may be defined
as the science which investigates those regulative principles
of thought that have universal validity whatever may be the
particular objects about which we are thinking. It is a
science which is concerned with the form as distinguished
from the matter of thought [Keynes‟ emphases].325
In a reflection on this definition you can see a reference to the regulative use of ideas
discussed in relation to both Aristotle and Kant. The solidity which Keynes attributes to
these regulative ideas indicates the standard association between logic and demonstration
as opposed to dialectic. Further, his reference to the particular objects indicates the
manner just discussed in which logic derives its meaning from internal relations and
those – in turn – from being. Moreover, further symbolizing Keynes‟ definition –
moving from propositional to predicate logic – will not succeed at increasing the capacity
of logic to indicate the solution to the problem of non-being.
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Consider standard letter E proposition: No S are P. The symbolic formulation
would be: (x) (Sx  ~Px). And, the way it reads clearly indicates what I concluded just
above, i.e. “For any x, if x is an S, then x is not a P.” 326 The logical relations between S
and P are contingent upon what is being “x.” So the application of formal logic itself
displaces the problem to a realm of demonstrative certainty, a specialized discursivity,
even further removed from any difficulty of beyond the forms. The more viable
approach seems to be dialectic.
Without trivializing the matter, indulge me in a metaphorical expression of the
ground just covered. For the metaphorical part of this thought experiment, then, suppose
you are in a room and the lights are on. In fact, as long as you can remember the lights
have always been on. In this room there are pamphlets and on the pamphlets there is
writing. Since the lights are on you can read the writing, and one of the pamphlets reads:
“The lights are out.” Now, certainly you will agree that there is a difference between
reading this pamphlet and being in a room with the lights out. Yet, suppose another
pamphlet to read, “The lights are on.” With this pamphlet, you may think that this
proposition is true. Yet, if you have never been in a room with the lights out, then the
truth of the proposition is merely mechanical. In other words, you either communicate
rightly or wrongly. However, there is a different way to relate to the truth of the
statement “The lights are on” when you have been in the dark.
Even beyond speaking to the value of light, a relation results which cannot be
captured in a logic of opposition. Loosely stated, it is as if you do not really “know” the
light until you have been in the dark, but the demonstrative attempt to pin down the
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meaning of “know” and “true” obscure the message to be communicated. On the one
hand, however you come to know the light will depend upon what you can read while in
the light. On the other hand, without encountering the darkness, whatever truth you come
to know about the light will be both limited and ungrounded – though taking the darkness
as ground is, of course, an illicit move if you deny (certainly I cannot here say “the
existence of”) such darkness. Hence, were it the case that you could come to notice the
light in the room flicker, then you could catch a glimpse of the darkness, and come to
better “know” the light.
Pointing to an underlying subject, i.e. hypokeimenon, it is as if since A=A, A &
A : Sameness :: A & ~A : Difference. 327 The dialectically provided first principle here of
the “law of identity” (A=A) provides the starting point for the demonstration, and the
difference internal to the demonstration is, of course, ἐλαληίνλ, i.e. logical difference.328
Dialectic, then, is more viable, as noted above, because if difference is to find the latch of
being, so to speak, it must look to the beginning of dialectic insofar as it is possible
without assumption. In fact, some commentators329 go so far as to suggest an analogy
such that truth : play :: demonstration : dialectic.
Recalling G.E.L. Owen‟s “Tithenai ta Phainomena,” with the Kantian
language from Chapter 1, dialectic begins with either conceptual or experiential
products.330 Hence, the question: can non-being be symbolized? If you do not start the
dialectic with an experiential product, then you beg the question. To suppose a
conceptual starting point is already to assign a symbol for non-being. In order for the
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symbol to get its meaning – think Aristotle‟s priority of account – a network of symbols
is involved. Such a derivation of non-being is, of course, logical, pertaining to ἐλαληίνλ,
and better labeled as not-being. You might say, for example, watching someone try to
connect oddly shaped blocks together speaks to the experiential conceptual distinction.
Often they will try the same combination of moves repeatedly despite being unsuccessful
at completing the combination. This shows them responding more to thoughts than to
perception. The situation from the perceptual point of view, so to speak, is experiential,
and from thought, conceptual.
Kant‟s Attempt to Discover and Demonstrate Nothing
“The man and his wife were both naked, and they felt no shame.”331
~Genesis 2: 25

In commenting on Hegel‟s work Heidegger notes, “In the Critique of Pure
Reason, Kant opened up the problem of an ontology of nature,” Heidegger clarifies that
this problem entails the question “of how to determine … extant and accessible beings as
to what and how they are. The determinations of the being of beings are called
„categories‟.”332 What Heidegger is articulating is a view of the performance of concept
application from the apperceptive standpoint. As already mentioned, this entails the use
of the transcendental object, as the productive imagination‟s conditon for the possibility
of objectively unifying a sensible manifold or schematically initiating reflection upon a
not currently experienced object. Since Kant worked from mulitiple standpoints, when
he worked from the conceptual standpoint he described the movement of retrospection or
sublation for deriving the objective =x as mirroring the alêtheatic movement from the
331
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apperceptive standpoint for deriving the subjective =x, i.e. the transcendental unity of
apperception.
Kant notes,
The highest concept with which one is accustomed to begin
a transcendental philosophy is usually the division between
the possible and the impossible. But since every division
presupposes a concept that is to be divided, a still higher
one must be given, and this is the concept of an object in
general [Gegenstande überhaupt]. (CPR 1998, A 290)
And, notice how Kant moves from a “division” – for example, the possible and the
impossible –, i.e. of two concepts, to the one concept which they logically presuppose.
Kant is here describing the process of sublation. You have already seen this in Aristotle‟s
supposition of the ὑπνθείκελνλ, i.e. hypokeimenon, from the division into binary
opposites of it concepts. Similarly, multiple empirical perceptions sublate to reveal their
transcendental unity as the apperceptive I. The difference from the conceptual standpoint
is that the sublated concept of an object in general is the =x, i.e. the transcendental object.
(Cf. CPR A 290) Hence, Kant employs the hypokeimenal movement “upward” to derive
the =x.333
Regarding the =x then, Kant parenthetically states the object in general is “(taken
problematically, leaving undecided whether it is something or nothing [my emphasis].)”
(CPR 1998, A 290) Here, again, Kant employs the notion of undecidability, and – notice
– it is regarding the being or not-being of that which is in question. Kant‟s employment
of undecidability is important to note because – from the conceptual standpoint – Kant
claims the being of the =x, as initial point in conceptual specification, to be undecidable.
This claim will prove to be decisive in distinguishing between the positions of various
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philosophers, including Kant, in regard to non-being. Kant supports this claim noting,
“Since the categories are the only concepts that relate to objects in general, the distinction
of whether an object is something or nothing will proceed in accordance with the order
and guidance of the categories.” (CPR 1998, A 290)
Now, if Kant just said that the matter of the =x is to be considered undecidable,
then why is he now talking about using the categories to guide in the decision as to
whether the =x is something or nothing? The answer: From the perspective of
conceptuality, it is possible to use the categories to make decisions about the =x. Yet, at
the same time, the experiential perspective, which does not extend far enough into
conceptuality for such decisions, only knows the =x as determining an object of
experience. Hence, whereas within the conceptual perspective the =x is maintained, i.e. it
is supposed to persist at least relationally, so as to possibly be reflected upon, from the
experiential perspective, the =x flickers. Reflective decisions require access to
conceptuality which the experiential standpoint does not have. This conceptuality is the
use of the Categories themselves to, as Heidegger noted, determine “the being of
beings.”334
Notice then, this is precisely why in attempting to determine non-being from the
conceptual standpoint that non-being is determined as a concept, i.e. as not-being not
non-being. Think of ἐλαληίνλ from the Introduction, and logical structure from above. In
explicating this concept of not-being, i.e. negation or nothing, using the Categories as a
guide Kant constructs a “Table of Nothing [Nichts],” Figure 3.2. It is worth noting that
according to the Word Index to Kant’s Collected Works [Wortindex zu Kants
gesammelten Schriften] Kant uses the locution “nichtsein,” i.e. not or non being – it is
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also translated at times as “nothing” –, over twice as many times in the Critique of Pure
Reason than any of the other (entire) volumes of his Collected Works, i.e. 26 times. 335
Now before looking to the Table, it is important to make a few prefatory
remarks. It is not due to whimsy that Kant‟s Table of Nothing appears in an Appendix
immediately before the Transcendental Dialectic. The section of the Critique of Pure
Reason in question here is appropriately titled “Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection,”
since he discusses the use of concepts to reflectively make decisions about nonconceptual genesis. This is one of two bridging chapters between the Transcendental
Analytic and the Transcendental Dialectic. Referring to the Analytic, Kant suggests at
the point of beginning the bridging that “We have now not only traveled through the land
of pure understanding, and carefully inspected each part of it, but we have also surveyed
it, and determined the place for each thing in it [my emphasis].” (CPR 1998, A 235/B
294) Kant makes a point to establish that “This land, however, is an island, and enclosed
in unalterable boundaries.” (CPR 1998, A 235/B 294) These bridging sections, then, are
meant to clarify the relation between representations and the faculties to which they
belong so as to further justify the critique of drawing inferences by highlighting the
dependence of these representations upon the faculties from which they originate.
You might recall that this is why Kant required a continuous power – which he
deemed imagination – to bridge the gap which already appeared between sense and its
synopsis on one side and understanding and its categories on the other. Referring, then,
to the critique of using one faculty‟s representations to account for the product of a
different faculty – such as understanding‟s concepts to account for sensibility‟s genesis –
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Kant explains, “What makes this critique of the inferences from the mere actions of
reflection useful above all is that it clearly establishes the nullity of all inferences about
objects that one simply compares with each other in the understanding… [my
emphasis].” (CPR 1998, A 278/B 334) In other words, since concepts of reflection do
not involve sensibility, the emptiness thesis, i.e. the other side of the blindness thesis, is
encountered. Remember the two stems of knowledge are sensibility and understanding,
“Through the former, objects are [intuitively] given to us; through the latter, they are
thought.” (CPR 2003, A 15/B29) And, “Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions
without concepts are blind [my emphasis].” (CPR 1996, A 51/ B75)
Defining Amphiboly from the section title noted above, Kant explains that a
“transcendental amphiboly” is “a confusion of a pure object of understanding with
appearance.” (CPR 1996, A 270/B 326) In other words, the fallacy of amphiboly is
committed when you fail to recognize that reflective concepts, which are without
experiential content, are empty. Kant‟s target here is Leibniz, but in regard to amphiboly,
it might as well be Hegel also. To this end, then, Kant provides an abstract example of
Leibniz‟s Law, i.e. the identity of indiscernibles. According to Kant,
Suppose that an object is exhibited to us repeatedly but
always with the same intrinsic determinations (qualitas et
quantitas). In that case, if the object counts as object of
pure understanding then it is always the same object, and is
not many but only one thing [numerical identity]. (CPR
1996, A 263/B 319)
Now, the contrary case regarding appearance is one which includes input from
sensibility.
But if the object is appearance, then comparison of
concepts does not matter at all; rather, however much
everything regarding these concepts may be the same, yet
the difference of the locations of these appearances at the
195

same time is sufficient basis for the numerical difference of
the object (of the senses) itself [Kant‟s emphasis]. (CPR
1996, A 263/B 319)
Whereas in the former case of the conceptual standpoint, difference in time and space is
sublated into a pure concept, in the latter case of the experiential standpoint the difference
in time and space cannot be sublated by a concept but merely indexed. 336 The industry
terminology being here: dialectical difference for the former and differential difference
for the latter. In other words, “the understanding can a priori never accomplish more
than to anticipate the form of a possible experience as such.” (CPR 1996, A 246/B 303)
Hence, it is in the spirit of conceptual anticipation, then, that Kant constructs his Table of
Nothing. To take the Table of Nothing map for the territory (of non-being) would be to
commit the fallacy of Amphiboly. (Cf. CPR A 270/B326)
It is highly remarkable that having so thoroughly discussed the structure of
experience by the end of the Transcendental Analytic, Kant just prior to the
Transcendental Dialectic still maintains: “we have no insight whatever into the intrinsic
character of things [Kant‟s emphasis].” (CPR 1996, A 277/B 333) And with his usual
reference to a different kind of mind he justifies this claim stating that “to be able to
cognize things” would require “us to be able to intuit [things], even without senses,” an
ability “wholly different from the human one not merely in degree but even in its
intuition and kind.” (CPR 1996, A 277-8/B 333-4) In other words, “those transcendental
questions that go beyond nature we would … still never be able to answer, even if nature
were uncovered for us.” (CPR 1996, A 279/B 335) What is most significant, however, is
what Kant says next in regard to the human mind. After all his work on the structure of
experience, Kant says, “This is so because we have not been given [the ability] to observe
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even our own mind,” and specifically “in it lies the secret of our sensibility’s origin by
means of an intuition other than that of our inner sense.” (CPR 1996, A 279/B 335)
Kant clarifies what he means by this “secret” in the following highly important
passage:
Its relation to an object, and what might be the
transcendental ground of this unity [formerly referred to by
Kant as original faculty of “sense”], undoubtedly lie too
deeply hidden for us, who know even ourselves only
through inner sense [from apprehension “up” in the
trajectory of experience], thus as appearance, to be able to
use such an unsuitable tool of investigation to find out
anything except always more appearances, even though we
would gladly investigate their non-sensible cause. (CPR
1998, A 279/B 335)
Kant is referring here to the unity of the synopsis. And the unity of the synopsis –
remember – is governed by affinity. Yet, Kant laments that the depths of affinity are still
too hidden for18th century eyes. This is tantamount to Kant‟s concession that the mind
has yet to exceed the velocity of the unreeling which constitutes filming. Hence,
filming‟s contribution to a barrier of being – for Kant – cannot be broken. It is in this
way that Kant arrives at his Table of Nothing. Accordingly, all attempts to conceptually
account for what would be the “boom” of breaking the being barrier result in the
boomerang action of being merely conceptual. Since imagination performs a “radical
displacement” (F&J 33) in regard to non-being, the pure understanding is thrice removed
(Cf. Rep 597e) from that which it would call “nothing.”
Kant‟s Table of Nothing, then, presents the categorical, i.e. conceptual,
determinations of nothing, i.e. not-being. Accordingly, Béatrice Longuenesse declares,
“As a pure concept of the understanding, negation is the concept of a „privation‟ or „lack‟
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of a real determination [my emphasis].”337 Another telltale sign that the emptiness thesis
has been encountered can be seen by the inclusion of the word “empty” in each division
of the table. Here then is Kant‟s conceptual analysis of nothing, i.e. Figure 3.2.
Kant’s Table of Nothing [Nichts] (A 292)
I.
Empty Concept
without Object
ens rationis
II.
Empty Object
of a Concept
nihil privativum

III.
Empty Intuition
without object
ens imaginarium
IV.
Empty Object
without Concept
nihil negativum

Figure 3.2
Kant‟s Table illustrates my division of the problem of non-being into two impasses. The
first impasse is “II,” nihil privativum, from the perspective of “I,” ens rationis. The
second impasse is “IV,” nihil negativum, from the perspective of “III,” ens imaginarium.
Notice imagination as the ground here. Also, remember, this second impasse is
paradoxical. So, it looks like nihil negativum, or absolute nothing, refers to non-being.
Yet, you must not forget the conceptual standpoint which made this Table possible. In
other words, as a discursive, i.e. conceptual, statement of absolute nothing, it is a
statement – it is not non-being. This is why in describing his Table Kant distinguishes
between “the thought-entity [das Gedankending] (no. 1)” and “the non-entity [Un-dinge]
(no. 4)” noting that neither of them are “possible”; and, neither are possible because “the
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thought-entity” is “mere invention,” 338 and “the non-entity” because “as the concept [it]
annuls even itself.” (CPR 1996, A 292/B 348) This, again, mirrors the second impasse of
the problem of non-being in pointing to the paradoxical nature of thinking that which
cannot be thought.
Upon reading Kant‟s Table of Nothing, Schopenhauer applaudingly repeats the
manner in which “IV” may be thought of as “II” because it is being viewed from the
conceptual standpoint. According to Schopenhauer,
[A]n absolute nothing, a really proper nihil negativum, is
not even conceivable, but everything of this kind,
considered from a higher standpoint or subsumed under a
wider concept, is always only a nihil privativum. … Even
logical contradiction is only a relative nothing… (WWI
409)
It should not be a surprise, then, that from here Schopenhauer immediately sees a
connection with Plato‟s Sophist. Here is Schopenhauer‟s rendition of “Plato‟s Puzzle”
following on the heels of his discussion of Kant‟s Table of Nothing:
[I]f we look for such an example [of non-being], we shall
stick to the non-sense as the positive we are just looking for
[IV], and skip the sense as the negative [II]. Thus every
nihil negativum or absolute nothing, if subordinated to a
higher concept, will appear as a mere nihil privativum or
relative nothing, which can always change signs with what
it negates, so that that would then be thought of as
negation, but it itself as affirmation. This also agrees with
the result of the difficult dialectical [my emphasis]
investigation on the conception of nothing which is given
by Plato in the Sophist (258d&e). (WWI 409)
Notice from the Introduction, there Schopenhauer cannot help but use Plato‟s language of
in relation to others, i.e. πξὸο ἄιια, as opposed to in itself, i.e. θαζ‟αὑηό, and this
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opposition brings to mind ἐλαληίνλ and ἕηεξνλ respectively. 339 Lastly, then,
Schopenhauer is in agreement with Kant‟s categorical-logico-discursive analysis of
nothing, and all three of us recognize non-being as paradoxically ineffable.
Now because Schopenhauer thinks of conation, i.e. “the will,” as the Grundkraft –
neither Kantian sense nor imagination –, Schopenhauer defines non-being as “denial of
the will.”340 Schopenhauer yields “If, however, it should be absolutely insisted,” then he
refers to non-being as “that state which is experienced by all who have attained to
complete denial of the will”; further referring to this state as “ecstasy, rapture,
illumination, union with God, and so on … that cannot further be communicated.”(WWI
410) Whereas Schopenhauer ultimately resorts to metaphors just before retreating to
“ineffability,” I can actually “speak of non-being without number,” and provide a way for
you to see that you too experience non-being. Though, again, it will take until the end of
the dissertation for me to provide a full treatment of the problem.
In sum, at this point you should be able to see the connection between the
problem of non-being, as stated in Plato, and Kant‟s nihil negativum as discussed by both
Kant and Schopenhauer. Kant‟s Table of Nothing provides a fourfold nothing in
accordance with the conceptual and experiential starting points of dialectic. Further, you
should have noticed how Kant and Schopenhauer both describe this nihil negativum,
absolute nothing, or non-being in a way following Gorgias. That is, all three recognize
that a conceptual treatment of non-being fails to solve the problem. So this is their
unanimously agreed upon jumping off point for landing in non-being. Kant has it as
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thing-in-itself, and Schopenhauer has it as denial of the will. Neither solves the problem,
but both are closer than where Hegel will take it by attempting to sublate the jumping off
point.
Conceptually “Stepping Back” – Hegel & the Closure of Discursivity
“The one and only thing for securing scientific progress is knowledge of the logical precept
that Negation is just as much Affirmation as Negation.”341
~G.W.F. Hegel (SL 64)

Some regard Kant‟s Copernican revolution as an admission of his own humility,
i.e. he is humble enough to admit he cannot know everything. In particular, he admits he
cannot know things in themselves. In fact, Kant‟s ascription of cognitive,
epistemological and ontological limits as requisite for his system has led commentators
such as Karl Ameriks and Rae Langton to speak of “Kantian humility.” Ameriks,
commenting on Langton‟s book titled Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in
Themselves, describes Kantian humility in the following way:
[T]ranscendental idealism can be expressed as not so much
a metaphysical extravagance as rather a principle of
modesty, as a reminder that things in their intrinsic
character need not be the way that our specific modes of
knowing must take them to be.342
With such a “principle,” Kant was able to point out that, despite reason‟s inevitable
reaching for beyond the sphere of being, such speculation is – without experience –
groundless. Speculations regarding such matters, though reasonable, “neither may hope
to be confirmed in experience nor need they fear being refuted in it.” (CPR 1996, A
421/B 449) Kant illustrates this claim in regard to the unconditioned “origin of the
world” (CPR 1996, A 451/ B 479) with the antinomies of pure reason in the
341
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Transcendental Dialectic of his Critique of Pure Reason. Hence, Kant concluded that
such employment of “pure” reason should be critiqued. Hegel, in comparison, was not so
modest.
In this section of Chapter 3 I examine Hegel primarily due to his influence on
contemporary French thought. Yet, at the same time, since Hegel represents a return to
the first impasse of Plato‟s puzzle, I show how Hegel‟s logic and insistence upon the
conceptual standpoint necessitated that he in fact make the return to the first impasse.
This, however, does not stop Hegel from speaking as though he has solved the problem
of non-being. As Tom Rockmore points out in discussing Hegel‟s Science of Logic,
Hegel affirms that „Nothing is, therefore, …‟ The
conclusion that follows is that pure being and nothing are
exactly alike . They are exactly the same, without any
difference [my emphases].”343
As I will show below, this nothing or non-being as Hegel sees it is not a return to the nondiscursivity of Kant‟s thing-in-itself.
In fact, the terms “discursive,” “discursivity,” and “non-discursive” never appear
in Hegel‟s Phenomenology of Spirit [Phänomenologie des Geistes] (1807). What is
more, of these terms only “discursive” appears in his Science of Logic [Wissenschaft der
Logik] – the Greater Logic – (1812-1816), and it only appears once. Hegel employs this
term precisely at the point at which he is disputing the antinomies in the Critique of Pure
Reason, i.e. specifically Kant‟s conclusion (mentioned above) in the Transcendental
Dialectic. The dispute, at this point, is about space, and Hegel notes, “[space] is an
intuition, that is, according to the Kantian definition, a representation which can only be
given through a single object, and is not a so-called discursive concept [my emphasis].”
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(SL 196) Hence, as you will see below, Hegel has little use for the discursive/nondiscursive distinction.
What is at stake in the dispute is the justification of supposing the thing-in-itself.
Hegel reveals his desire to collapse the hierarchical distinction between intuition and
concept – the Kantian distinction which gives rise to the discursive/non-discursive
distinction – with the following: “This Kantian distinction between intuition and concept
has, as everyone knows, given rise to a deal of nonsense about the former.” (SL 196)
The deal of non-sense – of which Hegel speaks and Schopenhauer affirms – is, of course,
the thing-in-itself. 344 Before discussing the details of the dispute below, it is important to
note, “the nature of quantity,” Hegel tells us, “gives rise” to this dispute between he and
Kant. (SL 196) And in rejecting Kant, Hegel expresses his preference for “the ancient
Eleatic school” by which he means “the pure being of Parmenides” and “the flux of
Heraclitus [Hegel‟s emphasis].” (SL 196) My comments above, then, regarding the
Parmenidean statement in Anscombe‟s syllogism hold here for Hegel.
Hegel has already stated the entirety of his position with reference to Parmenides
and Heraclitus. Hegel wants solid being, i.e. he wants being to be closed. He wants “the
One” to cover it all, i.e. be it all. Further, becoming will account for not-being and
change. Yet, becoming is enclosed within being. Put briefly, there is no becoming being
other than being becoming itself. The consequence for non-being, as Rockmore pointed
out above, non-being and being are “exactly the same.”
Now, as I will show below, it will be the “the nature of quantity,” which Hegel
takes to be central in his dispute with Kant over the thing-in-itself, and in discussing this
dispute I will already be tracing the understanding of difference inherited by Derrida and
344
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Deleuze. Whereas Kant had a mechanism for thinking of difference outside the structure
of experience – the “impossible” possibility of nihil negativum –, Hegel has it that all
difference is difference within being. The confusion here resembles the difference
between looking through a cone from the point of its convergence at what is beyond the
cone and looking at the cone from the side to say what is outside the cone – cf. Figure
2.8. Yet, perhaps Bruce Lee (1940-1973) is instructive here since in both cases one may
think of the cone as if “It is like a finger pointing a way to the moon. Don‟t concentrate
on the finger or you will miss all that heavenly glory.”345 Figured this way, it is as if
Hegel takes a quantity of pointing for the moon.
Both Derrida and Deleuze will be working against this Hegelian closure toward a
Kantian openness. Moreover, though I dealt extensively with Kant in the previous
chapter, recall I focused primarily on what I refer to as the purview of his experiential
standpoint, and also in the previous chapter I associated Hegel with the conceptual
standpoint. Therefore, though I will be referring below to some material which I covered
in the previous chapter, I do so here from the conceptual standpoint. In this way, I am
being fair in assessing Hegel‟s reading of Kant‟s thing-in-itself. In other words, looking
at Kant from the conceptual standpoint so as to be fair in evaluating what is at stake
between Kant and Hegel on Hegel‟s terms, i.e. the composition of a concept. To this end,
I quote Kant extensively below. In this way, I intend to clearly show Hegel‟s
interpretation of Kant‟s teaching in regard to the thing-in-itself without merely relying on
Hegel. Further quoting Kant provides the background for their dispute, i.e. space,
quantity, and discursivity.
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I have already shown that from the experiential standpoint Kant seeks to retain
something of the non-discursive which, for him, distinguishes the experiential from the
conceptual standpoint. This Kantian humility in the attempt to retain non-discursivity
leads him – from an experiential standpoint – to posit a thing-in-itself and – from the
conceptual standpoint – to posit a noumenon. As Hegel wishes to avoid the thing-initself, Hegel also seeks to avoid non-discursivity. The point of contention, then, is the
moment of the objective unity of =x within the conceptual purview. In order to collapse
Kant‟s discursive/non-discursive distinction, Hegel will seek to provide a reading of the
=x which regards any non-discursivity as merely an unclear moment to be clarified in the
very process which initially determined it unclear. For Hegel, the moon is the pointing;
the difference is merely an experiential confusion to be conceptually clarified. I am
referring here to the process of conceptual analysis. So, I will here examine the =x from
the conceptual viewpoint to which I only gestured in the previous chapter. And, in
looking at conceptual analysis I will begin to show the evolution of the Kantian
revolution on its way to the 21st century.
In the first edition (1781) Preface of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant says,
As regards distinctness, finally, the reader has a right to
demand, first, the discursive (logical) distinctness arising
through concepts, but then also an intuitive (aesthetic)
distinctness arising through intuitions, i.e. through
examples or other illustrations in concreto [Kant‟s
emphasis]. (CPR 1996, A xvii-xviii)
In regard to space, then, Kant is consistent in saying, “Space is not a discursive or, as we
say, universal concept of things as such; rather, it is a pure intuition [my emphasis].”
(CPR 1996, A 24/B 39) As befits Kant‟s concern for architectonic systematicity, the
above quote is taken from the Transcendental Aesthetic of his Critique, and the following
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quote is taken from the Transcendental Logic, specifically the Transcendental
Analytic. 346 Here, Kant – as his section title suggests – provides a “Guide for the
Discovery of All Pure Concepts of Understanding” stating, “When we bring into play a
cognitive power, then, depending on the various ways in which we may be prompted to
do so, different concepts come to the fore that allow us to recognize this power [my
emphasis].” (CPR 1996, A 66/B 91) However, concepts discovered as such, according to
Kant,
reveal themselves in no order or systematic unity; instead
they are ultimately only paired according to similarities,
and arranged in series according to the quantity of their
content, from the simple concepts on to the more composite
[my emphases]. (CPR 1996, A 67 /B 92)
Now as I indicated in the previous chapter, the Kant quote above points to the excessivity
of the non-discursive. For Kant then, conceptual specification, which would be
tantamount to systematic unity and order according to categorical analysis, is not the
arrangement which derives from the imagination‟s association of appearances underlying
an experiential quantity of =x. It is important to keep the two different views here of the
=x in regard to quantity separate, because from the conceptual standpoint, conceptual
specification may in fact be merely unpacking what is already latent in the =x. Yet, from
the experiential standpoint, first – and this is the very reason for using the notion of nondiscursivity – whether the conceptual specification fully unpacks the experiential content
of the =x must remain a matter of speculation. And, by speculation I mean non-verifiable
and an idea of pure reason.
It is tempting to suggest the mere difference between thought and sensation itself
indicates that conceptual specification does not fully unpack the experiential content of
346
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=x. This is because if thought could fully unpack the experiential content, then thinking
of the content should be experiencing the content. Since, this seems absurd: if thought is
to be equated with being, equated here must indicate a sort of mathematically mimetic
equation like isomorphism. Yet, retreating to isomorphism opens the door again for Kant
to suggest that the form in experience may indeed be imitated by the form in thought with
the difference that experience provides more than the form of thought can imitate. How
to characterize such excessivity? Kant‟s answer is to use the notion of non-discursivity.
Keep in mind, then, that Hegel‟s description of conceptual specificity may be successful
at collapsing the discursive/non-discursive distinction so long as this collapse is
understood ultimately in reference only to the conceptual standpoint. That is, a full
closure of discursivity can only mean a full retreat into the contemplative state of thought
alone.
Just prior to Kant‟s celebrated example regarding the judgment “all bodies are
divisible,” Kant pushes his discursive distinction again. Kant notes, “the cognition of any
understanding, or at least human understanding, is a cognition through concepts; it is not
intuitive, but discursive. All our intuitions, as sensible, rest on our being affected;
concepts, on the other hand, rest on functions.”347 (CPR 1996, A 68/B 93) And, Kant
clarifies, “By function I mean the unity of the act of arranging various representations
under one common representation.”348 (CPR 1996, A 68/B 93) Elaborating on my
treatment from the previous chapter, the “unity of the act” of arranging derives from the
logical form of the judgments employed. These judgments serve to unify experience
objectively in the object of experience and – via an alêtheatic (cf. αιήζεηα) reference –
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subjectively to the unity of apperception. At this point, the logical structure has already
been imposed upon the object in its determination, i.e. even if only latently in a quantity
= x. Hence, conceptual specification via logical, i.e. discursive, analysis of the quantity
may succeed at fully identifying the quantity in question.
With the imposition of the logical structure, then, it is as if a seed were planted –
just as picking a judgment in the Square of Opposition commits you to various other
forms of the judgment – such that it blossoms in an analytic unfolding on its own. Hegel
similarly suggests,
The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom,
and one might say that the former is refuted by the latter;
similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up
in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit
now emerges as the truth of it instead. These forms are not
just distinguished from one another, they also supplant one
another as mutually incompatible. (PS 2)
In Kantian language, Hegel‟s metaphor here is supposed to describe the movement from
the bud of =x to the blossom of conceptual analysis, and finally to its fruition through
dialectic. However, the analogy does not hold when Hegel introduces the description of
disappearance. Despite Hegel‟s hope, the non-discursivity inherent in experience does
not disappear as the trajectory of experience enters conceptuality. Experiential nondiscursivity can only be said to disappear during pure (reason) contemplation. That is,
even in the full bloom of an experience where the bud has vanished, the stem of
sensibility remains. Hence, you may pick and enjoy the truth of the fruit, but in regard to
the ground, it is the fruit that has vanished.
Returning to Kant‟s description of conceptual analysis, it will be helpful to
reproduce Kant‟s Table of Categories here.

208

Kant’s Transcendental Table of Categories (A 80/B 106)
[Concepts of the Understanding]
I.
Categories of Quantity
Unity
Plurality
Totality
II.
III.
Categories of Quality
Categories of Relation
Reality
Of Inherence and Subsistence
Negation
(Substance & Accident)
Limitation
Of Causality and Dependence
(Cause & Effect)
Of Community (Reciprocity
between Agent & Patient)
IV.
Categories of Modality
Possibility - Impossibility
Existence - Non-existence
Necessity - Contingency

Figure 3.3
Regarding Figure 3.3 – from the conceptual standpoint – Kant holds,
If we abstract from all content of a judgment as such and
pay attention only to the mere form of understanding in it,
then we find that the function of thought in judgment can
be brought under four headings, each containing under it
three moments [my emphasis].” (CPR 1996, A 70/B 95)
Remember, it is from this standpoint of abstracting from all content that Kant constructs
his “Transcendental Table of Concepts of the Understanding” (Proleg 55), i.e. Figure 3.2.
The first heading of which is, of course, “Quantity.” Kant explains, “the only use that the
understanding can make of these concepts is to judge by means of them [my emphasis].”
(CPR 1996, A 68/B 93) And, again, for Kant the discursive distinction is decisive. Kant
continues,
But in such a judging, a concept is never referred directly to
an object, because the only kind of representation that deals
with its object directly is intuition. Instead, the concept is
referred directly to some other representation of the object
(whether that representation be an intuition or itself already
a concept).349 (CPR 1996, A 68/B 93)
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Notice, of course, when Kant refers to intuition above, he is invoking the notion of nondiscursivity. Hence, I am repeatedly showing you the difference between Kant and
Hegel, i.e. the experiential and the conceptual, regarding non-being.
Further, these three quotes just above are decisive for the issue Hegel will take
with Kant. I quote Kant here, then, so that as you read Hegel‟s supposed closure of
discursivity below, you can recognize the interpretive violence Hegel performs on Kant‟s
text. Moreover, regarding these quotes, Kant is, in fact, preparing to show how
conceptual analysis works. Beginning with the point of an initial judgment Kant is
maneuvering to show the relationship between the transcendental object = x and the
concepts which explicate it. That is, Kant is attempting to describe the process of
deriving further concepts from an analysis of the transcendental object = x. Recall, this
=x is produced by imagination, and either schematizes the categories when thinking of an
absent object or determines the appearances associated – though not exhaustively – in
reproductive imagination when experiencing an object. Furthermore, keep in mind each
move involved in explicating the =x is an analytic judgment. It is as if Hegel wishes to
make synthetic a posteriori judgments – the judgments which contain the non-discursive
for Kant – out to ultimately be analytic judgments.
Consider now Kant‟s example: “In every judgment there is a concept that holds
for many [representations], and, among them, comprises also a given representation that
is referred directly to the objects, e.g. in the judgment, All bodies are divisible [Kant‟s
emphasis].” (CPR 1996, A 68/B 93) Kant explains his example stating,
[T]he concept of the divisible refers to various other
concepts; but among these, it is here referred specifically to
the concept of body, and the concept of body is referred in
turn to certain appearances that we encounter. Hence,
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these objects are represented indirectly through the concept
of divisibility. Accordingly, all judgments are functions of
unity among our representations. For instead of cognizing
the object by means of a direct representation, we do so by
means of a higher representation comprising both this
direct [intuitive] representation and several other
representations; and we thereby draw many possible
cognitions together into one. (CPR 1996, A 68-69/B 93-94)
To be sure, Kant thinks he has just described (discursive) thinking. He says, “thought is
cognition through concepts; and concepts, as predicates of possible judgments, refer to
some representation of an as yet undetermined object.” (CPR 1996, A 68-69/B 93-94) In
support of Hegel‟s reading, the as yet undetermined object may be taken to refer to the =x
as schema merely for thought. However, given my emphases in the lengthier quote prior,
non-discursivity does not reside merely in the undetermined nature of the object.
What is more, Kant seems to consider this example within the experiential scope,
as if analyzing a synthetic a posteriori judgment. For example, in judging “All bodies
are divisible” you recognize a quantity of appearances just as much as you recognize an
appearance of a body. In other words, in the categorical judgment “All bodies are
divisible” “bodies,” as the subject of the judgment is being used to determine a plurality
of appearances. Notice, this explication is now taking place within the purview of the
conceptual standpoint, as evidenced by the fact that Kant has entered into the Square of
Opposition. He is not talking here about a totality of impressions unified in an
appearance, as I discussed in the previous chapter. Rather, this is already a judgment of
the “I” type from the Square of Opposition. Therefore, this analytic judgment is vying
for objective validity in thinking about the quantity of appearances you have recognized
as a body.
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Put another way within the Kantian terminology, “body,” here, is heuristic not
ostensive. The distinction being that the concept (body) “indicates not what the character
of an object is, but how we ought, under this concept‟s guidance, to search for the
character and connection of experiential objects.” (CPR 1996, A 671/B 699) So, in this
case, body – not beings, boxes, spheres, animals, vehicles, etc. – indicates how one ought
to search amongst the encountered appearances so as to think about the experience of
them. At this point, i.e. without the predicate, of course, the object is still not determined
with universal validity – despite the heuristic concept in the subject position of the
judgment. The predicate then inserts the object – by being in the predicate position – into
the Square of Opposition. In this case, as a categorical judgment of the “A” type, i.e. all
bodies are divisible.
Kant, then, shows how further judgments may become involved in the process of
conceptual specification by moving the subject term from the initial judgment to the
predicate position, i.e. replacing the =x with the concept from the subject term in the
initial judgment. Kant illustrates this staying with his example in stating, “Thus the
concept of body signifies something – e.g. metal – that can be cognized through that
concept. … Therefore the concept of body is the predicate for a possible judgment, e.g.
the judgment that every metal is a body.” (CPR 1996, A 69/B 94) From this Kant
concludes, “Therefore we can find all of the functions of the understanding if we can
exhibit completely the functions of unity in judgments.” (CPR 1996, A 69/B 94) Hence,
when in the Transcendental Dialectic Kant addresses the antinomies regarding the “origin
of the world” – the material of the dispute with Hegel regarding the thing-in-itself – Kant

212

will mobilize the fruits of all the above labor to justify his agnosticism toward the thingin-itself as origin beyond the bounds of experience.
As evidenced by what Kant says (above) about the subject term in a judgment and
what Hegel says about Kant‟s description of intuitive cognition (also above), Kant and
Hegel agree that the act of identification is conceptual. Yet, Kant and Hegel disagree in
regard to the work involved in experiential identifications. And, this disagreement is
most striking in regard to space – the outer sense and first of the components in the
trajectory of experience which may be used to identity an object of experience. What is
at stake in regard to experiential identification is the experiential standpoint itself. Put
another way, if Hegel succeeds in collapsing the Kantian discursive/non-discursive
distinction, then with this leveling a way of seeing in the structure of experience is lost.
Without the discursive/non-discursive distinction, the experiential standpoint is just the
conceptual standpoint as initially confused. Having, then, discussed Kant above, I will
discuss Hegel further below before making my final comparison.
Returning to the Science of Logic, Hegel tells us that thinking, “in its reception
and formation of material does not go outside itself.” (SL 45) Rather, according to Hegel
thinking accomplishes this work by modifying “its own self, it does not result in thought
becoming the other of itself.” (SL 45) Invoking Kant, Hegel continues, “In its relation to
the object, therefore, thinking does not go out of itself to the object; this, as thing-initself, remains a sheer beyond of thought.” (SL 45) Now, Hegel himself was thinking
when he arrived at the above conclusions regarding thinking. So, with an inference
whose conclusion begs the question (Petitio Principii) by being merely the assumption
with which he began, Hegel concludes: “such an abstraction as the thing-in-itself is itself
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only a product of thought.” (SL 62) And, thereby, Hegel announced the closure of
discursivity. That is, any positing of an outside of thought must itself take place within
thought; therefore, the outside of thought is inside thought. In reading the following
obscure remarks by Hegel, remembering Hegel‟s assumption of the so-called closure of
discursivity will help provide clarity.
To go further, it might be helpful to go over what Hegel is suggesting by using
Kant‟s language. Hegel is pointing out that when thinking occurs, concepts do not go
outside of the understanding. This claim is essentially tautological, i.e. the concepts of
the understanding are in the understanding. Yet, it must be admitted, this claim is also
consistent with Kant‟s structure of experience, i.e. concepts of the understanding are in
the understanding. Since non-discursivity is at stake, consider an example from Kant
including non-discursivity: Kant holds that the unity resulting from the productive
imagination‟s production of the transcendental object =x works in more than one way.
On the one hand, the objective =x culminates an object of experience in a judgment of
experience, and thereby constitutes the experiential standpoint including non-discursivity.
On the other hand, the objective =x initiates conceptual analysis as the subject term in an
analytic judgment, and thereby constitutes the totally discursive conceptual standpoint.
Remember, you find the experiential standpoint (1) when the objective =x
culminates an object of experience in a judgment of experience; you find the conceptual
standpoint (2) when the objective =x initiates conceptual analysis as the subject term in
an analytic judgment; and, you find the apperceptive standpoint (3) at the copula of these
judgments. The experiential standpoint regards non-being; the conceptual standpoint
regards not-being; and, the apperceptive standpoint may regard either non-being or not-
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being. Yet in all cases, the =x results from the original source of imagination. Even in an
experiential case including non-discursivity – here is Hegel‟s point –, whatever you end
up thinking about is initially the product of a power of the mind, i.e. imagination. As
Hegel would have it, then, thinking does not go outside itself.
Trailing Hegel here to see where he leads, what Hegel has done is to deny Kant‟s
distinction between different negations. The only negation there can be for Hegel now is
logical negation, i.e. discursive negation. In other words, Hegel has barred the use of
(Kant‟s real) negation upon the notion of discursivity, i.e. there is no non-discursivity,
unless you consider the non-discursive to itself be discursive. And, of course, if you do
so, then there is no need to speak of non-discursivity. This is how Hegel has closed
discursivity. Further, it is in the wake of an assumed closure of discursivity, then, that
Hegel is able to make pronouncements about the “identity of identity and non-identity.”
(SL 74) And, it is within this context that he is disputing both Kant‟s assertions
regarding identification and Kant‟s humility in regard to the “origin of the world.” For
his contribution to the dispute with Kant Hegel states, “When substance, matter, space,
time, etc., are taken only as discrete, they are absolutely divided; their principle is the
one. When they are taken as continuous, this one is only a sublated one.” (SL 197)
Hegel clarifies his above quote by invoking concepts of the understanding as
listed in Kant‟s table, i.e. Figure 2.3. According to Hegel,
Quantity [latently] contains the two moments of continuity
and discreteness. It is to be posited in both of them as
determinations of itself. It is already their immediate unity,
that is, quantity is posited as first only in one of its
determinations, continuity, and as such is continuous
magnitude. (SL 199)
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Hegel goes on, “Or we may say that continuity is indeed one of the moments of quantity
which requires the other moment, discreteness, to complete it.” (SL 199) What Hegel is
rehearsing here is the movement through Kant‟s concepts of the understanding in the
order of their moments, i.e. Quantity to Quality. However, Hegel‟s innovation which
makes this movement more Hegelian than Kantian is an operation that precisely imitates
what happened to the thing-in-itself in the retroactive motion of the closure of
discursivity. In other words, Hegel will have solved the problem of the origin of the
world by encountering every objection as if it were merely the other half of a binary
opposition which can be traced back to the origin from which the split – into binary
opposites – derived. That is, for Hegel, the Quantity =x is conceptual, and as conceptual
it is dichastic, i.e. capable of spontaneously subdividing.
If you were to attempt to move from the origin to the binary opposition you might
observe this process as Theodor Adorno (1903-1969) described it, “purely observe each
concept until it starts moving, until it becomes unidentical with itself by virtue of its own
meaning – in other words, of its identity.”350 Adorno‟s description captures what occurs
in conceptual analysis, i.e. a concept is taken apart. When predicating the concepts
derived from analysis to each other, the result is a tautology. Now, I stressed in Chapter
2 that from the experiential standpoint you must start at the bottom of the categories of
Quantity, since experience passes into the categories of Quantity as a totality of
impressions. However, Hegel is treating these categories from the standpoint of the
conceptual, as evidenced by his consideration of explication from the moment of
Quantity in general. Hence, for Hegel, beginning with the =x from the productive
imagination, then, means beginning with a Quantity, and – invoking Adorno‟s description
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here – Hegel observes the bud of Quantity as it dichastically specifies itself blossoming
through analysis.
As Schopenhauer accuses, the perplexity here derives from Hegel‟s, perhaps
purposefully, obscure description. Kant‟s language, I think, seeks to be less obscure.
Notice, once the =x is analyzed into two concepts the reality of the unity of the Quantity
of concepts has changed. You now have plurality by way of negation, i.e. two concepts
instead of one. Focusing on the matter this way, you can say the concepts are different
from one another – after all they are two. Yet, focusing on the identity of the concept,
you can say they are one – after all the two came from one, and their meaning is identical.
Here is the “identity of identity and non-identity.” (SL 74) Perhaps this is what Arthur
Schopenhauer had in mind when he said,
[L]ike a man who sits some time in the conjurer‟s booth at
a fair, and witnesses the performance twice or thrice in
succession. The tricks were meant to be seen only once;
and when they are no longer a novelty and cease to deceive,
their effect is gone.351
On the one hand, Schopenhauer and I take the same issue with Hegel, no matter how that
issue is articulated it is ultimately Hegel‟s closure of discursivity. On the other hand,
Schopenhauer, Hegel and I are all in agreement that the thing-in-itself is unsatisfactory.
Moreover, all three of us read the thing-in-itself as a response to the problem of nonbeing. Following Kant, Schopenhauer and Hegel seem keenly aware that non-being must
be accounted for if full systematicity is to be achieved. Yet, and this perhaps accounts for
the obscurity of Hegel‟s language, Hegel seems to sacrifice all to method. As I will show
below Hegel is consistent in his depiction of dichastasis, i.e. spontaneous conceptual
analysis. However, the method is a retreat to the pure contemplation of contemplation,
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which though perhaps correct about contemplation cannot venture beyond mere pointing
and cannot even account for that toward which it points other than by pointing back at the
pointing.
So, Schopenhauer‟s rants against Hegel highlight the fact that Hegel‟s language,
whether intentionally or not, seems to cover over not only the fact that Kant already
sketched the beginnings of Hegel systematic logic regarding the “concepts of reflection,”
but also that Kant already indicated that Hegel‟s use of conceptuality is amphibolous.
And, as Kant explains “transcendental amphiboly” is “a confusion of a pure object of
understanding with appearance.” (CPR 1996, A 270/B 326) Hegel is most certainly
guilty of this. As Schopenhauer put it,
[If] the distinction of the phenomenon from the thing-initself, and hence the doctrine of the complete diversity of
the ideal from the real, is the fundamental characteristic of
the Kantian philosophy [as Schopenhauer holds that it is],
then the assertion of the absolute identity of these two …
was a return to the crudeness of the common view, masked
under the imposing impression of an air of importance,
under bombast and nonsense. It became the worthy
starting-point of even grosser nonsense of the ponderous
and witless Hegel. (WWI 418-419)
Hence, Hegel‟s controversial move is to work the logic of the ὑπνθείκελνλ, i.e.
hypokeimenon, backward. This is, of course, controversial because – it begs the question
– the hypokeimenonally revealed “one” was a supposition, but Hegel treats it as evidence.
Consider a passage from Hegel‟s Phenomenology of Spirit which begins with a
claim regarding the necessary determination of things in experience and ends with the
elimination of all things non-discursive:
§126, “The conceptual necessity of the experience through
which consciousness discovers that the Thing is
demolished by the very determinateness that constitutes its
essence and its being-for-self, can be summarized as
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follows. The Thing is posited as being for itself, or as the
absolute negation of all otherness, therefore as purely selfrelated negation; but the negation that is self-related is the
suspension of itself; in other words, the Thing has its
essential being in another Thing [Hegel‟s emphases]. (PS
76)
Die Notwendigkeit der Erfahrung für das Bewusstsein, dass
das Ding eben durch die Bestimmtheit, welche sein Wesen
und sein Für-sich-seyn ausmacht, zugrunde geht, kann kurz
dem einfachen Begriffe nach so betrachtet werden. Das
Ding ist gesetzt als Für-sich-seyn, oder als absolute
Negation alles Andersseins; daher absolute, nur sich auf
sich beziehende Negation; aber die sich auf sich
beziehende Negation ist Aufheben seiner selbst, oder sein
Wesen in einem andern zu haben.352
Here Hegel defers the positing of the thing-in-itself to the process of determination, and
the process of determination to the conceptual necessity of dichastasis, i.e. both the
necessity as spontaneous and the necessity as logical outcome of conceptual
specification. From here, the thing-in-itself represents more a Hegelian moment in the
process of conceptual analysis than a Kantian relation in the structure of experience. The
necessity involved in the dichastasis which posited the thing-in-itself, then, “demolishes”
the thing-in-itself as the being posited of non-being. Hence, the being for itself of the
thing-in-itself cancels itself in the being of (the Parmenidean) One-being through
reflective sublation [Aufhebung].
Now notice, with what Hegel calls the thing [das Ding] above, he correctly
identifies Kant‟s thing-in-itself as Kant‟s structural indication of nihil negativum, i.e.
what Hegel here refers to as absolute negation. Hegel, then, much like the Eleatic visitor
from Plato‟s Sophist points out that in the conceptual determination of experience this
non-being is being said, i.e. being posited as a thing-in-itself. Here comes the closure of
discursivity again. Hence, as being (posited) this non-being [das Ding] is “being for
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itself.” Voilà what Hegel has just accomplished in two sentences is the closure of being
along with the closure of non-discursivity.
Put another way, by accentuating the being posited of non-being as being for
itself, Hegel moved from III to IV in Kant‟s Table of Nothing. He, then, equates IV with
II, and steps back to I. See Figure 2.2. The problem with all this is that Hegel misses
what I have referred to as the paradoxical nature – or second impasse – of the problem of
non-being. That is, regarding Kant‟s Table of Nothing, Hegel misses that II can only be
equated with IV in thought alone. Hegel‟s trick here is the assumption of the closure of
discursivity such that IV necessarily becomes II since the difference between the two, i.e.
non-discursivity, has been eliminated from the equation. What is more, Hegel‟s
amphiboly is fortified by being only testable conceptually.
Of this fortification Schopenhauer accuses the “serving up sheer nonsense … such
as had previously been heard only in madhouses, [which] finally appeared in Hegel.”
(WWI 429) In fact, Schopenhauer found it so detestable he suggested, “If I were to call
to mind the way in which Hegel and his companions have misused such wide and empty
abstractions, I should necessarily be afraid that both the reader and I would be ill.” (WWI
84) Furthermore, it is worth noting that when Schopenhauer “stoops” to ad hominem
attack of Hegel, despite the criticism Schopenhauer sometimes receives for it, he is
actually following Aristotle‟s direction to the letter.353 That is, given Hegel‟s suggestion
that the starting point of dialectic can both be and not be, Schopenhauer is within
traditional standard bounds when he provides an ad hominem description354 of Hegel‟s
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philosophy as “empty bombast” and of Hegel as a “repulsive philosophaster.” (WWII 84)
Hence, Hegel‟s mistake is not dialectical method itself – as is sometimes suggested – but
its misapplication, i.e. mistaking the experiential standpoint for the conceptual.
What is important to recognize in Schopenhauer‟s repulsion is that it is possible to
make Hegel‟s move – perform his trick –, consider it merely in thought – such as Kant
(above) in his discussion of the “concepts of reflection” –, and stop short of claiming all
non-discursivity to have been demolished. In fact, this is precisely the strategy
Schopenhauer suggested, “matter never appears otherwise than with the visible, that is to
say, under the veil of form and quality [Schopenhauer‟s emphasis]”; as such, “it is never
immediately apprehended, but is always only added in thought as that which is identical
in all things under every variety of quality.” (WWII 311) This as part of Schopenhauer‟s
strategy is why these last two quotes from Schopenhauer make him sound like he is in
complete agreement with Kant regarding the experiential standpoint – he, of course, is
not. Yet, within the pure understanding, i.e. from the conceptual standpoint, both Hegel
and Schopenhauer are pushing Kant‟s, i.e. Aristotle‟s, logic. The problem Schopenhauer
takes with Hegel here is that it is as if Hegel‟s Grundkraft is the pure understanding.
And, as such the circularity of Hegel‟s logic collapses the experiential into the conceptual
standpoint.
Neither Hegel‟s commentators nor Hegel himself seem interested in denying the
circularity of his logic or his equating of the experiential with the conceptual. Joseph C.
Flay attempts to defend Hegel‟s decision to provide such a reading of Kant by quoting
Kant himself. Flay conjectures, “As Kant had also said, but Hegel now gives its strongest

any other similar pair of opposites. About such matters there is no proof in the full sense, though there is
proof ad hominem.” (Meta 1995,1062a19-22)
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interpretation: „What the things-in-themselves may be I do not know, nor do I need to
know, since a thing can never come before me except in appearance.‟” 355 Hence, Flay‟s
contorting of Kant is as myopic as Hegel‟s “strong” interpretation is amphibolous.
Another Hegel commentator Richard D. Winfield lists six general features of “The
Method of Hegel‟s Science of Logic.” Of the six general features of Hegel‟s method, the
following three are sufficient to support a reading of Hegel as solely working within the
confines of the conceptual standpoint: “the form of logical development is in unity with
its content,” “the movement of categories is circular, such that the advance from the
starting point is equally a regress,” and “the development has its own method as its final
result.”356
To cite just enough of the examples from Hegel‟s work for a reader to recognize
Hegel‟s exclusive embrace of the pure understanding; “the object is revealed to it by
something alien … it does not recognize itself.” (PS 466, §771) Further, “The
understanding [my emphasis] does not, however, realize that all these dissolving
distinctions are merely the internal maneuvers of its own self-consciousness.” (PS 518,
fn. §771) “Reason conceals the inner necessity of its own proceedings, and locates it in
the objects that it is studying. [Yet] … there is a distinction which is really no distinction:
teleology is in the organism, and Reason in the thing studied [my emphasis].” (PS 351,
fn. §259) Lastly, “The „beautiful soul‟ is its own knowledge of itself in its pure,
transparent unity – the self-consciousness that knows this pure knowledge of pure
inwardness as Spirit. It is not only the intuition of the Divine but the Divine‟s intuition of
itself.” (PS 483, fn. §795)
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The problem with all this is that, as I have repeatedly stressed about the nondiscursive, there is an excessivity that conceptuality cannot capture or contain. In regard
to experience, the concept of totality requires that a limiting must have already taken
place, and this limiting must be non-conceptual. This can be illustrated by combining
two negatives which do not make a positive, i.e. the fallacy of amphiboly plus the fallacy
of slippery slope: If I were to tell you that I was going to eat every slice of bread in a
whole loaf, you might think me gluttonous or underfed. If I were to tell you I was going
to eat every slice of bread in a bread store, you might think me misguided or upset with
the bread store personnel. If I were to tell you I was going to eat every slice of bread on
the planet, you might think me jesting. If I were to tell you I was going to eat every slice
of bread ever created from the dawn of bread slices, you might think me a fool. If I, then,
explained to you that as sublated spirit I am the eternal bread eating force in the world,
and therefore not only have I, as such, already eaten every slice of bread since the dawn
of bread slices; but also that you are me and each slice of bread you eat is truly being
eaten by me too, then you might think I had been reading Hegel. Yet, if I actually
believed this, I would starve to death; though, of course, this death would be a death that
is not really death at all, since it is both life and death, etc. Hence, the point of my
illustration: even in a simple slice of bread, there is more than can be grasped by the
mind, no matter how long you contemplate it.
So, in regard to non-being Hegel has returned to the first impasse since negation
in Hegel‟s system is only logical, i.e. discursive negation. This is why Adorno claims,
“The structure of his [Hegel‟s] system would unquestionably fall without the principle
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that to negate negation is positive.”357 When you deny the difference between the –
plurality of – the two concepts derived from analysis, then Hegel has it that you arrive
back at the one concept from whose analysis the two derived. There is no – what Kant
called – real negation. Hegel takes negation to be qualitative and retrospection or
sublation to be determinative ostensively, not heuristically. Further, notice how this goes
toward the closure of discursivity. The first moment of Quantity, as =x, may seem other
than discursive because it is not yet specified. However, the retroactive motion derived
from the negation of negation, i.e. the movement from Quality back to Quantity, unifies
the product of analysis, i.e. conceptual specification, so as to suggest the origin was
always already this unification. See Figure 2.3. On the one hand, support for this
conclusion regarding the origin derives from the following notion: Had the origin not
been this unification prior to specification, then the specification would not have been
such as to lead back to it. On the other hand, notice how Hegel‟s movement here is air
tight, and the reason the movement is air tight is because it is purely logical. Here, then,
is another telltale sign that he has embraced the conceptual standpoint at the cost of the
experiential standpoint.
Any lingering obscurity can be further cleared up by discussing the juxtaposition
of the following two paradoxical passages. Hegel declares,
The beginning is not pure nothing, but a nothing from
which something is to proceed; therefore being, too, is
already contained in the beginning. The beginning,
therefore, contains both, being and nothing, is the unity of
being and nothing; or is non-being which is at the same
time being, and being which is at the same time non-being.
(SL 199)
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Now, this can seem quite perplexing until you decode it by applying the movement of the
so-called closure of discursivity to it. As such, you see that the first moment is not
identified until the third moment or retrospection. According to the logic of
specification, then, Hegel is justified in his paradoxical remarks about the
undifferentiated origin (first moment) in so far as the analysis of the origin in yielding
(second moment) being and its negation, i.e. not-being, must have been both contained in
the first moment revealed through retrospection (third moment) by way of the logic of
specification. With this in mind listen to what Hegel says next:
[I]n the beginning, being and nothing are present as
distinguished [Hegel‟s emphasis] from each other; for the
beginning points to something else – it is a non-being
which carries a reference to being [my emphasis] as to an
other; that which begins, as yet is not [Hegel‟s emphasis], it
is only on the way to being. The being contained in the
beginning is, therefore, a being which removes itself from
non-being or sublates it as something opposed to it. (SL 7374)
Here, Hegel is pointing out that the “world” of everyday dwelling is qualitative. Hence,
the “beginning” takes place – in accord with Kant‟s Categories – regarding the
Categories of Quality. This is already – using the above language – at the second
moment of explication. That is, the being of your dwelling is specific being – Heidegger
might call it “inauthentic” –, and in negating the negation from which your specific
dwelling comes forth, you return to the undifferentiated – “authentic” – being which as
retrospective third moment is the origin of such grandeur as to contain both being and
non-being. Remember, this all works out logically. It is as if Hegel is constructing a map
for the fruit to retrace its steps back to the bud. Yet, as the adage goes, the map is not the
territory. This non-being “located” – in a loose sense – as always already coupled with
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being in the origin, and to which the logical retrospection provides a clearing, remains
merely the thought of non-being.
To provide an everyday example, then, suppose you are standing in the rain. Now
suppose further we start our experiential series at the point of impact between a drop of
rain and your skin. The initial impact registers a magnitude =x, a quantity of – Je ne sais
pas – call it =x. Moving up the series you identify it as wet (it is not dry), cold (it is not
warm), and so on in identifying it as rain. Tracing this thought so as to sketch it with the
rhetoric of science, I might say – recalling the Adorno description above – you observe
the moving concept of quantity specifying-ly split into binary opposites and identify
itself. Hegel’s trick here is like a metaphysical shell game.
Here, then, is a schematic rendition of Hegel‟s metaphysical shell game: Hegel
suggests Quantity is the unnoticed – because unidentified and undifferentiated –
beginning. And, he uses this suggestion to support his claim that the noticed – because
identified and differentiated – beginning is Quality, not Quantity. If you cannot see this
yet, you will see it in the way Hegel finishes the passage. Hegel concludes, “that which
begins already is, but is also just as much not yet. The opposites, being and non-being,
are therefore in immediate union in it; or the beginning is their undifferentiated unity
[Hegel‟s emphasis].”358 “It,” of course, refers to “that which begins” unnoticed in the
previous quote. So you see this is what is meant by “the identity of identity and nonidentity.” Hence, here is Hegel‟s trick again, “unity,” is logically correct – despite undifferentiated-ness – since the retrospective move is one of convergence from binary
opposites to their origin – playing the logic of the ὑπνθείκελνλ, i.e. hypokeimenon
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backward. In this way, Hegel supports the claim that the origin is discursive. So,
omniscience – absolute knowledge – is a possibility within the confines of this veritable
“intellectual system of the world,” (CPR A 270/B 326) which Kant rejected.
In fact, Hegel‟s trick can be applied to characterize Hegel‟s reading of Kant to
suggest that what Hegel hopes to accomplish is to sublate Kant‟s structure of experience.
If Hegel can treat the two stems of sensibility and understanding as opposed because they
are in the second moment of an analytic movement, then Hegel will be able to justify a
claim that the further specification of the sensible stem never leaves the purview of that
to which the stems are sublated. By way of the “identity of identity and non-identity”
Hegel can justify that despite the fact that he is working in conceptual isolation, for him
the conceptual standpoint is identical with the experiential standpoint. It is merely at the
qualitative level in which the opposition between sensibility and understanding emerge
from the quantitative level of absolute Being (the Parmenidean One-being), and hence,
why in the qualitative level “it does not recognize itself.” (PS 103) Strange, who would
have thought beatific vision to require so much logical inference?
Before drawing a conclusion and moving on to discuss how pure difference fits
into Hegel‟s system, I apply the work spent decoding and critiquing Hegel‟s system
above to a celebrated passage from Hegel‟s Phenomenology of Spirit quoted here at
length.
[T]he Understanding experiences only itself. Raised above
perception, consciousness exhibits itself closed in a unity
with the supersensible world through the mediating term of
appearance, through which it gazes into this background.
The two extremes, the one, of the pure inner world, the
other, that of the inner being gazing into this pure inner
world, have now coincided, an just as they, qua extremes,
have vanished, so too the middle term, as something other
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than these extremes, has also vanished. This curtain
hanging before the inner world is therefore drawn away,
and we have the inner being gazing into the inner world …
self-consciousness. It is manifest that behind the so-called
curtain which is supposed to conceal the inner world, there
is nothing to be seen unless we go behind it ourselves. (PS
103)
I will comment on this quote while also summing my above comments on Hegel. Putting
Hegel‟s quote another way, the above indicates a number of the points I have already
made about Hegel. First, if the understanding experiences only itself, then in Kantian
terms, this is not really “experience” at all, rather it is understanding. Perhaps Hegel‟s
analytic should be characterized as “understanding understanding understanding.” 359 As
I suggested above, this is due to leveling the discursive/non-discursive distinction and
with it the experiential standpoint. In other words, Hegel‟s metaphysical shell game, i.e.
Hegel‟s trick, transforms Kantian humility into Kantian (put favorably) confusion, but at
the cost of the experiential standpoint. Second, the “curtain” in the Hegel quote is to be
equated with “appearance” in Kant. As such, we experience both the curtain and
appearance first in both Kant and Hegel. Whereas, however, with Kant the thing-in-itself
is said to be behind (the curtain of) appearance, Hegel – taking appearance as the level of
quality in a series to be extended toward further and further clarity – has it that this
“stepping back” behind the curtain, as it were, leads to a fully intelligible, i.e. discursive
destination.
Third, since this fully intelligible destination is always being identified
retrospectively, as it were, the retrospective determination is a type of contamination.
That is, prior to the retrospection this destination enjoys – as Hegel might say – the purity
of being undifferentiated. In the process, then, of retrospective differentiation, i.e.
359

I mean this primarily as mnemonic reference to comments concerning Aristotle and Kant.

228

returning from the land of identity (on the other side of the curtain), the purity of the
undifferentiated gets contaminated by whatever qualities were encountered in the land of
identity. Lastly, in regard to the problem of non-being, Hegel‟s strategy is to retreat to
the first perplexity of the problem of non-being, and – donning purely logical plumes –
claim to have solved Plato‟s Puzzle. Yet, in regard to Plato‟s Puzzle – at best – Hegel has
a sophisticated version of not-being. Hence, neither Hegel nor Kant solved Plato‟s
Puzzle, and I believe Kant was closer than Hegel to a solution – arriving at the second
perplexity of the problem – because he had gained the ground of the experiential
standpoint.
Coming to Grips with Hegel
“But it can hardly be doubted that Hegel found in the Parmenides, and to a less extent in the
Sophist and Philebus, the basis of his dialectical logic.”360
~J. Glenn Gray

The section title – coming to grips361 – comes from a statement attributed to
Heidegger from The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. There discussing “the „is‟”
Heidegger calls for a shift from the conceptual to the apperceptive standpoint noting,
The problem will make no further progress as long as logic
itself has not been taken back again into ontology, as long
as Hegel – who, in contrast, dissolved ontology into logic –
is not comprehended. And this means always that Hegel
must be overcome … This overcoming of Hegel is the
intrinsically necessary step in the development of Western
philosophy which must be made for it to remain at all
alive. 362
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This section of the chapter, then, pertains to the 20th century coming to grips with Hegel
which will bridge the Kantian thing-in-itself with notions of pure difference. All that
remains, then, in regard to establishing the preliminaries is to clarify the notions of
language, retrospective differentiation, contamination, and pure difference on the way to
Derrida and Deleuze. In order to clarify these notions, therefore, I will briefly examine
Alexandre Kojève (1902-1968) and Jean Hyppolite (1907-1968) here, and examine
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) in the next
chapter. I will begin with language. Describing Alexandre Kojève‟s reading of Hegel,
Daniel Selcer states,
It is the very totality of being that is negated by the
discursive gesture of the understanding. Language does not
merely negate singularity; it is the negative in general.
Thus the labor of the negative is a discursive work; it is
language that separates and recombines entities in such a
manner as to annihilate the given [Selcer‟s emphasis]. 363
Selcer‟s description further emphasizes and clarifies a number of changes to Kant‟s
trajectory of experience in the writing of Hegel. First, as indicated in the movement from
unity (Quantity) to reality and negation (Quality) in the “discursive gesture of the
understanding,” language – though “the negative” – remains within being. Selcer‟s
emphasis of “is” indicates that the negation is not a negation of being. Second, as the
labor of the negative is a discursive work, negation cannot access an opening in
discursivity, i.e. there is no non-discursivity. Lastly, the discursive gesture of the
understanding which moves under the sign of “language” is said to annihilate the given.
The given, of course, in the Kantian structure of experience is all that comes before the
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understanding, namely the experiential standpoint. Hence, in the writing of Hegel the
Kantian experiential standpoint has vanished.
Originally published in 1952, Jean Hyppolite‟s Logic and Existence [Logique et
existence] emphasizes Hegel‟s elimination of the experiential standpoint; in so far as
Hyppolite‟s text seeks to make Hegel‟s text relevant for more than just thinking.
According to Hyppolite,
Experience and the Logos are not opposed. The discourse
of experience and the discourse of being, the a posteriori
and the a priori, correspond to one another and mutually
require one another. There would be no possible
experience without the presupposition of absolute
knowledge, but the path of experience points ahead to
absolute knowledge. 364
Notice, the first sentence by Hyppolite in the above quote announces he will be providing
a (re)interpretation of Hegel that seems more Kantian than the Hegel I have been
depicting so far. In fact, according to Leonard Lawlor, “Hyppolite‟s non-reductionistic
interpretation of the relation between the phenomenology and the logic effectively ended
the simple anthropological interpretation of Hegel popularized by Kojève before World
War II.” (LE viii) Hyppolite notes, “Speculative knowledge is simultaneously the
intuitive understanding that Kant attributed to God, and the discursive understanding that
he reserved for man. Speculative logic is the dialectical discourse which contains these
three moments within itself.” (LE 70) In this way, according to Hyppolite, “Absolute
thought thinks itself in our thought. In our thought, being presents itself as thought and
as sense.” (LE 58) Now, the three moments to which Hyppolite draws the attention of his
reader above are: the intuitive, the understanding, and the dialectical discourse. These
terms are analogous to other trinities in Hegel‟s Science of Logic. Notice, in each of the
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following trinities, the third term signifies the difference between the first two. To name
just a few of the trinities: (1) Being, Essence, and Concept; (2) Being, Nothingness, and
Becoming; (3) Nature, Logos, and Spirit; (4) Identity, Difference, and Contradiction (5)
Diversity, Essential Difference, and Absolute (pure) Difference.
According to Hyppolite, “Being, Essence, Concept constitute the three instincts of
the Logos, the three circles which reproduce at different levels the same fundamental
theme.” (LE 169) In this way, the movement of the Logos is the thinking of “absolute
thought” in “our thought.” And, before looking at how Hyppolite describes the
movement in the constitution of Logos, a look at what he says about the second trinity is
helpful. Hyppolite says,
The Absolute is not a form or a content; if this distinction is
maintained, then it is valid only for empirical
consciousness which does not grasp each content of
thought as the differential of its integral. It is the
inadequation of the determinate content that turns it into a
moment. Because it contradicts itself it becomes [my
emphasis].” (LE 91)
So, already here is the movement of determination through the three moments of the
trinity, which ultimately constitutes the retroactive determination of the (undifferentiated)
content of the first moment (noted in Hegel above). Starting at the second moment, then,
in the first trinity, Essence is the determination of that which distinguishes itself from
itself. Retrospectively, that which has distinguished itself from itself gets determined as
Being, and the movement which retrospectively determines that which ultimately
distinguished itself from itself by moving into Essence is (the dichastic movement of)
Concept. Once a term which connotes mobility is used in the third position of the trinity
it is, perhaps, easier to decipher. This will be the case with the next trinity, i.e. Being,
Nothingness (Non-Being), and Becoming. Remember, this is supposed to be the
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description of a beatific vision. What seems like the spontaneous conceptual analysis is
supposed to be a vision of the mind of God working.
Absolute – divine (non-discursive) thinking in Kant‟s language –, then, is
supposed to be thinking in our thinking. Yet, as Hyppolite‟s return to the sense of Kant
would have it, our thinking is the reflection of God‟s thinking as nature. Notice the
sudden appropriateness again of quoting William Blake. I might characterize this by
saying: what Kant did to Leibniz, Hyppolite and the French are doing to Hegel, and the
result may be seen by looking at the world as the unfolding of God‟s mind. As such, I
would ask: Is there anything sleeping in the abyss? That is, you have seen what Hegel
did to the thing-in-itself, how are the French philosophers reading the thing-in-itself at
this point? The answers can be found by examining these trinities.
So, when that which distinguishes itself from itself distinguishes itself as Essence
it does so by moving into (our) empirical consciousness and back out again. This into
and out of our empirical consciousness – according to Hegel and Hyppolite – all takes
place within Being and is the movement of Logos. The main difference here between
Hegel and Hyppolite is that Hyppolite – in attempting to bring Kantian sensibility back
into the trajectory of experience – has this movement occurring through the sensible
world on its way to thought. Tracing this movement backward, it is as if one moves out
of, i.e. beyond, phenomenology and into the thinking of divine mind – Logos – which is
thinking the world of which you are experiencing. Oddly, Plato has returned with a
vengeance. The forms in the mind are now thrice removed from the forms in the mind of
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God. In fact, Hyppolite‟s rendition here is beginning to seem like a materialist rendition
of Aristotle‟s God, i.e. thinking thinking thinking through matter.365
Consider how Hyppolite describes the Logos,
The seed, the initial cell is being, nothingness, becoming.
Being is determined only by nothingness. It is itself the
nothingness of itself, as that will appear at the level of
essence, because essence is the internal negation of the
whole sphere of being. (LE 169)
In plugging this trinity into my explication above: Being distinguishes itself from itself
by moving into an empirical consciousness, but in doing so it contradicts itself by moving
from divine to empirical consciousness. Therefore it appears determined as the
nothingness – its contradiction – which initiates the trajectory of experience. This is like
beginning the dialectical movement of the mind – stated in my Introduction – with an
outside of the forms (located in individual mind). Hence, this is a version of the
dialectical option I entertained in the Introduction of considering the forms to be nonbeing, i.e. “Nothingness,” in the language of this chapter.
According to Hyppolite, “essence is appearance. Essence is posited in
appearance, that is, negated being, and there alone.” (LE 170) Traversing appearance,
Human thought grasps the essence completing this movement of Logos, and again, in
order to think the undifferentiated we need to follow the movement which has
differentiated it. In doing this, we retrospectively determine the undifferentiated as
Being. The nothingness which initiated the trajectory is now being, and as Rockmore
(above) put it from a Hegelian perspective, the two – being and nothingness – are
“exactly the same.” This divine movement, then, from undifferentiated to differentiated
and back is the movement of becoming within being. Notice the trinity here: being,
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nothingness, becoming. According to Hyppolite, “Nothingness is an immediate just as
being is; the transition from being to nothingness, likewise from nothingness to being, is
only a passage, becoming.” (LE 170) The movement from material God through sense in
experience into conceptual reflection moves by way of a series of negations. Quoting
Hyppolite‟s potent passage at length,
Nothingness is an immediate just as being is; the transition
from being to nothingness, likewise from nothingness to
being, is only a passage, becoming … The sphere of
essence, which is the first negation of being – then the
negation of itself – is the field of reflection, of diremption.
Being opposes itself to itself; it negates itself as being and
it posits itself as essence. … Essence is the reflection of
being, its appearance and its intelligibility. But this
intelligibility, this conception, is simultaneously separated
and inseparable from appearance. … This is why reflection
reestablishes the first immediacy of being, just as this
immediacy had been reflected into essence. Immediacy
itself is conceived [my emphasis]. (LE 170)
Notice, Hyppolite has re-inscribed Hegel‟s metaphysical shell game into Kant‟s
trajectory of experience, and now behind appearance there is no longer a thing-in-itself.
Behind appearance is God.
Mixing Hegel – retrospectively, as it were – with Kant, Hyppolite reads Logos as
a logic of sense.366 Here is the quote where Hyppolite provides this Kantian reading of
the Logos.367 “Real actuality,” Hyppolite declares, is there in “the immediacy of being,”
“comprehended by means of its essence, as in essence and reflection” and it “is also itself
its sense, and this Sense is its being.” (LE 170)

Hyppolite has moved from Quantity to

Quality and is speaking of the relation of Quality to Quantity from Quality, i.e. without
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retrospectively determining Quantity –yet. And what Hyppolite says next will echo in
Deleuze,
Being is reflected in itself, and, in this reflection, it is as
sense. The subjective logic, or the logic of the concept, is
the logic of sense, but this sense is not a subject opposed to
the object. It is the being which is its self-consciousness,
its sense, and this self-consciousness, in turn, is being itself,
the absolute Idea scattered into nature and into history. In
the Logos, being is thought. (LE 170)
Transposing the above language of actuality into the language of (divine) expression: that
which is intuited immediately (à la Kant) through sense is the expression of the divine. It
is firstly intuited by empirical consciousness – i.e. human being – which as sense
indicates the inversion, i.e. displacement into representation, and secondly, conceived as
the virtual representation in the understanding of the actual divine structure. Hence, this
divine thinking’s return into itself after thinking itself as sense is the rhythm of possible
experience as you stand on the perimeter of the mind of God and the Logos passes
through you. Note that, despite these innovations and a return to Kantian sensibility, the
assumption of a Hegelian closure of discursivity remains in Hyppolite as the categories
represent the self-consciousness of God blossoming through the speculative thought of
human understanding.368
It is in this way that Hyppolite‟s reading of absolute difference in Hegel becomes
the pure difference of post-structuralism. According to Hyppolite,
Speculative thought thinks difference as reflected
difference, as essential difference, the difference of itself to
itself [my emphasis]. … Speculative contradiction is the
contradiction of the Absolute itself that negates itself by
368
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positing itself; but this meaning of negation, which is not
only subjective but also inherent to being, is the decisive
point of the Hegelian dialectic, the characteristic of
speculative thought in relation to empirical thought.
Empirical thought becomes speculative thought, when it
becomes thought of the universal self in every position, and
remains at the same time dialectical thought, and not
ineffable intuition. (LE 92)
There are three aspects of the above Hyppolite quote upon which I will comment. First,
essential difference is reflected difference. What this means is that essential difference is
difference at the second moment. Now this essential difference in the second moment is
different from that which it (contradictorily) reflects. In this way, by positing itself as
essential difference, essential difference is the difference of itself – in the second moment
– to itself – in the first moment. Second, the movement into essential difference is the
movement of pure difference. Invoking a celebrated Deleuze quote, this is like the
lightning in Difference & Repetition. There, Deleuze says,
[I]magine something which distinguishes itself from itself –
and yet that from which it distinguishes itself does not
distinguish itself from it. Lightning, for example,
distinguishes itself from the black sky but must also trail
behind it, as though it were distinguishing itself from that
which does not distinguish itself from it. 369
Lastly, the moment of essential difference takes place in empirical consciousness which –
analogously – makes the movement of pure difference the movement associated with
sense, i.e. intuition in Kant‟s trajectory of experience.
Now, given that this is a second moment, and the third moment is a return to the
first, the simultaneous retrospective determination and becoming speculative of empirical
thought means the realm of intuition is no longer “ineffable.” Hyppolite has brought
Hegel back to Kant – Hegel‟s shell game to Kant‟s trajectory of experience – in the hopes
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of regaining the experiential standpoint without the thing-in-itself. Yet, notice pure
difference takes essential difference as a peep hole into the abyss. It is as if the
qualitative moment in the movement of dichastasis sets the frame for a tile in Leibniz‟s
game. Whereas the qualitative orbit of essential difference passes through a discursively
closed sensibility, pure difference plunges into the peep hole opening through the depths
of the mind of God. And, as you might have anticipated at this point, this peering into
the abyss exactly coincides with the location of the thing-in-itself in Kant‟s structure of
experience. Hence, placing emphasis on the differential converging upon the integer of
quantity (as Hyppolite indicated above) seeks to avoid hypostasizing a thing-in-itself at
the cost of concentrating on the finger instead of the moon, i.e. the relational means of
indicating rather than that which is indicated.
In sum, by directing speculative thought into the material world, Hyppolite has
brought Kantian sensibility back to Hegel‟s systematic logic and combined Kant‟s
structure of experienced with Hegel‟s trick, i.e. Hegel‟s shell game. Yet, he has
maintained the supposed Hegelian closure of discursivity. As such, the conceptual
standpoint is still collapsed onto the experiential. Collapsing the standpoints is
convenient for circumventing the blindness thesis in Kant, but will produce some
untenable results. All this leaves a couple options in regard to the initial point of the
trajectory of experience, i.e. what was considered the thing-in-itself by Kant.
Maintaining the first impasse with Hegel you can wield Hegel‟s shell game against all
who might attempt to say something about that which is not by placing emphasis on the
qualitative process of identification. In this way, the quality of identity cannot be
inscribed upon a quantity of pure difference. This is precisely Derrida‟s strategy, as I
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will show in the next chapter. The other option is to plunge into the second impasse and
ride the lighting, as it were, into the darkness of pure difference. This is quite like a
return to Leibniz through Kant if – following Hyppolite‟s cue – you assume that
differential calculus can track qualitative change back into the quantitative abyss of pure
difference. As I will show, this is precisely Deleuze‟s strategy.
Hegel‟s Metaphysical Shell Game
“The single occurrence of lightning, e.g., is apprehended as a universal, and this universal is
enunciated as the law … Thus the difference qua difference of content, of the thing, is also again
withdrawn.”
~G.W.F. Hegel (PS 94-95)

In this final section of the chapter I provide a summary overview of the difficulty
confounding the philosophical problem of determining the origin or beginning of
experience in post-Hegelian thinking. This section is helpful in understanding Derrida‟s
resistance to logocentrism discussed in Chapter 4. Further, this section is helpful in
understanding Deleuze‟s concern to circumvent a major obstacle for his project of
describing pure difference. The basic faith one must have in order to play Hegel‟s
metaphysical shell game is certainly related to his so called closure of discursivity, and is
nicely summed up by Hegel himself in his other logic book, i.e. Logic: Part One of the
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences – The Shorter Logic – (1817), §213:
The Idea is the Truth: for Truth is the correspondence of
objectivity with the notion. By that correspondence,
however, is not meant the correspondence of external
things with my conceptions: … In the idea we have nothing
to do with … external things. And yet, again, everything
actual, in so far as it is true, is the Idea, and has its truth by
and in virtue of the Idea alone. Every individual being is
some one aspect of the Idea.370
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The basic faith in the above quote is to eliminate the non-discursive in that the initial
moment of difference, i.e. the initial undifferentiated/non-identified moment, is taken to
be exhausted by the retrospective differentiation of conceptual determination. Yet, it
seems to me this logical correspondence should be looked upon as modest eyes look upon
a love letter.371
According to Hegel in the Science of Logic, “[Difference] is the unity of identity
and difference; its moments are different in one identity and thus are opposites. Identity
and difference are the moments of difference held within itself; they are the reflected
moments of its unity [Hegel‟s emphases].” (SL 424) Granting Hegel, for now, the
mirror-correspondence imagery conjured up by the use of “reflection,” so as to show how
the shell game works, notice the determination of retrospective differentiation is at work
here again. Yet, because the Quantity which will be revealed at the moment of Quality is
difference, we now have the unique opportunity to – in thinking Quantity‟s opposite –
perhaps think the opposite of being, i.e. non-being. However, Hegel is already there
waiting to disappoint any attempt to get outside of discursivity.
In other words, according to Hegel, “The positedness of the sides of the external
reflection is accordingly a being, just as their non-positedness is a non-being.” (SL 424)
So, the moment of Quality indicates being displaced as with all appearances. In other
words, in determining whatever is determined we can say at least these two things about
the determination a priori: first, as soon as there is an identity, then there is the moment
or level of Quality – identity being determined by the split of the first moment or level of
Quantity into binary opposites. Second, if there is an identity, then there is being – at
least in that an identity is being identified. Hence, Hegel is ready to grant that the
371
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opposite of being is non-being, but the opposition takes place in the position of Quality.
And, therefore, as Quantity it already possesses being. So, any hopes at arriving at nonbeing have been foiled in advance as if in a metaphysical shell game – which one has
non-being under it? The answer, of course: None of them!
Admittedly, this is all quite dense. So, I would like to pass back over this for
clarity sake, and then to draw one final analogy. I have inserted an illustration to discuss.
Un-differentiated Moment
Level 1 –
Quantity

Level 2 –
Quality

Α

1
2

Differentiated Moment

Ω

ς

θ ς

4

θ

3

Figure 3.4
Figure 3.4 is supposed to represent two moments of the same triangle. As such, “Α”
stands for the triangle with an undifferentiated moment of Quantity, and “Ω” stands for
the triangle with a retrospectively differentiated moment of Quantity. Correspondingly,
“ς” and “θ” represent the binary opposites which arise upon reaching the level of
Quality. “Α” and “Ω,” then, are both the same and different triangles, and this paradox is
based on the faith in correspondence such that the retrospective differentiation represents
the Quantity as it was prior to the retrospective determinative contamination.
Mapping this movement on a cross corresponding to Figure 3.4, you can follow
the numbers as they move counter clockwise around the two triangles. In the upper left
hand corner of the cross you find 1, just below it 2, juxtaposed is 3, and above 3 you find
4. In this counter-clockwise movement it would be appropriate to speak of a difference
between what is in position 1 and what is in position 2. Hyppolite (above) referred to the
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first difference as “pure” and the second difference as “essential.”

Remember, I

mentioned above that Hegel‟s trick is to begin at the level of Quality. Hyppolite (above)
noted, “empirical consciousness takes this unity as immediate [my emphasis].”372 (LE
114) This is Hyppolite‟s way of saying Hegel starts at the level of Quality because
though the movement is from 1 to 2, the level of Quantity is undifferentiated and, as
such, may be initially described as unnoticed, unconscious, or unidentified.
Now depending upon which of the binary opposites is privileged at the level of
Quality you may consider yourself at 2 or 3 – say “ς” for 2 and “θ” for 3. At 4, then,
retrospectively the level of Quantity can be identified as “Ω.” So, you have just
completed a movement of retrospective determination in regard to one triangle. Yet,
recall the “Α” represented the undifferentiated Quantity prior to reflective contamination,
and now Quantity is represented differently by “Ω.” So, in completing a movement of
retrospective determination, you have identified a different triangle. To sum: first, 1 is
different than 2. Second, in 2 “ς” and “θ” are different from each other. Third, as “ς”
and “θ,” 3 is different than 4. And, fourth, 4 is different than 1. If this is still not clear is
will be after the next paragraph.
Now, let‟s play the shell game in regard to non-being. Since 1 has
undifferentiated and unnoticed being, and you start at 2; you identify being at 2 and nonbeing at 1. Yet, from 3 in lifting the shell to see 4 – or going back behind the curtain if
you prefer Hegel‟s Phenomenology metaphor – in order to see this non-being that you
just determined was there, you (retrospectively) differentiate what was undifferentiated.
Thereby, you do not find non-being. You find being, and in recognizing you have arrived
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at what was your true starting point – even though you were initially unaware of it – you
conclude: being is pure. All is being. The movement to arrive at this conclusion:
becoming. Hegel has succeeded in combining Parmenides and Heraclitus.
Hence, this is the shell game in regard to non-being. Yet, true Hegelians can
play this game with you – making the weaker argument the stronger and the stronger the
weaker – so as to have it come out however they like. This is why when Rockmore says
that “Being and Nothing are exactly the same” the undifferentiated can turn out to be
being or non-being. So, if you tell a Hegelian that the undifferentiated is non-being by
lifting the shell, they can say: “No, it‟s being.” And, if you tell a Hegelian that the
undifferentiated is being, they can say: “No, it‟s non-being.” Further, if you say it is
neither, they say it is “both.” If you say it is both, they say it is neither. Notice, every
time they refute you, they are correct. Yet, it is technically also the case that you are
never wrong. But, since they sit in the booth and move the shells: You lose.
There are two conclusions I want to draw from the above in order to close this
section. First, I want to point out an analogy between Kant‟s space and time and Hegel‟s
Quantity and Quality. Second, I want to say how the above analogy will help further
illustrate the heritage from Kant through Hegel and Hyppolite to Derrida and Deleuze.
By Lawlor‟s lights were there no Hyppolite (specifically his text Logic and Existence),
then there would be no pure difference in Derrida and Deleuze. (LE xi) Though I agree
with Lawlor‟s historical observation – it would be counterfactual and against the claims
of Derrida and Deleuze themselves to suggest otherwise – still Hyppolite was able to read
Hegel as such due to the thinking contained in Hegel‟s texts. In other words, I will show
that in the process of rewriting Kant, Hegel incorporated Kant‟s thoughts on space. Now,
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space is, of course, on the experiential, i.e. pre-understanding side of the trajectory of
experience. So, despite Hegel‟s attempt at the closure of discursivity, his incorporation
of Kant‟s thoughts on space left an opening to experiential non-discursivity. It is this
opening upon which Hyppolite seized providing a more Kantian reading of Hegel. And,
it is this more Kantian reading of Hegel that led to pure difference in Derrida and
Deleuze.
At the beginning of his text, Hyppolite keenly strikes at the heart of the matter –
the thing-in-itself. Hyppolite tells us Hegel‟s “logic extends Kant‟s transcendental logic
by exorcising the phantom of a thing-in-itself … Absolute knowledge means the in
principle elimination of this non-knowledge, that is, the elimination of a transcendence
essentially irreducible to our knowledge.” (LE 3) Further, Hyppolite wastes no time in
expressing the meaning of absolute knowledge in the wake of a closure of discursivity.
Hyppolite says, “Absolute knowledge is not different from the immediate knowledge
with which the Phenomenology of Spirit starts; it is only its true comprehension.” (LE 4)
Now I have shown above to what this business of immediate beginning and
retrospective true comprehension amounts. Namely, Hegel – with conceptual
understanding as the threshold of externality – takes Kant‟s concept of quantity as the
immediate moment of experience to be followed by Kant‟s concept of quality. What
Lawlor‟s historical observation regarding textual influence misses is what following out
this analogy brings to light. Mapping Kant’s concepts onto Hegel seems correct. Yet,
the influence of Hegel on such a mapping means that Quantity – in regard to experience
– maps onto space in Kant. Moving through the trajectory of experience: the
combination of space and time – with and by the imagination – amounts to appearance in
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Kant. Mapped analogously on to Hegel, Hegel‟s first moment is analogous to space and
his second moment to time in the determination of appearance. Notice how after this
mapping a celebrated quote from Hegel‟s Phenomenology seems far less cryptic.
This curtain [of appearance] hanging before the inner world
is therefore drawn away, and we have the inner being [the
„I‟] gazing into the inner world – the vision of the
undifferentiated selfsame being, which repels itself from
itself, posits itself as an inner being containing different
moments, but for which equally these moments are
immediately not different – self-consciousness. It is
manifest that behind the so-called curtain which is
supposed to conceal the inner world, there is nothing to be
seen unless we go behind it ourselves, as much in order that
we may see, as that there may be something behind there
which can be seen [my emphasis]. (PS 103) [A.V. Miller‟s
insertions]
With the closure of discursivity, the thing-in-itself has become the eye of God looking
through the bifocals of space and time. Since our use of concepts to understand this is
actually God looking through bifocals into a mirror, what God sees is only one aspect of
Hegel‟s above double genitive – “vision of the undifferentiated selfsame being.” For us,
it is only the vision of God in the sense of (the) power (of vision). The actual vision – as
in image – has lost something in passing through bifocals.
What is gained by recognizing that Hegel‟s Quantity maps on to Kant‟s space?
Briefly, the answer: Kant understands space as containing infinity within it. It is not until
space-time and the advent of continuity that we can think of a continuous infinity. Quite
relevant, then, for Derrida and Deleuze, Hyppolite says, “Time is negativity, the pure
restlessness of difference.” (LE 188) Hence, the question of how to think the (noncontinuous) infinite within pure difference is the question of the thing-in-itself. In trying
to replace the thing-in-itself Derrida and Deleuze are up against the question of non-
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continuous infinity. A number of quotes from the Critique of Pure Reason support this
claim. Kant says,
Now the consciousness of the homogeneous manifold in
intuition in general, insofar as though it the representation
of an object first becomes possible, is the concept of a
magnitude (Quanti). Thus even the perception of an object,
as appearance, is possible only through the same synthetic
unity of the manifold of given sensible intuition through
which the unity of the composition of the homogeneous
manifold is thought in the concept of a magnitude … they
must be represented through the same synthesis as that
through which space and time in general are determined. …
(CPR 1998, A 162/B 203)
In fact, according to Kant, the mapping of Quantity on to space is precisely what allows
for the use of geometry a priori in regard to experience. For example,
every appearance as intuition is an extensive magnitude, as
it can only be cognized through successive synthesis (from
part to part) in apprehension. All appearances are
accordingly already intuited as aggregates (multitudes of
antecedently given parts) … On this successive synthesis of
the productive imagination, in the generation of shapes, is
grounded the mathematics of extension (geometry) with its
axioms, which express the conditions of sensible intuition a
priori … (CPR 1998, A 163/B 204)
Congruent, then, with space and time as outer and inner sense, Kant depicts Quantity as
divided into extensive magnitude and intensive magnitude. Further, Kant says, “in
[intensive] magnitudes as such we can recognize a priori only a single Quality, viz.
continuity, and that in all Quality (the real [component] of appearances) we can cognize a
priori nothing more than their having an intensive quantity, viz. the fact that they have a
degree.” (CPR 1996, B 218) You can now consider the difference between the two
infinities.
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Differentiating between the two infinities – infinity in time and infinity in space –
Kant launches what also functions as a justification for non-discursivity. According to
Kant,
Time is not a discursive [concept] … it is a pure form of
sensible intuition. … To say that time is infinite means
nothing more than that any determinate magnitude of time
is possible only through limitations [put] on a single
underlying time. Hence the original representation time
[Kant‟s emphasis added in 1787] must be given as
unlimited. … any such representation must be based on
direct intuition. (CPR 1996, A 31-32/B 47)
Recall, limit – according to Kant‟s Table of Concepts – is an aspect of Quality not
Quantity. This accounts for the (above) splitting of Quantity because with time we can
think continuity, and this limit is infinite. Compare this now with what Kant says about
space.
Space is not a discursive or, as we say, universal concept of things as such; rather
it is a pure intuition.” (CPR 1996, A24-25/B 39) And, here is Kant‟s justification: “Space
is represented as an infinite given magnitude. (CPR 2003, A24-25/B 39) Kant clarifies
that he does not mean space may be represented in an infinite number of possible
representations. Rather, Kant says,
[N]o concept, as such, can be thought as containing an
infinite multitude of representations within itself. Yet, that
is how we think space (for all parts of space, ad infinitum,
are simultaneous) [Kant‟s emphasis]. (CPR 2003, A 25/B
40)
How to think this infinity (which as infinite lacks finite being) in conjunction with the
Hegelian version of dialectic will be the task which goes under the name of: describing
pure difference – Derrida and Deleuze will have different descriptions. Within the
framework of the Kantian system, it is as if Hegel puts being in the place of space. In
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doing so, he accomplishes the destruction of the discursive/non-discursive distinction but
at the cost of retreating to the first moment in the problem of non-being.
In other words, despite Kant‟s specific warning in the last block quote above –
“no concept can be thought [my emphasis] as containing an infinite multitude of
representations within itself [Kant‟s emphasis] – Hegel has it that this infinite multitude
may be thought as (Parmenidean) being. Again, Hegel‟s attempt is amphibolous.
Further, notice from Kant‟s emphasis that he evidently had Leibniz‟s metaphor of the tile
game in mind. That is, in denying that the mortal mind can think the infinity within a tile
that itself is a limiting of the mind of God, Kant is further justifying that though Quantity
is involved in thinking both the object in experience and reflection, these Quantities
cannot be the same. Kant‟s modesty keeps him from faith in Hegel‟s correspondence.
The sensible Quantity contains an infinity which cannot be thought. Notice what has
been reworded and stated again? The infinite Quantity in sensibility exceeds our ability
to think it – voilà the value of the notion of non-discursivity again.
At this point all the general preliminaries are in place to bridge Kant to Derrida
and Deleuze. To sum, I have shown that I non-being cannot be stated symbolically, and I
have shown Kant was well aware of this limitation by discussing his Table of Nothing in
the Critique of Pure Reason. I showed Hegel‟s reading of Kant‟s thing-in-itself so as to
show Hegel‟s position in regard to the problem of non-being and Kant‟s Table of
Nothing. Generally speaking, I argued for a reading of Hegel in relation to Kant such
that Hegel collapses the multiple standpoints of Kant‟s system to the conceptual
standpoint. I included Schopenhauer‟s criticisms of Hegel to show an alternative to
Hegel‟s treatment of Kant. Specifically, Schopenhauer‟s work in regard to the problem
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of non-being connects Kant with Plato and provides a (non-Hegelian) critique of the
thing-in-itself without collapsing Kant‟s standpoints.
I then provided a summary of Hyppolite‟s Kantian rendition of Hegel such that
Kantian sensibility was given a prominent role in Hegel‟s system via materialistic
speculative thought. In doing this, I highlighted the fact that Hyppolite did not resuscitate
Kantian non-discursivity. Hyppolite‟s rendition of Hegel is the last of the general
influences bridging Kant to Derrida and Deleuze, i.e. the remaining influences are more
thinker-specific. Hyppolite provides a view of the altered Kantian conceptual and
experiential standpoints which Derrida and Deleuze, respectively, take as points of
departure in articulating the ground of experience. In this way, Derrida and Deleuze are
working – with an altered framework – on the same problem which Kant sought to solve
by positing the thing-in-itself. Hence, at this point you have seen enough of the historical
work on the problem of non-being to understand the efforts of Derrida and Deleuze in its
regard. Further, you have now seen a further explication of the logical options involved
in attempting to solve the problem of non-being. As early as the Introduction I indicated
the option which must be taken à la Plato and Gorgias to solve this problem, i.e. looking
to experience. As you have seen then, and as you will see, this problem remained
unsolved until I pursued the Ancient option differently.
Finally, in Aristotelian language, regarding their strategies for solving the
problem of non-being: Kant‟s focus pertains to priority of being; Derrida‟s focus pertains
to priority of account; and, Deleuze‟s focus pertains to priority of time. As I will
continue to indicate, and as the terms used to describe the priority also indicate, Kant‟s
focus came closest thus far to solving the problem of non-being. Yet, the innovations
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Derrida and Deleuze provide – which I will show as already inherent in Kant‟s account –
provide an elaboration of Kant‟s thought which Kant did not live long enough to perform.
Hence, after discussing Derrida and Deleuze, you will see my reading of a return to the
Kantian experiential standpoint for the sake of solving the problem of non-being.
“I am ultra-Kantian. I am Kantian, but I am more than Kantian.”373
~Jacques Derrida
“And contrary to what phenomenology – which is always phenomenology of perception – has tried to make
us believe, contrary to what our desire cannot fail to be tempted into believing, the thing itself always
escapes.”374
~Jacques Derrida
“Différance, which (is) nothing … (is) the thing itself.”375
~Jacques Derrida

Chapter Four: Pure Difference in Derrida – Recognizing Différance
Introduction and Justification for Chapter 4 Sections and Objectives
In this chapter I explicate Derrida‟s understanding of pure difference. I have already
begun this explication in the previous chapter. The first three sections of this chapter are
primarily expository. That is, my objective for these sections is the not without difficulty
task of presenting a coherent view of Derrida‟s discussion of pure difference and the idea
into which it evolves – Différance. The remaining sections of the chapter contain my
arguments concerning Derrida‟s pure difference in relation to Kant‟s thing-in-itself and
Derrida‟s pure difference in relation to the problem of non-being. Hence, in this chapter,
then, I focus on Derrida‟s comments concerning pure difference.
In so doing, one immediately sees that shortly after initially discussing pure
difference in relation to Husserl, Derrida – realizing the paradoxical nature of referring to
373

Jacques Derrida, “On Forgiveness: A Roundtable Discussion with Jacques Derrida,” Questioning God,
John D. Caputo, Mark Dooley, Michael J. Scanlon, ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 66.
374
Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, David B. Allison, tr., (Evanston: Northwestern University,
1973), 104. Hereafter cited as SP.
375
Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, Peggy Kamuf, tr., (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1992), 40.

250

pure difference as such – shifted to writing about Différance. I will argue that this is
tantamount to Derrida‟s attempt to solve the problem of non-being by making a
philosophical position of the problem‟s second impasse. Remember, for Derrida, being
in Hyppolite‟s wake means both returning to Kantian sensibility and maintaining Hegel‟s
closure of discursivity. Further recall, pure difference is thought as the first moment of
undifferentiated Quantity in Hegel‟s shell game. In this way, Derrida accepts Hegel‟s
shell game as an inevitable consequence of attempting to express in language a sensuous
being that you mean. Hence, Derrida develops a way of referring to pure difference so as
to acknowledge the inability to refer to pure difference.
How might this be seen as a solution to the problem of non-being? By employing
the term Différance Derrida seeks (paradoxically) to collapse the second impasse – of the
problem involved in referring to any thing that lacks a signification – by embracing it.
Such a strategy may be of great value toward solving the problem of non-being, but it is
completely misplaced by Derrida. This strategy works better – as I will employ it in Part
II of the dissertation – if you also allow for non-discursivity. Maintaining the closure of
discursivity Derrida is content to conclude his project by returning to Kantian
undecidability regarding pure difference. It is in this way that Derrida failed to solve the
problem of non-being. Recall, undecidability for Kant pertained to the thing-in-itself. In
this chapter, then, I will further illustrate and expand the above.
Pure Difference ex Priority of Account: Derrida‟s Stacked Deck
“Perhaps what is inexpressible (what I find mysterious and am not able to express)
is the background against which whatever I could express has meaning.”376
~Ludwig Wittgenstein
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Though Kant is explicit that neither space (CPR A 25-25/B 39) nor time (CPR A
31-32/B 47) is discursive, Hegel‟s closure of discursivity furthers what may be thought of
as philosophy‟s self assuring truth of “the now.” A quote from Hegel‟s Phenomenology
of Spirit §§97-98 expresses my claim precisely:
[I]t is just not possible for us ever to say, or express in
words, a sensuous being that we mean. The same will be
the case with the other form of the “This”, with “Here”.
“Here” is, e.g., the tree. If I turn round, this truth has
vanished and is converted into its opposite: “No tree is
here, but a house instead.” “Here” itself does not vanish;
on the contrary, it abides constant in the vanishing of the
house, the tree, etc., and is indifferently house or tree.
Again, therefore, the “This” shows itself to be a mediated
simplicity, or a universality [Hegel‟s emphases]. (PS 60-61)
Hegel‟s move here is tantamount to making space and time discursive since Hegel‟s
version of the nunc stans – standing now – as overlay of the senses allows for reference
to the senses through the frame of space and time, i.e. here and now. In this way, Hegel
allows for reference to the undifferentiated moment – through space and time – in the
explication of experiential meaning without expressing the sensuous being you mean. I
do not need to know the name of this pain, so long as I can refer to it as “this pain” “here
and now.”
At first this might seem little different from Kant. However, as Hegel hints in the
above passage noting, “the truth has vanished and is converted into its opposite,” you
already know by the Hegel quote at the end of the previous chapter from the “Shorter
Logic” that – consistent with the shell game – of this truth, “The Idea is the Truth … [&]
Every individual being is some one aspect of the Idea.”377 Hence, on the one hand, a
return to the senses is a return to the ideas. And, on the other hand, Hegel seems to take
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the language pertaining to the standing now to function discursively in the subject
position of judgments such as “Here is a tree.”
Now, Derrida takes the “Here” which “itself does not vanish” to be “presence.”
Derrida declares, “According to a fundamentally Greek gesture, this Hegelian
determination of time permits us to think the present, the very form of time, as
eternity.”378 Further, “Eternity is another name of the presence of the present.” (MOP 46)
And Derrida explains – as can be seen in the Hegel quote above – “Hegel also
distinguishes this presence from the present as now.” (MOP 46) So, coupled together,
there is a sensuous flowing now and a non-sensuous standing eternal now. The latter,
then, acts as an overlay through which you can identify the sensuous. I will make this
clear for you in a moment, but first I want to show you how this immediate issue
connects with non-being.
Because of what has been said so far regarding time and Hegel, Derrida says,
“Time is not (among beings). It is nothingness because it is time, that is a past or future
now.” (MOP 50) In other words, “time is not (a being) to the extent that it is not
(present).” (MOP 50) Derrida deduces
The mē on, the no-thingness, therefore, is accessible only
on the basis of the Being of time. Time as nothing can be
thought only according to the modes of time, the past and
the future. Being is nontime, time is nonbeing [my
emphasis] insofar as being already, secretly has been
determined as present, and Beingness (ousia) as presence.
(MOP 51)
Beyond being reminiscent of Hegel‟s shell game, this language should already indicate to
you that this non-being is internal to understanding. As such, this is what I refer to as
not-being, not non-being, i.e. ἐλαληίνλ not ἕηεξνλ.
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Finally, Derrida concludes, “Time is indeed the discursive manifestation of
negativity.” (MOP 51) In this way, Derrida has returned to the first line of the large
Hegel quote which began this section, i.e. from the Phenomenology of Spirit §97, “it is
just not possible for us ever to say, or express in words, a sensuous being that we mean.”
(PS 60) Recall though Hegel takes the sensuous being as still being a part of the
Parmenidean One-Being, he will refer to it as “non-being”; yet, this is merely the nonbeing which his shell game will reveal as ultimately being. Derrida, then, in a Kantian
twist, will treat this matter as undecidable, and as such Derrida offers his solution to the
problem of non-being, i.e. pure difference which is in-itself undecidable. That which
Hegel calls a sensuous being you cannot mean, Derrida takes as the difference which is
undecidable, i.e. neither sensible nor intelligible, and as undecidable this difference is
pure difference. Applying Hegel‟s shell game, Derrida treats this undecidable site
between the binary opposites of flowing and standing nows like the rendezvous for a
Bacchanalian revel.
Recall the comments from Sextus Empiricus in the chapter on Kant. According to
Sextus, “If undecidable, we have it that we must suspend judgment; for it is not possible
to make assertions about what is subject to undecidable dispute. But if decidable, we
shall ask where the decision is to come from [my emphasis].”379 If you ask the question
of Hegel, where is the decision to come from, regarding the Phenomenology §98, the
answer is time. The standing now reveals the presence of Being in time. Being is
decidedly constructed upon the opposition between the flowing and non-flowing of time,
and the non-flowing, i.e. standing now of Being, for Hegel is privileged. So, Derrida
seeks to deconstruct the foundation upon which Being is erected. Now, this is not to be
379
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taken as a privileging in turn by Derrida; deconstruction does not need a special target.
As all Derrida scholars can tell you, no erection is safe with Derrida around. In order to
deconstruct the foundation of time, then, upon which Being is erected, Derrida must show
that the difference between what amounts to Being and non-being does not point to
Being. That is, Hegel‟s Parmenidean One-Being has it that the undifferentiated first
moment, upon retrospective determination is revealed as (having been all along) Being.
If Derrida can make the first moment undecidable, rather than Being, then he “has it” as
Sextus might say. In order to accomplish this, of course, Derrida must work on the
problem of non-being.
Recall from my discussion of priority in account from the Introduction‟s
discussion of Aristotle that in Metaphysics IX §8 Aristotle argues actuality precedes
potentiality in account [ιόγῳ] (Meta 1049b12-17), time [ρξόλῳ] (Meta 1049b17-1050a3),
and being [νὺζίᾳ] (Meta 1050a4-11). Now, by considering the logos [ιόγνο] as a type of
potentiality – think of the many possible descriptions of an entity – Derrida is able to
argue for a non-logo-centric priority. Any reckoning, i.e. accounting, to be made of this
priority, of course, must invoke the logos to which it is prior. Moreover, notice how this
functions as a sophisticated rendition of the thing-in-itself. Derrida is positing pure
difference as the actuality prior to the potential logo-centric descriptions, and then
claiming that “pure difference” as a description derives from the logos. Hence, he is
attempting to further inculcate or enforce Kant‟s idea of the non-discursive thing-in-itself
by denying non-discursivity, i.e. invoking Hegel‟s closure of discursivity, and by also
denying priority to the logos. For ease of communication, Derrida will ultimately
exchange speaking of pure difference for speaking of this movement to that which though
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differing from the logos can necessarily only be identified by deferring to the logos – thus
the movement of Différance. However, as there is a good deal yet to discuss toward
recognizing Différance, I will return to Différance below.
Returning, here, to Derrida‟s reading of presence; notice, Being is nontime, but
Being is found – recovered or gathered together – in time. The difference between Being
and time, then, is the difference between the standing eternal now and the flowing
sensuous now. You may recognize the eternal, here, is much like Kant‟s transcendental
unity of apperception which persists across perceptions. Yet, here, Derrida is focusing on
time, rather than perceptions. So, the form of time, as presence, persists as time flows,
and this persisting form of time is Being. It is as if, were there not a standing now, i.e. a
place to stand, you could not see time flow past; were there not a place to stand, you
could not recognize change – you would be changing too much to be enough you to
notice that you are changing. This is why Derrida above says, “the no-thingness” is
“only accessible on the basis of the Being of time.” (MOP 51) By Derrida‟s lights, the
concept of time may be used within Being to indicate non-being, i.e. that which is not
(now). So as you can see this non is supposed to refer to Becoming as not Being, and as
such this term should be called not-being, rather than non-being. Further, you can see
Derrida‟s logic as an exploitation of Aristotle‟s priority of account. Derrida‟s innovation
will be to deny a difference in kind between the account which is prior and that to which
it is prior.
Thus far, then, I have shown you Derrida‟s attempt to solve the problem of nonbeing with reference to the work of Aristotle and Hegel. And to use the language of
Aristotle, what has been said thus far is that Derrida attempts to collapse priority in time
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to priority in account. In the background of this move lurks a Hegelian justification, i.e.
despite following Hyppolite Derrida retains the closure of discursivity. 380 Yet, there is, of
course, more to Derrida‟s solution. In fact, that he pursues this problem, that he is
concerned with it, more than just dismissing the problem as merely arising from the
dialectical movement of negativity shows a Kantian influence rustling him in his
Hegelian slumbers. Now, perhaps the more standard references to state in regard to
Derrida‟s innovation here are to the work of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Ferdinand
de Saussure (1857-1913). I will use such references, then, to demonstrate the movement
in Derrida‟s work from pure difference to Différance.
I will discuss Husserl by way of two related preliminaries to pure difference: first,
what has come to be referred to as “The Metaphysics of Presence,” thanks to Derrida, and
second, I will discuss Husserl‟s expression/indication distinction. As Derrida notes in
Speech [Voice] and Phenomena [La Voix et le Phénomène] Derrida tells us,
And here again we find all the incidences of primordial
nonpresence whose emergence we have already noted on
several occasions. Even while repressing difference by
assigning it to the exteriority of the signifiers, Husserl
could not fail to recognize its work [difference] at the
origin of sense and presence. … In this pure difference is
rooted the possibility of everything we think we can
exclude from auto-affection: space, the outside, the world,
the body, etc. … We come closest to it [pure difference] in
the movement of différance [my emphasis]. (SP 82)
It is for this reason that Leonard Lawlor refers to “pure difference” in Derrida‟s early
work as “the source of the concept of différance.”381 And, as you can see in the above
quote, Derrida does not locate pure difference as much as he locates “its work” “at the
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origin of sense and presence.” Hence, notice, Derrida locates “pure difference” by
equating it with “origin.” Further, the above quote – by referencing “sense and presence”
– situates this thought precisely within the previous discussion regarding Hegel. 382
According to Husserl, Husserlian phenomenology stands or falls upon the truth of
one principle. Husserl – in Ideas I §24 – calls this principle the “principle of all
principles.” And, one is thereby forced to decide whether they accept this principle or
not. Especially in light of what has been said concerning Hegel in Chapter 2, and as will
be shown below, neither Derrida nor Deleuze accept this principle. Here is Husserl on
the so-called principle of all principles.
No conceivable theory can make us err with respect to the
principle of all principles: that every originary presentive
intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that
everything originarily (so to speak, in its “personal”
actuality) offered to us in “intuition” is to be accepted
simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within
the limits in which it is presented there [Husserl‟s
emphases]. 383
This amounts to assuming – contra Hegel – that the experiential starting point is the first
moment – not the second moment – of conceptualization, and further this principle
assumes nature‟s sincerity. 384 As such, intuition as the sincere expression of nature
outright denies the wisdom of Heraclitus – “Nature loves to hide [θύζηο θξύπηεζζαη
θηιεῖ].”385 At the origin, so to speak, for both Derrida and Deleuze is pure difference,
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and pure difference is different from itself. Hence, for Derrida and Deleuze, it is better to
speak of irony than sincerity in regard to this “origin.”
Yet, Husserl believes nature to be sincere. What is more, Derrida shows how
Husserl attempts to immunize himself from Hegel‟s shell game by denying the possibility
of some other beginning, i.e. an “abysmal alterity.” In regard to Kant, Derrida‟s critique
of Husserl suggests: rather than guttural awareness, there is isomorphic harmony with
nature sincerely revealed at the moment analogous to (the “inner sense” of) time in
Kant‟s trajectory of experience. In other words, Husserl is accused of suggesting time
exhausts space, rather than taking time as a way of thinking space in a continuum – the
way Kant thought time (see previous chapter). The following passage, indicated by
Derrida, makes Husserl‟s position explicit. I quote it at length, bulleted so as to be able
to discuss it afterward. According to Husserl,
[1] We can now pose the question: What about the
beginning-phase of an experience that is in the process of
becoming constituted? Does it also come to be given only
on the basis of retention, and would it be “unconscious” if
no retention were to follow it? [2] We must say in response
to this question: The beginning-phase can become an object
only after it has elapsed in the indicated way by means of
retention and reflection (or reproduction). [3] But if it were
intended only by retention, then what confers on it the label
“now” would remain incomprehensible. [4] At most it
could be distinguished negatively from its modifications as
that one phase that does not make us retentionally
conscious of any preceding phase; [5] but the beginningphase is by all means characterized in consciousness in
quite positive fashion. It is just nonsense to talk about an
“unconscious” content that would only subsequently
[nachträglich] become conscious. Consciousness
[Bewusstsein] is necessarily consciousness [bewusstsein] in
each of its phases. [6] Just as the retentional phase is
conscious of the preceding phase without making it into an
object, so too the primal datum is already intended –
specifically, in the original form of the “now” – without its
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being something objective. [7] It is precisely this primal
consciousness that passes over into retentional modification
– which is then retention of the primal consciousness itself
and of the datum originally intended in it, since the two are
inseparably united. If the primal consciousness were not on
hand, no retention would even be conceivable: retention of
an unconscious content is impossible. 386
Husserl here considers the passing from moment to moment of time to be even less
problematic, i.e. more sincere, than Hegel took it (above). Recall from above, Derrida,
operating in the wake of Hegel‟s closure of discursivity will be skeptical of the
Husserlian claim I labeled “6.” In other words, Derrida will not allow Husserl to suppose
a sincere flow of the now as a stable ground of time – this move is ultra-Kantian; and, if
no longer stable, then Derrida has deconstructed the metaphysics of presence, i.e. with
Derrida, philosophy loses the sincerity of its self assuring truth of “the now.”
In regard to the bullet points in the quote: First, [1] this question is, of course, a
question about origination, a question of the origin. I have been discussing this question
above, especially in regard to Kant and Hegel. Second, [2] here Husserl stands on the
shoulders of Kant. “Reproduction” betrays the Kantian origin of the reproductive
imagination. In other words, Husserl can be located, in regard to the question of origin,
as invoking the Kantian trajectory of experience to support his position. I point this out
to further show how Husserl is here participating in the same discussion as the above
thinkers, i.e. Kant-Hegel-Hyppolite. Third, [3] here Husserl is arguing against a version
of my thesis about memory. Suffice to say at this point, Husserl and I think of memory
differently (more on this in the Memory chapter). Fourth, [4] this is the Hegelian thesis –
negative dialectic, shell game, etc. Husserl, as will be explicit by the end of his quote,
rejects this thesis. Remember, this is the very thesis which allows for a discussion of
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pure difference. Fifth, [5] here Husserl is invoking the principle of all principles, and
denying the efficacy of Hegelian thesis just mentioned. Sixth, [6] to further support [5]
Husserl here appeals to the metaphysics of presence. Lastly, [7] albeit Husserl and I
think differently about retention, this claim of his about memory is simply wrong (more
on this in the following chapters).387
Now with the above in place, I can discuss Husserl‟s distinction between
expression and indication. Derrida‟s Différance can be seen to derive from his critique of
this Husserlian distinction. Husserl, in Logical Investigations, explains there is a
difference between expression and sign. The meaning of a “sign” is the sense that the
sign “expresses.” (Sh Log 103) Moving, then, from thing to indication to meaning –
think the trajectory of Kant‟s structure of experience: in discussing indication Husserl
notes, “A thing is only properly an indication if and where it in fact serves to indicate
something to some thinking being.” (Sh Log 104) Husserl goes on to say, “From
indicative signs we distinguish meaningful signs, i.e. expressions.” (Sh Log 104) He
clarifies,
We shall lay down, for provisional intelligibility, that each
instance or part of speech, as also each sign that is
essentially of the same sort, shall count as an expression,
whether or not such speech is actually uttered, or addressed
with communicative intent to any persons or not [Husserl‟s
emphasis]. (Sh Log 104-105)
First notice, indicative signs are distinguished from “meaningful” signs. So, there are
meaningless signs which express meaningful signs. Further, in the first of these three
quotes, Husserl associated a meaningless indicative sign with a “thing.” Husserl then,
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invoking the sincerity of intuition, suggested the meaning of the expression derives from
the combination of the thing with the here and now as the “if and where” which intuited
the thing as an indication serving to express the meaning of something. Husserl here
betrays that such speech is suggestive of believing in an eternality, i.e. a “metaphysics of
presence” – whether gradually or spontaneously revealed – in and through which
meaning persists. I suppose this is reminiscent of some Platonic heaven. Yet, it would
be as if the sentence: “Deleuze‟s book on expression was not forged in hell” could be
reduced to one stable meaning that persists beyond the particular phrasing. So Derrida
will interrogate Husserl‟s theory of meaning.
What is left to show before invoking Derrida is Husserl‟s descriptions of talking
to someone else and talking to yourself. Invoking a perennial trope – the physical and the
psychical – Husserl indicates his meaning of the distinction between expression and
indication. On the one hand, both literally and figuratively he provides a list of examples
of “The expression physically regarded,” including “the sensible sign, the articulate
sound-complex, the written sign on paper etc.” (Sh Log 105) On the other hand,
invoking the Kantian rhetoric of the reproductive imagination, Husserl says,
A certain sequence of mental states, associatively linked
with the expression, which make it be the expression of
something. These mental states are generally called the
„sense‟ or the „meaning‟ of the expression, this being taken
to be in accord with what words ordinarily mean. (Sh Log
105)
Now, though Husserl‟s list of examples may illustrate his will-to-description, all the
possible meanings of “expression” which he indicates are beyond the scope of my
concern. However, his discussion of how the physical side of speech becomes
communicative is ideal. Husserl says,
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The articulate sound-complex, the written sign, etc., first
becomes a spoken word or communicative bit of speech,
when a speaker produces it with the intention of
„expressing himself about something‟ through its means; he
must endow it with a sense in certain acts of mind, a sense
he desires to share with his auditors. Such sharing becomes
a possibility if the auditor also understands the speaker‟s
intention. … What first makes mental commerce possible,
and turns connected speech into discourse, lies in the
correlation among the corresponding physical and mental
experiences of communicating persons which is effected by
the physical side of speech. (Sh Log 106)
From Husserl‟s pre-death-of-the-author epoch he sees the cathexis or imbuing of the
physical with meaning as dependent on the “desire” of the author “to share.” Hence, it is
at least clear that for Husserl indication is necessary in the communication of meaning,
i.e. the “correlation among the corresponding physical and mental experiences” is
“effected by the physical side of speech.”
So as to maintain a distinction between physically acting and mentally imagining,
then, Husserl describes the difference between speaker and listener, i.e. first person
experience and vicarious experience.
Speaking and hearing, intimation of mental states through
speaking and reception thereof in hearing, are mutually
correlated. … The hearer perceives the speaker as
manifesting certain inner experiences, and to that extent he
also perceives these experiences themselves: he does not,
however, himself experience them, he has not an „inner‟
but an „outer‟ percept of them. (Sh Log 106-107)
On the one hand, then, this seems an adequate description of the conveyance of meaning
through speech. On the other hand, Husserl‟s theory of the conveyance of meaning
through speech might – as Derrida will point out – come into conflict with his thesis of
necessary indication in regard to talking to yourself.
Husserl – in further supporting his thesis of indication – provides a description of
both communicated and uncommunicated expressions. Expressions used in
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communication depend “essentially on the fact that they operate indicatively.” (Sh Log
107) Of uncommunicated expressions, Husserl says, they “continue to have meanings as
they had before, and the same meanings as in dialog. A word only ceases to be a word
when our interest stops at its sensory contour, when it becomes a mere sound–pattern.”
(Sh Log 107) However, Husserl qualifies, “when we live in the understanding of a word,
it expresses something and the same thing, whether we address it to anyone or not.” (Sh
Log 107) So far no conflict, but next Husserl will describe – what some scholars equate
with the transcendental reduction388 – soliloquy, i.e. when “one speaks to oneself, and
employs words as signs, i.e. as indications, of one‟s own inner experiences.” (Sh Log
108)
Given the structure Husserl has just described, he now has the ontological
commitment or the phenomenological commitment, or at least the logical commitment to
a counterintuitive description of hearing yourself speak. If indications were necessary for
meaning, it follows then that you need to hear yourself before you know what you mean.
The other alternative is that you imagine the words in front of you – so as to have an
indication of your meaning – as you engage in soliloquy. Husserl decides upon
imagination to solve his problem.
In imagination a spoken or printed word floats before us,
though in reality it has no existence. We should not,
however, confuse imaginative presentations, and the imagecontents they rest on, with their imagined objects. The
imagined verbal sound, or the imagined printed word, does
not exist, ony its imagined verbal sound, or the imaginative
presentation does so. The difference is the difference
between imagined centaurs and the imagination of such
beings. (Sh Log 108)
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What Husserl says here is certainly consistent, i.e. he sticks to what his necessary
indication thesis committed him, but such a description does not seem to correspond with
experience. It is this flaw in Husserl‟s system which Derrida will treat as a rendezvous
for a Bacchanalian revel.
To sum, whatever you indicate is what you mean. Despite what you might think,
if you do not indicate it, then you do not mean it, nor do you communicate it. And notice
that this is like the ribbon cutting ceremony at the grand opening of another site to play
Hegel‟s shell game. Given Husserl‟s understanding of physical and psychical, now the
psychical depends on the physical, and the physical lacks (psychical) identity. Sound
familiar? An undifferentiated, unidentified first moment, which is itself determined as
such only retrospectively from a second moment. It is as if, Husserl left an entryway
unguarded, and in it Derrida has stuck Hegel‟s javelin. Now, in a way to be (further)
explained below, Husserl‟s system is infected with pure difference. As Derrida will
make all too clear, retrospective identification does not ensure nature‟s sincerity. In a
post-Hyppolite ultra-Kantian innovation – the motor force of which being Hegel‟s shell
game – Derrida will replace Husserl‟s decision regarding nature‟s sincerity with
undecidability. And, to do so Derrida will invoke Saussure.
Another celebrated influence on Derrida, then, Ferdinand de Saussure‟s seminal
text Course in General Linguistics [Cours de linguistique générale] (1916) provides a
description of meaning which can be read as rival to Husserl‟s description. Recall
Husserl‟s description of language required one to hold a counterintuitive notion of
communication in solitude. Yet, both Husserl and Saussure consider expression
dependent upon indication; so, what is the difference which makes all the difference for
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Saussure? Thought through the vocabulary of Saussure: the material – the physical
sound patterns or written signs – is prerequisite for the psychical element of meaning.
Saussure, embracing the dependence of expression upon indication, provided a way to
think of meaning as itself constituted by indication, rather than by meaning intention, i.e.
rather than by imbuing the physical with psychical meaning. According to Saussure, the
differences between indications – the physical aspects – could account for the production
of meaning. For example, regarding the physical construction of the following words, a
bat is a bat because it is not (it is different from) a cat, or a car, or a bar, etc.389 Hence,
material difference makes all the difference much like a condition for the possibility of
meaning for Derrida, though it is grounded in priority of account.
As explained by Saussure, the “First Principle” of General Linguistics amounts
to: “The bond between signifier and signified is arbitrary.” 390 What this means is that
every sign may be thought of as composed of a physical side and a psychical side.
Staying with speech for the moment, what Saussure calls the “sound image,” [imageacoustique] would be the physical side, i.e. the signifier [signifiant]. And, what Saussure
calls the “concept” would be the psychical side, i.e. the signified [signifié].391 Now,
Saussure is able to say this and acknowledge that, insofar as meaning is psychical, even
the “physical” side is recognized by the psychical. What this means is – as I already
rehearsed above with Husserl – you cannot mean the matter because what would be “the
matter” (physical) is external to all meaning (psychical). This is the reason for speaking
about the “side” of a sign. Remember, generally speaking – as exemplified by Hyppolite
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– these French thnkers have employed Kant against Hegel. In other words, something
may be functioning like the thing-in-itself, though you – of course – cannot express its
meaning. Saussure says,
The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a
concept and a sound-image. The latter is not the material
sound, a purely physical thing, but the psychological
imprint of the sound, the impression that it makes on our
senses. The sound-image is sensory, and if I happen to call
it “material,” it is only in that sense, and by way of
opposing it to the other term of the association, the concept,
which is generally more abstract [my emphasis]. (CGL 66)
Hence, here, Saussure provides a theory of meaning which functions by way of the basic
pattern outlined by Kant. Transposing into the Kantian key – it is as if the senses pick up
the “purely physical thing” without ever being able to mean it. Further, this sensory
sound image is conventionally, i.e. arbitrarily, associated with the concept under which it
is subsumed. Thing + sense, + concept ≈ Thing + signifier + signified, and, separately,
both equal the “sign.”
In this way, every sign is composed of a signifier and a signified to which the
signifier points. (CGL 67) Now the importance of what we might call Saussure‟s
principle of all principles is to recognize that the relation between a signifier and the
signified to which it points is both arbitrary and fixed. This requires nuance. According
to Saussure,
The signifier, thought to all appearances freely chosen with
respect to the idea that it represents, is fixed, not free, with
respect to the linguistic community that uses it. The
masses have no voice in the matter … This fact, which
seems to embody a contradiction, might be called
colloquially “the stacked deck.” … No individual, even if
he willed it, could modify in any way the choice which has
been made; and, what is more, the community itself … is
bound to the existing language. (CGL 71)
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This is why – above – I referred to the conventionality of the association between sensory
sound image and concept. Further, Saussure‟s use here of a gaming metaphor – “stacked
deck” [la carte forcée]392 is significant because the community of Kant scholars at times
associates the thing-in-itself with the signifier “wild card.” This seems proper, i.e. I
would not change this association if I could. So, the relation between signifier and
signified is arbitrary – it could have been otherwise – but fixed – it is not otherwise.
Using a phrase I used with Husserl: you can only express what you indicate. And,
physical indication is arbitrarily tied up in conventionality. 393
The last piece to take from Saussure on the way to understanding Derrida‟s pure
difference involves Saussure‟s second principle. Whereas the first principle is the
arbitrary nature of the sign, the second principle is the linear nature of the sign. Of this
principle, Saussure says, “The signifier, being auditory, is unfolded solely in time from
which it gets the following characteristics: (a) it represents a span, and (b) the span is
measurable in a single dimension; it is a line.” (CGL 71) Of this linearity Saussure
suggests, “it is fundamental, and its consequences are incalculable. … the whole
mechanism of language depends upon it.” (CGL 71) Beginning with “auditory
signifiers,” Saussure concludes that these
signifiers have at their command only the dimension of
time. Their elements are presented in succession; they
form a chain. This feature becomes readily apparent when
they are represented in writing and the spatial line of
graphic marks is substituted for succession in time. (CGL
71)
Hence, paraphrasing Saussure here by stringing together the vocabularies of Aristotle,
Kant, and Derrida I would say: Saussure has located pure difference (Derrida) as the
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remote matter (Aristotle) in the intuitive slot designated for space in the (Kantian)
structure of experience. In order to better understand this principle, then, think of it as a
principle of animation or motivation – a motivation indicatively, not expressively
generated. To do so, it helps to consider what Saussure says later in the text when, in
clarifying the first principle, he distinguishes between radical and relative arbitrariness.
According to Saussure, “The fundamental principle of the arbitrariness of the sign
does not prevent our singling out in each language what is radically arbitrary, i.e.
unmotivated, and what is only relatively arbitrary.” (CGL 131) Radical and relative
arbitrariness are distinguished in terms of motivation or animation, there are degrees
between absolute and relative arbitrariness: “the sign may be relatively motivated.” (CGL
131) For example, “The English plural ships suggests through its formation the whole
series flags, birds, books, etc. while men and sheep suggest nothing.” (CGL 132)
Saussure means that each sign, dependent upon its degree of arbitrariness, seems to point
forward – in line – to the next sign. This internally motivated movement from sign to
sign may be thought of as a sliding from sign to sign. And this sliding can be accounted
for indicatively. Recall, every sign is composed of different elements, i.e. a signifier and
a signified.
Saussure himself refers to these as the acoustic image of the signifier and the
concept to which is points as the signified. Image and concept, it should not escape you,
were the two components which Kant‟s Transcendental Deduction sought to combine via
the condition for their possible combination, i.e. the =x. Recall that an image in a
judgment of perception in Kant‟s structure and trajectory of experience was not a fully
determined object of experience, i.e. it was not an object of a judgment of experience. In
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order to be a determined object of experience, the three-fold synthesis was required to
culminate in the recognition under a concept such that the Square of Opposition, i.e.
universality, was entered. Similarly for Saussure, the combination of a sound image with
a concept is the combination of a noise with the “stacked deck” of meaning agreed upon
through use by a community of language users. Yet, just as the image could be
determined in different ways – limited in different ways –, so too can a signifier be
combined with different signifieds. For example, “Hey, that‟s one of the Socrates twins”;
“Hey, that‟s Socrates”; or “Hey, that‟s my toga!” Put another way, because of the
internal difference between image and concept, the coupling of one image and concept
may slide into a coupling of said image and a different concept or an associated image
and prior concept, etc. with each coupling constituting a sign.
Lastly, then, in a phrase which will function as a sign of what is to come in
Derrida, Saussure, in regard to this sliding makes the following statement. “This is not
the place to search for the forces that condition motivation [or animation] in each
instance,” rather these forces are themselves indicated in the “ease” of sliding and the
“obviousness” of the meaning of “the subunits.” (CGL 132) For example, when one
signifier slides from within one sign to couple into another, Derrida will refer to this
movement of supplementation as the “logic of supplementarity.” In other words, notice
what is being said: all indications seem to suggest ἐλαληίνλ is grounded in ἕηεξνλ;
however, in so far as ἕηεξνλ is to be meaningful, it must always reduce, “upward,” 394 so
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to speak, to ἐλαληίνλ. Hence, Derrida will consider pure difference (in-itself) merely “a
dream.”395
Derrida‟s Doctrine of the Sign – “The Logic of Supplementarity”
“[A]ppearance draws into the concept of the thing a certain mixture of supplementary representations
that the understanding knows how to separate from it.”
~Immanuel Kant (CPR 1996, A 271/B 327)

Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980) in his The Imaginary: A Phenomenological
Psychology of the Imagination [L’imaginaire: psychologie phénoménologique de
l’imagination]396 published in 1940 suggests French philosophy by that time had acquired
the habit of posing “philosophical questions in the Kantian perspective.” 397 Beyond even
Sartre‟s musings, Derrida‟s logic of supplementarity is still haunted by a certain Kantian
perspective. In his 1967 publication Of Grammatology [De la grammatologie],398
Derrida declares, “Maintaining it for convenience, let us nevertheless say that the space
of writing is purely sensible, in the sense that Kant intended.” 399 Further, recall Kant‟s
discussion regarding “amphiboly,” which I discussed in the previous chapter. Kant
explains that a “transcendental amphiboly” is “a confusion of a pure object of
understanding with appearance.” (CPR 1996, A 270/B 326) Expanding this notion Kant
explains,
[T]he principle that realities (as mere affirmations) never
logically oppose each other is an entirely true proposition
about the relations of concepts, but signifies nothing at all
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either in regard to nature nor overall in regard to anything
in itself (of this we have no concept) [my emphases]. (CPR
1998, A 273/B 329)
Now, it might take the remainder of the chapter to illustrate, but this quote from Kant
explains what Derrida is up to. First, substitute pure difference for “nature” and any
“thing in itself.” Next, since Kant suggests here signification falls short of signifying
“nature,” take nature to be a regulative idea – not a constitutive idea. (CPR 1998, A
179/B 221-222) In other words, the signification “nature” is not meant to constitute a
truth about things, e.g. that things are “natural,” but rather it is to function so as enable
discussion of various aspects of experience for which “we have no concept.” Combining
this qualification with pure difference, then in regard to Derrida, you may substitute
Différance instead for nature, i.e. pure difference.
Notice the similarity between the preceding and the following block quotes:
according to Derrida,
The concept of origin or nature is nothing but the myth of
addition, of supplementarity annulled by being purely
additive. It is the myth of the effacement of the trace, that
is to say of an originary différance that is neither absence
nor presence, neither negative nor positive [my emphases].
(OG 167)
On the one hand, Derrida embraces Kant‟s warning against amphiboly. Supplementation
entails a form of alienation. On the other hand, Derrida pushes the idea further
suggesting any reference at all to that from which the understanding alienates must
employ the understanding, and thereby deserves distrust. In other words, the “concept” –
and this is a concept because that is what Kant‟s power of understanding employs – of
“origin” or “nature” is already not to be believed. For example, if you believe in these
concepts, then you might think it correct to refer to the understanding itself as “nonnatural” or unnatural. Notice how this should be problematic because Kant and Derrida
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both acknowledge that “we have no concept” and were led to “nature” by invention, i.e.
“nature” regulative was meant to function like a place holder in the structure of
experience.
This problem points back to Kant‟s Transcendental Deduction and the manner in
which he considered the structure of experience to include heterogeneous stems
combinable by imagination in a process of connecting apprehended pure intuitions with
pure concepts. In other words, even though you do not have concepts for what you are
sensing, you are able to refer in time to “This” – here and now – as “a tree.” Derrida
addresses the heterogeneity part noting, “The paradox is that one annuls addition by
considering it a pure addition”, and the temporal part suggesting, “Speech comes to be
added to intuitive presence.” (OG 167) On the one hand, Derrida is calling into question
why the concept “pure” should be allowed to extend into sensibility and remain
homogeneous to concepts. On the other hand, Derrida is calling into question why
discursivity is to be thought of as supplementing something non-discursive when “we
have no concept” for what is supposedly being supplemented. Rather, it seems like
discursivity is supplementing itself. Whereas, the logic of identity would have a concept
identify something non-conceptual, the logic of supplementarity would have concepts
supplement each other without ever leaving the realm of discursivity.
For these reasons, I refer to Derrida as occupying the conceptual standpoint in
Kant‟s structure of experience. Just as concepts relate to other concepts in constellations
populating the understanding, Derrida will consider all (conceptual) pointing to take
place within the understanding – it is a myth to think that there is an “outside” of thought
to think about. Notice, Derrida thereby is perpetuating Hegel‟s closure of discursivity.
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In this way, Derrida will not accept that you can get “outside” of the terminological
constellations, neither to provide identity to a “sensation” nor to solve the problem of
“non-being.” Hence, I refer to Derrida as remaining at the second impasse of the
problem of non-being and failing to solve it. After discussing Différance in Derrida
below I devote a section to Derrida and the problem of non-being. So, as you read the rest
of the chapter, remembering how Derrida relates to the Kant passage above and Hegel‟s
closure of discursivity will help you navigate his tricky locutions.
To understand Derrida‟s doctrine of the sign, 400 then, think – with Hegel and
Hyppolite – of Derrida as if he is waiting at the second moment in Kant‟s trajectory of
experience (after Hegel‟s closure of discursivity) with essential difference to repeatedly
show the inherent instability of meaning in attempting to refer to pure difference.
Derrida is able to do this because he plays the Hegelian shell game, and Derrida is a
thimblerigger401 par excellence – Derrida‟s “Hegelianism without reserve.” (MOP 19)
Remember I suggested above that one way to think of what Hegel was up to, his shell
game, is to imagine the incoming Absolute as the expression of the Absolute. If this were
the Absolute‟s expression, you could only think it by what it indicates, and what it
indicates is a Quantity of sense. It is only at the moment of Quality, then, that
identification takes place, and all determination of identity suffers from this same fate of
secondariness.
Since recognition of some possible first moment is always from a second
moment, it becomes impossible to pin down meaning because the meaning of every
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expression depends on an inexpressible indication. The indication is inexpressible
because its relation to the sign which marks it is either arbitrary or dependent upon
relations of a different kind, i.e. relations of signs not indications. As such, for example,
it is impossible to know whether the indication is a component or whole. One is tempted
to suppose indications can be compared, but it is rather the case that indications indicate
due more to human experiential capacity limitations than any hoped for identity of the
indication(s). Indeed, the rhetoric of Kantian non-discursivity is being broached here, but
certainly not to defend the non-discursive excessivity of the thing-in-itself. Derrida will
ensure his pronouncements safely pertain to that which is always already supplementary,
i.e. Derrida will not engage in any attempt to identify an indication as non-sign.
Describing what animates Derrida‟s words by way of Saussure: All signs are
composed of a signifier and a signified, signifiers pointing to signifieds, and the
movement from one sign to then next sign derives from within the sign itself in
accordance with the rules of the stacked deck. Since the relation between signifier and
signified is arbitrary, it is as if – animated from within – signifiers as indications express
themselves. Every expression is unstable in so far as, on the one hand, the expression is
an arbitrary association between indicative signifier and the signified it is taken to mean
relative to a community of language users. On the other hand, because the generation of
the “sliding” from sign to sign is internal to indication, any decision to stop the sliding
must also be relative to either the indication or the community of language users. Recall
Saussure‟s example comparing “sheep” with “ships.” In both cases, the decision itself is
ultimately arbitrary – rooted in the degree of arbitrariness found in the sign or the
community. The choice of sign derives from the stacked deck, and the sliding is

275

governed by the stacked deck. This is why paraphrasing Derrida in a discussion of
Heidegger, Richard Rorty concludes: we do not speak the language, “the language speaks
us.”402
Going further by returning to the notion of the Absolute, we can combine a
Hegel-Hyppolite way of describing Derrida with a Husserl-Saussure way of describing
him. As such, the Hegel-Hyppolite discussion illustrated how the Logos was to be
thought of as a logic of sense. Including Husserl-Saussure, any attempt to stabilize the
meaning of what is indicated in sense requires, first and foremost, an ability to stabilize
meaning. Language cannot be thought to accomplish this feat since the relation of a
signifier to the sensuous being it is supposed to mean is arbitrary, i.e. sounds refer to
concepts not “material.” Moreover, any attempt to pin down the meaning with further
precision invokes a sliding through the stacked deck which itself was arbitrarily
established by language users. As such, indication remains the indicating of a signifier,
and the possibility of indication itself referring to a transcendental (signified) Logos
vanishes, absorbed in the fluid undertow of the sliding. No signifier will be allowed the
status of a signified which can stand outside signification as a condition for the possibility
of meaning, i.e. constituting once and for all the relation of a signifier to what it signifies.
The community of language user, i.e. agreement, and differences internal to the signs, i.e.
cat is not bat, etc. are the (internal) conditions from which meaning derives – so much for
Hegel‟s Absolute Idea and Husserl‟s principle of all principles. 403,404
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For the purpose of either understanding Derrida‟s style of dealing with other
philosophers or the purpose of understanding his relation to the problem of non-being, it
is unnecessary to discuss every term Derrida ever employed. In fact, I have already
described what he will refer to – following Heidegger‟s notion of destruktion – as
“deconstruction.” That is, Derrida‟s version of Hegel‟s shell game, which I will more
explicitly describe below, amounts to a general formulation of what to expect from
Derrida‟s encounters with others. Yet, to enter further into Derrida‟s terminology,
considering a quote from Derrida‟s “Letter to a Japanese Friend” is quite helpful.
The word “deconstruction,” like all other words, acquires
its value only from its inscription in a chain of possible
substitutions, in what is too blithely called a “context.” For
me, for what I have tried and still try to write, the word has
interest only within a certain context, where it replaces and
lets itself be determined by such other words as “écriture,”
“trace,” “différance,” “supplement,” “hymen,”
“pharmakon,” “marge,” “entame,” “parergon,” etc. By
definition, the list can never be closed and I have cited only
names… What deconstruction is not? Everything of course!
What is deconstruction? Nothing of course! [my
emphases] 405
To begin with, it is important to understand what Derrida means by “this list can never be
closed.” The beginning of his quote echoes the Saussurian principles noted above, i.e.
the signified is arbitrarily associated with the signifier which, further, points beyond the
signified to other signifiers in an inherently motivated sliding. Derrida prefers terms like
iteration and inscription. So, the chain of signifiers ensures infinite repeatability or
iterability at the site where meaning is to be inscribed. The list of words Derrida provides
above is supposed to suggest – consistent with what has just been said – that none of
these words stop the sliding or close off the possible extension of the list.
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The “list” of signs in the stacked deck “can never be closed” precisely because
discursivity is already closed, i.e. signs only relate to more signs. Whereas the logic of
identification would have it that to an indication which begins an experience in the first
moment a signifier from the stacked deck of language is applied in the second moment,
Derrida‟s logic of supplementarity would have it that the first moment is itself already
derived from the stacked deck. It is as if Derrida, in denying Kant the subjective side of
the Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason, holds that no concept can
identify the =x. Recall in the trajectory of experience, the =x exceeds the ability of
language to mean it; if =x only pertained to one concept, it certainly could not be a
condition for the possibility of conception. In other words, the strength of any
identification, i.e. objective conceptual determination will derive not from a
correspondence of understanding to the imagination‟s =x, i.e. of sign to the sensible
indication, but in the network of supplements through which every sign must slide if it is
to have meaning.
In other words, Derrida has ratcheted up Hegel‟s shell game, and there is now no
possible way to even refer to “non-being,” i.e. every shell that is lifted is a shell that is
shifted. Recall, this is exactly how I described the second impasse of the problem of nonbeing. There I noted: it is as if the Eleatic visitor is asking: What are we discussing if
non-being cannot be discussed? Derrida is pushing the same question and accentuating
that it is a logic of supplementarity which is invoked, not a logic of identity, when
attempting to answer the question. What are we discussing? We are discussing whatever
we think we are discussing – discursivity is closed. You do not get back to and identify
the first moment, as Hegel would have it, you simply heap supplement upon supplement
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from the stacked deck, covering the first moment which was itself already indicated
within the stacked deck. The first moment is not Hegel‟s pure difference, but a sign
which contains pure difference.
Another way to see how the logic of supplementarity works for Derrida is to
consider the overlap of space and time with Quantity and Quality which I discussed in
closing the previous chapter. Think of an infinite opening in the first moment which
resembles the infinity of space and allows for the arbitrariness of indication itself. The
infinity of the second moment, then, is the infinity of a sliding continuum. And, you can
already see the analogies with which I have been working realized in Derrida‟s
articulation of pure difference. The first moment, though Hegel‟s, by way of Hyppolite
has become fused with Kant‟s first moment in the trajectory of experience – space.
Remember Kant tells us space has its infinity “within it.” So, in the first moment
the word, i.e. sign, supposed to correspond to an indication is arbitrary, and in the second
moment the sign from the first moment slides along an infinite continuous list which can
“never be closed.” It is, then, this second moment of Quality – just as it is for both Kant
and Hegel – which can identify the first moment retroactively. And, though it is beyond
sense, it is consistent with Kant‟s trajectory of experience to say that the thing-in-itself
and pure difference are tied up in the infinity of space, in the first moment. Derrida‟s
difference is to have this infinity already enclosed in a sign, as if in a tomb or pyramid. 406
Retroactive determination is still required to more fully identify and determine the sense
of the sign in the first moment, but the (pure) difference internal to every sign always
remains untouched. In this way, you can see how pure difference would be Derrida‟s
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replacement for the thing-in-itself. Yet, Derrida, taking Hegel seriously indeed, never
allows for reference outside of discursivity, not even for a (first) moment.
To sum, then, in regard to Derrida‟s doctrine of the sign, pulling together a
number of terms, it is as if Différance for Derrida stands for the combination of pure
difference and the logic of supplementarity. According to Derrida,
“presence without difference,” conforms to the logic of
identity and to the principle of classical ontology (the
outside is outside, being is, etc.) but not to the logic of
supplementarity, which would have it that the outside be
inside, that the other and the lack come to add themselves
as a plus that replaces a minus, that what adds itself to
something takes the place of a default in the thing, that the
default, as the outside of the inside, should be already
within the inside, etc [my emphasis]. (OG 215)
You should now be able to recognize that what Derrida means by saying “the outside be
inside or that lack come to be added”: as significations, i.e. “outside” and “lack,” the
meanings of these terms derive from and pertain to a network of signs – like the
constellations of concepts in Kant‟s understanding. “Lack” cannot mean at all “outside”
language. In fact, that it even seems like there can be an “outside” of language is an
effect of language itself. Whereas the “default” status for Kant pertains to supposing the
thing, the default for Derrida pertains to the thing‟s supplementation. In this way,
Derrida is ultra-Kantian by attempting to fend off in advance any effect of language
which would send one looking for the “outside” or “underside” of language.
Whereas Kant‟s regulative term “nature” regulates positionally, it does not
regulate interpretationally. Derrida is attempting to create a sign which both indicates its
position in the structure of experience and limits the way in which it may be interpreted
so as to guard against amphiboly or transcendental illusion. By the time Derrida decides
to use the term Différance, then, he has already built both Hegel‟s and Saussure‟s
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movements into the manner in which Kant thought of the thing-in-itself. On the one
hand, at the site of Kant‟s infinity of space words differ, i.e. infinite (pure) difference. On
the other hand, at the site of Kant‟s infinity of time words defer, i.e. infinite (sliding)
deference. As such, Différance is a more sophisticated term than pure difference. And,
by more sophisticated I mean Différance participates in Hegel‟s shell game without
supposing any identification to be – in Kant‟s sense of the term – real, i.e. other than the
“relationship of mutual and incessant supplementarity or substituion [which] is the order
of language.” (OG 235) In Derrida‟s view, pure difference encountered the problem that
even if different from itself, the difference must always be difference internal to – Kant‟s
understanding – the stacked deck. As a result, Derrida coined a term to encompass both
infinities, i.e. “Différance.”
Jacques the Fatalist and his Différance
“Jacques, my friend, you are a philosopher, and I am genuinely sorry for you.”407
~Denis Diderot

Were I to produce an image of my beginning to this section of the chapter I would
suggest you imagine the “Exergue,” to Derrida’s Margins of Philosophy as a pond.
Analogously, the words of the following few paragraphs would be like the skimming of
the water with a writing stone. Though, as Derrida would have you believe, the depths of
the pond are perhaps imponderable, it is my hope to come full circle, as it were, and
illustrate to you Derrida‟s trick. Certainly you may test me on this. If what you read here
allows you to predict the next turn from up Derrida‟s sleeve, then I will have decoded his
play, revealed his secret, and refused his gift. Though I believe his Différance to have
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some efficacy in the structure of experience, it is contra Derrida, not in regard to the
ground. To begin, then, a brief reference to Hegel, and to conclude, I will tie my
discussion in with Hegel‟s shell game.
Recall the Phenomenology of Spirit §97 quote: “it is just not possible for us ever
to say, or express in words, a sensuous being that we mean.” (PS 60) It is possible to use
Derrida‟s Différance to show his reading of pure difference; Derrida can be seen in
agreement with Hegel regarding the inability to think undifferentiatedness without
language. Hegel, elsewhere, put the matter as such,
To want to think without words as Mesmer once attempted
is, therefore, a manifestly irrational procedure which, as
Mesmer himself admitted, almost drove him insane. But it
is also ridiculous to regard as a defect of thought and
misfortune, the fact that it is tied to a word; for although the
common opinion is that it is just the ineffable that is the
most excellent. Yet this opinion, cherished by conceit, is
unfounded, since what is ineffable is, in truth, only
something obscure, fermenting, something which gains
clarity only when it is able to put itself into words. (PS 60)
Recall, in terms of language, that which is purely – not merely essentially – different,
then, differs from whatever signifier is used to indicate it, and defers to an other sign
sliding along the chain in a “list” which “can never be closed.” In this way, Derrida is
not so much attempting to think without words, as he is attempting to show that neither
words nor thoughts capture the thing. In terms of experiential appearance what is
apprehended differs from that which is supposed to be appearing, and defers to an endless
list of associated appearances. In this way, you can see Derrida as returning to
Hyppolite‟s Kant, i.e. taking up Kant‟s structure of experience with the experiential and
conceptual standpoints collapsed while maintaining Hegel‟s closure of discursivity. 408
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Taking Phenomenology of Spirit §97, then, as one way to refer to the starting
point of Hegel‟s shell game, “it is just not possible for us ever to say, or express in words,
a sensuous being that we mean.” (PS 60) Derrida supposes,
perhaps difference is older than Being itself. There may be
a difference still more unthought than the [ontological]
difference between being and beings. We certainly can go
further toward naming it in our language. Beyond Being
and beings, this difference, ceaselessly differing from and
deferring (itself), would trace (itself) (by itself) – this
différance would be the first or last trace if one still could
speak, here, of origin and end. (PS 60)
Derrida asks, “How can we make this sensible except by metaphor? [Derrida‟s
emphasis]” (MOP 209) Derrida avers, “Each time that a rhetoric defines metaphor, not
only is a philosophy implied, but also a conceptual network in which philosophy itself
has been constituted.” (MOP 230) As such, for Derrida, “What is defined, therefore, is
implied in the defining of the definition.” (MOP 231) Notice Derrida is merely invoking
the unavoidability of the stacked deck if there is to be meaning at all. Hence, Derrida
maintains Hegel‟s closure of discursivity – he is not attempting to think without words;
yet, he also maintains an opening in the structure of experience at the starting point of the
dialectic. Recall for Kant, this is the thing-in-itself.
Derrida himself makes the connection between his thinking and that of
Aristotle‟s. This, then, is consistent with Derrida‟s attack on the signification of the
ὑπνθείκελνλ, i.e. hypokeimenon. Since, “There is a code or a program – a rhetoric, if you
will – for every discourse on metaphor,” Derrida quotes from Aristotle‟s Poetics (Poet
1457b6-9), “Metaphor (metaphora) consists in giving (epiphora) the thing a name
(onomatos) that belongs to something else (allotriou).” (MOP 231) Notice, this
“belonging” to something else points to the difference in kind between the stacked deck
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and pure difference. In regard to the hypokeimenon as purely different, then, Derrida
wants to establish that whatever term from the stacked deck is used to refer to “pure
difference” it ultimately functions metaphorically.
Moving from Aristotle to Pierre Fontanier (1765-1844) Derrida notes, “all kinds
of words can give rise to metaphors,” following it up with a quote from Fontanier,
“Tropes by resemblance consist in presenting an idea under the sign of another idea that
is more striking or better known, and which, moreover, has no other tie to the first idea
than that of a certain conformity or analogy [Derrida‟s emphasis].” (MOP 235) Finding
a way next to discuss resemblance through Aristotle, Derrida notes: “Mimēsis is never
without theoretical perception of resemblance or similarity, that is, of that which always
will be posited as the condition for metaphor [Derrida‟s emphasis].” (MOP 237) And,
Derrida concludes this metaphorical excursion stating, “The power of truth, as the
unveiling of nature (physis) by mimēsis, congenitally belongs to the physics of man, to
anthropophysics. … such is the natural origin of metaphor.” (MOP 237)
In fact, “metaphor indeed belongs to mimesis, to the fold of physis, to the moment
when nature, itself veiling itself, has not yet refound itself in its proper nudity.” (MOP
237) This last image should bring to mind the Heraclitus mentioned above – “Nature
loves to hide [θύζηο θξύπηεζζαη θηιεῖ].”409 Again, these Derrida quotes thus far are
exploring the way in which choosing an initial metaphor from the stacked deck leads to a
constellation which may be used to explore the first metaphor. Yet, there are still more
quotes to examine before grasping what this “difference … older than Being itself” might
be like.
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Derrida solidifies the link with my discussion of Aristotle in the Introduction as
he declares, “Analogy is metaphor par excellence.” (MOP 242) Noting, however, that as
“Aristotle remarks, there are cases in which one of the terms [in an analogy] is missing.”
(MOP 242) In such cases, “The term has to be invented then” (MOP 242) such that it is
possible the term “would be metaphorical in all its aspects.” (MOP 243) In fact, “within
language the analogy itself is due to a long and hardly visible chain whose first link is
quite difficult to exhibit, and not only for Aristotle”; (MOP 243) “Which refers, in any
case, in Aristotle‟s text, to the problem of the proper name or the analogy of Being.”
(MOP 244) Hence, Derrida can be seen here emphasizing the assumptive nature of
discovery or invention; “Like mimēsis, metaphor comes back to physis, to its truth and its
presence.” (MOP 244) Derrida is supposing an intrinsic resistance to signification for the
ὑπνθείκελνλ, i.e. hypokeimenon, as that which is purely different from the stacked deck.
As such, there can be no correspondence, no mimesis, in regard to this first term. In
other words, there is no stable ground for the Law of Identity in regard to pure difference.
Hoping to avoid refuting himself, Derrida will speak of this intrinsic resistance as
the movement of Différance. He again quotes Aristotle, “the greatest thing by far is to be
a master of metaphor,” so as to “know better than others to perceive resemblances and to
unveil the truth of nature.” (MOP 244) Such a “genius of mimēsis, thus, can give rise to a
language, a code of regulated substitutions, the talent and procedure of rhetoric, the
imitation of genius, the mastery of the ungraspable.” (MOP 245) Derrida asks, perhaps
rhetorically, “Under what conditions would one always have one more trick, one more
turn, up one‟s sleeve, in one‟s sack?” (MOP 245) Derrida will revel in these conditions
so as to undermine any signification of the ὑπνθείκελνλ.
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As if answering the question himself, Derrida claims, “Philosophy, as a theory of
metaphor, first will have been a metaphor of theory.” (MOP 254) And moving from
Plato through Kant to Hegel, Derrida maintains, “Doubtless, Hegel‟s Idea, for example, is
not Plato‟s Idea,” and this is because, “doubtless the effects of the system are irreducible
[my emphasis] and must be read as such. But the word Idea is not an arbitrary [=] X, and
it bears a traditional burden that continues Plato‟s system in Hegel‟s system.” (MOP 254)
From here Derrida provides an analysis of “catachresis.” Referring again to Fontanier
and his text Supplement to the Theory of Tropes, Derrida reports, “The Supplement
concerns first the violent, forced, abusive inscription of a sign, the imposition of a sign
upon a meaning which did not yet have its own proper sign in language.” (MOP 255)
Derrida quotes Fontanier as referring to a supplement as a “secondary origin.” (MOP
255) Further, according to Fontanier – as Derrida quotes him – “Catachresis, in general,
consists in a sign already affected with a first idea also being affected with a new idea,
which itself had no sign at all.” (MOP 255) Hence, the supplement is of a code which
“traverses its own field, endlessly displaces its closure, breaks its line, opens its circle,
and no ontology will have been able to reduce it [my emphasis].” (MOP 271) Derrida
concludes, “Metaphor is less in the philosophical text (and in the rhetorical text
coordinated with it) than the philosophical text is within metaphor.” (MOP 258) That is,
“Henceforth the entire teleology of meaning, which constructs the philosophical concept
of metaphor, coordinates metaphor with the manifestation of truth, with the production of
truth as presence without veil.” (MOP 270)
It should be remembered that the three-fold synthesis is one synthesis with three
parts. So, given Derrida‟s quotes above, it is as if imagination‟s apprehension is the
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beginning of a threefold process of invention. The result of this process, i.e. =x, is
meaningful in its relation to the constellation of concepts which are activated by its
invention. I say “activated” here because for both Kant and Derrida imagination‟s act of
construction by way of the three-fold synthesis results in the experienced first term
toward identifying experience in a chain of thinking about experience. What imagination
produces, then, is a simulacrum – copy without an original. Though imagination may
attempt to mimic sensibility given Kant‟s discussion of the excessivity of nondiscursivity, imagination cannot correspond to sensibility. This is what makes
imagination‟s product metaphorical and simulacral. Hence, it is possible to speak of
genesis perceptually, i.e. of an appearance, and experientially, i.e. of an object of
experience; yet, these products of imagination are simulacra since there is no original
which they can be said to mimic.
Recall Kant‟s structure and trajectory of experience first registers sensation on the
way to appearance, and the product of the productive imagination just prior to conceptual
and linguistic determination is =x. As I have already mentioned the conceptual
standpoint pertains to understanding, judgment, and reason such that (from the
conceptual standpoint) =x is merely regarded as what these powers can construct with it.
In other words, these powers cannot see beyond it. Other views require other vantage
points such as the apperceptive or experiential. In so far as meaning derives from
conceptual and linguistic determination, here is a way to restate the problem of
retroactive determination within Kant‟s structure and trajectory of experience (from the
conceptual standpoint), i.e. it is just not possible for you to ever say an =x – a sensuous
being – that you mean.
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With all I have said thus far, you could, of course, recognize what I am writing
about here. However, I will make the analogical relation explicit. It is the =x which
animates the self-enclosed writing machine. For Derrida the =x always already comes
with a sign – as the difference internal to a sign –, so the animation of the sliding which
constitutes writing, on the one hand retroactively determines the =x by relating the initial
sign in the first moment of Quantity to the subsequent writing which emerged from it.
And, on the other hand, the writing does not retroactively determine the =x because the
=x is internal to the sign; so the =x, for Derrida, is never touched or seen nude.
Schematically speaking in regard to Kant‟s structure of experience, being inside
the writing machine is like being inside the understanding. On the one hand, you
encounter the emptiness thesis without the intuitive input of =x. On the other hand, the
entire problem of the Transcendental Deduction derives from the change of registers from
sensibility to understanding. So, it is possible to think of the concepts or the words being
used to describe =x as not entirely homogeneous with =x. As such, =x is different than
the concepts or words being used to describe it, and the =x as the irreducible difference
standing in for sensibility on the horizon of the understanding – writing machine. In fact,
reading =x as a concept or sign ensures that =x is even different from itself. This is
because =x is supposed to be a sign for the product of sensibility which is of a different
kind than signs. Hence, whatever sign is used it must be thought to include an irreducible
difference.
Further – and here is Derrida‟s point –, if it requires concepts or words to express
difference, then “pure difference” gets its meaning not from a homogeneity with the
product of sensibility, i.e. a sensuous being or =x, but from within the writing machine,

288

i.e. by its position in the constellation of concepts or words which are also not
homogeneous with =x. Derrida‟s argument would be self-refuting were he to claim =x is
“pure difference” because he cannot assign a sign to =x. Therefore, he suggests pure
difference is “a dream …” (W&D 151) And, he refers instead to the inability to say the
=x that you mean by referring to the internally motivated movement of the writing
machine in its differing and deferring, i.e. Différance.
Now, at this point, since Derrida and Hegel occupy common ground, Derrida can
exploit this much of Hegel‟s shell game. Recall in discussing Hegel above Derrida
stressed that neither the Platonic nor the Hegelian Idea is an “arbitrary [=] X.” Here is
the use value of Derrida‟s discussion of Aristotle and metaphor. Derrida claims the
mastery of this – playing on the grasp/concept of the German Begriff – ungraspable = x
requires metaphor. Just as the Eleatic visitor from Plato‟s Sophist seems to be asking,
“What are we discussing if non-being cannot be discussed?” So, in Derrida‟s question,
“How can we make this sensible except by metaphor? [Derrida‟s emphasis]” (MOP 421)
The “this” is supposed to refer to the =x, and the sign “sensible” is to be thought of as the
metaphor which “consists in giving (epiphora) the thing a name that belongs to
something else [Aristotle‟s (Poet 1457b6-9)].” (MOP 231) That is, “presenting an idea
under the sign of another idea that is more striking or better known, and which,
moreover, has no other tie to the first idea than that of a certain conformity or analogy
[Derrida‟s emphasis].” (MOP 235)
Kant‟s =x is like, or it is as if the = x, is a case where the term in an analogy is
“missing.” And, recall that in such cases Derrida claims, “The term has to be invented
then” (MOP 242) such that it is possible the term “would be metaphorical in all its
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aspects.” (MOP 243) As Paul Ricoeur put it, “Henceforth, to revive metaphor is to
unmask the concept.”410 The metaphor as supplement to the =x resembles a “secondary
origin.” (MOP 255) Derrida explains that this refers “in Aristotle‟s text, to the problem
of the proper name or the analogy of Being.” (MOP 244) This is precisely how Derrida
will be critical of Hegel noting, “This is why classical thought concerning structure could
say that the center is, paradoxically, within the structure and outside it.” (W&D 279) In
other words, Derrida is accusing philosophers and philosophy of believing the invented
metaphor somehow corresponds to the non-metaphorical, i.e. non-linguistic.
Recall the philosophical notion he discussed above which holds an idea fits an
analogy because it was invented to resemble – in accordance with the stacked deck –
what is outside the analogy. Like “looking through” an Idea, for Derrida you cannot help
but see, not what is not the Idea, but what the Idea is. Further, what the Idea is depends
on its relation to other Ideas – again, ἐλαληίνλ not ἕηεξνλ. That is, “The center is at the
center of the totality, and yet, since the center does not belong to the totality (is not part
of the totality), the totality has its center elsewhere. The center is not the center [Le
centre n’est pas le centre]411.” (W&D 279) Though this accusation does not work as well
against Kant, with this accusation Derrida is able to appropriate the mechanism of
Hegel‟s shell game412 and deny its ability to totalize – all this without affirming nondiscursivity – by positing pure difference as the irreducible difference internal to the
starting point in Hegel‟s shell game. Hence, here is where Derrida and Hegel no longer
occupy a common ground. Consider Hegel‟s shell game and Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1
Derrida himself precisely places Différance in relation to Hegel‟s shell game.413
Recall the Hegelian sublation [Aufhebung] is the logical mechanism for retrospectively
differentiating – (un)covering the first moment – the undifferentiated first moment of
sense as idea, i.e. at the point when 4 is equated with 1 for Hegel. Derrida declares,
If there were a definition of différance, it would be
precisely the limit, the interruption, the destruction of the
Hegelian relève wherever it operates. What is at stake here
is enormous. I emphasize the Hegelian Aufhebung, such as
it is interpreted by a certain Hegelian discourse, for it goes
without saying that the double meaning of Aufhebung could
be written otherwise. Whence its proximity to all the
operations conducted against Hegel‟s dialectical
speculation [Derrida‟s emphases]. 414
His reference to a “certain Hegelian discourse” signals that the logic of the speculative
logic is internal to itself. Derrida seeks to have the sublation written otherwise, then, by
taking the totalizing closure which Hegel‟s sublation [Aufhebung] performs in the
recognition of 1 as 4 to indicate 1 as invention and the 1 thru 4 cycle as insufficient to
bring non-identity into the light of identification. Remember, it was a negation of
Quantity which moved to Quality, and a negation of the negation which resulted in the
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positive recognition of Quantity. Hence, Derrida causes Hegel‟s structure to fall by
maintaining that to negate negation is negative. 415
This realization was not lost on Jürgen Habermas. According to Habermas,
Adorno‟s “negative dialectics” and Derrida‟s
“deconstruction” can be seen as different answers to the
same problem. The totalizing self-critique of reason gets
caught in a performative contradiction since subjectcentered reason can be convicted of being authoritarian in
nature only by having recourse to its own tools. The tools
of thought, which miss the “dimension of nonidentity” and
are imbued with the “metaphysics of presence,” are
nevertheless the only available means for uncovering their
own insufficiency. 416
By using the tools of thought and destroying the Hegelian sublation Derrida suggests the
undifferentiated never was (fully) present in the movement from 1 to 4 in Hegel‟s shell
game. As such, all moments of the shell game (1 thru 4) are on equal footing for Derrida.
This is not because of a Hegelian sublation which reveals 1 as 4 but because 1 was
always already an invented sign in the analogical chain of signs. This, according to
Derrida, is precisely why 4 can be equated with 1, i.e. because the structure of differences
– what can and cannot relate to this invented metaphor “1” – are disseminated into the
other terms (2 thru 4) determining whether they appropriately “fit” with the first term or
not. “The ineffable” “=x” (of the) “undifferentiated” “first moment” never was
present/absent. In other words, conceptual determinations of presence and absence
pertain to products of the understanding not products of sensibility.
What Derrida‟s version of Hegel‟s shell game hopes to accomplish is to persuade
you to think of whatever sign is associated with the =x as already a metaphor. A
metaphor for what, you ask? And, Derrida has it. He cannot say, of course, or he would
415
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be showing you how to win the shell game, but his references to Aristotle point out
clearly enough that the “this” which has been “made sensible” by metaphor was the
missing link in an analogical chain. Hence, a purely metaphorical term must be
“invented.” Derrida‟s invention is Différance.
Now, Différance, just like all inventions, once invented must suffer the fate of
“textual drift,”417 i.e. the sliding of meaning along a chain of signifiers befitting all words.
According to Derrida,
I would say, first off, that différance … strategically
seemed to me the most proper,” [and] “by decision and as a
rule of the game, if you will, turning these propositions
back on themselves, [moving from 4 to 1 in Figure 4.1] we
will be introduced to the thought [mirroring Hegel‟s
movement to idea/thought] of différance … by means of
this solely strategic justification. (MOP 245)
Différance is not meant to replace Being. Rather, Différance is meant to capture the fact
that a term had to be invented, and whether, as invention, it pertains – it is appropriate –
to its experiential provocation for invention as adequation or imitation depends not on a
correspondence between invention and provocation, but on the relation between
invention and the network of terms from which the invention derives its meaning. The
provocation for invention is, of course, heterogeneous to this network. A sensation only
makes sense metaphorically, and you still cannot say a sensuous being that you mean.
Hence, Derrida has made Hegel‟s shell game his own, and these are the conditions with
which “one always [has] one more trick, one more turn, up one‟s sleeve, in one‟s sack.”
(MOP 245)
Taking a moment, then, to refer directly to Figure 4.1, it is as if, suddenly, Figure
3.1 takes on the paradoxical nature of Kant‟s Table of Nothing. Recall Kant‟s Table of
417
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Nothing shows nihil negativum, i.e. non-being; yet, his table is not the solution to the
problem of non-being because it itself is a representation. So too, =x was thought to be
an unrepresented starting point, but Derrida has shown that as unrepresented, neither
“=x” nor “Being” are appropriate. What is wickedly wiley 418 about Derrida‟s shell game:
You start playing the game with the idea that you understand the starting point as a point
which cannot be understood, but if you cannot understand it, then – what are we
discussing here? – Derrida shows that the triangle of the undifferentiated first moment is
the triangle of the differentiated moment. They are the same not because of the sincere
revelation via retrospective determination à la Hegel, but because the undifferentiated
first moment with its pure difference “is a dream.” (W&D 151) What you thought you
understood as the starting point at 1, in Figure 4.1, you recognize as undecidable at 4.
Whereas Hegel has you return to affirm your assumed starting point, Derrida has it that
you negate your starting point to such an extent that you cannot be certain to call it “a
return.” For Derrida, the (Kantian) understanding is like a “labyrinth which includes in
itself its own exits (S&P 104) [le labyrinth qui comprend en lui ses issues],”419 which, of
course, means “no exit.” This is why I replaced the “W” from Hegel‟s shell game with
the universal sign for “chaos” in Derrida‟s shell game.
Lastly, regarding Figure 4.1, notice that whether the “A” is decidable or not
presupposes participation in Kant‟s structure of experience. Despite all this talk about
rhetoric, this conversation is taking place in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of
psychology. Derrida points to Jean Jacques Rousseau‟s (1712-1778) Essay on the Origin
of Languages (1781) noting as “a general theory of the forms and substances of
418
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signification[,] [t]his theory is inseparable from a psychology of the passions” – quoting
Rousseau, “the first invention of speech is due not to need but passion.”420 Further –
quoting Rousseau –, “As a man‟s first motives for speaking were of the passions, his first
expressions were tropes. Figurative language was the first to be born. Proper meaning
was discovered last.” (MOP 269) This suggests that at the level of Quality in Figure 4.1,
the level of Quantity is revealed as having always already been itself the level of Quality.
This is not new territory, Nietzsche was already here – Beyond Good and Evil §138 –
“When we are awake we also do what we do in our dreams: we invent and make up the
person with whom we associate – and immediately forget it.”421 In fact, Derrida has
come full circle back to the Copernican revolution with Kant. Whereas Kant – despite
undecidability – posited the thing-in-itself at the “bottom” of the structure of experience,
Derrida is merely accentuating the undecidability (of the thing-in-itself).
kNOw Irony, kNOw Derrida
“First of all, I take irony seriously … you can‟t do this without irony.” 422
~Jacques Derrida

Richard Rorty once asked, “How does one decide whether [Derrida] is really a
much-misunderstood transcendental „philosopher of reflection,‟ a latter-day Hegel, or
really a much-misunderstood Nominalist, a sort of French Wittgenstein?” 423 There are
three main strategies standardly employed to answer this question regarding Derrida.
The three strategies involve: (1) a focus on logic; (2) a focus on history; (3) a focus on
deconstruction. Notice, Rorty‟s question is calling for a general statement to cover
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particular instances of Derrida‟s writing. In fact, Rorty notes that passages from Derrida
may be cited to support either of the options – latter-day Hegel or French Wittgenstein.
Still, Rorty, choosing the latter, argues, “The Idea that there is some neutral ground on
which to mount an argument against something as big as „logocentrism‟ strikes me as one
more logocentric hallucination.”424 Rorty, here, employs the first strategy, and by
employing logic, notice he does not need to look at an abundance of Derrida‟s writings.
In this way, Rorty suggests perhaps Derrida is something of a “Nominalist” noting,
“Nominalists like myself – those for whom language is a tool rather than a medium, and
for whom a concept is just the regular use of a mark or noise.”425 Rorty‟s use of the word
“regular” like normal, or normative, is another way of saying: however the community of
language users happens to use the marks or noises in question. Certainly there is
something of this to be found in Derrida, but perhaps not enough to equate Derrida and
Rorty.
Responding to Rorty, John Caputo employs the second strategy in answering
Rorty‟s question. First, Caputo gives his reason for suggesting that the first strategy for
reading Derrida will not work. That is, per Caputo‟s description, Derrida supplies “the
presuppositions for thinking that whatever sense language does make will also be
unmade, that the things we do with words will come undone [Caputo‟s emphases].”426
This reason, as I will show below, is not sufficient for denying the application of (the)
logic (of identity) to Derrida‟s writings, but it is an accurate general statement in regard
to Derrida‟s writings. Caputo then suggests a standard reading of Derrida‟s texts in
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chronological order such that reveal a progression in his thinking from an apocalyptic to
an ironic tone,427 i.e. from a latter-day Hegel to a French Wittgenstein. According to
Caputo,
Still, there is a side of Derrida that Rorty does not admire,
and that is the side where Derrida gets serious … That is
the side of Derrida which argues for philosophical ideas
like différance, archi-écriture, supplement, undecidability,
etc. … [I]n his early writings, Derrida even adopted an
unmistakeably apocalyptic tone about these quasi-entities,
announcing the end of the age of the book and the
beginning of writing. While Derrida has shaken that
particularly bad habit, he still talks like “metaphysics” is an
inescapable, encompassing something or other which has a
hold on us which is deeper than we can say. 428
Lastly, then, the third strategy for deciding upon the difference between latter-day Hegel
and French Wittgenstein is a focus on deconstruction which treats these opposites with
the logic of supplementarity – emphasizing the difference over the decision.
A clear example of the third strategy, then, can be seen in Derrida‟s own response
to John Searle in Limited Inc. There, Derrida points out that the work which is titled
“Reply to Derrida” and “signed” by John R. Searle itself admits – in its margins, as it
were – a debt to a number of others. Derrida suggests, then, these “authors” should also
be included in the meaning of the sign “Searle.” Having indicated two other authors
already, Derrida proposes “three +n” as the appropriate signature for “Reply to
Derrida.”429 He, then, says, “Let‟s be serious.” And, you might think his word “serious”
should be in quotation marks, not because he is being either serious or non-serious, but
because Derrida does not trust the word. He follows it by noting,
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Faced with this speech act (“let‟s be serious”), readers may
perhaps feel authorized in believing that the presumed
signatory of this text is only now beginning to be serious,
only now committing himself to a philosophical discussion
worthy of the name, and thus admitting that what he has
previously been engaged in was something entirely
different. (LI 34)
Notice what Derrida is attempting to highlight here. Between the commas, as it were,
Derrida is playing on “author” in “authorized” which is still in question, questioning the
synonymy between serious and philosophical – a Nietzschean move –, and suggesting the
falsity of the retroactive determination of this speech act‟s other as its binary opposite –
which the speech act itself suggests, i.e. what was previously engaged in was “something
entirely different [my emphasis].”
The thread I am treating here as illustrative of the third strategy in this
deconstructive response which deconstructs “Searle” culminates in Derrida‟s move from
“Searle” to “three + n” to “Society with Limited Responsibility (or Limited Liability)
[Société à responsabilité limitée].” (LI 36) Now, Derrida “justifies” naming this society
– in this context430 – since, he notes, the other authors indicated by “Searle” have neither
consented nor are aware of their inclusion in the signature for “Reply to Derrida” –
hence, the “Limited Liability.” (LI 36) Noting the excessive length of the sign, Derrida
abbreviates it to “Sarl,” and voilà. Derrida, now, can refer to “Sarl” instead of “Searle”
and intend not only the same meaning which Searle himself is supposed to intend but also
the supplemental marginalia which the logocentric relation to the sign “Searle” renders
underprivileged. Hence, Derrida may be described as arguing with Searle by
“performing” the logic of supplementarity for which he is advocating. In other words,
Derrida is illustrating that even the meaning of the sign “Searle” is unstable and slides
430
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through various significations such as “Sarl.” This is supposed, of course, to call into
question the ability to make decisions – logical or historical – based on the meaning of
the signs involved.
Now, this third (focus on deconstruction) strategy is, as Derrida lamentingly
admits, inextricably bound to the “context” in which it is employed. (Psyche 5-6) As
Claire Colebrook puts it, “certain located speech acts within a context can prompt us to
think the very emergence or creation of contexts.” (Psyche 5-6) These “located speech
acts” are the invented first terms Derrida spoke of above, and different contexts emerge
from the combination of the context, provided by the sign, and the internal difference of
the sign which motivates the analogical sliding. For example, the way in which Derrida
was able to conjure reference to other contexts while seemingly maintaining a tie to the
first term by a logical thread. So, where the third strategy for reading Derrida meets back
up – retroactively, as it were – with the first strategy, what is at stake is the irony of irony.
How to think the irony of irony? Does the negation of a negation equal a
positive? Derrida is not coy on the subject:
First of all, I take irony seriously; I take the problem of
irony very seriously. And we need some irony that is
something which challenges the common sensical concepts,
and you can‟t do this without some irony. So there is no
doubt some irony. 431
The way to think the irony of irony is what links all three of these reading strategies for
Derrida. That is, treating the sign “irony” ironically illustrates the logic which Rorty
hopes to use to ground his reading, and reveals a progress of singularly moving from
common sensical concept to concept – which Caputo highlighted – in a deconstructive
movement which requires irony without allowing irony to become a transcendental
431
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signified, i.e. not allowing irony to be present as a context for determining “everything.”
Given these three strategies for reading Derrida, I will now provide my reading of
Derrida by affirming all three strategies – a sort of yes, yes, yes.
My concern with Derrida in this chapter pertains to his relation to Kant‟s thing-initself and the problem of non-being. So toward concluding this chapter, as I show my
reading of Derrida I will do so by further indicating his relation to Kant‟s thing-in-itself
and the problem of non-being. Quoting Derrida‟s early work “Structure, Sign and Play in
the Discourse of the Human Sciences” at length here, you see what Caputo might refer to
as Derrida‟s attempt to break the habit of an apocalyptic tone, but equally, you see
Derrida privileging concepts to be later played off against other concepts. According to
Derrida,
We cannot do without the concept of the sign, for we
cannot give up this metaphysical complicity without also
giving up the critique we are directing against this
complicity, or without the risk of erasing the difference in
the self-identity of a signified reducing its signifier outside
itself. For there are two heterogeneous ways of erasing the
difference between the signifier and the signified: one, the
classic way, consists in reducing or deriving the signifier
and signified, that is to say ultimately in submitting the sign
to thought; the other, the one we are using here against the
first one, consists in putting into question the system in
which the preceding reduction functioned: first and
foremost, the opposition between the sensible and the
intelligible [My emphases]. (W&D 281)
Upon reading this quote, one immediately sees at its conclusion a reference to Kant, i.e.
the opposition between the sensible and the intelligible. Derrida‟s project, of course, is to
maintain the irreducibility of the difference between the sensible and the intelligible.
Such a reduction he notes is a way of “erasing the difference between signifier and
signified.” How is that the case?
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It is the case because “sensible” is a sign just as much as “intelligible” is a sign.
In this way, the difference between the signs is a product of the difference internal to
every sign à la Saussure, i.e. the difference between signifier and signified. It is, of
course, tempting here to play Derrida against Derrida suggesting, “signifier” and
“signified” are signs too. Yet, here is the so-called quasi-transcendental feature of
Derrida or his “complicity” with which he began the quote above. He “cannot do without
the concept of the sign.” In this way, the concept of the sign is a sign in general, and that
means the concept of the sign plays the role of the = x, the transcendental object in Kant.
What Derrida does not say is that in allowing him the sign to play the role of the =x, you
have also allowed him pure difference and the thing-in-itself by allowing him the
unrepresentable difference internal to every sign, i.e. the difference between signifier and
signified. Hence, this internal difference stands for the contribution from sensibility
which is irreducibly different in kind from signs – pure difference as the thing-in-itself.
Recalling Hyppolite‟s influence on Derrida‟s reading of Kant, sense and
understanding are collapsed and discursivity is closed. In this way, the difference
internal to the transcendental object is the difference which should have been beneath
imagination as a source separate from the understanding. As such, the internal difference
of the =x is the thing-in-itself. Now, just as all transcendental a prioris must be pure, this
internal difference is pure difference. Hence, on the one hand, Derrida‟s dialectic
privileges the Kantian inheritance from where it derives, revealing pure difference as
reiterating the thing-in-itself.
On the other hand, Derrida will treat “pure difference” as a sign, recalling the
quote above from “Letter to a Japanese Friend” – even though Derrida does not dream of
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treating “the irreducible difference between signifier and signified” as sign. Pure
difference, then, according to Derrida receives the status of a dream, and the difference
internal to every sign – what would be ἕηεξνλ – is replaced with the combination of
“undecidability” to capture the differing of internal difference from whatever sign it
wears as a mask, and the “logic of supplementarity” to capture the deferring which
motivates the signifiers sliding which invokes other signs connected to the first as a
supplement. (W&D 151) This differing and deferring is captured by Derrida‟s famous
Différance, and ἕηεξνλ is thereby reduced upward in Kant‟s structure of experience to
ἐλαληίνλ.
Lest he further his “complicity” with metaphysics, Derrida will “refuse the term,”
i.e. any term, other than the metaphysical concept of sign. Indeed, this progression from
pure difference to Différance indicates the irony which emerges as Derrida
“deconstructs” all other metaphysical concepts such as the thing-in-itself and non-being.
Hence, this constitutes my reading of Derrida. I agree with the readings of Rorty,
Caputo, and Derrida in regard to Derrida, and I take the inner workings of Derrida‟s
system to be in dialog with systems outside his system such as Kant, Hegel, Hyppolite,
Husserl, and Saussure. After illustrating, explicitly relating, and expanding my reading
of Derrida in regard to non-being below, I will draw together, support, and conclude my
claims regarding Derrida, the thing-in-itself, and the problem of non-being.
Remembering What Virtually Has not Been Said
At this point in the chapter there have been four (4) sections. The first discusses
pure difference, and in that section I pointed to Derrida‟s Kantian inheritance of the
thing-in-itself; the second section discusses Derrida‟s application of the logic of
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supplementarity to pure difference; the third discusses the transformation of pure
difference into Différance due to Derrida‟s application of the logic of supplementarity to
pure difference; and, the fourth section showed how Derrida‟s Différance – not pure
difference – avoids being equated with Kant‟s thing-in-itself. That is, with Derrida, “The
thing itself is a sign.” (OG 49) Across these four sections, then, I have written a vista to
the first strategy for reading Derrida, i.e. a view to the logic of his textuality – especially
the first two sections of the chapter. Next, I engaged the second strategy for reading
Derrida‟s texts, i.e. taking Derrida‟s writing as a sign of what he meant – especially the
third section of this chapter. What remains prior to a concluding section, then, is to
(further) dispel a reading of Derrida which takes him to be a “realist,” i.e. (in any non“private” language version of the term) any reading of Derrida which attempts to position
him in the experiential standpoint. As I have repeatedly stressed, Derrida revels in and at
the conceptual standpoint. Recall, the negation which pertains to the conceptual
standpoint, according to Kant, is logical negation, i.e. ἐλαληίνλ, not real negation. To be
frank, Derrida is not a realist.
The Fallacy of Reductio ad rem
“[T]he „realist‟ turn … is a further excess of irony.” 432
~ Jacques Derrida, Khōra

As the title of this section of the chapter indicates, I am concerned here to dispel a
reading a Derrida which suggests deconstruction may be used as a method to “reduce” an
experience, or an object of experience, to the thing-in-itself. Notice, not even Kant would
have held such a position. Kant followed a “regression” of the trajectory of experience,

432

Jacques Derrida, Khōra, Ian McLeod, tr., On the Name, Thomas Dutoit, ed., (California: Stanford
University Press, 1995), 123.

303

not a reduction of the object of experience, positing the thing-in-itself in relation to the
understanding, as transcendental object =x, and to the imagination as the thing-in-itself.
In fact, Derrida himself attacks the project of reading deconstruction as a method for
reducing to the thing. The target of Derrida‟s criticism was the project described in JeanLuc Nancy‟s Corpus.433 Though Nancy did not refer to his project as such, Derrida
derogatorily deemed such a project a “post-deconstructive realism.”434
As Derrida points out in On Touching, Jean-Luc Nancy, this “realism” cannot be
reduced to any of the traditional realisms. How does Derrida arrive at this name then?
Of the three words in this phrase, “post-deconstructive realism,” the word internal to the
phrase is the key, i.e. “deconstructive.” Nancy‟s project is supposed to be deconstructive
in that it takes deconstruction as a starting point. Nancy‟s project is, then, supposed to be
“post” this deconstructive starting point in that, after applying deconstruction as a
method, Nancy draws conclusions regarding what is “real,” despite the fact that
deconstruction does not allow for these conclusions. From this description alone you
should recognize Nancy‟s conclusions do not follow from his premises. In other words,
Derrida meant the phrase “post-deconstructive realism” ironically. In fact, Derrida meant
both parts in the phrase “post-deconstructive” “realism” ironically. That is, in Derrida‟s
wake, there can be neither. Hence, whereas the phrase is ironic, treating this irony as
ironic is “an excess of irony.” 435
Despite all this, however, there are some theorists who wish to advocate for a
post-deconstructive realism. I take the discussion, then, in this section of the chapter to
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be valuable because if it is possible to make Derrida into a realist – unless “realist” is
meant idiosyncratically, on the verge of a private language –, then my claim that he is
working from the conceptual standpoint would be wrong. I claim Derrida first posited
pure difference to solve the problem of non-being – the equivalent to Kant‟s thing-initself –, but then quickly moved to Différance as the (non)solution to the problem of nonbeing. 436 If it turns out after all that Derrida believed the thing-in-itself to be real, then
there could be a way – perhaps similar to a negative theology – to reduce to these real
things.
In the context of this section, then, my claim is that the reasoning which animates
the use of deconstruction as a method for reducing to a so called real thing, i.e. postdeconstructive realism, is fallacious. I will support my claim by touching on two aspects
which figure largely in post-deconstructive realism. First, I argue post-deconstructive
realism is predicated upon an incorrect reading of deconstruction. Second, the logic
involved in formulating post-deconstructive realism is fatally flawed. I argue the starting
point of deconstruction itself, i.e. a sign or a concept of a sign, precludes the possibility of
reducing (a sign or a concept) to a real thing. There are two fallacies traditionally used to
refer to such attempts to reduce a sign or a concept to a thing – Austin‟s “descriptive
fallacy” and Russell‟s “fallacy of verbalism.” What is more, post-deconstructive realism
is both amphibolous and a transcendental illusion. All these fallacies are in play because
a blatant misreading of Derrida‟s logic produces the illogical position of postdeconstructive realism.
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In the preface to Derrida‟s work of Dissemination, Derrida reveals his skeptic
proclivities. Derrida explains,
To put the old names to work, or even just to leave them in
circulation, will always, of course, involve some risk: the
risk of settling down … into the system that has been, or is
in the process of being, deconstructed.437
Recall the comment from Kant‟s preface to the Critique of Pure Reason in which he
noted the “nomadic” skeptics prefer undecidability to any “permanent cultivation of the
soil.” (CPR 1998, A ix) As such, there is a trace of these quotes noticeable in The Work
of Mourning by Derrida for Gilles Deleuze titled, “I‟m Going to Have to Wander All
Alone.”438 Notice, of this “wandering” that I am tracing in this paragraph given – that I
was not (until now) talking of “ships” or “sheep” – the largeness of the topics in play, i.e.
Kant, Derrida, Deleuze, skepticism, mourning, tracing, linguistics, Saussure, prefacing,
undecidability, cultivation of soil, etc. you should be able to think of this paragraph as yet
another indication of what Derrida – quoted above – stated in his description of
deconstruction in his “Letter to a Japanese Friend.” According to Derrida, “The word
„deconstruction,‟ like all other words, acquires its value only from its inscription in a
chain of possible substitutions” and “By definition, the list can never be closed [my
emphases].” (Psyche 5-6) So, where does deconstruction end? The answer: In the same
place that it begins. Where is that? Welcome to the shell game.
To be, a bit more, clear: If you accept the premises of deconstruction, then there
can be no end to deconstruction. If there can be no end to deconstruction, then there can
be no post-deconstruction. Once inside deconstruction “those who resist it are
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unwittingly drawn into its tight embrace.” 439 Therefore, if you are employing
deconstruction, then you must adhere to its logic (of supplementarity) which means you
cannot take any constellation of the remains of deconstruction as a non-deconstructive
conclusion. There is a logic (of supplementarity) involved. If you do not follow
Derrida‟s logic in employing deconstruction, then of what you are employing – it is not
deconstruction – Searle‟s complaint is correct. Searle complains that with deconstructive
“methods of reasoning one can „prove‟ absolutely anything.” 440 Hence, any attempt to
appropriate the “method” of deconstruction for non-deconstructive or post-deconstructive
conclusions fails on the grounds of the logic internal to deconstruction.
Specifically regarding the starting point of deconstruction, then, recall Derrida‟s
claim, “We cannot do without the concept of the sign.” (W&D 281) This, he goes on,
means the signifier and the signified, along with their difference which is internal to “the
concept of the sign.” In this same passage, which I quoted above, Derrida explains there
are “two ways” of “erasing the difference between the signifier and the signified,” and
the first, “classic way” of which Derrida is critical, “consists in reducing [à réduire] or
deriving the signifier and signified, that is to say ultimately in submitting the sign to
thought [my emphasis].” (W&D 281) The second – which is accomplished by way of
deconstruction – “consists in putting into question the system in which the preceding
reduction [réduction] functioned.” (W&D 281) There are, of course, multiple kinds of
reductions in philosophy. For example, under the genus reduction, there are the species
of methodological, theoretical, and ontological. Further, transcendental,
phenomenological, physical and psychological may, of course, be even further
439
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specifications of those prior species. Derrida‟s point is that none of them consist in
deconstruction.
What Derrida derogatorily referred to as Nancy‟s realism, Nancy attempts to
articulate as an “order of touch.” According to Nancy,
What touch communicates is not res (or réal) but of the
order of touch, which itself is real without being réal: it‟s
an impulsion or a drive, a pressure, an impression or
expression, an unhinging. The union is made in the order
of the movement: it is that in which, or as which, one of the
soul‟s movements is transmitted to the body, or one of the
body‟s movements to the soul.441
To be clear Nancy also suggests, “That the thing itself would be there isn‟t certain. Here,
where we are, amounts to nothing more, perhaps, than a reflection…” 442 Notice, touch,
then, is not taken statically here. Touch is not equated with a moment of touching.
Rather, the order of touch is to be the accumulation of touchings maintaining a reduction
across these touchings. Suppose each first moment of Hegel‟s dialectical movement, i.e.
the moment of the “sensuous being,” to be a touch. Then, instead of going through the
movement, connect the first moment of this movement, i.e. this touch, with the first
moment of the next touch, i.e. the beginning of the next movement. The idea is to stay at
the level of impression and attempt to derive a haptic reading through the connection of
the touches without conceptuality. The post-deconstructive realist project, then, supposes
the connection across the touches to be more real than the connection of the touches plus
conceptuality. In other words, the touching with conceptuality is reduced to mere
touching.
The sentiment of Nancy‟s project works toward inverting Husserl‟s
phenomenological reduction. As Derrida put it, “the phenomenological epochē is a
441
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reduction that pushes us back toward meaning.” (W&D 281) And, one way of describing
Nancy‟s reduction is “of the frame, or of the layers of sense enframing things [my
emphasis].”443 So, if a repetitive reduction were needed with each touch, you might say
the real resides in the remains of the reducing. When this “reduction stumbles upon
something irreducible”444 this is the touching that bringing forth the thing. Further,
“enframing” is a Heidegger derived term which is absolutely appropriate here because the
concern is not to frame one touch, but to have a frame which remains open so as to
gradually reveal what one might say is brought-forth and seen in this dynamic framing.
Also, enframing is intended to communicate that this moving is sub-essential, i.e. sub the
(second) level of the dialectal movement which is associated with essence. The thing is
supposed to be associated with touching, then, because touching has a sort of blind-sight.
Like the old fable of a bunch of men groping an elephant and taking pleasure in guessing
what it is they are touching, in the “sight” of this “touching,” and in the site/sight of the
remains of this touching, touching remains blind. In other words, you do not know what
it is you are touching upon.
The way this is supposed to be deconstructive, then, is by considering that which
is moving through the frame as the connections of internal differences between and in the
sliding of signs in a deconstruction. In other words, in the sliding of signs – concerning
just the internal differences from sign to sign – the movement of Différance is described
as movement along the traces from internal difference to internal difference. At this
point, the post-deconstructive realism project still seems plausible, but this is as far as it
will get. The problem occurs as soon as this touching is considered “real.”
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I have already established that the traces are between signs. And, here is where –
invoking the Derrida quotes above in regard to reduction – the post-deconstructive
realists submit “the sign to thought” (W&D 281) which is indicative of the “classical
way” Derrida noted above, and precisely deemed a non-deconstructive activity. In other
words, it is logocentric to non-ironically think of the “trace” as a “material trace [my
emphasis].”445 Moreover, to non-ironically say “the „product‟ of this reduction leads a
life of its own”446 is a dream. On a much simpler note, consider how this realist trace
also gets described: “As a trace of psychic animation trapped in the impenetrable
materiality of the body.”447 If the “materiality” is “impenetrable,” then how did anything
get “trapped in”?
Within Nancy‟s sense of touch, if there is not an assumption of sincerity à la
Husserl, then you cannot “submit it to thought,” e.g. how is one to know whether what
you are touching is not changing faster than your touch can register? And, if there is an
assumption of sincerity, then the project is not deconstructive. Either what is enframed is
on the “linguistic side” of experience, in which case it is neither thing nor real, or if it is
“outside” language, i.e. discursivity, it certainly cannot be associated with Derrida. Kant
would call such an inference a transcendental illusion of the cosmological kind. The best
such a project should be able to hope for is the identification of touching without
interpreting the touching. Nancy‟s project follows the wisdom of taking one obscurity
and associating it with another. The order of touch is real. To the lady on the street this
should seem too obvious to state. To a philosopher Nancy‟s project is philosophically
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interesting, but it does not resonate with Derrida‟s deconstruction – no matter how much
terminology is used to mask its fallacies.
The Derrida of Dissemination might suggest that what the post-deconstructive
project is actually touching is the “excrement of philosophical essentiality.” 448 As I noted
above, the essential excrement is not so much in the touching, as it is in the interpreting
of the touching which renders it the touching of the “thing” and “post-deconstructive.”
As Derrida explained,
The gossipy small talk of history reduces the thing itself …
to the form of a particular, finite object, the sort of object
that determinate modes of knowledge – empirical
descriptions or mathematical sciences – are incapable of
producing spontaneously through their own workings and
must therefore, for their part, introduce [invent] from the
outside and define as a given.449
Notice, the first target in Derrida‟s list is the “form” of a particular. If enframing in this
context constitutes the form of the post-deconstructive thing itself, then Derrida already
deemed it non-deconstructive. Moreover, it is as if Derrida is, in the above quote,
sketching a view of the realist position in question as a sensual embrace of Kant‟s
blindness thesis – an exchange of “haptic” for “speculative” in Hegel‟s logic. Further, it
is not clear that such a realist position is not a transcendental amphiboly, i.e. mistaking a
haptic appearance for a pure object of the understanding. For example, if a reduction is
necessary along each “touch,” then perhaps it is the very entrance into the understanding
which combines sensibility with understanding to identify the sense as “touch” dragging
a trace of the understanding along in the reduction. After all Derrida thought that
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recognition “gives back, in the place, let us say, of the thing itself, a symbolic
equivalent.”450
Lastly, reductio ad rem, i.e. reduction to the thing from the starting point of a
sign, i.e. a deconstructive starting point, is always already fallacious in itself. Recall that
in his 1923 paper on “Vagueness,” Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) referred to “the fallacy
that consists in mistaking the properties of words for the properties of things” as the
fallacy of verbalism.451,452 Moreover, in J.L. Austin‟s (1911-1960) How to do things with
words (1955) he described the “descriptive fallacy” as “the mistake of taking as
straightforward statements of fact,” i.e. as real, “utterances” that are either “nonsensical”
or “intended as something quite different,” i.e. ironic. 453
I will now address the putative “reality” of the post-deconstructive thing. In order
to think of deconstruction as performing a reduction to the thing, then, one should ask: Is
this “thing” real or merely relational? If the former, then Derrida looks like John Locke,
and if the latter, Derrida looks like Kant. I have extensively discussed Kant above, so I
will briefly mention John Locke. According to Locke,
Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the
immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding,
that I call “idea;” and the power to produce any idea in our
mind, I call “quality” of the subject wherein that power is.
… “ideas,” if I speak of them sometimes as in the things
themselves, I would be understood to mean those qualities
in the objects which produce them [ideas] in us. 454 (Bk I,
§8)
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Locke goes on to make his famous distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
“Primary” qualities are “utterly inseparable from the body, in what estate soever it be;
such as in all alterations and changes it suffers, all the force can be used upon it, it
constantly keeps;” these, then are “original or primary qualities [Locke‟s emphases].”455
Secondary qualities “are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various
sensations in us by their primary qualities.” 456 Lastly, Locke notes,
Ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of
them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies
themselves; but the ideas produced in us by these
secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all.
There is nothing like our ideas existing in the bodies
themselves [my emphasis]. 457
So, for Locke qualitative inscriptions of the secondary kind can be reduced away so as to
get at the thing-in-itself which – for Locke – exists independently of the mind. Put
another way, the thing-in-itself may be described – in a kind of negative theology – by
way of negatively judging its mind dependent secondary qualities. The thing-in-itself is
not (the secondary quality) blue, etc.
It might be tempting, then, to associate the “second origin” from Derrida, noted
above, with Locke‟s secondary qualities, since Derrida‟s second origin is an “origin”
metaphorically. On the one hand this works if we agree the signs, as secondary, pertain
to the thing as primary, but the latter part is problematic. On the other hand, the negative
theology present in Locke does not seem to be able to work in Derrida. So, here are two
significant problems already if one is to suggest the infinite play of signification can be
reduced to something real. If a thing is to be taken as real, perhaps not exactly like John
Locke‟s thing-in-itself but in a related way, then Derrida‟s thing should have either
455
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existence or mind independence. We could muddy the water by deconstructing “mind,”
and try to make what remains real. Yet, this does not seem to help; Derrida says, “The
thing itself is a sign.” (OG 49) And, “To exist is to be, to be an entity, a being-present.”
(OG 167) So, it seems rather like I noted above, there are no remains from
deconstruction which remain. 458 Ultimately, for Derrida, no term can remain un-turned –
not even “event” or “time,” etc. Moreover, an event internal to the discourse is only
ironically real. 459 Recall how Derrida boasts,
I would say that the difficulty of defining and therefore also
of translating the word “deconstruction” stems from the
fact that all the predicates, all the defining concepts, all the
lexical significations, and even the syntactic articulations,
which seem at one moment to lend themselves to this
definition or to that translation, are also deconstructed or
deconstructible, directly or otherwise, etc. And that goes
for the word, the very unity of the word deconstruction, as
for every word. (Psyche 5)
Ultimately, then, there will not be a “touch” or a “thing” or a “real” – for Derrida –
beyond the infinite play of signification. “[C]onstantly” “moving”; “If words and
concepts receive meaning only in sequences of differences, one can justify one‟s
langauage, and one‟s choice of terms, only within a topic and an historical strategy.” (OG
70) It is fantasy to privilege a realm of “anonymous” things left over after deconstructing
– as if these things are “underneath” their logocentric identification.
Take for example Simon Critchley‟s claim: “Wherever Derrida is read, he is not
dead. … Here and now, in the present that holds within itself the promise of the future,
the dead live.”460 Of course, Critchley is not speaking realistically; he is speaking
metaphorically. For Derrida, the thing – like pure difference – is a “dream of a purely
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heterological thought” at the “source” of empiricism. (W&D 151) When postdeconstructive realists make claims like “in the act of reading, the text reads us before
and while we face it,”461 certainly they do not mean that a text really reads us. Hence,
reductio ad rem is fallacious if you attempt to apply it to anything which is not ideal or
mind dependent. Moreover, reducing to the thing, what you have is another sign whose
deconstruction is yet to come.
Lastly, the logic invoked to support post-deconstructive realism is fatally flawed.
The logic of the thing in post-deconstructive realism depends upon what is posed as
“Derrida‟s logic that opposes opposition.” As such this logic is based on four (4)
sentences from the entire oeuvre of Derrida. What is more, these four sentences are
misrepresented. In the way in which these four sentences are advertised, you can see
what is attempting to be accomplished: “The annulment of opposition between the thing
and its other.” (W&D 151) Before showing what is supposed to be “Derrida‟s logic that
opposes opposition, consider the following from Derrida in regard to this language of
“the thing and its other.”
Derrida asks, “But how can the „Other‟ be thought or said without reference – we
do not say reduction – to the alterity” in a binary opposition? (W&D 127) So, before
even looking at the logic behind post-deconstructive realism, notice, the problem is not so
much the use of “thing,” i.e. the content, the problem is the form of the relation. If this
opposition is “annulled” due to the “logic that opposes opposition,” then why not use this
on all of the opposites Derrida considers? Suddenly, despite the disclaimer that “it does
not amount to the disappearance of difference,” not only does it amount to the
disappearance of difference but negation goes out the window too. By saying that some
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thing is not A, I have expressed opposition, and therefore, by post-deconstructive logic
not A is A. (Huh?) Such wrongheadedness can be resolved quite easily. The fact of the
matter is, there is no such thing as “Derrida‟s logic that opposes opposition.” The logic is
supposed to come from the Politics of Friendship; and, I will now show this to you.
The four sentences come from Derrida‟s Chapter 5, “On Absolute Hostility: The
Cause of Philosophy and the Spectre of the Political.” The question Derrida has posed
just prior to the section under discussion: “What is said here of the enemy cannot be
indifferent to what is said of the friend, since these two concepts co-determine one
another. But the correlation can formally follow three logical chains: [Derrida‟s
emphasis].”462 So, the determination of the enemy is under discussion, and Derrida
invokes the binary opposite of the enemy, i.e. the friend, noting that “these two concepts
co-determine one another.” As you should be able to predict, this scenario will not turn
out differently than the other binary oppositions Derrida faced.
In the attempt to work out the determination of the enemy/friend, then, Derrida
says “the correlation can formally follow three logical chains.” He intends to work
through all three, and then draw a conclusion. Not to pick the second of the three out and
represent it in isolation as a logic-in-itself which annuls opposition. As predicted, the
first “logical chain” treats enemy and friend as “symmetrical,” the second opposes the
opposition of the first, i.e. the opposition being opposed is not opposition in general or
opposition in regard to the thing-in-itself, it is the opposition just posed in the first option
of three possible options for determining the concepts enemy and friend. The third
option, then, points to some third which “endlessly binds or opposes [Derrida‟s
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emphases]” – Derrida‟s predictable solution – in this case it is “the political,” and such
“metonymization of the political” 463 is considered as a third option. Therefore, Derrida,
of course, declares in the light of all three of these options that “we must be patient at the
crossroads and endure this undecidable [Derrida‟s emphasis].” (PF 123) Hence, Derrida
does not deem the second option to have “annulled opposition.”
So, as you can see, despite so called post-deconstructive realism, logical negation
was not “annulled” in 2007. The misquoted, taken out of context, four sentences which
allow for post-deconstructive realism to consider the thing real is a misreading. As such,
post-deconstructive realism is fallacious on multiple counts, and, furthermore, represents
a blatant and severe misreading of “deconstruction.” Rather, it is the case, as I have
differently and repeatedly expressed above, Derrida treats the thing as a sign, and
deconstruction treats of signs. Derrida is operating within a closure of discursivity and at
the conceptual standpoint in Kant‟s structure of experience. For Derrida, there is no postdeconstruction, and the thing is not real, it is a sign.
Derrida‟s Response to the Problem of Non-being: The Conceptus Logico-Discursivus
Standpoint
To the conditioned reader Derrida‟s Différance and deconstruction read like
melodrama. Derrida‟s formulaic is always already on the verge of being a one trick
pony. His wild lust to beat Hegel at his own game can be stopped by not starting. Just
refuse to play Derrida‟s shell game. On the one hand, I would say there certainly is
something brilliant about such a rigorous commitment to circuitous logic. On the other
hand, the deep problem with Derrida‟s philosophy is the shift from a merit based logic to
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a logic of cronyism. Since there is no real criteria for determining which terms should
avoid deconstruction in Derrida‟s wake, philosophy becomes politics. Yet, philosophy as
politics is not real politics because there is far less money and power involved. The
metaphorical politics of philosophy is the politics of vanity. Even if Derrida‟s use of the
logic of cronyism may be shown to be “fair,” the shift itself is regrettable in the extension
of its sovereignty because ultimately it depends upon the hospitality of the tyrant. This is
a truth of finitude, whether you can sign it or not.
Or, perhaps Derrida is attempting to illustrate this very issue. As such, Derrida‟s
formulaic should be lauded and applied so as to unmask the logic of identity as always
already a logic of cronyism. In this way, Derrida‟s philosophy looks like a therapeutic
for each singular agent. The question is meant to ask: You – who is now in the “world”
of mere “signs” – how will you be just? How will you conduct yourself in accordance
with Justice? Suddenly, an overcoming of Platonism this is not – not that there ever was
a “Platonism.” You are situated squarely and perpetually at the beginning the Republic,
and Derrida refuses to allow you to defer to the authority of a text as he interrogates you.
You are here. You are in the world. What is justice?
Of course, to be frank, this is a reading of Derrida. Must I really say it at this
point? The matter for Derrida must remain “undecidable.” However, not to spite but
despite Derrida; his position within a network of philosophical discussion can be
identified. As such, Derrida clearly has a Kantian (and Hegelian) heritage. And such a
trace should not be overlooked for the identity of something which goes under the sign of
“Derrida‟s philosophy.” In this way, Derrida does have a response to traditional
philosophical problems. What I have been working toward, which should be able to be
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seen at this point, is that Derrida has replaced Kant‟s thing-in-itself with pure difference.
Further, Derrida has a response to the problem of non-being, and it is not novel. It is
precisely the response of the Eleatic “visitor” in Plato‟s Sophist. I have already discussed
Derrida‟s reading of the “thing” as a sign. So, as I conclude this chapter I will point to
Derrida‟s comments on non-being. Derrida, predictably, treats “non-being” the same as
every other term he considers a “sign.” 464 Yet, so as to “show the work,” so to speak, I
conclude this chapter as such.
In showing Derrida‟s comments on non-being, I will be summarizing this
chapter. I will show you three instances where Derrida is providing a response to the
problem of non-being. And, the conclusion – when non-being proper is treated, i.e.
supposed as non-sign – is that Derrida posits Différance as the undecidable solution to the
problem of non-being. Otherwise, Derrida treats non-being as a sign, reserving the most
non-sign for the irreducible difference contained within every sign. The irreducible
difference of the thing-in-itself or non-being is the irreducible difference of pure
difference which Derrida locates internal to every sign. As such, pure difference may be
seen as Derrida‟s replacement for the thing-in-itself, and his solution to the problem of
non-being. However, quite early in his life of letters, Derrida thereafter moves away
from writing about pure difference, shifting the focus to Différance, and more tightly
closing discursivity by suggesting his only “metaphysical complicity” to be the concept
of “sign.” So, Différance is as close to a decision that the later Derrida will provide
regarding a response to the problem of non-being. As I indicated both in the Introduction
and in Chapter 2, this focus on always already being within language as the inability to
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solve the problem of non-being is a further embrace of the second impasse to the
problem. 465
It should be clear, then, that there is no negative theology with Derrida. As
Derrida put it, “No, what I write is not „negative theology.‟” 466 Yet, Derrida, and
especially Derrideans, seem at times to entertain various other terms, as if these terms
refer to the internal difference which for deconstruction to work must be located within
signs. One such term revolves around negative theology, and invokes a notion of nonbeing. So, it is worth considering this term “khōra.” Attempting to supplant Différance
with “khōra,” Derrideans befittingly beg the question declaring, “Neither being nor
nonbeing, the khōra involves a negativity that escapes both the positive and negative
theological register.”467 Notice, it behooves them, of course, to not consider non-khōra
or the difference which magically appears between these two binary opposites when they
do. After all, khōra is good and non-word, and binary opposites are bad, right? In this
example, then, notice being and non-being – as words, i.e. signs – have been relegated to
the Qualitative level of binary opposition, and it is here that the (Hegelian) negativity
which points “back” to – what in this case gets called – khōra is supposed to be
something philosophers have yet to set their eyes or fingers upon. And, this is precisely
the question. On the one hand, in the context of negative theology khōra gets discussed
as void which could not be seen or touched. On the other hand, the khōra of negative
theology is supposed to be located deconstructively.
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If negative theology is to be thought within deconstruction, then it must take place
at the Qualitative level between binary opposites so that the term with the “non” in front
of it could be privatively identified from the other term. Why is it not possible to locate
negative theology within deconstruction such that the negation or remotion moves from
the Qualitative to the Quantitative? Such a placement would seem more consistent with
Derrida‟s predecessors. The answer: It is because, we are told, “This form of negation,
according to Derrida, is a (quoting Derrida here) „negativity without negativity.‟” 468
Now, such an equation of the non-word khōra, which is suddenly older than both being
and non-being, should be problematic in light of Derrida‟s declaration of “everything” as
“discourse.” I quote him here to contextualize this notion. According to Derrida,
Henceforth, it was necessary to begin thinking that there
was no center, that the center could not be thought in the
form of a present-being, that the center had no natural site,
that it was not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of
nonlocus in which an infinite number of sign substitutions
came into play. This was the moment when … everything
became discourse – provided we can agree on this word –
… The absence of a transcendental signified extends the
domain and the play of signification infinitely [my
emphasis]. (W&D 280)
I am here stating, then, the questions which I will pursue to show you what Derrida is
doing in the previous quotes. First, how can there be negativity without negativity?
Second, what sort of “necessity” is involved in thinking that “the center” has no “natural
site?” Third, how does Derrida arrive at “an infinite number of sign substitutions,” why
not 9 or 42? Lastly, why does Derrida qualify his claim that “everything became
discourse” with “provided we can agree on this word?”
All of these questions have actually already been answered. If you recall Kant‟s
Table of Judgments, “Universal, Particular, and Singular” judgments pertain to Quantity,
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and “Affirmative, Negative, and Infinite” judgments pertain to Quality. So, the =x,
internal difference, pure difference, or in this case, khōra pertain to the Quantitative level.
Now if either a Universal or a Particular judgment is made, then the Square of Opposition
is entered. Therefore, the judgment regarding this Quantitative level must be Singular.
Similarly, then, at the Qualitative level, the Quality of this Singular judgment is Infinite.
Such a judgment is supposed to sound like “This is =x” or “Wow, this is khōra.” The
“Wow” is appropriate because it expresses a sense of wonder, not affirmation or
negation. Expressing affirmation or negation requires identifying the Quantity within a
logic, i.e. perceptual judgments need not identify “that” which is judged. Hence,
whichever term can be entertained here – and this is the very question under
consideration – it must pertain to a singular infinite judgment. (This answers the first and
third questions I asked above.) And, this is exactly the type of judgment which contained
non-discursivity for Kant. Whereas the infinity of space exceeds even a limiting into the
infinite chain-like continuity of time, each of these infinities was apprehended
sequentially by imagination. And the regression back down the series though leading to
an unimaginable vastness (for Kant) is a form of negation. Therefore, what Derrida must
mean by negation without negativity is negation without logical negativity. As such, this
is Kant‟s real negation which pertains to the experiential and points to what he refers to
as the thing-in-itself.
Put another way, the block quote above from “Structure, Sign, and Play,” is
Derrida‟s quick version of Kant‟s Transcendental Deduction. 469 Instead of attempting to
solve the heterogeneity problem, Derrida retreats to the “function” of combination. This
is tantamount to siding with Kant‟s second edition Transcendental Deduction over his
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first edition Deduction. The “necessity” of thinking “the center” has no “natural site” is a
restatement of the unknowable nature of the thing-in-itself. Either you determine its
nature – eliminating the need to speak of the thing-in-itself – like Hegel by “going behind
the curtain” to see yourself, or you point to something you are not supposed to be able to
even say, i.e. the thing-in-itself. Derrida is adding a third option by focusing on the
unknowable nature of the first moment of Quantity. Since repetitive experience amounts
to singularly experiencing infinity – due to the limiting of human experiential apparatus –
, and no signification is sufficient – sufficiency pertaining to relations higher up in the
structure of experience –, then no amount of sign substitutions will ever arrive at a
correspondence.
Elsewhere Derrida referred to this process noting: “To comprehend [Derrida‟s
emphasis] the structure of becoming, the form of a force, is to lose meaning by finding it.
The meaning of becoming and of force, by virtue of their pure [and different], intrinsic
characteristics, is the repose of the beginning and end.” (W&D 26) Derrida cannot speak
of this “pure” difference without invoking its other, i.e. meaning, so he asks the
community of language users if they will allow him his use of the Saussurian stacked
deck in such a way as to refer to the sign substitutions as “discourse.” This is the second
of the four questions I am pursuing in regard to Derrida‟s Transcendental Deduction. If,
they – you, i.e. the community of language users – consent, to this initial term, a slew of
terms will follow, but the network connections amongst the terms to come will never
correspond to the infinite connections (in perception) “under” or “outside” of experience
– as if the mind could mirror the “universe” – because the connections can never be taken
up all at once into the human experiential apparatus. Even Leibniz‟s assumption of
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mathematics – God as divine geometer – as a Universal judgment must remain an
assumption. Signaling his shift from the “mineness” 470 of a Heideggerian focus on the
apperceptive standpoint to Hegel‟s speculative and parasitic logic of the conceptual
standpoint, in Monolingualism of the Other, Derrida notes, “I have only one language; it
is not mine.”471 In other words, because Derrida‟s perspective originates on the
conceptual logico-discursive side of Kant‟s structure of experience, it is within the
understanding – and constantly thwarted in – attempting to look “out.”
So, it is not Kant who has not escaped Derrida; it is Derrida who has not escaped
Kant. The difference between Derrida and Kant here: Kant posits a solution to the
problem of not being able to look “out,” which is the problem of non-being, and Derrida
is content to merely return to the second impasse of the problem, after having escaped
Hegel‟s dialectical grasp, at the first impasse. Derrida‟s irony here pertains to either the
insincerity of accepting a first term or the sophistry of applying a “method” that you
know ahead of time produces results just as metaphorical as the stacked deck you
ingeniously exposed as metaphorical. Perhaps David Farell Krell‟s text on Derrida The
Purest of Bastards is on to something.472 Returning, then, to the term under discussion
currently, “khōra,” and the topic of negative theology, it seems as though khōra just
happened to be the word that the community of language users gathered at the time of
Derrida‟s writing in the above quotes agreed upon to apply to the Quantitative level of
experience.
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Just as Derrida requires your agreement as to what counts as a word; he requires
your agreement as to what does not count as a word. (This answers the fourth question I
asked above in regard to Derrida‟s Transcendental Deduction.) The sliding along the
chain of signification never stops, Derrida‟s liberal difference is that he asks you to vote
on which term should be privileged, but, make no mistake, the term of the term, as it
were, is always a singular event. When the conference is over, the term is no longer
privileged. Imagine that: it’s different every time. I am reminded of a story Thomas
Szasz is fond of telling about Voltaire (1694-1778): “Asked by his secretary what he
would have done had he lived in Spain under the Inquisition”; Voltaire is said to have
replied, “I would have worn a big rosary, and gone to mass every day and kissed all
monks‟ sleeves, and tried to set fire to all their monasteries.” 473 There are no remains
from deconstruction which remain. Deconstruction is one of those sophistical “games”
which you can play reminiscent of the skeptic Carneades (c. 219- c. 129 BC)474 who gave
public lectures in Rome in 155 BC and “argued for and against justice on successive
days, stunning audiences and incurring the displeasure of Cato the Elder, who convinced
the Senate to throw the philosophers, for a time, out of the city.” 475 In other words,
neither negative theology in its relaxed form nor in its most rigorous sense 476 can stop the
thimblerigger “genius of metaphor” Derrida from having one more signification from the
stacked deck up his sleeve.
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In sum, this chapter began by showing Derrida identify non-being with time. This
is why Derrida above says, “the no-thingness” is “only accessible on the basis of the
Being of time.” (MOP 51) What is not the standing now of Presence, is not. In other
words, though Derrida is critical of the “Metaphysics of Presence,” his solution to the
problem of non-being is the same as those in Hegel‟s wake. Just as non-being is internal
to being, for Hegel, non-being is internal to language for Derrida. Moreover, if you
switch registers or modes from the logic of identity to deconstructive logic of
supplementarity, then irreducible difference is internal to signs and sign use. Derrida
revels in the circuitous logic indicating every attempt to identity the difference internal to
a sign as the sliding movement into another sign. Non-being as that which is supposed to
be “outside” any system is the difference irreducible to that system. When it is called
“non-being” Hegel reads it as within being, and when it is called “non-being” Derrida
reads it as within language. The repetition is there in both the previous sentence and the
thought of Hegel and Derrida. Kant truly attempts to think non-being by positing the
thing-in-itself outside the structure of experience. Yet, both Hegel and Derrida are quick
to make hay with the discursive nature of such a positing. As Plato‟s Eleatic visitor
might put it, when you say non-being, non-being is being said. But of course, Kant is not
ignorant to the discursive nature of his positing. Hence, Kant discursively articulated this
“non-being” in multiple ways such as nihil negativum in his Table of Nothing.
In shifting to Différance, then, Derrida does not sever his Kantian heritage. If as
Sartre noted, “Kant had already shown the irreducible difference between sensation and
thought,”477 then Derrida sought to fortify Kant‟s language so no one would ever attempt
to reduce the difference again. To fortify this pure difference, Derrida, then, discusses
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Différance. In other words, by maintaining that pure difference is internal to signs such
that a sign may be different from itself in that its meaning is arbitrary, Derrida
preemptively denies that a relation of difference pertains to any non-signs.
Recall, it was the Hegelian reading of Kant which rendered the difference
between sensation and thought as the pure difference internal to the concept of
experience. It was the retroactive determination which revealed the pure difference as
conceptual. So, I am supporting my claim by a sort of genealogy. Yet, at the same time,
it is only a merely genealogical support, if you side with Derrida. If you do not support
Derrida‟s reading of pure difference, then the question becomes what is the irreducible
difference that Derrida appropriated? And the answer, as Sartre noted above, is Kant‟s
difference between sensation and thought. Derrida is functioning at the conceptual
standpoint, and this is what accounts for his “contextuality.” Deconstruction works on
texts “from within.” Recall it was the submitting of “the sign to thought” above that
allowed for the philosophical tradition‟s hierarchical structure which occluded the selfwriting of Différance. On the contrary, then, deconstruction accentuates the irreducible
and undecidable difference already at work in the work due to the very nature of the
sign(s).
In a celebrated quote worth rendering at length, Derrida famously explained:
The very condition of a deconstruction may be at work,
within the system to be deconstructed; it may already be
located there, already at work, not at the centre but in an
excentric centre, in a corner whose eccentricity assures the
solid concentration of the system, participating in the
construction of what at the same time threatens to
deconstruct. One might then be inclined to reach this
conclusion: deconstruction is not an operation that
supervenes afterwards, from the outside, one fine day; it is
always already at work in the work; one must just know
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how to identify the right or wrong element, the right or
wrong stone – the right one, of course, always proves to be,
precisely, the wrong one. Since the disruptive force of
deconstruction is always already contained within the
architecture of the work, all one would finally have to do to
be able to deconstruct, given this always already, is to do
memory work. Since I want neither to accept or to reject a
conclusion formulated in these terms, let us leave this
question hanging for a while [Derrida‟s emphasis]. 478
I am fond of this statement of deconstruction by Derrida precisely because he not only
describes deconstruction, but he denies, for the sake of maintaining undecidability, that
memory is somehow outside sign systems. As you should be able to see by this
conclusion, Derrida treats “memory” as a sign, and as such, he wants “neither to accept or
to reject a conclusion formulated” in terms of memory. Decidedly, the matter is
undecidable for Derrida. Just as the =x was required to be added to the understanding for
an experience, yet the =x was from an origin other than the understanding, so too, Derrida
– maintaining his position at the conceptual standpoint and the closure of discursivity –
requires an encounter which changes the signs with which he is presented. On the one
hand, this change, for Derrida, can never be identified because he is always already
within a sign system. On the other hand, by acknowledging “signs” as such, from his
perspective it is the difference internal to the signs themselves which animate a
movement and meaning throughout a system of signs.
It should be clear, then, that Derrida has taken a discursive standpoint. Further,
in so far as non-discursivity would be tantamount to “outside” of language, Derrida
denies that non-discursivity, the thing-in-itself, pure difference, or non-being, can be
outside of language. He accomplishes this by considering each of the terms to be always
already a sign. In this way, Derrida has a tautologically grounded argument. If you are
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using language, then you are already “within” language. As such, any attempt to express
something “outside” of language with language remains inside language. As John
Caputo puts it, “In Derrida‟s terms, it is always too late to assert our superiority over, our
transcendental mastery of, language, for we are always already speaking and drawing on
its resources.”479
Caputo‟s quotation should remind you of Hegel‟s closure of discursivity: any
attempt to think what is outside of thought must remain inside thought. Now, Hegel
wanted to allow for an undifferentiated or first moment of pure difference to capture
Kant‟s non-conceptual =x which initiates reflective thought or does the work of
combining sensibility and understanding in completing an experience. However, so as to
remain consistent with his own closure of discursivity, Hegel had this first moment of
pure difference be revealed by a retroactive determination of sublation as itself
discursive, i.e. the idea. Embracing Saussure Derrida takes the initial pure difference of
Hegel‟s system and locates it in the difference between a signifier and a signified internal
to every sign. In this way, there can be no retroactive determination, and no nonlinguistic way to refer to this difference.
Ultimately, then, this will be Derrida‟s strategy for denying any outside of
language – outside of sign systems. There a number of places where Derrida mentions
non-being, and in each case non-being is taken to be internal to language, and the identity
of internal difference as not non-being but undecidable. And of this undecidability,
Derrida notes, “undecidability is not indeterminacy. Undecidability is the competition
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between two determined possibilities or options.”480 As I showed by way of Sextus
Empiricus in Chapter 2, when the Pyrrhonian skeptics arrived at undecidability, there was
something about which judgment was to be suspended. The agreement between the
skeptics and the stoics extended far enough for reference to that thing about which there
is dispute. Highlighting the second impasse of the problem of non-being, Derrida would
have it that non-being derives its meaning just as being derives its meaning, i.e. from the
network of supplementation – not from any outside-text; (OG 158) or, as Derrida puts it
in Dissemination, “There is nothing before the text: there is no pretext that is not already
a text,”481 As such, there is no “undecidable” that does not derive its undecidability from
the text, not whatever we might dream to be undecidable “outside” the text. Tracing this
undecidability throughout a text is the work of deconstruction.
In Acts of Literature Derrida ventriloquizes Plato‟s Sophist. As such, you find
more of the same looking different from Derrida. According to Derrida, “It is impossible
to pin mimesis down to a binary classification.” Suddenly “Sophist” seems like it is
standing in for Différance in this context, Derrida unsurprisingly concludes that in the
hunt for the Sophist, it is the “organized manner” itself which bars Theaetetus from
finding the sophist‟s secret hide-out. The covering cannot be rolled aside for Derrida
because the “Sophist is capable of „producing‟ „likeness and homonym‟ of everything
that exists.”482 Describing this “logic” of the Sophist Derrida suggests,
Mimēsis produces a thing‟s double. If the double is faithful
and perfectly like, no qualitative difference separates it
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from the model. Three consequences of this: (a) The
double … is worth nothing in itself. (b) Since the imitator‟s
value comes only from its model, it is good when the model
is good [and vice versa] … (c) If mimēsis is nothing and is
worth nothing in itself, then it is nothing in value and being
– it is in itself nothing, and is worth the nothing in itself,
then it is nothing in value and being – it is in itself
negative. 483
This description is exactly like the description of the rhetorical invention of metaphor for
the missing link in an analogically connected chain of terms from Margins of Philosophy
quoted in the second section of this chapter. In other words, the question of metaphor in
philosophy is answered with philosophy as metaphor. This supposed to lend support to
the gesture which regards all philosophical concepts as signs. That is, exempting the
metaphysical concept of sign-in-itself. It is as if Derrida‟s system is the double of the
philosophical system. You should be tempted to treat “Derrida‟s system” as a sign which
is the negation of the sign “philosophical or metaphysical system.” And, in the
retrospection to the first moment determine the thing-in-itself from Kant‟s system as the
“in-itself” of Derrida‟s system which is in itself (as) language.
Hence, after examining Derrida‟s multiple iterations of non-being it is clear that
he treats the logic of supplementarity as primary. That is, the attempt to derive pure
difference, the thing-in-itself or non-being from any system derives from the construction
of the system itself. And, since – according to Derrida – these systems are weaved
together by the logic of supplementarity, every system and its determination of the
ground can be deconstructed. Put another way, by reveling in these conditions Derrida
seeks to undermine any signification of the ὑπνθείκελνλ, i.e. hypokeimenon. As such,
Derrida treats non-being as yet another sign whose meaning – as a problem or otherwise
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– is propped up on a system. What such a reading of non-being shows, then: Derrida
failed to solve the problem of non-being.

332

“[O]f the professed Heracliteans, such as was held by Cratylus, who finally did not think it right to say
anything but only moved his finger, and criticized Heraclitus for saying that it is impossible to step twice
into the same river; for he thought one could not do it even once. But we shall say in answer to this
argument also, that there is some real sense in their thinking that the changing, when it is changing, does
not exist. Yet, it is after all disputable;
for that which is losing a quality has something of that which is being lost, and of that which is coming to
be, something must already be. And in general if a thing is perishing, will be present something that exists;
and
if a thing is coming to be, there must be something from which it comes to be and something by which it is
generated, and this process cannot go on ad infinitum.”
~Aristotle (Meta 1995, 1010a11-1010a23)
“One thunderbolt strikes root through everything.”484
~Heraclitus
“[T]his world … pre-exists its expressions. It is nevertheless true that it does not exist
apart from that which expresses it.”485
~Gilles Deleuze

Chapter Five: Pure Difference in Deleuze – Expressing Difference Differently
Introduction and Justification for Chapter 5 Sections and Objectives
In regard to the organization of this chapter, though each of the sections has the potential
to express more than this introductory “justification” can say, I have three objectives for
this chapter. First, I seek to I explicate Deleuze‟s idea of pure difference. Of course, I
will accomplish this by referring to that which has been produced thus far in the other
chapters. Second, I discuss Deleuze‟s justification for his reading of pure difference and
examine the ontological commitments of his account. Lastly, I provide Deleuze‟s
solution to the problem of non-being emphasizing how and why it fails to solve the
problem of non-being. The first two objectives, then, provide support for my conclusions
regarding Deleuze and his attempt to solve the problem of non-being. What is more, the
first two objectives will also contribute to ideas yet to come, i.e. ideas discussed in Part
II.
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Recall that I consider the first three chapters preparatory to both the Derrida and
Deleuze chapters. The focus of this chapter, then, is really Deleuze‟s Difference &
Repetition [Différence et répétition] (1968). Yet, a famous quote by Alain Badiou
regarding Deleuze‟s overall style of thinking is appropriate here:
It is therefore perfectly coherent that, in starting from
innumerable and seemingly disparate cases, in exposing
himself to the impulsion organized by Spinoza and SacherMasoch, Carmelo Bene and Whitehead, Melville and JeanLuc Godard, Francis Bacon and Nietzsche, Deleuze arrives
at conceptual productions that I would unhesitatingly
qualify as monotonous, composing a very particular regime
of emphasis or almost infinite repetition of a limited
repertoire of concepts, as well as a virtuosic variation of
names, under which what is thought remains essentially
identical. 486
Though I would have preferred Badiou‟s quote to conclude with reference to the
repetition of a structure, rather than invoke essence and identity, as an appropriate
paraphrase: it is possible to read Deleuze as if each of his books on other thinkers were an
attempt to ventriloquize the thinker in question so as to express a repetition of Deleuze‟s
structure or system by using the other thinker‟s vocabulary. This is perhaps the most
rewarding and frustrating aspect of Deleuze‟s style. And, this is another reason I favor
Difference & Repetition, because I take it to verge upon the key with which to decode
Deleuze‟s other books.487
Despite the complexity of Deleuze‟s thought, then, each repetition of his thought
encompassed in a different book may be taken as so many signs with univocal reference
to this structure as key. So, the focus of this chapter is, of course, Deleuze and Difference
& Repetition. However, the breadth of Deleuze‟s thought forces me – to at least once
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each – refer to Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), Marcel
Proust (1871-1922), Henri Bergson (1859-1941), and Francis Bacon (1909-1992) which
means briefly engaging the relevant texts as needed. For example, these figures help
illuminate the ways in which Deleuze‟s thought both follows and differs from the thought
of Aristotle. And, it is the ways in which Deleuze differs from Aristotle and Hegel488 that
provide the novelty to his otherwise Kantian solution to the problem of non-being.
The purpose for writing this chapter, then, is to provide Deleuze‟s reading of pure
difference, and provide support for my claim that Deleuze indirectly attempts to solve the
problem of non-being with his new concept of difference as pure difference. You will
understand why I use the word “indirectly” here by the end of the chapter. In sum, on the
one hand, Deleuze – following Bergson – wants to treat non-being as a “pseudoproblem.” On the other hand, Deleuze re-writes the problem and offers “?-being” as its
solution. In regard to Deleuze‟s new concept of difference as pure difference, it should
be noted that this new concept is actually an Idea in Kant‟s sense of the term. Yet, as
Kant also holds, these ideas, as problematic, are unhinged concepts. (CPR 1998, A 508/B
536)489

Consider how Kant refers to the unconditioned – thing-in-itself – in discussing

pure concepts.
Now since the unconditioned alone makes possible the
totality of conditions, and conversely the totality of
conditions is always itself unconditioned, a pure concept of
reason in general can be explained through the concept of
the unconditioned, insofar as it contains a ground of
synthesis for what is conditioned. (CPR 1998, A 322/B
379)
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Deleuze acknowledges he is aware of Kant‟s distinctions in both his commentary on
Kant490 and his article on Kant‟s Third Critique. 491 Hence, providing Deleuze‟s reading
of difference will ultimately entail comparing his structure of experience with that of
Kant‟s.
First, a judgment of the sublime is tantamount to the unhinging of a concept of the
understanding because the sublime exceeds our ability to recognize it with a concept of
the understanding. (CPJ 128) The sublime is thereby made sense of in relation to an idea
– as an unhinged concept –, rather than a concept with which it is supposed to be equal
(=x). As you know, this unhinging is signaled by the “free play” of imagination. (Cf.
CPJ 192-195) Second, a judgment of the beautiful provides a different conception of
harmony. (Cf. CPJ 198) Whereas harmony can be, and perhaps usually is, thought of as
synonymous with equality, Kant‟s Third Critique provides a more musical version of the
soul. In other words, harmony is determined by the resonance of the faculties – the soul
as aesthetic tuning fork. As aesthetic this harmony is not derived from engaging identical
concepts of the understanding. Rather, it is the harmony between sensibility and the
understanding broadly designated. Hence, from Kant‟s Third Critique Deleuze is able to
think a concept – a regulative Idea in the language of Kant‟s First Critique – of
difference other than the perhaps more traditional identical concept of difference. In this
way, the identical concept of difference may be called “identical” because it derives from
relations grounded in – invoking Plato – the Idea of the Same, i.e. =x. As such an
identical concept of difference functions as a constitutive Idea in the language of Kant‟s
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First Critique, and is determined by negation – ἐλαληίνλ à place de ἕηεξνλ. Deleuze then
is able to justify this concept of pure difference, despite what I refer to as its “fractal
simulacral” character,492 by looking to the difference of which pure difference is
supposed to be a concept as if it were the power of the psychic tuning fork‟s resonating.
The claim which Deleuze wrote Difference & Repetition to support: there is a
different concept of difference, and this concept is of “pure difference,” i.e. the unhinged
Idea of Difference in itself. This, of course, reaches all the way back to Plato‟s Sophist.
Deleuze is attempting to realize Plato‟s project of thinking Difference in itself, i.e.
ἕηεξνλ. The value of this project, as Plato‟s dependence of reckoning thesis (discussed in
the Introduction) emphasized, derives from the difficulty of thinking being in itself. On
the one hand, recall that providing an account of being depends upon providing an
account of non-being. On the other hand, recall that the Sophist concludes by – ironically
in my opinion – equating non-being with Difference in itself, i.e. ἕηεξνλ. Hence, what
hangs in the balance of Deleuze‟s advocacy for the concept of pure difference is both
being and non-being. Deleuze‟s concern – as established by Plato – is with being. In
other words, Deleuze is attempting to think nothing less than being in itself by thinking
difference in itself.
I have already made my position on this clear. I believe there is enormous value
in Deleuze‟s ontology; however, I believe it is ultimately flawed in its account of nonbeing. Therefore, in concluding this chapter I will address Deleuze‟s account of non-
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being directly. Elsewhere I address the area where the flaw in Deleuze‟s ontology
appears most prominently, i.e. in his ethical theory.493
I begin to address Deleuze‟s ontology, then, by directly discussing Deleuze‟s
concept of pure difference. I, next, discuss Deleuze‟s pure difference as it relates to
Kant‟s structure of experience, and this discussion includes Deleuze‟s famous “syntheses
of time.” Moving in the following section to a higher level of generality, I will discuss
Deleuze‟s notion of “Transcendental Empiricism” as it relates to what has already been
stated. In the final sections of the chapter I address what I see as the flaw in Deleuze‟s
ontology, and I directly address Deleuze‟s comments regarding non-being from
Difference & Repetition.
The Recursive Fractal Character of Pure Difference
“Whereas pure difference in Derrida thinks recursion as the „recursive discursive,‟
pure difference in Deleuze thinks non-discursive recursion „fractal-like.‟”
~Frank Scalambrino, Non-Being & Memory, I.5

“Everything starts out in the abyss,”494 declaimed Deleuze. Yet, what does
“abyss” [l’abîme] mean here? On the one hand, this is a question regarding how to
identify the abyss. On the other hand, this is also a question regarding method in relation
to identifying the abyss. To start with the former, in the Logic of Sense (1969) [Logique
du sens] Deleuze makes a distinction between an abyss with differences and an abyss
without differences. In fact, he makes this distinction while denouncing the alternatives
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to his penchant for a valorized chaos.495 These alternatives are “common to metaphysics
and transcendental philosophy.” (LOS 106) They are:
either an undifferentiated ground, a groundlessness,
formless nonbeing [non-être], or an abyss without
differences [“abîme sans différences,” my emphasis] and
without properties, or a supremely individuated Being and
an intensely personalized Form. Without this Being or this
Form, you will have only chaos [le chaos]. (LOS 106)
So this quote is supposed to address the foundational Aristotelian 496 and self-referential
Kantian alternatives to what Deleuze refers to as “Nietzsche‟s discovery.” According to
Deleuze, Nietzsche “explored a world of impersonal and pre-individual singularities, a
world he then called Dionysian or of the will to power, a free and unbound energy.”
(LOS 106) Deleuze‟s further description is more salient, as he notes:
This is something neither individual nor personal, but
rather singular. [Quelque chose qui n’est ni individuel ni
personnel, et pourtant qui est singulier] Being is not an
undifferentiated abyss, it leaps from one singularity to
another, casting always the dice belonging to the same cast,
always fragmented and formed again in each throw. It is a
Dionysian sense-producing machine, in which nonsense
and sense are no longer found in simple opposition [my
emphases]. (LOS 107)
Discussing the juxtaposition of these two block quotes, then, will help to explicate the
different abysses and indicate Deleuze‟s method involved in doing so. The quotes
themselves show the movement from Aristotle to Kant to Deleuze in regard to
beginnings.
So the abyss in which everything starts out is – for Deleuze – an abyss with
differences. In other words, here is Deleuze‟s version of what I refer to as the
495
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contemporary French critique of Hegel‟s dialectic. 497 There is already difference internal
to the starting point – an abyss with differences in this case. Recall that so far this is also
Derrida‟s strategy for critiquing Hegel‟s dialectic. However, whereas Derrida thinks of
the difference internal to the starting point as recursively warding off all attempts to “see”
“outside” discursivity, i.e. the non-discursive, when Deleuze looks into the abyss he sees
overflowing non-discursive joy and dancing abundance. 498 This is, of course, a question
of how to characterize the ground. Deleuze in the above first block quote accuses
Aristotle and Hegel499 of “starting” with an undifferentiated ground. Kant‟s ground
gained over the strategies of Aristotle and Hegel derives from his ability to think of the
ground as difference, not quite difference in itself but the thing-in-itself as different.
Though Kant thinks difference differently (than Aristotle and later Hegel) via selfreference to his structure of experience, Deleuze thinks Kant still falls short of thinking
difference in itself. 500 Hence, of the two questions with which I began this section, the
above goes as far toward identifying the abyss – the first question: as possible without
addressing the latter of the two questions – what is the method involved in identifying the
abyss?
To start answering the second question then, consider two more aspects of the
above two block quotes. Deleuze uses the term non-being, i.e. non-être. To what is he
referring here? Deleuze is referring to Aristotle‟s arsenal of logical distinctions, the same
logical distinctions with which Aristotle put forth his response to the problem of non497
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being. In other words, this non-being – which is really not-being – pertains to ἐλαληίνλ.
The piece to highlight in juxtaposition here from the second block quote is Deleuze‟s
comment, “Being is not an undifferentiated abyss.” Notice, on the one hand, Deleuze‟s
concern is different than Aristotle‟s, i.e. Deleuze is interested in ἕηεξνλ. Yet, on the other
hand, Deleuze is talking about being. Why is he not talking about non-being? The
answer is because Deleuze treats Plato‟s dependency of reckoning thesis from the Sophist
quite seriously. Whereas Kant seems to be treating difference as pointing to non-being,
Deleuze – by way of Plato‟s thesis – treats difference as pointing to being. And, this
speaks directly to method.
What is at stake here should remind you of the constitutive regulative distinction
in Kant and the demonstration dialectic, or justification discovery, distinction in Aristotle.
In discussing this distinction in Aristotle recall that I used the locution to “look through”
in the attempt to describe thinking the Idea of Difference in itself, i.e. ἕηεξνλ, as
contrasted with difference in relation to others, i.e. ἐλαληίνλ. The suggestion by the end
of the Introduction was that Aristotle mistakenly subsumed Plato‟s ἕηεξνλ as a question
of ἐλαληίνλ. Whereas Kant‟s structure of experience, with its account of nondiscursivity, points to ἕηεξνλ from an ἐλαληίνλ governed ground, Deleuze seeks to return
to ἕηεξνλ as Difference in itself. Now, recall further that this looking through was
supposed to be a way to see outside the forms. So here is the point of intersection, then,
where the first question which began this section (how to identify the abyss) can be fully
answered by fully answering the second question (what is the method involved in
identifying the abyss). It is clear thus far that Deleuze takes the starting point of dialectic
to be a differentiated abyss – a starting point with internal difference. Throughout the
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dissertation you have seen that there are two ways to start the dialectic. The dialectic
begins with either experience or with thought, with perceptions or with ideas. With Kant
to thank, pure difference is supposed to be the non-discursive which exceeds – overflows
– its process of becoming discursive, whether it be through perception or conception. 501
Finally, then, regarding Difference in itself as the differentiated abyss by way of the two
starting points of dialectic, when Deleuze looks into this abyss, what does he “see”?
Answering this question of the abyss speaks directly to the relation between pure
difference, Kant‟s thing-in-itself, and the beginning of Hegel‟s dialectical movement.
Recall Aristotle in regard to the hypokeimenon and especially Chapter 3 regarding
dialectic, the opposition found in the second moment points back to the underlying first
moment which the (Nietzschean) criticizers of Hegel (and Aristotle by proxy) consider
already to include an internal difference. So, the second moment occurring in thought
produces the opposition between difference and identity, i.e. ἐλαληίνλ. Yet, Deleuze is
concerned to emphasize the first moment – like an abyss with differences – as already
containing a difference more profound than that identified in the second moment, and that
difference is pure difference, i.e. ἕηεξνλ. If you consider the difference between
moments, the first moment pertains to a Quantity of pure difference and the second
moment pertains to its identity through Qualification. Since the non-discursivity of pure
difference eludes discursive (identical) difference thought through opposition in the
second moment of dialectical movement, Deleuze hopes to show the second moment as a
repetition of the first when regarded from the point of view of Difference in itself. In this
way, Deleuze is like the true apologist for Kant in Hegel‟s wake. Whereas Hegel‟s
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dialectic accomplished the closure of discursivity, and thereby excluded both nondiscursivity and Kant‟s thing-in-itself from the dialectical movement, Deleuze has
recovered non-discursivity as pure difference and hopes to show it permeating the
dialectical movement by way of repetition.
Hegel held that “Difference in itself is self-related difference; as such, it is the
negativity of itself, the difference not of an other, but of itself from itself; it is not itself
but its other,” and as such concluded, “Difference is therefore itself and identity.” (SL
417) Recall this is also how Hegel – as indicated by Tom Rockmore in Chapter 3 above
– argues for the equation of being and non-being in the first moment of the dialectic.
According to Hegel difference “is mediated with itself by the non-being of its other …
Difference as such is already implicitly contradiction [Hegel‟s emphasis].” (SL 431) In
the context of the language I have been using, ultimately Deleuze accuses Hegel of
following Aristotle in reducing Plato‟s ἕηεξνλ to ἐλαληίνλ. Whereas Hegel uses
difference as the negativity, the op-positivity, consistent with ἐλαληίνλ to connect the first
and second moments of dialectic, Deleuze will use the positive difference of ἕηεξνλ to
connect the first and second moments.502 Further, whereas for Hegel difference leads to
equating being and non-being, for Deleuze the being of pure difference as positivity will
be the motor force of the dialectic hoping to arrive at an Idea of itself. 503 The question
for Deleuze becomes how to indicate the positivity of difference in itself.
In order to approach an idea of positive difference in itself, consider the
following:
502
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What is different from difference can be difference in itself,
since difference in itself is different from itself.
According to Deleuze, “Difference must be shown differing [Deleuze‟s emphasis].”
(D&R 56) So, what does Deleuze see when he looks into the abyss? He sees that which
is different than what he sees.504 And, what is this that is different from itself? It is
difference. What is this difference? Difference is that which is different from itself.
Since this movement in the abstract could continue indefinitely: first, notice that this is
ἕηεξνλ without the oppositional thinking of ἐλαληίνλ. Next, notice that this movement is
more than circular. This is the recursive fractal character of pure difference. It does not
run in a circle; the dialectic runs in a circle. (Cf. D&R 273) As Deleuze would have it
then, the dialectic produces an Idea to match the starting point of the dialectic, and both
are the Idea of Difference in itself. Each completed movement of the dialectic produces
the Idea of Difference.
The circular movement which brings about the Same, again and again, traces the
trajectory of something other. Since with each return of the dialectic the movement is the
same, there can be uniformity in this thinking. Yet, precisely the reason why you cannot
determine if the end corresponds or exhausts the start is that the Idea of Difference in
itself contains an internal difference – it is different than itself. 505 As the return of the
Same is driven and dragged along the trajectory of pure difference, the trajectory takes on
the character of a recursive fractal. Fractal-like because each movement of the dialectic
is the same as the next and recursive because the dialectic procedure is applied repeatedly
so long as the power of pure difference allows for it. In this way, “Difference is the
504
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genuine beginning,”506 and so it is that the abyss with which everything begins is
differentiated.507
Recall, again from Chapter 3, Hegel‟s overly narrow consideration of difference
as ἐλαληίνλ was not the only problem with his dialectic. The other problem pertained to
Kant‟s discussion of amphiboly. The question Deleuze must answer then, if he is to
avoid this second problem: how might pure difference as positivity appear in experience?
This question, of course, pertains to the experiential component of Kant‟s structure of
experience. What is more, as I will show below, it is in this way that pure difference
functions to replace the thing-in-itself as difference-in-itself. Recall from Aristotle‟s
discussion of dialectic: the way in which individuals process experience is precisely the
way in which they begin the dialectic perceptually. Again, I will discuss the way
Deleuze thinks through Kant‟s structure of experience in depth below. Suffice to say for
now, Deleuze distinguishes between “the original and the copy” and “the model and the
simulacrum,”508 so as to characterize two different types of relations in regard to the
perceptual catalyst of the dialectic.
Recall from the Introduction, in discussing Aristotle I concluded that both
demonstration and dialectic begin with assumptions. Yet, the assumptions which begin a
demonstration are supposed to be on more solid ground. As a result, the relation between
the assumptions and what follows from those assumptions in a demonstration is thought
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to be different from the relation between the assumptions and what follows from those
assumptions in a dialectic. Whereas the copy is, thereby, supposed to be demonstratively
the Same, the simulacrum is avowedly Different. Hence, the connection between
Deleuze‟s two types of relations and dialectic. The original copy relation allows for a
relatively straightforward puzzle which excludes non-discursivity; with this relation you
can support the claim that the starting point of dialectic has an identity. This is the case
even if you follow Hegel and postpone identification until the third moment of the
dialectic, i.e. the dialectical ubiquity of ἐλαληίνλ allows for the identification of the
starting point of dialectic as a copy of the (original) Idea which identifies it. The more
difficult puzzle figures discursivity as enveloping the non-discursive positive difference;
with this relation you can support the claim that the discursive (envelope) repeats, and
thereby evidences, non-discursive difference. Therfore, not to follow what he implicitly
accuses the history of Western philosophy as thinking of being the Same, Deleuze
pursues the simulacral – à la recherche of the perceptual catalyst.
What is more, notice that both of these types of relation pertain to thought. The
solidity of the ground between assumptions and what follows in a demonstration is a
ground of thought, not experience.509 That there is experience with which to compare
thought accentuates the very necessity of assumption, whether beginning demonstration
or dialectic. This does not mean that demonstrations are necessarily wrong. Rather, it
means that whatever we take as a starting point in experience, you can speak of the
strength of its product‟s relation to it; though it would be further assumptive to think a
correspondence between what is producing or causing perception and what is perceived.
So this is the long hand version with which Deleuze avows his debt to Kant. What
509
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Deleuze is thinking through here is the excessivity of the non-discursive as it moves
along the limiting trajectory of the structure of experience on its way into the dialectic.
Having stated the above, then, you should be able to recognize that despite the
image with which the perceptually originated dialectic begins, the image is different from
that which produced it. So, which of the two types of relation noted above better
describes the relation between image and that which produced it in experience prior to
the image‟s ascent onto the organizing (reflective) thought ground of dialectic? The
relation, of the two noted above, which applies here is the simulacral. This is not to claim
that the image‟s relation to that which produced it cannot be organized into a relation of
original and copy. Nor is it to claim that the image is not an image. Rather, it is to claim
that prior to the dialectical organization, the image‟s relation to that which produced it is
simulacral. This is of the utmost importance if you are examining the beginning and not
what it becomes.
Without relying upon what Aristotle called priority in being or Saussure‟s stacked
deck, the image is at best the copy of a copy in a limitless line of copies. Yet, “If we say
of the simulacrum that it is a copy of a copy, an endlessly degraded icon, an infinitely
slackened resemblance, we miss the essential point: the difference in nature between
simulacrum and copy.”510 It concerns Deleuze that you not miss “the difference in
nature” because,
The simulacrum implies great dimensions, depths, and
distances which the observer cannot dominate. It is
because he cannot master them that he has an impression of
resemblance. The simulacrum includes within itself the
differential point of view … In short, folded within the
simulacrum there is a process of going mad, a process of
510
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limitlessness … always simultaneously more and less, but
never equal [my emphasis]. 511
According to Deleuze “the depths” which “the observer cannot dominate,” speak to the
“aggressiveness of the simulacra,” (Cf. D&R xx) their “phantasmatic power,”512 and as
they barge their way into Kant‟s understanding broadly designated, the power upon
which these images ride reaches all the way into the dimension of Ideas. 513 For these
simulacra “it is not a matter of reproducing or inventing forms, but of capturing
forces.”514 Hence, Deleuze speaks of “the coupling of forces, the perceptible force of the
scream and the imperceptible force that makes one scream.” (FB 52) In other words, the
imperceptible force is the internal difference of the perceptible force, and their coupling
is the simulacrum that is different than itself, i.e. an image with internal difference.
As Deleuze would have it, then, the image which perceptually, i.e. experientially,
starts the dialectic is also different than itself, since it is the power of pure difference
itself through which the image initiates the dialectic. Put in more Kantian language, “The
violence of that which forces thought develops from the sentiendum to the cogitandum.”
(D&R 141) Since the perceptual catalyst of the dialectic is simulacral, the structural
syntheses receive their descriptions from the vocabulary of the hermeneutic of suspicion.
The descriptors which now apply to descending Kant‟s three-fold synthesis: the
recognition that hides, the reproduction that masks, and the apprehension which
repeats.515 Descending further you arrive at the thing-in-itself which has become pure
difference. What is more, the sense of pure difference which I am attempting to capture
511
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is, in many ways, dispersed throughout the early works in Deleuze‟s corpus. Given the
complexity, then, and the decisive – for the overall dissertation – nature of the following
discussion, I devote an entire section for its sake. However, for the sake of
comprehensibility, i.e. so as to make the comparison between Kant and Deleuze
understandable, I devote the next section to a more general discussion. The more general
discussion, regarding what Deleuze referred to as his “transcendental empiricism” should
help contextualize the sustained comparison which follows it between Deleuze‟s structure
of experience and Kant‟s.
Transcendental Empiricism: The Pure Difference that Makes a Difference
[I]magine something which distinguishes itself from itself – and yet that from which it distinguishes itself
does not distinguish itself from it. Lightning, for example…”
~Gilles Deleuze (D&R 28)

Given the work of the preceding chapters, there are two ways to express how
Deleuze overcomes Hegel‟s closure of discursivity. On the one hand, it can be expressed
through Aristotle‟s four causes. On the other hand, it can be expressed through Kant‟s
distinction between constitutive and regulative ideas. In regard to Aristotle‟s four causes
[ἄηηηα]. Recall, the four causes: (1) the agent or initiator of change [ἀξρὴ], i.e. the
efficient cause; (2) the essence, “the whole or synthesis or form” [ὅινλ θαὶ ἡ ζύλζεζηο
θαὶ ηὸ εἶδνο], i.e. the formal cause; (3) “the for the sake of which” [ηέινο], i.e. the final
cause; and, (4) the “substratum” [ὑπνθείκελνλ], i.e. the material cause. One way I could
succinctly express Deleuze‟s overcoming of Hegel‟s closure of discursivity is to
distinguish between two different ways of viewing Aristotle‟s four causes. These two
ways would pertain to viewing the causes as though they correspond to two of Plato‟s
“five great kinds” from the Sophist (251a5-259d8): Sameness [ηαὐηόλ] and Difference
349

[ἕηεξνλ]. Suppose Aristotle‟s notion of the causes in so far as it pertains to discursivity to
thereby pertain to the form of the Same, and in so far as it pertains to non-discursivity to
thereby pertain to the form of Difference. What changes?
Most importantly, the “for the sake of which” becomes “for the sake of itself.” If
the ηέινο cannot be justified by reference to any discursive features of an object, then the
ηέινο of an object refers to the very power which is causing the unfolding of the object.
The formal cause, in so far as formality itself is discursivity can only be thought of as deformed, and as de-formed points to, on the one hand, the material cause – the
ὑπνθείκελνλ, i.e. the hypokeimenon; and, on the other hand, the excessivity of all the
potential objects which could become actual objects through the matter form
combination. Without recourse to discursivity, i.e. without engaging Aristotle‟s logical
apparatus, this ὑπνθείκελνλ of an object – just like the ηέινο – refers to the object‟s
power to appear prior to identification in the form. Moreover, since the ὑπνθείκελνλ as
non-discursive is both excessive and not yet an identified unit, it is consistent to think of
the ὑπνθείκελνλ as a cluster of (object) fragments. Further, the power involved here
should be thought of as intensity, not extensity, since extensity alreadys entails a matter
form combination. To grant Aristotle his further distinction in regard to matter would be
to posit a virtual realm as proximate matter prior to actualization by discursive information, and to posit the underlying power, i.e. intensity, as remote matter. Lastly, as
the non-discursive initiator of change, the efficient cause, cannot refer to the form, and
thereby – nothing remains – it must refer to this remote matter, i.e. intensity. In fact, the
difference in kind between the particular constraints on an expression and the power of
expression itself accounts for the difference between the virtual dimension, and intensity
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though neither are discursive. Hence, thinking Aristotle‟s causes through Plato‟s
distinction between the Same and the Different reveals a set of causes different from
Aristotle‟s, and the non-discursive of these causes all refer to power. Lo and behold: a
swarm of power – an abyss – with differences. (Cf. D&R 277) See Figure 5.1 (the “E”
stands for extensity – by way of Sameness – and the “I” stands for Intensity – by way of
Difference).
Aristotle‟s Four Causes
E
I

Efficient Cause
Discharge of
Power

Remote Matter
Power as
Intensity

Proximate Matter
Virtual
Dimension

(In)Form(ation)
Actualization

Final Cause
Discharge of
Power

Figure 5.1
Before discussing Deleuze‟s overcoming of Hegel‟s closure of discursivity
through the vocabulary of Kant‟s constitutive regulative distinction, I would like to
briefly draw your attention to a subtle distinction which Deleuze – it may turn out –
misses. Notice, in constructing the above chart: rather than negate Aristotle‟s causes in
order to arrive at the non-discursive, I triangulated the causes, so to speak, through
Plato‟s “great kinds.” On the one hand, the difference between the forms is the
difference which allows for participation in the forms, i.e. ἐλαληίνλ. On the other hand, I
did not derive the non-discursive causes by suggesting that they participate in the
discursive form of Difference. What am I saying? Whether this is an instance of
“looking through” the form of Difference, i.e. ἕηεξνλ, or not matters less than the fact that
I did not derive the “non” of non-discursivity from ἐλαληίνλ, i.e. any opposition or
negation of Aristotle‟s causes. This will be most relevant at the end of the chapter where
I provide Deleuze‟s discussion of the non of non-being. However, since I will reference
the above as support for my claim against Deleuze below regarding the non in non-being,
it is relevant to point it out to you now.
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In regard to Kant‟s vocabulary, Deleuze‟s innovation is not to suggest that
thought occurs without concepts;516 rather his innovation is to think of discursive
experiential concepts as referring to the non-discursive forces which express them, i.e. of
which they are expressions. The way he overcomes the Hegel-Derrida claim that a
concept as such only derives its meaning from its participation in a constellation of
concepts – Saussure‟s stacked deck – is to distinguish between open ended and closed
concepts. Now then, this distinction was already made by Kant, i.e. the distinction
between constitutive and regulative, in regard to concepts. Whereas a constitutive idea is
taken to constitute an object through its recognition in the = x, a regulative idea, as
indicated above, is not thought to state the whole of that to which it refers. The
examples, of course, being God, the soul, and freedom announced in Kant‟s Critique of
Pure Reason. (Cf. CPR A 509-510 /B 537-538 and A 684-687/B 712-715) Since I will
focus in the next section explicitly on the relation between Kant and Deleuze, suffice to
say for now: Deleuze employs Kant‟s notion of a regulative idea in regard to practical
experience. In other words, Deleuze overcomes the difficulty which holds that as
discursive the concept cannot express the non-discursive by holding that an open ended
concept is able to delimit without attempting to exhaust the non-discursive forces which
express it. Because Deleuze is thinking about experience he is able to suggest that the
experiential forces involved are themselves expressing that which only an open ended
idea can discursively do justice. Hence, the condition for the idea is itself within
experience – transcendental empiricism.
Identifying himself with traditional philosophical terms, in the Preface to the
English edition of Dialogues II, Deleuze declares, “I have always felt that I am an
516
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empiricist, that is, a pluralist.”517 Explaining further, of empiricism Deleuze notes,
“[T]he aim is not to rediscover the eternal or the universal, but to find the conditions
under which something new is produced (creativeness).”518 Accordingly, Deleuze‟s
Empiricism starts with a completely different evaluation:
analyzing the states of things, in such a way that non-preexistent concepts can be extracted from them. States of
things are neither unities nor totalities, but multiplicities.
The abstract does not explain, but must itself be
explained. 519
Notice, Deleuze prefers to think of Kantian sensibility – the states of “things” – using a
notion of plurality, i.e. “multiplicity,” rather than concepts such as unity or totality. This,
of course, speaks to Kant‟s Table of Concepts of the Understanding according to
Quantity. On the one hand, Deleuze‟s decision here pertains to the “Empiricism” piece
of transcendental empiricism. On the other hand, notice Deleuze above announces his
concern to “find the conditions under which something new is produced.” This concern
refers to the “Transcendental” piece of transcendental empiricism. Hence, transcendental
empiricism for Deleuze locates the conditions for production of the new within the
elements of experience themselves. In this way, as Deleuze declares in Difference &
Repetition, he shifts the eminent concern – from that which he sees in Kant as the
“domain of representation” – “to become „experience‟, transcendental empiricism or
science of the sensible.” (D&R 56) Lastly, as “non-pre-existent” indicates, Deleuze
holds that concepts and ideas themselves may be open ended and created anew. That is,
the generation of newness pertains to the conceptual as well as the experiential for
Deleuze.
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Precisely indicating his reading of “things,” Deleuze further ties the notions of
transcendental and empirical together in this quote,
It is not just that there are several states of things (each one
of which would be yet another); nor that each state of
things is itself multiple (which would simply be to indicate
its resistance to unification). The essential thing, from the
point of view of empiricism, is the noun multiplicity, which
designates a set of lines or dimensions which are
irreducible to one another. Every „thing‟ is made up in this
way. 520
By suggesting each thing is made of “irreducible” lines or dimensions, and multiplicity as
referring to a block or a set of these lines, Deleuze indicates that from which these lines
derive as the ultimate conditions for the production of novelty, i.e. the new. Moreover,
the possibility of a one-to-one correspondence between concepts and experience must be
excluded since the experiential features of things are so many “multiple” lines. Even if a
one-to-one rendering of language and things were possible – which it is not –, there can
be no correspondence between things and the multiplicity expressed as things. What is
more, since Deleuze‟s transcendental empiricism entails such a multiplicity of lines or
forces expressing things, once expressed no signification can ever exhaustively identify
the thing. In other words, Deleuze has renamed Kantian non-discursivity as multiple
lines or dimensions. Recall that this renaming is consistent with both the thinking of
Leibniz and of Kant on the matter. It is as if these lines or dimensions expressing things
may be placed first in – what I refer to as – a limiting trajectory toward the identification
of the things as such. 521
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Discussing David Hume‟s “empiricism,” Deleuze suggests the “history of
philosophy has more or less absorbed, more or less digested, empiricism.” 522 By this
Deleuze suggests the history of philosophy overlooks the “secrets” empiricism “harbors.”
(PI 35) Deleuze further suggests it is the secrets of empiricism that Hume “pushes the
furthest and fully illuminates,” accordingly,
His empiricism is a sort of science-fiction universe avant la
lettre. As in science fiction, one has the impression of a
fictive, foreign world, seen by other creatures, but also the
presentiment that this world is already ours, and those
creatures, ourselves. A parallel conversion of science or
theory follows: theory becomes an inquiry. (PI 35)
Notice this empiricism, for Deleuze, describes a “seemingly fictive world.” This should
remind you of comments made by both Aristotle and Kant. As Aristotle clearly points
out, an assumption is not synonymous with a “lie.” Whereas “lie” tends to indicate the
failure of an assumption, thinking about experience nonetheless requires assumptions.
Hence, on the one hand, the failure of an assumption means the shift to a different
assumption. On the other hand, the assumptive nature of dialectical and demonstrative
beginning for Aristotle allows Deleuze to refer to the experiential “world” as fictional.
Kant‟s way of suggesting as much was to refer to the non-discursive as excessive in
relation to the conceptual apparatuses which attempt to identify it.
Recalling my comments, then, in the “Copernican Revolution” section from
Chapter 2, Deleuze, of this empiricism, concludes, “The result is a great conversion of
theory to practice.” (PI 36) Following Hume and functioning as a sort of mid-wife
Deleuze asks the following questions:
To establish possession of an abandoned city, does a javelin
thrown against the door suffice, or must the door be
522
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touched by a finger? To what extent can we be owners of
the seas? Why is the ground more important than the
surface in a juridical system, whereas in painting, the paint
is more important than the canvas? (PI 36)
Deleuze concludes, “It is only then that the problem of the association of ideas discovers
its meaning.” (PI 36) And, for Deleuze, “What is called the theory of association finds its
direction and its truth in a casuistry of relations.” (PI 36) This charge of a “casuistry of
relations” – like agreement among language users which establishes Saussure‟s “stacked
deck” – points back to the identity of the world as “fictive.” Pointing to the
anthropomorphic determination of relations, which subsequently gets considered
“natural” through a process of association, Deleuze highlights the excessivity of
experience. In other words, multiplicity should be thought over “natural” unity in regard
to experience since the determination of things and of relations among things is never the
whole truth and nothing but the truth.
As such a description of the experiential world emphasizes, one cannot expect to
refer to experience, i.e. provide a description of “the world,” in an exhaustive way. 523
The principle to be drawn here is that what is at work in “experience” produces the things
and relations which conceptual identification further limits. Deleuze‟s emphasis on the
assumptive fictive nature of conceptuality is an attempt to highlight conceptual
identification as necessarily open ended. This insight finds its metaphysical expression in
Deleuze‟s idea of an abyss with differences noted above. This is different than Derrida‟s
account because Deleuze – as affirming Kantian non-discursivity – is able to think of an
experiential abyss as excessively overflowing, and thereby as positive. The difference
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being that, despite the fictive character, Deleuze is able to further describe the
multiplicity involved in his transcendental empiricism noting,
There is something wild and powerful in this transcendental
empiricism that is of course not the element of sensation
(simple empiricism), for sensation is only a break within
the flow of absolute consciousness. It is, rather, however
close two sensations may be, the passage from one to the
other as becoming, as increase or decrease in power (virtual
quantity). (PI 25)
It would be as if to view such wild multiplicity stereoscopic mind with its discursive
categories should become kaleidoscopic mind so as to not privilege the fiction over the
very force which it seeks to describe. Perhaps such a becoming in the mind might verge
upon a correspondence to the ontogenesis, i.e. experiential becoming, upon which
conceptuality rides. In lieu of such a kaleidoscopic conversion, Deleuze – as indicated by
the last two words of the above quote – resorts to the term “virtual.” Since one cannot
expect to refer to experience or the world in an exhaustive way, virtual is both the
qualifier describing these powers devoid of discursive domestication, and the term for
Deleuze‟s anticipatory mental mechanism regulating the identification of things.
A conversion of theory into practice, then, for Deleuze treats the two terms
“theory” and “practice” as always already mutually informing one another. In the course
of explication the relation between Deleuze‟s thought and Kant‟s three-fold synthesis of
imagination becomes clear. At this point, notice for Deleuze: judgments made about the
world entail making judgments about judgments already made. It is as if experience has
judged, conceptuality has judged, and Deleuze is advocating not so much for a different
judgment as he is for the fact that you have the capacity to judge differently. Recall Kant
does not deny a subliminal, i.e. prior to conceptual, limiting process of experience.
Rather, Kant further acknowledges it by calling it “blind” – think of the “blindness
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thesis” from the Critique of Pure Reason. With Sigmund Freud in the interim, Deleuze
refers to such a process as “unconscious.” And, as it is unconscious, as we are blind to it,
each thing has already been determined through what retrospectively – given Deleuze‟s
emphasis on the excessivity of non-discursive experience – must be a casuistical
categorical judgment. What is supposed to be all of x such that x is defined by some
function f(x), necessarily limits x in ways which not logic, but blind minds determine – in
other words: blind, unconscious, or habitual processes. Hence, consistent with Kant‟s
structure of experience, logic works out the relations upon the culmination (=x) of a blind
limiting process which leads to identification.
Attempting to reference things as dynamic, i.e. without a static identity, Deleuze
describes a “Harlequin world” of experience through disjunctive judgments. Though
inclusive – this or this or this – disjunctive judgments are also limiting because they take
associations to be determined relations. In other words, whatever you determine x to be,
in the determination you must limit the potentiality of x, so attempting to explain the
dynamic state of x prior to identification, you cannot access the potentiality by thinking
the relation between x and the potential to be x through the idea of privation. Privation
merely directs you back “down” the categorical judgment which determined x. It does
not access the potentiality as potentiality. It is casuistical reasoning that thinks the
potential which was limited in deriving x may be accessed by a return from x. Whereas
Deleuze‟s disjunctive judgments function as corrective by reminding you that categorical
judgments contingently – if it helps, think contingent because contextual – limit
potentiality, forming a disjunctive set of judgments does not solve the problem of how to
translate the potentiality involved in the genesis of x into discursivity. One way to make
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the attempt is to note that the difference between “this is x” and “this can be x or y or z,”
is not the most original designation of difference in the disjunctive series attempting to
describe the potentiality generating – and passing through – x or y or z, etc.
Notice this is Deleuze‟s re-writing of Kant‟s avowal of the inability to use
discursivity to describe the non-discursive. Judging a perception, the appearance may be
determined as different objects of experience, e.g. “this is Socrates” or “this is the gadfly
of Athens” or “this is Plato‟s teacher,” or “this is the torpedo fish/midwife,” etc.524
Hence, reflecting upon the “this” regressively from what I might call the disjunctivity of
appearance produces ideas – in the (broadly designated) understanding – which in turn
fall short of exhausting the “this,” i.e. the harlequin world of experience. You might like
to think the “this” is “Socrates,” but “Socrates” is merely one determination of the “this.”
So regressing back to the “this-in-itself,” so to speak, one must regress back from all the
determinations, not just one. Whereas the determinations are disjunctive, the ideas
produced from such a regression are conjunctive. Suddenly the “this” is pronounced
multiple: “this” is “Socrates” and “the gadfly of Athens,” and, etc. Notice, still the ideas
must fall short of telling the whole story of the “this-in-itself.” Further, this mimics
Kant‟s rendition of non-discursivity. What is more, as indicated at the beginning of the
current section, this is Deleuze‟s re-opening of discursivity in Hegel‟s wake.
In fact, this is what Deleuze means in making a technical matter of “learning.”
According to Deleuze, you non-discursively encounter problems in the context, i.e.
environment. For example, consider the problem of the motion of the ocean as you learn
how to swim in it. (Cf. D&R 165 and 192) Different Ideas result from the non-discursive
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intense encounters in the water. Hence, it is as if the forces involved in the learning
process developed the idea you now have of how to swim in the ocean. This links with
the above paragraph by noting: you develop an Idea of “Socrates” through your
encounter(s). Moreover, the fact that these Ideas can evolve indicates their openendedness.
Though Deleuze‟s explanation of the process involved in identifying an
experience regrettably invokes a notion of “consciousness,” the logic of his argument is
still quite tenable. Hence, the terminology Deleuze invokes to formulate his argument
fits into a dialectical movement. Deleuze contends “relations are external and
heterogeneous to their terms” whether these terms be “impressions or ideas.” (PI 37-38)
As such the “real empiricist world” “is a world of exteriority, a world in which thought
itself exists in a fundamental relationship with the Outside.” (PI 38) Considering the
relation, then, between the world exterior to consciousness and the world interior to
consciousness, Deleuze explains exteriority as “a world in which the conjunction „and‟
dethrones the verb „is‟; a harlequin world of multicolored patterns and non-totalizable
fragments.” (PI 38) Notice, Deleuze is not suggesting he can exhaustively describe
intensity – the discursive and the non-discursive remain heterogeneous. The Deleuzian
starting point to dialectic will affirm the difference in a fundamental relationship with
exteriority by allowing an open ended discursive concept as regulative to affirm the
“Outside” as initiating the dialectic. Recall that transcendental empiricism holds the
conditions for the generation of the non-discursive force to originate in experience.
Deleuzian dialectic will affirm the link between first and last moments, between
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experience and ideas, but Deleuze does not want a discursive last moment to eliminate
the non-discursivity of the other (à la Hegel).
The discussion of transcendental empiricism in this section, then, should provide
the wider context in which to understand the following section which explicitly compares
Deleuze with Kant. Further, you should now understand the general mechanism involved
in Deleuze‟s enunciation of pure difference. For example, you should understand
Deleuze‟s inclusive “or” between “the pure concept [le concept pur de la différence]” of
difference and the “Idea [l’Idee]” of difference. The pure concept of difference is the
Idea of difference, i.e. ἕηεξνλ; it is not functioning to determine the difference between
forms – ἐλαληίνλ. Now then, since “looking through” such an idea for Deleuze reveals
the very fractal simulacral character of pure difference recurring through experience, the
pure concept of pure difference as a regulative idea is supposed to refer to the expressive
ontogenetic surge of intensity flowing in experience. This intensity is, of course, nondiscursive. Hence, that to which this pure concept of difference is supposed to refer, as
purely different, is pure difference. (Cf. D&R 222)
Deleuze‟s Structure and Trajectory of Experience
“In Oklahoma,
Bonnie and Josie,
Dressed in calico,
Danced around a stump.
They cried,
„Ohoyaho, Ohoo‟ …
Celebrating the marriage
Of flesh and air.”525
~Wallace Stevens, Life Is Motion

The purpose for this section of the chapter is to show Deleuze‟s structure and
trajectory of experience. This is valuable because moving from a schematic
525
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representation of Deleuze‟s structure and trajectory of experience I am able to
regressively focus in, as it were, on Deleuze‟s discussion of the ground of experience.
So, though it is not as simple as merely replacing Kant‟s name with that of Deleuze‟s,
noting the structural similarities between Kant and Deleuze has become a hallmark of
Deleuze scholarship.526 To begin, then, recalling the constitutive regulative distinction
noted above,
As early as his first book, Empiricism and Subjectivity,
Deleuze rejects the idea of total unities, and works to
analyze how things which are practically speaking unified –
like human being, societies and ideas of God and the world
– come to be so.527
So, where in Kant‟s structure of experience has Deleuze discovered an opening for pure
difference? Pure difference as a pure concept of difference is open as a regulative idea,
and pure difference as the non-discursive fractal simulacral power seen by “looking
through” pure difference as a concept is pure difference as an open version of the thingin-itself. (D&R 222) Hence, whereas Daniel W. Smith‟s celebrated claim “From the
viewpoint of the theory of Ideas, Difference and Repetition can be read as Deleuze‟s
Critique of Pure Reason,”528 speaks to the first opening, I will examine the second
opening in this section of the chapter.
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Whereas Kant‟s Category of Quantity regards plurality, i.e. “magnitude,” (CPR
1998, A 166/B 207) as pertaining to extensive quantity, Deleuze is concerned to discuss
plurality as intensive quantity. The question to ask, then, is: What might such plurality as
intensive quantity look like in Kant‟s structure of experience? Since Kant‟s system does
not have a concept of intensive quantity, Deleuze must create a concept for it. This
concept is the concept of pure difference. In order to learn Deleuze‟s concept, it is
important to discuss Kant‟s structure of experience from Deleuze‟s point of view.
Fortunately, and perhaps surprisingly, Kant had already gestured toward the project.
According to Kant, “In all appearances the real that is an object of sensation has
intensive magnitude, i.e. a degree [Kant‟s emphases]. [In allen Erscheinungen hat das
Reale, was ein Gegenstand der Empfindung ist, intensive Grösse, d.i. einen Grad.]”529
(CPR A 166/B 207) Strikingly, in Prolegomena §24, Kant refers to this very intensity as
“a difference [ein Unterschied] that has a magnitude.” (Proleg 58) In fact, it is clear that
Kant contrasts intensive with extensive magnitudes: “the real does have a magnitude, but
not an extensive one.” (CPR 1996, A 168/ B 210) What is more, Kant suggests intensive
“magnitudes may also be called flowing [fliessende] magnitudes [Kant‟s emphasis].”
(CPR 1996, A 170/B 211)
It is in Kant‟s discussion, then, of freedom and the individual being as free that he
makes a connection between intensive being and the thing-in-itself. According to Kant,
“Only two kinds of causality can be conceived in regard to what occurs, viz. either a
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causality according to nature or one from freedom”; and, Kant clarifies that by “freedom”
“in the cosmological sense of the term, I mean the power to begin a state on one’s own
[Kant‟s emphases].” (CPR 1996, A 533/B 561) Further, “regarding such a subject‟s
power we would frame an empirical as well as an intellectual concept of its causality,
these concepts occurring together in one and the same effect.” (CPR 1996, A 538/B 566)
Hence, Kant makes the same claims that Deleuze will later make in regard to what is
dynamic in experience and found along with appearances.
That is, the extensive pertains to the faculty of understanding, and the intensive
pertains to reason. (Cf. CPR 1996, A 531/B 559) Hearkening back to Aristotle Kant
suggests “Any efficient cause” will have a “character,” and “in a subject of the world of
sense [Subjekte der Sinnenwelt] we would have, first an empirical character [empirischen
Charakter] … [second] an intelligible character [intelligibelen Charakter; Kant‟s
emphases].” (CPR 1996, A 539/B 567) In regard to this “subject of the world of sense,”
whereas the first character is to be associated with intensity, the second character is to be
associated with extensity. 530 Finally, Kant makes clear that in regard to the world of
sense, “The first character could also be called the character of such a thing in
appearance, the second the character of the thing-in-itself [den Charakter des Dinges an
sich selbst].” (CPR 1996, A 539/B 567) Hence, since Kant holds that “if appearances are
things in themselves, then freedom cannot be saved” (CPR 1996, A 536/ B 564), a three
term relation emerges: the thing-in-itself, intensity, and freedom at once both dynamic
and pertaining to the “subject of the world of sense.” (Cf. CPR 1996, B xxvii-xxviii)
Synonymous with this statement Deleuze maintains that “Difference is not phenomenon
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but the noumenon closest to the phenomenon.” (D&R 222) The above comments should
prove helpful as you move through Deleuze‟s structure of experience.
The Table of Contents from Difference & Repetition is a good place to start this
comparison, then, between Kant‟s and Deleuze‟s structure of experience. Consider
Figure 5.2.
Introduction
Chapter 1
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Chapter 5
Conclusion

Table of Contents for Difference & Repetition
Repetition and Difference
Répétition et difference
Difference in Itself
La différence en elle-même
Repetition for Itself
La répétition pour elle-même
The Image of Thought
L’image de la pensée
Ideal Synthesis of Difference
Synthèse idéelle de la différence
Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible Synthèse asymétrique du sensible
Difference and Repetition
Différence et répétition

Figure 5.2
Notice the TOC begins and ends with repetition. Considering the endpoints of the TOC –
the Introduction and the Conclusion – illustrates the change which traversing the structure
is supposed to perform – from repetition and difference to difference and repetition. Yet,
the structure itself begins with difference (-) in (-) itself. Recall the thing-in-itself begins
Kant‟s structure of experience, and yet, you are not to think the structure as such – you do
not notice the thing-in-itself – until you are able to (regressively) look back across the
structure. So, the treatise starts with repetition, the structure starts with difference, and by
the end of the treatise you can think of difference as antecedent to repetition. This is
further supported by noticing the place of imagination in the TOC.
Given the place at which the “Image” of thought appears, continuing the
comparison with Kant‟s structure of experience, you might assume difference in itself
and repetition for itself respectively indicate the intuitions of space and time. However,
this is not the case. Rather, the relation between difference in itself and repetition in itself
follows Aristotle‟s apparatus for indicating the hypokeimenon (ὑπνθείκελνλ). To be
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clear, what I am suggesting is that the logic, i.e. the method, for deriving difference in
itself follows that employed by Aristotle. Consider the explanation Deleuze offers prior
to beginning his treatise,
Two lines of research lie at the origin [l’origine] of this
book: one concerns a concept of difference without
negation [un concept la différence sans négation] … the
other concerns a concept of repetition in which physical,
mechanical or naked [nues] repetitions (repetition of the
Same) would find their raison d’être in the more profound
structures of a hidden repetition in which a „differential‟ is
disguised and displaced. These two lines of research
spontaneously came together, because on every occasion
these concepts of a pure difference and a complex
repetition [ces concepts d‟une différence pure et d‟une
répétition complexe] seemed to connect and coalesce
[Deleuze‟s emphasis].531 (D&R xix-xx)
Note that this is the first of five (5) times the term “pure difference” (D&R xx, 42, 60,
125, and 144) appears in Difference & Repetition – it occurs only once in The Logic of
Sense. (LOS 289) The double entendre involved here, of course, is that Deleuze is
already implementing his thought regarding divergent series – “two lines … which
spontaneously came together” – in regard to origination. As I have already discussed
pure difference as a pure concept above, I will continue to focus on pure difference as an
open dynamic version of the thing-in-itself. Now then, the revelation of this other
difference – pure difference – is tied up with repetition. As Deleuze noted, this repetition
is “complex.” What he means by this is that the repetition is twofold, and these two
repetitions are opposed to one another. Hence, from two opposed terms, so to speak,
Deleuze derives the underlying subject of “pure difference.” “Difference lies between
two repetitions [Deleuze‟s emphasis].” (Cf. D&R 76) This is the difference which –
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though disguised by repetition – initiates Deleuze‟s structure of experience. Pure
difference is (the) difference (-) in (-) itself. (Cf. D&R 125 and 144) 532
Pure difference is the “hidden differential;” it is “disguised and displaced;” (D&R
xx) and, it is located prior to imagination in Deleuze‟s structure of experience. In this
way Deleuze indicates the difference internal to the images which appear to be perceptual
catalysts for the dialectic. “All identities are only simulated, produced as an optical
„effect‟ by the more profound game of difference and repetition.” (D&R xix) As regards
these “simulated identities,” “In simulacra, repetition already plays upon repetitions, and
difference already plays upon differences.” (D&R xix) This “play” which is located in
the ground of experience, accounts for the flowing intensity of animation.
Now, it seems to me there are two ways that Deleuze can justify such a structure
in which non-discursivity is supposed to inhere, and he need not distinguish between
them. On the one hand, he could consider the first difference as the third in a descending
line of four terms and suppose the fourth term to refer to the non-discursive “term” pure
difference. To do so would be like Aristotle‟s use of analogy, but in regard to the
intensive. On the other hand, he could just arrive at Difference in itself by thinking of it
as indicated by the (disguised) repetition of the complex repetition thought as Repetition
for itself. In either case you get Difference in itself by itself, as it were, and the
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unraveling of the simulacrum – discussed in the first section of this chapter – can be
considered to indicate the sensational power flowing through perception. In this way,
rejecting the idea of total unities, an open idea of flowing pure difference replaces the
thing-in-itself.
Consider that, according to Deleuze, “The privilege of sensibility as origin
appears in the fact that, in an encounter, what forces sensation and that which can only be
sensed are one and the same thing, whereas in other cases the two instances are distinct.”
(D&R 145) This distinction is precisely the difference between the starting points of
dialectic. So, despite the non-discursivity of the force of pure difference, Deleuze takes
phase changes in experience to be so much supportive evidence for the persistence of
force – signs of a flowing path of force, i.e. along the trajectory of experience. The
sensational force of pure difference is the perceptual catalyst, i.e. the experiential starting
point, to the dialectic. As experiential, this relates to Deleuze‟s discussion of Kant‟s
threefold synthesis of imagination – the trajectory of experience from the thing-in-itself
through sensibility and imagination en route to the understanding.
To finish with the discussion of Deleuze‟s TOC: Chapters 1 and 2 of Difference &
Repetition pertain to Kant‟s discussion of apprehension; Chapter 3 pertains to Kant‟s
discussion of – the second fold of imagination‟s threefold synthesis – reproduction in
imagination; Chapter 4 – with its “Ideal synthesis” pertains to recognition in a concept;
and, lastly, Chapter 5 points to an asymmetrical synthesis that pertains in general to
Kant‟s distinction between constitutive and regulative ideas in the Critique of Pure
Reason, and in particular to reflective judgment in the Critique of the Power of Judgment.
The movement in Kant‟s case goes from the repeated application of the structure of
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experience to the thing-in-itself, and thereby producing different objects of experience.
The movement in Deleuze‟s case considers non-discursive pure difference to be prior to
the structure which repeatedly marks its movement – the difference between the
Introduction and the Conclusion of Difference & Repetition.
I begin here a consideration of what may be called: Deleuze and the Standpoints
of Architectonic. Now then, Deleuze following Leibniz‟s influence on Kant also thinks
of various standpoints – points of view with different perspectives – along the trajectory
of experience. Recall that in my chapter on Kant I indicated three standpoints in regard
to Kant‟s structure of experience: the experiential, the apperceptive, and the conceptual.
In so far as the conceptual pertained to what Kant calls “the understanding broadly
designated,” Deleuze maintains each of the standpoints I already enumerated and
includes another. Deleuze‟s fourth standpoint is that of Reason, in particular the Ideas of
Reason. (Cf. KCP 51) So, as you can see, this fourth standpoint may be arrived at by
merely considering Kant‟s third conceptual standpoint as pertaining to the understanding
not broadly, i.e. narrowly, designated and adding a standpoint to account for that which
the narrowing subtracted out. This distinction between the third and fourth standpoints,
then, is analogous to the distinction between constitutive and regulative Ideas in Kant.
Deleuze following Spinoza thinks of these standpoints along an expressive
continuum. In other words, the trajectory of experience traverses the standpoints of the
structure of experience dependent upon the intensity of power or the force in question.
As univocal expressions of being, these forces indicate the power of which they are an
expression dependent upon the standpoint they are capable of reaching. In this way, pure
difference as the force animating the structure of experience may find its idea in the
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fourth standpoint if it is capable of surpassing the other standpoints. In surpassing the
other standpoints, the force awakens the standpoint of regulative ideas, and sees itself in
the concept it created. As Deleuze puts it, “We become completely expressive [Deleuze‟s
emphases].”533 In order to accomplish this, the second and third standpoints must both be
overcome. Overcoming these standpoints respectively amounts to overcoming both the
“death of man” and the “death of God.” I will pick this thread back up below in
discussing Deleuze‟s reading of the Eternal Return.534
This is why Deleuze, in Difference & Repetition, says, “There is a beatitude
associated with passive synthesis, and we are all Narcissus.” (D&R 74) Recall passive
synthesis in Kant‟s structure of experience pertains to the synthesis of apprehension.
Recall further, the thing-in-itself is prior to the synthesis of apprehension in Kant‟s
structure of experience. Thinking of the thing-in-itself as productive, Deleuze has
replaced the thing-in-itself with pure difference. This pure difference is the intensive
force located in the ground of each individual being. Deleuze‟s construction here runs
parallel with Aristotle by thinking individual beings as related univocally, (Cf. EP 37) i.e.
related by way of focal meaning, to being. Deleuze, then, thinks of the Idea of
Difference, ἕηεξνλ, as the pure concept of pure difference, and pure difference as the
intense being of individual beings expressing being as expressions of being. Notice, this
is Deleuze‟s version of “looking through” an Idea. Moreover, you further see the
relevance of the fractal simulacral character of pure difference now: as a singularity, its
trail connects each individual being with being. It traverses the heterogeneity otherwise
found in the problem of ontological difference. Hence, looking to the passive synthesis
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of apprehension by looking though the regulative Idea pertaining to beyond apprehension
“we are all Narcissus” gazing at ourselves and over the fractal simulacral bridge of
ontological difference – beatitude.
Despite four standpoints, Deleuze will speak of – what amounts to – three phases
in the traversing of the structure of experience. These three phases correspond to activity
along the trajectory of experience, i.e. to the three active syntheses, of the imagination,
understanding, and reason. Put another way, Deleuze takes the overcoming of each of
the original powers to extensively be productive of a mode of representation or
knowledge and intensively to be productive of a mode of existing. Recall Kant‟s three
original powers (transcendental faculties). According to Kant there are
three original sources (capacities or faculties [or powers] of
the soul), which contain the conditions of the possibility of
all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any
other faculty [or power] of the mind, namely sense,
imagination, and apperception [Kant‟s emphasis]. (CPR
1996, A 94/B 127)
First, at the level of apprehension Deleuze encounters sense to be productive of affects.
Second, traversing Kant‟s threefold synthesis of imagination, the product of imagination
is the =x. Recall, the =x, whether subjective or objective, marks the spot of the narrowly
designated understanding in Kant‟s structure of experience. So, Deleuze‟s third phase
pertains to the overcoming of the narrowly designated understanding – movement from
the third standpoint to the fourth. Overcoming the standpoint of the narrowly designated
understanding, then, the animating force creates the concept – as regulative Idea – of
itself and enters into the third phase of the Eternal Return. This may be pictured in the
imagery of overcoming life so as to eat from the tree of eternal life. 535 Hence, the
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epigenesis of knowledge and existence may be parsed into parallel phases of ontogenesis.
Overcoming the standpoint of the understanding in the ontogenesis and the form of the
Same in the epigenesis, the becoming being – the being which is becoming – enters into a
relation of (eternal) recurrence with itself.
In order to make sense of this recurrence: along the trajectory of Kant‟s structure
of experience, Deleuze assigns “different kinds of knowledge,” “different ways of living,
different modes of existing” (EP 289) to each of these phases of ontogenesis. In a
passage worth quoting at length, Deleuze declares:
The first kind of knowledge has as its object only
encounters between parts of bodies, seen in terms of their
extrinsic determinations. The second kind rises to the
compositions of characteristic relations. But the third kind
alone relates to eternal essences: the knowledge of God‟s
essence, of particular essences as they are in God, and as
conceived by God. (We thus rediscover in the three kinds
of knowledge the three aspects of the order of nature: [1]
the order of passions, [2] that of the composition of
relations and [3] that of essences themselves. (EP 303)
Deleuze indicates the first kind pertains to “imagination” and “passive affections.” (EP
289) The second kind pertains to a “constitutive state” of reason or “of understanding.”
(EP 290-291 and cf. EP 296) Finally, the third pertains to the next state of reason where
“God‟s existence is thus known to him through itself.” (EP 301) As I noted above,
difference bridges any heterogeneity in the ontological difference by being the bridge of
heterogeneity. This is the pure concept of pure difference; this is Difference in itself; this
is “looking through” ἕηεξνλ or gazing into an abyss with differences. Hence, “in the third
kind of knowledge the idea of God is, in its turn, the material cause of all ideas.” (EP
305) Recall Figure 5.1, in regard to intensity and the form of the Different the final cause
and the material cause enter into a loop with one another. This is the major difference
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between Kant and Deleuze, Deleuze shifts the placement of the alêtheatic (cf. αιήεηα),536
operator in of the structure of experience from apperception (in Kant) to the becoming
active being‟s intensive loop.
Put into more Kantian language: Though you cannot understand the thing-initself, you can think it with a regulative Idea. In this same way, moving through the
phases you do not return to the ground of the force expressing the phases along the
trajectory until you arrive at the third phase and think the groundlessness of the ground.
This return is the Eternal Return, and it is not the “mythic circle” of the return of the
Same. The Eternal Return is the return of the different as the (regulative) Idea of (the)
Difference (-) in (-) itself. This is supposed to be the height of a looping trajectory. Now
you might want to object that the Idea is different from the force of difference of which it
is supposed to be an Idea. Yet, by pertaining to the form of the Different and not the
form of the Same – ἕηεξνλ not ἐλαληίνλ –, the difference between the Idea of difference
and the force of difference is a productive bridging heterogeneity. It is not an identical
difference derived from negation. In regard to the fractal simulacral,
What is different from difference can be difference in itself,
since difference in itself is different from itself.
So, the Idea of Difference in itself is different from difference; and, Deleuze‟s thing-initself, according to the form of the Different, enters into a recursive loop with itself. This
will have interesting ramifications for the thing-in-itself as a solution to the problem of
non-being.
Deleuze retains within his philosophy my favorite concept from psychoanalysis,
and this concept will help bridge the final gap needed before comparing Kant‟s and
Deleuze‟s structure of experience. That concept is the concept of “cathexis.” Cathexis
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was birthed into philosophical vocabulary by James Strachey (1887-1967), whom you
should recall as providing the English speaking world with Sigmund Freud‟s work in
translation. In order to translate Freud‟s use of the German word “Besetzung,” Strachey
used the Ancient Greek θάζεμηο, i.e. cathexis, meaning to “hold,” “restrain,” or “retain,”
as in the sense of “holding your bladder.” 537 Here is Freud‟s German:
Wir bilden so die Vorstellung einer urspünglichen
Libidobesetzung des Ichs, von der später an die Objekte
abgegeben wird, die aber, im Grunde genommen, verbleibt
und sich zu den Objekt-besetzungen verhält wie der Körper
eines Protoplasmatierchens zu den von ihm augesichickten
Pseudopodien [my emphases].538
And here is Strachey‟s translation:
Thus we form the idea of there being an original libindinal
cathexis of the ego, from which some is later given off to
objects, but which fundamentally persists and is related to
the object-cathexis much as the body of an amoeba is
related to the pseudopodia which puts it out [my
emphases]. 539
The value of this concept in the context of Deleuze‟s philosophy regards the pseudopodic movement by way of contraction and extension. Yet, all you really need to know
about “pseudopodia” in this context is that it refers to the contraction-extension
movement mechanism of an amoeba. Pseudopodia, meaning “false feet,” is used here to
capture the fact that the contracting and expanding moves the amoeba as though it
reached out with feet and walked – though more like a rhythmic pulling itself along than
a scuttling.
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You can think of this rhythmic movement of contraction and extension physically,
virtually, i.e. mathematically, or metaphysically. 540 Interestingly these ways of thinking
about the movements coincide with ways of reading Freud‟s noun form die Besetzung or
the verb form besetzen. Physically the verb besetzen means “to occupy” physical space;
virtually it means “to fill” a virtual structure, and metaphysically it means to psychically
charge a territory with intensity. If it helps you to recognize the difference between the
physical and the metaphysical, think of the duo as analogous to the literal metaphorical
distinction here. Given that the ontogenetic movement of intensity passes through these
points on its way to discovering its Idea of itself, it is possible to construct a graphic
illustration. To create the following series of figures, I combined three of Deleuze‟s
graphics together with one from Henri Bergson for the sake of illustrating a direct
comparison with Kant‟s structure and trajectory of experience. I begin the series with
Figure 5.3.
Bergson‟s Memory Cone (turned on its side)

Figure 5.3
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As you can see, Figure 5.3 provides an illustration of Henri Bergson‟s “memory
cone” turned on its side. The labels being as follows: P stands for the plane of action; S
stands for the contraction of singularities; the various AB combinations as virtual levels
along a trajectory of actualization. 541 As Bergson put it,
between the sensori-motor mechanisms figured by the point
S and the totality of the memories disposed in AB there is
room … for a thousand repetitions of our psychical life,
figured by as many sections A'B',A''B'', etc., of the same
cone. We tend to scatter ourselves over AB in the measure
that we detach ourselves from our sensory and motor state
to live in the life of dreams; we tend to concentrate
ourselves in S in the measure that we attach ourselves more
firmly to the present reality. 542
Given Bergson‟s description, you can see why the graphic is referred to as Bergson‟s
“memory cone.” That is, the cone illustrates the presence of memory, and as memory, it
is the presence of the past. To consider these various AB plateaus of actualization, then,
and S as the point of sensory motor contraction, is to notice the relation between
Bergson‟s memory cone and Kant‟s structure of experience. Such is my general strategy
for moving through the series of illustrations. At this point, I would like to use Figure 5.3
to discuss Deleuze‟s distinction between extensity and intensity.
According to Deleuze, “intensity is an implicated, enveloped or „embryonized‟
quantity.” (D&R 237) “Within intensity, we call that which is really implicated and
enveloping difference; and we call that which is really implicated or enveloped distance
[Deleuze‟s emphases].” (D&R 237) This distance, then, can be illustrated as distance
from S in Bergson‟s memory cone to the AB plateau. Now, since an “intensive quantity
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may be divided, but not without changing its nature,” “the acceleration or deceleration of
[forced] movement defines within it intensive parts.” (D&R 237) Hence,
difference in depth is composed of distances, „distance‟
being not an extensive quantity but an indivisible
asymmetrical relation, ordinal and intensive in character,
which is established between series of heterogeneous terms
and expresses at each moment the nature of that which does
not divide without changing its nature. (D&R 237-238)
How might this be a description of Figure 5.3? The terms AB indicate extensities along
an intensive trajectory; each section (moving left to right in Figure 5.3) between plateaus,
for example the distance between A''B'' and A'B', may be thought of as an intensive part
of the trajectory. The distinction between extensity and intensity is the distinction
between, on the one hand, up and down and, on the other hand, left to right in Figure 5.3.
Notice, then, the memory cone illustrates a contraction (S) expansion which
draws intensity into the structure of experience where it derives its explicit identity
through an association with extensity. This is quite similar to the notion of cathexis, i.e.
intensity and extensity are coupled together along a trajectory which traverses the
structure of experience in a manner dependent upon the power of the involved intensity.
“[E]xtension being precisely the process by which intensive difference is turned inside
out and distributed in such a way to be dispelled, compensated, equalized and suppressed
in the extensity which it creates.” (D&R 233) In fact, I think of the three levels – the
three repetitions – shown on the memory cone as the levels of Quantity, Quality, and
Idea. (D&R 239) In this way Bergson‟s memory cone and Deleuze‟s structure of
experience provide a mechanism to compare Deleuze‟s intensive dialectic of pure
difference with the graphic I originated regarding Hegel‟s shell game. Hence, what was
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the undifferentiated starting point in Hegel is now the differentiated as intensive abyss of
Difference starting point in Deleuze.
Abyss with Differences
Level 1 –
Quantity

Level 2 –
Quality

Idea of Pure Difference

1
2

4

ς

θ ς

θ

3

Figure 5.4
On the one hand, the entire next section of the chapter may be read as expounding
upon Figure 5.4. On the other hand, and what is sufficient for you to grasp at this point:
whereas Hegel‟s dialectic illustrates a version of what Deleuze might call an extensive
version of dialectic, 543 Deleuze‟s dialectic illustrates an intensive version. (D&R 232)
The major claim illustrated by Figure 5.4 being that the difference supposed to be internal
to the first moment of dialectic – the contemporary French critique of Hegel‟s dialectic –
traverses the dialectic and returns to itself. It is as if Deleuze accuses Hegel of conflating
the dialectic of Sameness – of extensity – with the dialectic of Difference – of intensity –
upon which it is actually parasitic. Recall from the Deleuze quote in the above
paragraph, intensity creates extensity. Hence, Deleuze‟s dialectic begins with nondiscursivity, as intensity, i.e. non-discursive intensity, and culminates in an open Idea of
Difference; ἕηεξνλ instead of ἐλαληίνλ, it is as if Deleuze has reverse engineered “looking
through” the Idea of Difference. This difference which permeates the intensive dialectic
is pure difference.

543

Cf. Chapter 3.
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Consider Deleuze‟s distinction between differentiation and differenciation or
different/ciation with regard to Figure 5.3. (Cf. D&R 279),544 Whereas differentiation
pertains to the difference between each A and B, the difference of distance from S
through the AB levels to the top of the cone (far right in Figure 5.3) is differenciation. In
fact different/ciation links with the virtual actual distinction: “Virtuality exists in such a
way that it actualizes itself as it dissociates itself; it must dissociate itself to actualize
itself. Differentiation is the movement of a virtuality actualizing itself.” (DI 40) Further
in “Bergson‟s Conception of Difference,” Deleuze notes, “Differentiation certainly
comes from the resistance life encounters from matter, but it comes first and foremost
from the explosive internal force which life carries within itself [my emphases].” (DI 40)
In order to help illustrate this point, I have added the labels of Bergson‟s memory cone to
Deleuze‟s “Diagram of Differentiation.” In this way, think of Deleuze‟s summary
diagram as embedded within the above cone. Hence, the combination should capture the
embedded branching aspect of Deleuze‟s structure and trajectory of experience.

544

Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, tr., 96-98. Hereafter cited as
Berg.
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Deleuze‟s Summary Diagram of Differentiation

Matter
(relaxation/expansion)
Fixation of carbon
MemoryDuration

(S)
Life
(contraction)

Plant:

(A' B')
Fixation of nitrogen

(A'' B'')
Animal:

Decentralized
nervous system
(A' B')
Centralized
nervous system

Exteriorization and
dominance of matter
(A B)
Conversion and
understanding of life
(intuition)

Figure 5.5
Figure 5.5, then, provides a good illustration of the development of an
“embryonized” or “enveloped” difference of intensity as it actualizes itself along a
trajectory. Also Figure 5.5 provides textual evidence for the dialectical movement
linking first and last moments into a loop – as seen in Figure 5.4. For example, notice
that the bottom right hand corner (also consistent with the left to right movement of
Figure 5.3) of Figure 5.5 indicates the “understanding of life,” and it is “Life” which –
just beyond the S – indicates the beginning of a line which ends with an Idea of itself.
Finally, Figures 5.3 through 5.5 should help you understand Figure 5.6 as a direct
comparison between Kant‟s and Deleuze‟s structure of experience.
Recall the words of the late President of the French Society for Philosophy Jean
Wahl (1888-1974) announcing the beginning of the question answer section of Deleuze‟s
“Method of Dramatization” presentation: “I‟m not going to say system, but an attempt to
peer through the lens of differentiation, understood as twofold, giving us a world
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understood perhaps as fourfold [my emphasis].”545 I created Figure 5.5, then, by
combining (Figure 5.3) Bergson‟s memory cone (M&M 211) (Cf. Berg 60) with
Deleuze‟s “Summary Diagram of Differentiation” (Berg 102) found in his book on
Bergson. In fact, it is with such an upward – as opposed to the downward movement of
genus and species – branching movement which Deleuze will use as support for his
solution to the problem of non-being. Of course, the branching Deleuze‟s graphic
illustrates begin with intuition. This claim finds its support in Deleuze‟s discussion of
intuition as method for Bergson. According to Deleuze, “Thus intuition does form a
method with its three (or five) rules. This is an essentially problematizing method (a
critique of false problems and the invention of genuine ones), differentiating (carvings
out and intersections), temporalizing (thinking in terms of duration) [Deleuze‟s
emphases].” (Berg 35) Lastly, in noting the “two fundamental characteristics of duration;
continuity and heterogeneity,” Deleuze further supports the reading I gave above
regarding difference as bridging the ontological difference, i.e. duration as the continuity
of heterogeneity. The last section of this chapter will address Deleuze and the problem of
non-being directly. Here, then, I will culminate a comparison between Kant‟s and
Deleuze‟s structure of experience with Figure 5.6.
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Gilles Deleuze, “The Method of Dramatization,” Desert Islands and other texts 1953-1974, Michael
Taormina, tr., (Los Angeles, Semiotext(e), 2004), 103.
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Deleuze‟s Structure of Experience

Figure 5.6
As you can see, I took Deleuze‟s graphic of the “Baroque House”546 and turned it
on its side – just as I did Bergson‟s memory cone in Figure 5.3. (Cf. Berg 35)547 The
following, then, is the key for Figure 5.6: (1) Differential elements within the Idea of
Difference, i.e. singular points, which coupling and resonating force singular movements
upward along the trajectory of Kant‟s structure of experience (Cf. FB 60-61) (Cf. D&R
117) – this corresponds with Kant‟s synopsis. Section 1, of course, is non-discursive.
This is why I am fond of saying: were Deleuze to move back “down” the trajectory in the
structure of experience, upon “breaking the being barrier,” the sonic boom would be nondiscursive. Now, as “Matter” in Figure 5.5 shows, “m” stands for those forces which do
not participate in differentiation. 548 (2) “S,” as a contraction, is the contraction of
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Gilles Deleuze, Le Pli: Leibniz et le Baroque, (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1988), 7; Deleuze, The
Fold, 5.
547
It is worth noting, that in reading the primary and secondary sources, I have never encountered anyone
who has attempted such a reading of Deleuze‟s graphics. However, I am aware of and affirm Fred Evans‟
multiple graphics related to Difference & Repetition and A Thousand Plateaus. In general – as you may
have noticed by this point in the dissertation – I believe graphics can function as excellent teaching tools.
548
Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema II: The Time-Image, Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, tr., (London: The
Athlone Press, 2000), 295.
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apprehension549 – this corresponds to Kant‟s first fold of the three fold synthesis of
imagination; (3) the expansion of this contraction expresses in the upward direction of
Kant‟s trajectory a “memory immediately consecutive to perception” 550 – this pertains to
the second fold of Kant‟s threefold synthesis of imagination. (4) This further
differentiated phase corresponds with Kant‟s third fold of the threefold synthesis, i.e. the
=x of (both or either) recognition or apperception. Finally, (5) pertains to the bottom
right hand corner of Figure 5.5, and the “4” in the upper right hand corner of Figure 5.4.
Notice, then, if the trajectory of the intensity involved (the soul power for it)551 is
sufficient, the intensity will climb further, “upward,” along the trajectory of Kant‟s
structure of experience, and in expressing the Idea of itself, (5) enters into a nondiscursive loop with itself – this corresponds to the thing-in-itself initiating an experience
which culminates in thinking of the cosmological Idea of the thing-in-itself. In this way,
(5) may also, recursively as it were, correspond with Figure 5.6 as an expression of the
Idea containing the singular points which correspond to the singularities forced out of the
Baroque House. Hence, “The violence of that which forces thought develops from the
sentiendum to the cogitandum.” (D&R 141)
It is as if “S” represents the attempt to step once in the proverbial river of flux.
Just before the initial bracket of (2) you find an abyss with differences – this
“groundlessness” “swarms” with “differences.” (D&R 277) In fact, the hypokeimenal
derivation of pure difference can be seen by considering the S as complex. The S as
blind apprehension of perception – like lightning – distinguishes itself from pure
difference. It does this not by making pure difference discursive but by indicating the
549

Cf. Deleuze, The Fold, 97.
Deleuze, Cinema II: The Time-Image, 289.
551
Cf. My discussion of Socrates‟ art of midwifery from the Introduction.
550
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movement of non-discursive (intense and pure) difference. Apprehension has the
capacity to perform such a function because it is actually difference which is forcing, i.e.
performing, apprehension. Recall the distance traversed of the structure of experience is
directly (and positively) correlated with the intensity creating extensity by actualizing
itself. Hence, you should be able to see now the manner in which Deleuze has
appropriated Kant‟s structure of experience.
Deleuze has taken Hyppolite‟s cue – noted in Chapter 3 – to the extreme, i.e.
Deleuze has returned to Kant in order to rework Hegel‟s dialectic. As such, Deleuze has
replaced Kant‟s thing-in-itself with pure difference by – following Kant – focusing on
intensive magnitude over extensive magnitude. Associating extensity with the Platonic
form of the Same and intensity with the form of Difference, by way of Plato‟s
dependency of reckoning thesis Deleuze is working toward a solution of the problem of
non-being by working toward an account of being. I will continue referencing Figure 5.6
in the next section.
Pure Difference ex Priority of Time: Deleuze‟s Paradoxes of Time or The Epiphenomenal
Emergence of the Idea of Persistence
“[B]y comparing a quality common to two sensations,
we succeed in extracting their common essence
and in reuniting them to each other…”552
~Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time

In this section I will provide further support for my claim regarding the overlap between
Kant‟s and Deleuze‟s structures of experience. I illustrated this claim with Figure 5.6
above. I will provide further support by showing you how my reading of Deleuze‟s
structure of experience accurately describes his “Three Syntheses of Time.” In order to
552

Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, Vol. VI: Time Regained, C.K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence
Kilmartin, tr., D.J. Enright, rev., (New York: The Modern Library, 2003), 290.
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accomplish this task I will discuss the syntheses and discuss the series of figures above. I
will then use this discussion as support for my further claim regarding persistence. My
claim regarding persistence is important because I will rely upon it to criticize Deleuze in
the following chapters and support my ultimate claim regarding non-being. My claim
regarding persistence: persistence must always only be an assumption regarding intensity
in Deleuze‟s structure of experience. The assumption emerges with the idea of pure
difference due to the “repetitions” which indicate its trajectory. (Cf. D&R 1)553 Deleuze
expresses the persistent aspect of pure difference with notions such as “the chain of force
[chaîne de force].” (D&R 140) However, these repetitions as discursive indications of
non-discursive difference depend upon discursivity to support a claim of persistence.
From a merely argumentative perspective, you might suggest that all claims
regarding the non-discursivity of difference must depend in some way upon discursivity.
Therefore, if this is a problem for Deleuze it will be a problem for everyone. Yet, and
here is the importance of my upcoming conclusion to the dissertation, the specific
discursivity in question is such that it covers over its own gaps in processing. It is not
mere discursivity in general, but the generation of discursivity through experience which
is at stake. Hence, the non-discursive power pulses its discursive indications which
discursively span the trajectory – from discursive indication to discursive indication. On
the one hand, Deleuze can still have his overall claim regarding intensity and being,
despite my argument which undermines his claim of persistence. On the other hand, the
ramifications of this change to his structure and trajectory of experience are tremendous
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Notice what he says about “festivals.” Also, cf. Jay Lampert, Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of
History, (New York: Continuum, 2006), 14.
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regarding how to think about being. I will culminate this thread below by culminating
the dissertation.
To begin then, I will prove my depiction of Deleuze‟s structure and trajectory of
experience by showing how it accurately describes what he refers to as the three
syntheses of time. Put generally – and recalling the Introduction which explains the title
of this section – these syntheses of time are taking place within Aristotle‟s discussion of
the priority of time with which he attacked Zeno. Recall from Chapter 4, in my
discussion of Derrida regarding time I used the following language: coupled together,
there is a sensuous flowing now and a non-sensuous standing eternal now. Further I
showed you Derrida considers that this standing “Eternity is another name of the
presence of the present.” (MOP 46) As such it is possible to distinguish “this presence
from the present as now.”554 This is reminiscent of Husserl‟s Kantian inspired 555
distinction between transcendent and immanent time, and as such the time of the
transcendent is time of the “pure hyletic [my emphasis].”556 Recall Derrida concluded,
“Time is not (among beings). It is nothingness because it is time, that is a past or future
now.”557 In other words, “time is not (a being) to the extent that it is not (present).”558
Now, since Derrida refused to acknowledge non-discursivity, by acknowledging nondiscursivity Deleuze will be able to affirm the above Derridean conclusion while also
affirming the non-discursive force of intensity expressing this “not” of time. Perhaps,
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Jacques Derrida, “Ousia and Grammē,” Margins of Philosophy, Alan Bass, tr., 46.
Cf. Tom Rockmore, Kant and Phenomenology, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), Ch. 4.
556
Cf. Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological
Philosophy, (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), 207 and 210. Notice also the Aristotelian
overtones of hylē as matter which point to the hypokeimenon.
557
Jacques Derrida, “Ousia and Grammē,” Margins of Philosophy, Alan Bass, tr., 50.
558
Jacques Derrida, “Ousia and Grammē,” Margins of Philosophy, Alan Bass, tr., 50.
555
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then, non-discursivity is what Deleuze had in mind when he noted: “I think Husserl has
let something slip away.”559
In regard to Figure 5.6, then, I am looking at the section I labeled “2.” The
contraction S indicates the inception of immanent time or, what Derrida would call, the
presence of presence. Therefore, to the left of S – just prior to S – is the thing-in-itself,
hypokeimenonal remote matter, or pure difference. Both Derrida and Deleuze would
agree with locating pure difference as such. However, recall Derrida rejects any use of a
sign to signify that which would be left of the S in Figure 5.6. Derrida justifies this
rejection be pointing out that discursivity takes place in the sections I labeled “3-5.”
Now, Deleuze can be seen agreeing thus far with Derrida‟s reading of Figure 5.6. Yet,
think back to what I said above regarding Figures 5.3 through 5.5. Hence, Deleuze
affirms what is to the left of S as the non-discursive pure difference traversing the
sections of the structure of experience I labeled 1 to 5. So discursivity is needed to
identify the work of the non-discursive, and just as moment 1 links with moment 4 in
Figure 5.4, what is left of S – for Deleuze – can be identified as pure difference.
So, the question becomes: how does Deleuze think of this non-discursive pure
difference as traversing the structure of experience? Notice that once you are able to ask
this question, then you immediately see why I constructed this section as such. That is,
the three syntheses of time are the discursive indicators along the trajectory of experience
– up/across the differentiating cone – which indicate the persistence of pure difference,
i.e. “Difference inhabits repetition.” (D&R 76) What is more, Deleuze is able to think
pure difference as such, despite Derrida, not due to the assumption of persistence but due
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Gilles Deleuze, “Kant (Lecture delivered: April 4 1978),” Les Cours de Gilles Deleuze, Melissa
McMahon, tr., www.webdeleuze.com, (Lecture transcript retrieved 04/25/2007), 5.
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to the assumption of difference as expressive. It is the thought of difference as expressive
which accounts for the forced movement out of the Baroque House chimney and into the
Bergson cone. Hence, difference as expressive need not entail an isomorphism between
non-discursive force and discursive indicator. For example, even Gabriel de Tarde‟s
(1843-1904), “Imitation is generation at a distance”560 can be thought of without a filled
duration of the same, so to speak, across the distance. In fact, the movement could work
more like a sign signal telegraph system than a pony express delivery system. 561
The answer to the question, then, thinks of the chain of force as an unfolding
which forces the syntheses of time. Consider what Deleuze says in Proust & Signs:
What forces us to think is the sign. The sign is the object of
an encounter …There are only meanings implicated in
signs; and if thought has the power to explicate the sign, to
develop it in an Idea, this is because the Idea is already
there in the sign, in the enveloped and involuted state, in
the obscure state of what forces us to think [my
emphases]. 562
This quote not only repeats – in Deleuze‟s words – what I have already stated above in
regard to the movement from left to right in Figure 5.6, but it also links to the conclusion
of Difference & Repetition in a way which refers to the five (5) sections of Figure 5.6.
That is, Deleuze refers to the states of the unfolding with the following “pli” related
terms: (1) perplication, (2) complication, (3) implication, 563 (Cf. D&R 168) (4)
explication, and (5) replication. (D&R 280-281) Moreover, since according to Deleuze,
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Gabriel de Tarde, The Laws of Imitation, Elsie Clews Parsons, tr. (New York: Henry Holt and Company,
1903), 34.
561
What I hope to capture with this analogy is that in a pony express system, the force of the traveling and
the message being carried are constantly coupled. In a sign signal system the force sending the message
can actually be broken without interrupting the message. Hence, in regard to the latter, the assumption of
persistence would be justified in regard to the message but not the force upon which the message is
supposed to be riding.
562
Gilles Deleuze, Proust & Signs: The Complete Text, Richard Howard, tr. (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota, 2000), 97. Hereafter cited as P&S. Also, cf. Jacques Barzun, From Dawn to Decadence: 500
Years of Western Cultural Life, (New York: Harper Collins: 2000), xiv.
563
Recall implication‟s function in the discussion of simulacra noted above.
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“Kant never ceased to remind us that Ideas are essentially „problematic‟. Conversely,
problems are Ideas.” (D&R 168) These Ideas “are Deleuze‟s equivalent of „regulative
ideas‟ in Kant. … the regulative idea works problematically, to establish the condition
out of which solutions, or „decisions,‟ can emerge.”564 Hence, replication of the
perplication expresses the explication of the Idea implied in the problem-Idea complex.
In regard to differentiation, then, the developing of extensity is the enveloping of
intensity – consider Figure 5.5. This is important to notice because this is how – contra
Derrida – Deleuze is able to think non-discursivity alongside with discursivity in phases
of the structure of experience which should be merely discursive, e.g. the understanding
broadly designated. Moreover, the distance traversed across the structure of experience is
what determines the intensity expressed as envelope; so, Deleuze is able to think of
various determinations as blocking intensity from entering into a circuit with itself.
Ultimately these are determinations which associate being with extensity or attempt to
think of being with, i.e. by looking through, the Idea of the Same. Rather, for Deleuze –
notice the nearly exact position here in regard to Plato‟s Sophist – it is through the Idea of
Difference that you are able to think being. Hence, this being is the being of intensity,
not extensity. (D&R 229) This is why, for Deleuze, “it is being which is Difference.”
(D&R 39) And, be sure not to forget my claim that pure difference is Deleuze‟s
replacement for Kant‟s thing-in-itself: “Being is the difference itself of the thing.” (DI
25)
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Steven Shaviro, Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze and Aesthetics, (Mass: MIT Press, 2009),
32. Also, cf. Gianni Vattimo, The Adventure of Difference, Cyprian Blamires, tr. (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1993), 65.
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Lastly then, before discussing the three syntheses of time, notice that taking
section 1 of Figure 5.6 as the physicality565 (D&R 76-77) of which the mind necessarily
must be – to use Kant‟s terminology – blind, makes section 2 refer to the complex
repetition which hypokeimenally reveals section 1. (Cf. NP 5) Deleuze points this out
with what he refers to as “Hume‟s famous thesis”: “Repetition changes nothing in the
object repeated, but does change something in the mind which contemplates it.” (D&R
70) In order to see how this indicates the initial upward movement of difference in
regard to the structure of experience, consider Kant‟s description of the thing-in-itself.
“For, of course, it is understood that a thing-in-itself is of a different nature from the
determinations that make up merely its state.” (CPR 1996, A 360) In fact, Deleuze
describes the movement precisely as Kant would – noting the place of imagination – in
regard to the structure of experience: “Between a repetition which never ceases to unravel
itself and a repetition which is deployed and conserved for us in the space of
representation there was difference, the for-itself of repetition, the imaginary.” (Cf. D&R
76) Hence, “The movement that changes the nature of things must be founded in things
themselves” (DI 23) Moreover, recall this “repetition which never ceases to unravel”
points to the recurring fractal simulacral character of pure difference, i.e. the pure
difference hypokeimenonally (DI 24) revealed as – regarding Figure 5.6 – in section 1
from section 2.
In sum, Deleuze is working with Kant‟s structure of experience. Yet, he is
concerned with intensive, not extensive, quantity. However, Deleuze also recognizes that
one comes with the other, i.e. intensity is the force that animates extensity. This is how
Deleuze replaces Kant‟s thing-in-itself with pure difference. In other words, Deleuze
565

Deleuze states it negatively: “not physically…”
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thinks “the thing itself, according to what it is, in its difference from everything it is not,
in other words, in its internal difference.” (DI 32) Notice already the distinction between
discursive and non-discursive at work here. The difference that makes all the difference
for Deleuze being the non-discursive which traverses the trajectory and the entirety of the
structure of experience. Hence, Deleuze is able to consider the two different, though
coupled, trajectories of intensity and extensity, and the trajectory of intensity as the
trajectory of pure difference. Now, since Deleuze takes Plato‟s dependency of reckoning
thesis seriously, he thinks difference is being. And – you anticipated it – extensity will
end up as a type of not-being. Though before discussing non-being below, it is important
to understand how Deleuze thinks of the selection involved such that ontogenesis may
either enter into a non-discursive loop566 with itself in the Eternal Return or lose itself in
extensity.
Recall according to Gilbert Simondon (1924-1989), “Looking for the principle of
individuation in a reality that precedes individuation itself means considering the
individuation as merely ontogenesis [Simondon‟s emphasis].”567 The principle of
individuation, then, for Deleuze is difference, and it is through the selection of difference
that the being as intensity of ontogenesis is realized – think Plato‟s dependency of
reckoning thesis here. In other words, if you understand my summation just above, then
in regard to Deleuze‟s consideration of the Eternal Return, you understand, for example:
The eternal return does not bring back „the same‟, but
returning constitutes the only Same [le seul Même] of that
which becomes. Returning is the becoming-identical of
becoming itself. Returning is thus the only identity, but
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Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, 1972-1990, Martin Joughin, tr. (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1995), 139.
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Gilbert Simondon, “The Position of the Problem of Ontogenesis,” Parrhesia, 7, (2009), 4-5.
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identity as a secondary power; the identity of difference,
the identical which belongs to the different. (D&R 41)
Notice Deleuze‟s capitalization of the Same recalls Plato‟s Sophist, i.e. the form of the
Same. Whereas becoming identical is “of becoming itself,” identity “belongs” to the
different. So, you see that “It is no longer a question of selective thought but of selective
being; for the eternal return is being and being is selection.” (NP 71) Selecting the
Eternal Return, then, amounts to looking through Difference – and seeing the fractal
simulacral trail – as the beatitude of being, i.e. the beatific vision. See that which you are
– the being of being-in-the-world – as the epression of the power of the supreme being,
God. (EP 309-310)
According to Deleuze, “It is not being that returns but rather the returning itself
that constitutes being insofar as it is affirmed of becoming and of that which passes.” (NP
48) In the epigenesis, then, of intensity and extensity, affirmation of Difference – not
affirmation of the Same – affirms intensity in a process of ontogenetic selection.
Consider Nietzsche‟s warning from the Cheerful Science to describe the outcome of
selecting the Same:
Sigh. – I caught this insight on the way and quickly seized
the rather poor words that were closest to hand to pin it
down lest it fly away again. And now it has died of these
arid words and shakes and flaps in them – and I hardly
know any more when I look at it how I could ever have felt
so happy when I caught this bird.568 (§298)
It is through affirming extensity that intensity is pinned down, and through affirming
Difference that the Eternal Return of intensity is selected; via this recurrence, i.e. nondiscursive loop, the being of ontogenesis emerges selected through affirming Difference.
(NP 9) Understandably, you might want to attribute the “sort of boldness which animal
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Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Walter Kaufmann, tr. (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 239.
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tamers show, or people who live with a madman and are not afraid of provoking him” 569
to extensity; yet, it is rather the case that extensity must borrow its power from intensity –
the courage of provocation as itself a type of unraveling, i.e. fractal simulacral, madness.
Affirmation as selection, then, leads directly into a discussion of the syntheses of time,
since “the eternal return must be thought of as a synthesis.” (NP 94)
To affirm difference, then, the (will-to-) power (Cf. NP 49) of difference must
overcome the third synthesis in Kant‟s structure of experience, if it is to enter into a
recurring circuitous loop with itself – replicating the explosive perplicating. As such,
entering this loop entails overcoming both the death of (the identity of, the extensity of,
the Same of the becoming of) God and the death of man, and recall this loop is nondiscursive. In this way you can understand the, perhaps, otherwise difficult to understand
locutions of Deleuze reminiscent of Proust‟s, “Very well: had I been obliged, the next
moment, to hurl myself out of the window, I should still have preferred such a fate [my
emphasis].”570 The exemplary quote I have in mind by Deleuze: “Intensity is suspect
only because it seems to rush headlong into suicide [my emphasis].” (D&R 224) Given
Deleuze‟s philosophy, suicide seems to refer to becoming extensity, i.e. the death of man
as extensity, and extensity as “a force separated from what it can do.” (Cf. NP 123) In
fact, as extensive these are “repetitions that have become mechanical because they are
external, frozen differences that revert to a substance that they can no longer make light
and spiritual.” (P&S 49-50) Hence, by thinking through the syntheses of time you see
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that even suicide can be overcome through the Eternal Return. The end of the Same is
not the same as being‟s ceasing to express itself as Difference.
Lastly, then, consider Deleuze’s description of the three syntheses of time, and the
corresponding four paradoxes as evidence for my interpretation of his structure of
experience. The first synthesis (of habit): “Although it is originary, the first synthesis of
time is no less intratemporal. It constitutes time as a present, but a present which passes.”
(D&R 79) This synthesis is “the foundation of time.” (D&R 79) Regarding both Figure
5.3 and Figure 5.6 this synthesis pertains to apprehension as the “S” contraction, i.e.
section 2 in Figure 5.6. In Difference & Repetition Deleuze refers to the corresponding
first paradox as the paradox of the “contemporaneity of the past with the present that it
was.” (D&R 81) In Bergsonism Deleuze refers to the first paradox as the “paradox of the
leap” (Berg 61): “to constitute time while passing in the time constituted.” (Berg 61)
Hence, the contemporaneity pertains to the manner in which the contraction at “S”
hypokeimenally reveals the combination of sections 1 and 2 from Figure 5.6; and, the leap
pertains to the leap from section 1 into section 2. This is also a rehearsal of transendent
time as contemporaneous with immanent time at the “S” with which I began this section
of the chapter, i.e. referring to Husserl and Derrida. As noted above in discussing Figure
5.6 this corresponds to apprehension in Kant‟s structure of experience.
The second synthesis (of memory): “Memory is the fundamental synthesis of time
which constitutes the being of the past.” (D&R 80) And, “It is memory that grounds
time.” (D&R 80)571 In both Difference & Repetition and Bergsonism Deleuze refers to
the second paradox as the paradox of coexistence (Berg 61): “all of the past coexists with
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the new present in relation to which it is now past.” (D&R 81-82) Notice, at this point in
the trajectory traversing Deleuze‟s structure of experience – as illustrated in Figure 5.6 –
the virtuality of the cone has been entered. So, “all of the past” coexists with the new
present virtually. It should be of no surprise, then, that Deleuze calls this synthesis, what
is section 3 in Figure 5.6, “memory.” This is also how I referred to section 3 of the
illustration above, and in regard to Kant, the synthesis is the second of the threefold, i.e.
reproductive imagination or memory.
The third synthesis, then, is “the empty form of time” (D&R 88): “The form of
time is there only for the revelation of the formless in the eternal return. The extreme
formality is there only for an excessive formlessness.” (D&R 91) In Difference &
Repetition Deleuze refers to the third paradox as the paradox of “pre-existence”: “the
pure element of the past in general pre-exists the passing present [my emphasis].” (D&R
82) In Bergsonism Deleuze refers to this (third) paradox as the “paradox of Being” (Berg
61): “There is a difference in kind between the present and the past.” (Berg 61) On the
one hand, my emphasis of the term general [l’élément pur du passé en général], on the
other hand the difference between the present as sensibility and the past as understanding,
should indicate to you Kant‟s synthesis of recognition. The pure form is the =x, i.e. the
object in general. The third synthesis is the understanding – which as I noted for Deleuze
is – narrowly designated. Hence, this is what I referred to in Kant‟s structure of
experience as the conceptual standpoint. In Figure 5.3 this would be the A'B' plane; in
Figure 5.6 this is section 4.
The fourth paradox, then, is called the paradox of “repetition within a life” (D&R
83) in Difference & Repetition and the paradox of “psychic repetition” (Berg 61) in
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Bergsonism. You should already know from what I stated prior to explicitly examining
these syntheses that this pertains to the Eternal Return, the AB plane in Figure 5.3, and
section 5 in Figure 5.6. Hence, in regard to Kant‟s structure of experience the Ideas of
reason have been reached. I referred to this as Deleuze‟s fourth standpoint. Here is
where you can learn the Idea of pure difference from experience, and as the process of
ontogenesis enters here into a non-discursive loop, intensive being as pure difference is
revealed. Just as the “present is always contracted difference,” (D&R 84) the Idea
envelops this pure difference so as to – replicate the perplication – reveal its recursive
fractal character. This is the Idea of Difference which conditioned the ontogenesis –
notice the loop – just as Kant‟s thing-in-itself can be thought of as a cosmological Idea.
To sum the syntheses, then, the first synthesis pertains to the living present as foundation;
the second synthesis pertains to the pure past – “the past which was never present,” as
ground; and, the third synthesis pertains to the future, i.e. the eternal return, as
groundlessness – the intensity of an abyss with difference looking into itself.
In concluding this section of the chapter, I will address Deleuze‟s assumption of
persistence. Notice, despite Deleuze‟s trajectory of experience, no aspect of it
necessitates a “filled” persistence. As you recall my comments above about the pony
express you also notice that the importance of my use of the metaphor above has
persisted – you are further along in this text, and it has meaning here too. Its meaning is
repeated here in difference words. Yet, if you look on each of the pages between the
iteration just above of pony express and the iteration further above, you will notice the
word does not appear on each page between here and there. This is a good example of a
non-filled duration. In other words, because the context (on this page) called for you to
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recall the meaning, you did so. It is perfectly consistent with the meaning of persistent to
suggest, then, that the meaning persisted; however, the evidence cannot support
stretching the claim so as to suggest the meaning was present throughout the interim or
that its presence persisted.572 Hence, persistence must remain merely an assumption for
Deleuze, though the idea of it certainly may emerge with extensive phenomena along the
trajectory across repetitions.
Though I could have – as Deleuze does in Difference & Repetition – dwelled
longer in discussing the three syntheses of time and the four paradoxes, I believe the
above is sufficient evidence to conclude the accuracy of my interpretation of Deleuze‟s
structure of experience. Moreover, in considering my multiple comparisons between
Kant and Deleuze throughout this chapter, I believe I have sufficiently established that
pure difference is Deleuze‟s intensive replacement of Kant‟s extensive thing-in-itself. 573
All that remains is to provide Deleuze‟s reading of and attempt to solve the problem of
non-being. On the one hand, I have already indicated Deleuze considers the problem of
non-being a “pseudo-problem.” Yet, it does not stop him from attempting to solve this so
called pseudo-problem. On the other hand, I have already provided above for you
Deleuze‟s strategy for solving the problem. That is, Deleuze associated intensity with
being and extensity with non-being; however, a number of subtleties need worked
through in order to provide Deleuze‟s solution to the problem, i.e. ?-being.
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Deleuze‟s Response to the Problem of Non-Being: ?-being
“Being is the difference itself of the thing.”
~Gilles Deleuze (DI 25)

In this final section of the chapter I pick back up the thread I was discussing at the
end of the above section. Put another way, I examine the manner in which Deleuze
considered the intensive being of the eternal return to be free. This – again – directly
links Deleuze with Kant. This free intense being emerges when the intensity of the force
that animates you becomes sublime, i.e. when its intensity is of sufficient power,
becoming enters the phase of eternal return – the becoming active of being. This being
will contrast with different types of becoming – including the fractal-like becoming upon
which it rides –, so as to reveal by contrast Deleuze‟s response to the problem of nonbeing.
In 1963 after publishing the short book titled Kant’s Critical Philosophy [La
philosophie critique de Kant], Deleuze published an article in Revue d’Esthétique titled
“The Idea of Genesis in Kant‟s Aesthetics” [“L’idée de genèse dans l’esthétique de
Kant”]. A brief examination of Deleuze‟s reading of Kant‟s critical philosophy here will
provide a point of departure for grasping the relations amongst extensity, non-being, and
?-being. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, it is possible to specify the different types of
judgment in Kant by thinking through his Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of
Pure Reason, i.e. by considering the possible outcomes of the process which combines
sensibility to understanding. First, the intuitive product of sensibility may be determined
in general with merely subjective validity. This is what Kant refers to as a judgment of
perception in the Prolegomena. (Proleg 130) Second, the intuitive product of the
sensibility may be determined in such a way as to yield objective validity. This is what
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Kant refers to in the second edition Preface of the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR 1998, B
11-12) and in the Prolegomena (Proleg 130) as a judgment of experience. Lastly, the
intuitive product of the sensibility, if the understanding “has no concept ready for the
given intuition,” (CPJ 26) may be paused in its relation to the concept of an object in
general, i.e. without being determined by it. This is what Kant refers to in the Critique of
the Power of Judgment as a reflecting judgment or a judgment of reflection. (CPJ 26)
The “the power of judgment,” according to Kant, “holds the imagination (merely in the
apprehension of the object) together with the understanding (in the presentation of a
concept in general) [my emphasis].” (CPJ 26)
Now Kant further specifies reflective judgments as either aesthetic or teleological.
To see how these reflective judgments differ from determinative judgments notice
reflective judgments treat “nature as art,” which “does not, any more than logic, contain
cognition of objects and their constitution [my emphasis].” (CPJ 10) Rather, reflective
judgments provide a means for “the investigation of nature” with which “to observe
nature and hold its forms together.” (CPJ 10) As such, the appearance of “lawfulness” is
“contingent;” meaning the lawfulness which “the power of judgment presumes of nature
and presupposes in it (only for its own advantage), is a formal [my emphasis]
purposiveness of nature, which we simply assume in it [Kant‟s emphasis].” (CPJ 10) In
other words, because the understanding only has the concept of “an object in general” to
contribute to identifying the experience of nature, a regulative idea of reason must be
applied heuristically in the identification of nature. Hence, reason steps in while the
understanding is perplexed and thereby satisfies the power of judgment merely by
providing the ideas with which to complete (the form of) a judgment about nature.
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These judgments are problematic, of course, because what you suppose is
intimately related to what you experience. This is a sensitive matter which I think
requires nuance. There are three points, then, which I hope to stress about reflective
judgments in general before further discussing the difference between the kinds of
reflective judgment. First, a strict division must be maintained, following Kant, between
determinative and reflective judgments. Lest you find yourself arguing that the human
ability to make a computer has some apodictic claim to the meaning of life or nature.
Second, it is a mistake to think that reflective judgments pertain merely to the Critique of
the Power of Judgment and have no place in the Critique of Reason. In fact, as I
discussed in Chapter 2 and mentioned again in Chapter 4, regulative ideas function
heuristically. So, to take the application of a regulative idea as identifying something
beyond experience is to embrace a transcendental illusion – such as thinking you can
know God. Lastly, combining the previous two points, in your struggle – if that is how
you like to think of it – with non-discursivity, what takes center stage is not nondiscursivity but your capacity to create concepts. Nietzsche is the champion of this
Kantian view, but Deleuze systematizes this point and follows suit.
Kant stresses that whereas determinative judgments function “schematically” and
“mechanically;” reflective judgments function “technically” and “artistically.” (CPJ 17)
So when Deleuze, following Nietzsche, 574 suggests philosophy is the creation of
concepts,575 this is neither an attempt to debunk logic nor an attempt to deny the products
of physical science such as digital cameras. Concepts and ideas in the latter cases pertain
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to determinative judgments, and philosophical concepts pertain to reflective judgments.
In other words, philosophy teaches how to think about the world and objects in it. This is
why ethics is always already within the purview of philosophy, i.e. you must think to do
ethics. A machine can make more machines, but the technique and artistry involved in
making concepts of the world and others which the world and others will live into and
through requires thought in its freedom.
One of Kant‟s many achievements, then, with his concept of reflective judgments
was to show, i.e., determine, the non-discursivity of “nature” as a field of infinite
freedom – the abyss where some potential always remains asleep. 576 Looking into such
an abyss, it is your “presuppositions” which both create and guide you in what Kant
referred to as the “labyrinth of the multiplicity.” (CPJ 17) This is why Nietzsche‟s
insight “when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you” 577 provides a
Kantian foil to the Hegelian dialectic. Certainly when you go behind the curtain you may
see yourself behind the curtain. Yet, thinking that this constitutes the ultimate ground
either mistakes a regulative idea for a constitutive one, or lacks in creativity. As Kant put
it, the necessary and heuristic presupposing of concepts in reflective judgments “is
appropriate to the experience of the causality of our own capacity.” (CPJ 35) It seems to
me, those who argue against the efficacy of philosophy either overestimate the power of
determinative judgments or lack the ability to recognize they are always already
operating within a reality constellated by regulative ideas. Hence, Deleuze‟s use of ideas
of intensity and power to communicate what Kant – just above – referred to as the
“causality of our own capacity.”
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Neither reflective judgments nor regulative ideas are merely some eccentric
extravagance of the aging Kant to be found merely in the Critique of the Power of
Judgment. On the contrary, both reflective judgments and regulative ideas appear in the
Critique of Pure Reason. Of course, Kant does not overly dwell on these topics because,
there, he is not providing a critique of the power of judgment. For example, in the
Critique of Pure Reason Kant explains,
Reflection (reflexio) does not have to do with objects
themselves, in order to acquire concepts directly from
them, but is rather the state of mind in which we first
prepare ourselves to find out the subjective conditions
under which we can arrive at concepts. (CPR 1998, A
261/B 317)
There is, at least, no deviation in the Critique of the Power of Judgment regarding
reflective judgments from this statement in the Critique of Pure Reason. The “subjective
conditions” reference queries from where the determination hails, i.e. the understanding
(narrowly designated) or reason. Kant contends that though “all comparisons, require a
reflection, i.e. a distinction of the cognitive power to which the given concepts belong,”
often “Many a judgment is accepted out of habit, or connected through inclination.”
(CPR 1998, A 261/B 317) In other words, often life is lived unreflectively, and you do
not consider whether what you take to be real is logically determined or the outcome of
presumption. Thus Nietzsche declares, “Cynicism is the only form in which base souls
approach honesty.”578 It is as if a significant amount of life is make-believe. In fact, for
Kant “nature” functions much like “thing-in-itself” in that the term derives its referring
power relationally in regard to the structure of experience. That is, there can be no nature
in itself. Kant does not belabor this point in the Critique of Pure Reason, but he clearly
holds such a position already as can be seen in his discussion of the soul and regulative
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ideas. Here you hear an echo of Aristotle on assumptive beginnings for both
demonstration and dialectic.
A phrase perhaps rarely quoted from the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant claims,
“For in that which we call the soul, everything is in continual flux.” (CPR 1998, A 381)
As if anticipating so called psycho-analysis, Kant‟s 1781 discussion of the soul prefigures Freud as a “clown without shame” 579 by invoking the critical insight derived from
the power of reflective judgment. According to Kant,
But if a psychologist takes up appearances for things in
themselves, then as a materialist he may take up matter into
his doctrine, or as a spiritualist he may take up merely
thinking beings (namely, according to the form of our inner
sense) as the single and sole thing existing in itself, or as a
dualist he may take up both; yet through misunderstanding
he will always be confined to sophistical reasonings about
the way in which that which is no thing-in-itself, but only
the appearance of a thing in general, might exist in itself.
(CPR 1998, A 380)
Why must such a thinker be confined to “sophistical reasonings”? Because – like trying
to say non-being from within being – he takes the relations his reason works through to
necessarily pertain to the thing-in-itself, i.e. he “hypostasizes what exists merely in
thoughts.” (CPR 1998, A 384) Kant invokes the same language in the Third Critique
noting one can “use the concept of a natural end in an objective sense;” yet, “whatever
may be found in experience to belong to teleology contains merely the relation of its
objects to the power of judgment,” and such a use is “already sophistical” because any
principle derived from such concepts “is legislative for itself (not nature), namely as a
reflecting power of judgment.” (CPJ 35) Compare also Kant‟s description in Sections:
§61; §84; §91 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment.
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Put in the language of Kant‟s regulative/constitutive distinction among Ideas of
reason it is worth quoting at length,
I assert: the transcendental ideas are never of constitutive
use, so that the concepts of certain objects would thereby
be given, and in case one so understands them, they are
merely sophistical ... however, they have an excellent and
indispensably necessary regulative use, namely that of
directing the understanding to a certain goal respecting
which the lines of direction of all its rules converge at one
point, which, although it is only an idea (focus imaginarius)
– i.e., a point from which the concepts of the understanding
do not really proceed, since it lies entirely outside the
bounds of possible experience… (CPR 1998, A 644/B 672)
Recall, as beyond possible experience the transcendental ideas relate to cosmology,
psychology, or theology. So, the concept of nature, like the thing-in-itself, is a
transcendental idea regarding cosmology. Concepts of the understanding determine
objects of experience; ideas of reason function regulatively in relation to what is always
already a “fictive” “harlequin” “exteriority.” Hence, in their regulative use reflective
judgments treat determined relations sophistically for Kant and such judgments point to a
“casuistry of relations” (PI 36) for Deleuze.
Now then, how is Deleuze‟s idea of ?-being to be thought of as a solution to the
problem of non-being, given what has been said above? It is as if this chapter itself
enters into a loop with itself. Recall I began this chapter by claiming a judgment of the
sublime is tantamount to the unhinging of a concept of the understanding because the
sublime exceeds our ability to recognize it with a concept of the understanding. (CPJ
128) It was this unhinging which signaled the “free play” of imagination. (Cf. CPJ 192195) I also pointed out that a judgment of the beautiful provides a different conception of
harmony (Cf. CPJ 198) – a more musical version of the soul, i.e. the soul as aesthetic
tuning fork. Hence, the value of discussing Kant‟s Critique of the Power of Judgment
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pertains to the vision it provides of a – sublime – power which produces Ideas by
resonating with itself – entering into a loop with itself.
Thinking this power through the Idea of Difference as intense difference reveals
the resonating “soul” itself as the powerful intense individuated (as expressed) being of
difference. Suddenly thinking itself belongs to this intense power of difference revealed
through the Idea of Difference. Thinking through the Idea of the Same, then, provides a
vision of extensity – the so called Other structure. Hence, on the one hand, Deleuze
thinks the intense being as more primordial, and thereby it participates in being itself. On
the other hand, extensity participates in the form of the Same, and as a reactive
displacement of the intense power of difference extensity is associated with non-being.
All that remains to be seen, then, is how Deleuze figures non-being as ?-being.
To conclude this section on non-being and Deleuze, then, consider a perennial
joke regarding mathematics from a source which – as the reference indicates – is
unknown. I quote the joke in its entirety here not for any mathematical significance;
rather, I quote it in full for its ability to illustrate a (metaphysical) point.
An engineer, a physicist, and a mathematician are shown a
pasture with a herd of sheep, and told to put them inside the
smallest possible amount of fence. The engineer is first.
He herds the sheep into a circle and then puts the fence
around them, declaring, “A circle will use the least fence
for a given area, so this is the best solution.”
The physicist is next. She creates a circular fence of
infinite radius around the sheep, and then draws the fence
tight around the herd, declaring, “This will give the
smallest circular fence around the herd.”
The mathematician is last. After giving the problem a little
thought, he puts a small fence around himself and then
declares, “I define myself to be on the outside! 580
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In so far as I am identified by extension as the (apperceptive) I which I think I am, then in
regard to the forces upon which this I is posed, I am on the outside – the Same is on the
outside. Recall, “We do not contemplate ourselves, but we exist only in contemplating –
that is to say, in contracting that from which we come.” (D&R 74) Hence, Difference as
the form of the (non-discursive) inside becomes less associated with the mind as a
privileged inside than with the intense creative forces to which I am blind, i.e.
unconscious. These non-discursive forces refuse to bear the mark of identity. 581 As
Deleuze would have it, to affirm that the discursive apperceptive I is a momentary
expression of the creative non-discursive me (moi) is to affirm, and thereby not to
impede, the flow of intensity which is most me. Though I stand outside – as an extension
– of this flow, I become aware of it through disguised affects – the sublime surges of
intense power of each is me, and me is always a prerequisite for I, i.e. I is on the outside.
By considering non-being a pseudo-problem (Berg 17), then, Deleuze not only
aligns himself with Bergson, 582 but also with Derrida. It is as if Deleuze is suggesting
that from the perspective of non-discursive intensity, “non-being” must be discursive to
have meaning. In this way, Deleuze is emphasizing the second impasse of the problem of
non-being. Yet, this is Deleuze‟s mistake. Reading the problem as such, Deleuze
embraces Aristotle‟s paradigm shift by returning to a priority of account perspective.
Consider Deleuze‟s comments, “Being or nothing, being or non-being, are equally
undifferentiated: the two conceptions [my emphasis] come together in the idea of
becoming having a final state, „In metaphysical terms, if becoming could end in being or
nothing …‟ [Etre ou néant, être ou non-être également indifférenciés: les deux
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conceptions se rejoignent dans l’idée d’un devenir ayant un étant final. «En termes
métaphysiques, si le devenir pouvait aboutir à l’être ou au néant…»583]” (NP 46) This is
a mistake because Deleuze had already enunciated non-discursive being. What I would
rhetorically ask Deleuze, were he alive today: if being can be non-discursive, why can‟t
non-being pertain to non-discursivity?
My hope in asking Deleuze such a question would be to highlight his assumption
of persistence in regard to this intense non-discursive being he has enunciated. Notice –
though Deleuze failed to solve the problem of non-being –, all he had to do was articulate
a way to highlight a break in the intense flow of being. As such the break in the flow
would indicate non-being. What is more, the whole business of debating whether this
break in the flow of being is a logical or non-logical negation would be a sham. There
need be no discussion of “negation” in regard to a break in the intensity. Hence, I believe
Deleuze progressed further toward solving the problem of non-being than Derrida by
highlighting non-discursivity; however, ultimately, his innovations to Kant‟s structure of
experience failed to reveal sensibility‟s secret origin. As such, notice how Deleuze
lapsed into a rejection of the problem of non-being by overly focusing on negation.
In a way Deleuze did, in fact, articulate a break in the flow of being. Deleuze
articulates extensity as a break in the flow of intense being, i.e. in the epigenesis of
extensity and intensity. As can be seen in my quotation above from his Nietzsche &
Philosophy, Deleuze thinks of non-being as the “terminal state” of ontogenesis. Eternal
return is being, falling into representation, etc. is non-being. However, as such when the
ontogenesis breaks it falls into becoming, and when its flow loops it is. Notice, like
Aristotle, Deleuze has reduced Plato‟s trinity of Being, Becoming, Non-Being to Being
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and Becoming. This is another way to recognize Deleuze failed to solve the problem.
And, whereas in regard to Derrida – noted in the above paragraph – Deleuze progressed
further toward solving the problem, this reduction of Plato‟s trinity proves Deleuze did
not advance as far as Kant toward solving the problem.
So, what is Deleuze‟s justification for shifting from non-being to ?-being ? Given
the passage‟s relevance, I quote at length. According to Deleuze,
we must consider whether or not the celebrated thesis of the
Sophist, despite certain ambiguities, should be understood
as follows: „non‟ in the expression „non-being‟ expresses
something other than the negative. On this point, the
mistake of the traditional accounts is to impose upon us a
dubious alternative: in seeking to dispel the negative, we
declare ourselves satisfied if we show that being is full
positive reality which admits no non-being; conversely, in
seeking to ground negation, we are satisfied if we manage
to posit, in being itself or in relation to being, some sort of
non-being (it seems to us that this non-being is necessarily
the being of the negative or the ground of negation). (D&R
63)
Since you are reading this in Chapter 5, Deleuze has stated nothing new, i.e. nothing that
you cannot recollect from above. The quote goes toward justifying my reading of
Deleuze‟s reading of the problem of non-being as I have been articulating it throughout
this chapter. Yet, what he states parenthetically in the above quote is important. With
parentheses, as it were, Deleuze expresses his reduction of Plato‟s trinity. Deleuze is
entangled and forced to produce such a reduction because he attempts to solve the very
aspect of the problem which he considers “pseudo,” i.e. how can “non” be a form of
negation?
Notice Deleuze‟s retreat to Aristotle‟s heavy logical hand as he sums the passage
I quoted above:
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The alternative is thus the following: either there is no nonbeing and negation is illusory and ungrounded, or there is
non-being, which puts the negative in being and grounds
negation. Perhaps, however, we have reasons to say both
that there is non-being and that the negative is illusory.
(D&R 63)
With Deleuze‟s summation he has bolted the question of negation to the problem of nonbeing. And, such an extensive explication should be counter to Deleuzian intuition, i.e.
counter-intuitive given Deleuze‟s “system.” Hence, it is not wrong for Deleuze to invoke
ἕηεξνλ and ἐλαληίνλ in concluding the above; however, he should recall Kant‟s real
negation as pertaining to what is accessed by looking through ἕηεξνλ, instead of
considering ἕηεξνλ as real negation.
It is by invoking ἕηεξνλ and ἐλαληίνλ, then, that Deleuze makes sense of his use
of “( )” and “?” in regard to non-being.
Being is also non-being, but non-being is not the being of
the negative; rather, it is the being of the problematic, the
being of problem and question. Difference is not the
negative; on the contrary, non-being is Difference: heteron,
not enantion. For this reason non-being should rather be
written (non)-being or, better still, ?-being [Deleuze‟s
emphases]. (D&R 64)
Strangely gesturing toward Rockmore‟s comment in Chapter 3 regarding Hegel, Deleuze
sounds as though he is equating being and non-being.584 Yet, Deleuze here, of course,
thinks being as embedded within its own internal difference, i.e. as fractal simulacral, and
thereby Deleuze is still anti-Hegelian with this “Being is also non-being.” Hence,
Deleuze claims “non-being” without the parentheses stands for contradictory negation,
(D&R 68) and ?-being or (non)-being, stating the “non” parenthetically, stands for “the
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differential element in which affirmation, as multiple affirmation, finds the principle of
its genesis.” (D&R 64)
I will conclude this chapter, then, by discussing two last Deleuze quotes. First, on
the one hand, Deleuze holds, “the two forms of negative non-being [le deux formes du
non-être négatif],” are: “a non-being of logical limitation [un non-être de limitation
logique]” and “a non-being of real opposition [un non-être d’opposition réelle].” (D&R
108) Deleuze‟s position here is, of course, ultra-Kantian. Yet, he considers the real
opposition to necessarily mean opposition between two beings. Rather, here in the
structure of experience is precisely where he should have located the break in being. On
the other hand, Deleuze holds,
As for negation, this is only the shadow of the highest
principle, the shadow of the difference alongside the
affirmation produced. Once we confuse (non)-being with
the negative, contradiction is inevitably carried into being;
but contradiction is only the appearance or the
epiphenomenon, the illusion projected by the problem, the
shadow of a question which remains open and of a being
which corresponds as such to that question. (D&R 64)
In order to draw a conclusion, then, regarding what has been said thus far, it is possible to
speak of three terms here: (1) pure becoming, (2) pure being as pure difference, i.e. the
becoming active of being or the intense being of the eternal return, and (3) ?-being as
(non)-being, i.e. becoming reactive. Whereas 1 is associated with ontogenesis, 2 and 3
are associated with the epigenesis of ontogenesis. Further, 1 is associated with nondiscursivity prior to apprehension, 2 is associated with non-discursivity and intensity, and
3 is associated with discursivity and extensity. Hence, 3, i.e. ?-being is Deleuze‟s
response to the problem of non-being.
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The problem with Deleuze‟s response: on the one hand, you might like to
associate the three terms with Becoming, Being, and Non-Being. However, despite the
fact that the terms are three in number, Deleuze is only discussing Becoming and Being.
This is why in Nietzsche & Philosophy he can consider 2 and 3 becoming active and
becoming reactive, respectively; “The eternal return teaches us that becoming-reactive
has no being.” (NP 72) Recalling Figures 5.3 and 5.6

This in itself is sufficient to prove

Deleuze has failed to solve the problem of non-being. On the other hand, notice Deleuze
thinks “problems and questions in their difference in kind from answers-solutions: the
(non)-being of the problematic which rejects equally the two forms of negative nonbeing.” (D&R 108) Now here, you might like to question why and how ?-being can refer
to both 1 and 3. This is because Deleuze is associating the ?-being with becoming, and as
such ?-being in 1 is pure becoming, in 2 it is becoming active being and of Difference, in
3 it is becoming reactive and of the Same. Hence, Deleuze‟s Hegelian sounding
association of being and non-being refer to 3. In sum, Deleuze’s non-being, i.e. (non)being or ?-being, is – as you should see by its association with becoming – a type of notbeing.
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“[Kant] simultaneously gave us a history of our subject, fixed its problematic, and professionalized it
(if only by making it impossible to be taken seriously as a „philosopher‟
without having mastered the first Critique).”585
~Richard Rorty
“Seeing into darkness is clarity; knowing how to yield is strength;
use your own light and return to the source of light;
this is called practicing eternity.” ).”586
~Laozi

Chapter Six: Part I Summary
In order to provide a concise summary of Part I, I will indicate what I believe to be some
of the main ideas in each of the chapters. This summary is not intended to be an
exhaustive list of every claim made in Part I. Rather, this summary is intended to remind
you of some of the more salient aspects of Part I prior to entering Part II. Recall I began
the Introduction by claiming that the topic of this dissertation is the problem of nonbeing, and announcing I would address this topic in order to criticize the contemporary
readings of “pure difference” put forth by Derrida and Deleuze. Since I indicated the
method for addressing this topic could be divided into two treatments, this summary
indicates the culmination of what I referred to as the first “negative” treatment. Of
course, then, Part II will indicate the culmination of the positive treatment, and provide
my solution to the problem of non-being.
In the Introduction, then, I introduced you to the problem of non-being by
teaching you the criteria Plato enunciated for its solution in the Parmenides and the
Sophist. I also discussed the value of solving the problem of non-being. According to
Plato, the problem needs to be solved to determine the relations amongst Being,
Becoming, and Non-Being. In other words, Plato‟s dependency of reckoning thesis
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holds: you cannot recognize being until you recognize non-being. I, then, pursued Plato‟s
distinction between “ἐλαληίνλ” (enantion) and “ἕηεξνλ” (heteron). The value of the
distinction can be found in Plato‟s discussion of ἕηεξνλ as Difference-in-Itself, or the
form, i.e. Idea, of Difference itself. Further, I discussed the manner in which “looking
through” the Platonic Idea of ἕηεξνλ was supposed to provide a solution to the problem of
non-being. Hence, the discussion spoke directly to both establishing the criteria and
context for the problem and establishing the origin of the attempt to solve the problem of
non-being by using the Idea of Difference.
The lineage here, of course, being from Plato‟s Idea of Difference to Derrida and
Deleuze. However, recall, just as I consider the suggestion of Difference as merely an
ironic solution to the problem of non-being in the Sophist, neither Derrida‟s nor
Deleuze‟s revaluation of Difference solves the problem. As I also highlighted above, this
does not mean the strategy in regard to dialectic is untenable. Rather, the Idea of
Difference can be used to point outside the dialectic. Though ultimately what is being
pointed to, as such, is the experiential standpoint of Kant‟s structure of experience.
Recall that there were a number of ways to posit a version of not-being beyond the
experiential standpoint; however, they generally fit into one of two categories
corresponding to Kant‟s justifications for the thing-in-itself.
Warranting the claim of beyond the experiential standpoint, philosophers either
appeal to logic or some peculiarity of the power, i.e. faculty, of the mind functioning at
the level of the structure of experience in question. Though Kant employs both means for
justifying the thing-in-itself, Aristotle stands as the champion of appeal to logic. In other
words, recall what I referred to as Aristotle‟s arsenal with which he accounted for
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opposition and change within being. With his matrix of opposition and the logic of the
ὑπνθείκελνλ, i.e. hypokeimenon, Aristotle also provided a method for arriving at remote
matter which would be equivalent to an outside of dialectic, and perhaps even – regarding
Kant‟s structure of experience – what may be referred to as Aristotle‟s thing-in-itself.
Yet, as I stressed multiple times: given that the employment of logic depends upon the
activity of the mind, i.e. a fortiori being, such justifications for claiming a beyond fail to
solve the problem of non-being. It is not that they are illogical, they may be perfectly
logical. Rather, they fail to overcome the first impasse of the problem – “you may not
and ought not to attribute being to not-being … it is unthinkable.”587
The regulative idea of Kant‟s Copernican revolution, then, functions in place of
Aristotle‟s hypokeimenal logic – the specific indication of the ὑπνθείκελνλ derived by
regressing from the object of experience. So regression from the object of experience to
the thing-in-itself counts as a method for logical, i.e. structural, indication. Most
importantly, again, as logic driven, it fails to solve the problem of non-being. Negating
that which is indicated – as all the above thinkers were quite eager to point out – itself
indicates more logic, i.e. not-being. Hence, Derrida‟s logic of supplementarity holds in
regard to such a method for solving the problem of non-being. That is, whatever the
solution appears to be, it is always a supplement to the non-being for which it was
posited.
Derrida‟s logic of supplementarity, i.e. the movement of Différance, is – I think –
best explained by discussing discursivity. Derrida, of course, would not have approached
the issue as such, since he does not affirm the meaningful use of “non” in regard to nondiscursivity. In this way, a tangent can be seen running from a merely logical reading of
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Plato‟s Sophist to Aristotle through the higher faculties in Kant‟s structure of experience
through Hegel to Derrida. Hence, this tangent connects any number of articulations,
then, which fail to overcome the first perplexity or impasse of the problem of non-being.
On the one hand, like Theaetetus, these thinkers either fail to remember the criteria of
ineffability, or they deny it. On the other hand, as Chapter 3 illustrated, logic as a method
cannot overcome the first perplexity or impasse of the problem.
The second method, then, for solving the problem reveals a different tangent line.
This tangent line would run from reading the solution to the problem of non-being in
Plato‟s Sophist as ironic to Gorgias‟ distinction between conceptual and perceptual
negation through the lower faculties of Kant‟s structure of experience to Deleuze‟s
reading of pure difference as a quantity of intensity in an eternal non-discursive loop with
itself. Hence, the second method is precisely the second justification Kant provides for
positing the thing-in-itself, i.e regarding the faculties or powers functioning along the
trajectory traversing the structure of experience. In other words, negating not the place or
location within the structure of experience, rather negating the power functioning at the
ground of experience.
Hearkening back to my discussion of what I refer to as the Socratic schools, i.e.
stoicism, skepticism, hedonism, and cynicism, a defining difference between the two
methods I am discussing can be seen in the prolêptic which emerges from applying each
of the methods. Recall in Chapter 2 I referred to the two different kinds of prolêptic as
conceptual and perceptual, respectively. Whereas the first method leaves its practitioner
looking in thought, the second method leaves its practitioner looking for evidence of a
flicker in the power at the ground of experience. Hence, not only is the second method
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the better method for solving the problem of non-being, it also provides the most
appropriate anticipations for its practitioner. Of course the solution to the problem of
non-being will not be “in” the writing. The writing – this writing you are reading – as
clearly being writing must function as prolêptic in regard to the power functioning at the
ground of experience. This is precisely the thinking at work in Part II below.
Differences along the tangent line, then, are differences regarding the power
functioning at the ground of experience. These differences may be large in scope, such
as disagreeing which power is functioning at the ground of experience, or these
differences may be more narrow in regard to specific aspects of the grounding power. In
either case, being in Kant‟s wake means this ground is the elusive kaleidoscopic (so
called) “latch” of being. From Aristotle onward philosophers have regarded the power
functioning at the ground of experience to be imagination. Even those who take the
second fold of Kant‟s threefold synthesis of the imagination as forming the foundation (I
mean “foundation” here technically, as Deleuze thinks it) of experience, believe
imagination prerequiste lest you be snagged on Kant‟s blindness thesis. Hence, the
brilliance of Wurzer‟s notion of filming. Lifting the veil means imagination‟s opening on
to itself – its memory – developing, i.e. gaining, sight. On the one hand, a notion with
which Hegel was happy to make hay: the ground acts like a chameleon in regard to
retrospective thought. On the other hand, thinking imagination as power of the ground,
from the second perplexity of the problem of non-being, the ground dances like an
abyssmal kaleidoscope – filming‟s filming functions by un-realing.
As a large in scope difference, then, and, by allowing hypokeimenonal logic to
regress to the ground, Deleuze thinks the power of the ground of experience as sense. In
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this way he follows Kant by choosing the first of Kant‟s three original faculties of
experience, and by allowing the hypokeimenal logic to fully regress into what he sees as
the fractal simulacral character of the ground. Notice this is a peculiar mixture of
Aristotle with Kant. Deleuze‟s assumption of a seamless phase change from becoming to
being through a logic of sense follows Aristotle through Hyppolite‟s Hegel so as to
overcome Kant‟s blindness thesis. Hence, Deleuze applies the second method and arrives
at the ground as multiplicity. Think of the resonating differential elements on the ground
floor of the Baroque House illustration.
Now here is the final distinction I wish to draw in regard to Part I. I draw this
distinction to support my claim that Kant advanced further than any of the prior thinkers
– Plato excluded for reasons noted above – toward solving the problem of non-being. I
might paraphrase this distinction by suggesting: whereas Kant remains skeptical in regard
to the thing-in-itself, Deleuze takes a more stoic stance in regard to pure difference. Put
another way, just as in Chapter 2 I discussed the reconciling of “the metaphysics of
metaphysics” with “the end of metaphysics,” it would be incorrect to posit the thing-initself as either being or becoming. However, Deleuze is comfortable positing pure
difference upon which the structure of experience is riding, i.e. structurally prior to
repetition or contraction, as becoming.
If it helps here, think of Kant‟s Table of Nothing. On the one hand, Kant
recognizes the “Tableness” as discursively barring a recognition of non-discursivity –
filming‟s filming functions by un-realing. Kant‟s strategy for post-sense preapprehension, i.e. blind synopsis, is to think of non-discursivity – à la Leibniz – as
excessive. Another way to put the point: Kant showed the appropriate relation to
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Aristotle‟s priority of being. The value of pointing to this excessivity is not that it itself
solves the problem of non-being. Rather, on the other hand, the value of locating nondiscursivity functions along with the value of the Table of Nothing. That is, both provide
a subtle discursive way to paradoxically discuss the ground of experience and its
negation, i.e. the nihil negativum of non-being, as sub-discursive. These depictions of the
ground of experience remain true to the tangent line of the second strategy and to Plato‟s
puzzle, i.e. the problem of non-being.
I, too, follow the second strategy for solving the problem of non-being. Recall
Kant believed “affinity” to govern the multiplicity of non-discursive sense. Kant was
more correct than he was even able to see. Affinity does, in fact, govern sense, and, what
is more, affinity is itself a product of the power of memory – the memory of the real.588
As such, memory – to use Kant‟s language – is “the secret of our sensibility’s origin.”
(CPR 1996, A 279/B 335) So, following the second strategy I differ from Kant and
Deleuze because I think the ground of experience as the power of memory. Part II of the
dissertation will provide support for this claim by looking at contemporary memory
research.
Here, then, is how I refer, in an abbreviated fashion, to the power grounding
experience: memory as play-ground and memory as psychic circuit breaker. Especially
for those who are not familiar with the research, it will require Part II below to flesh out
what I mean here. On the one hand, by mapping the above visions of pure difference
from Derrida and Deleuze onto the structure of experience, in light of contemporary
memory research, I culminate the negative part of my critique of pure difference. In this
way, I am granting Derrida and Deleuze their theses; however, I argue their theses are
588
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misplaced in regard to the structure of experience and fail to meet Plato‟s criteria for the
solving the problem of non-being. On the other hand, with the support of contemporary
memory research in regard to the structure of experience I solve the problem of nonbeing. In this way, I will discuss what contemporary memory research has uncovered
regarding what Kant called “affinity.” Because the ground of experience is nondiscursive, it is better to refer to “play” than “truth” regarding this ground – hence, playground. And, because I take exception to Deleuze‟s assumption of persistence, I will
argue against persistence of being – hence, psychic circuit breaker. In other words, Part
II will demonstrate that your being does not persist, it pulses; and, since memory
accounts for what is standardly considered the persistence of being, non-discursive breaks
in the play-ground reveal non-being. Hence, I critique pure difference with Non-Being &
Memory by solving Plato‟s puzzle, i.e. the puzzle pure difference was supposed to solve.
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“Habit is a second nature that destroys the first. But what is nature? Why is habit not natural?
I am very much afraid that nature itself is only a first habit, just as habit is a second nature.”589
~Pascal, Pensées §126
“Suppose someone were to ask:
„Is it really right for us to rely on the evidence of our memory
(or our senses) as we do?”590
~ Wittgenstein, On Certainty §201
“A parting word?
The melting snow
Is odorless.”591
~ Bokusui Wakayama,
Japanese Death Poems

Chapter Seven: Part II – Introduction: Memory, Propaedeutic to a Solution
Introduction and Justification for Chapter 7 Sections and Objectives
Here is a succinct statement of the manner in which I am going to conclude this
dissertation: I will show you that Kant‟s standpoints of the structure of experience pertain
precisely to the standpoints adopted as memory loci in contemporary memory research.
By re-articulating, so to speak, Kant‟s structure of experience in light of contemporary
memory research, I am able to help Kant overcome Aristotle‟s paradigm shift in the
problem of non-being. Put another way, using contemporary memory research to support
my claims regarding the structure of experience, I will solve the problem of non-being.
The three standpoints of Kant‟s structure of experience should be thought of as
standpoints of memory. As such, Kant‟s sensibility pertains to the experiential standpoint
of contemporary memory research; Deleuze‟s pure difference as it enters into a circuitous
loop of the Eternal Return pertains to the performative standpoint of contemporary
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memory research; Derrida‟s logic of supplementarity – his doctrine of the sign – pertains
to recollective memory, i.e. the contemporary memory research‟s idea of the movement
of working memory forcing recollections upon entering the conceptual standpoint from
“beneath.” Hence, my innovation is to think through the consequences of rethinking
memory in Kant – particularly sensibility and what he referred to as “affinity” in the
Critique of Pure Reason – in light of contemporary memory research.
This chapter, then, briefly examines Plato to situate a discussion propaedeutic to
19th, 20th, and 21st century thinkers regarding memory. In this way, recalling Kant‟s
structure of experience, I am able to show continuity from Plato through Kant to
contemporary memory research. On the one hand, then, in this chapter I trace the
philosophical roots of the contemporary memory discoveries with which I solve the
problem of non-being. On the other hand, I provide a historical reading of the research
most salient for the sake of solving the problem of non-being.
Anamnēsis: Dismembering and Remembering … Memory
“It is quite true what philosophy says, that life must be understood backwards.
But that makes one forget the other saying, that it must be lived – forwards.
The more one ponders this, the more it comes to mean that life in time is never properly intelligible,
for the very reason that at no point can I find complete repose in which to take up the position –
backwards.”592
~Søren Kierkegaard, The Diary of Søren Kierkegaard

§1 Mnemosyne – “Mnemosyne,” names “a power” which can “decipher the
invisible.”593 And, of origins, Hesiod (circa 8th century BCE) recalls in Theogony,
Mnemosyne was the mother of the nine Muses. 594 Plato reiterates the genealogy in his
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Theaetetus (191d), and for reasons which I shall make clear shortly, this passage amongst
others regarding memory from Plato are worth considering. I.M. Crombie suggests,
“Everybody who has heard of Plato has heard of the doctrine of anamnēsis (ἀλάκλεζίο)
or recollection. It is indeed an essential part of Plato‟s philosophical outlook. It is
however not quite so easy to say what precisely the doctrine is.” 595 Fortunately, I am not
concerned to precisely state Plato‟s doctrine of anamnēsis here. Rather, I am concerned
to make one simple claim about memory as it appears in Plato and to provide textual
support for my claim. My claim is that whatever Plato thought of memory, his texts
discuss multiple processes which function similarly enough to all be referred to as
processes of memory. In other words, Plato discusses memory as multiple. Just as
something of Mnemosyne resides in the Muses in accord with which we may call her
their mother – call it, reminiscent of Wittgenstein, a family resemblance. So to, the
multiple processes and functions dispersed throughout experience may be referred to as
the work of the power of memory. The passages I have picked come from the following
dialogs: Theaetetus, Phaedrus, Phaedo, Republic, and Meno.
§2 Plato’s Three Metaphors for Memory – Contemporary memory researchers
seem quite concerned to identify which thinker(s) was the first to conceive of a particular
model or conception regarding memory. I am reminded of Alfred North Whitehead,
“The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it
consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.”596 When I articulate what I will refer to as the
“Contemporary Memory Canon” below, I will indicate the widely accepted first thinkers
and their corresponding texts. However, a brief consideration here of the possibility that
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Plato may have thought of memory as multiple will be fruitful. Plato‟s Theaetetus
provides two highly celebrated metaphors for memory. The first of which is the “block
of wax.” According to Socrates,
I want you to suppose, for the sake of the argument, that we
have in our souls a block of wax, larger in one person,
smaller in another, and of purer wax in one case, dirtier in
another; in some men rather hard, in others rather soft,
while in some it is of the proper consistency. … We may
look upon it, then, as a gift of Memory, the mother of the
Muses. We make impressions upon this of everything we
wish to remember among the things we have seen or heard
or thought of ourselves; we hold the wax under our
perceptions and thoughts and take a stamp from them, in
the way in which we take the imprints of signet rings.
Whatever is impressed upon the wax we remember and
know so long as the image remains in the wax; whatever is
obliterated or cannot be impressed, we forget and do not
know. (Theaet 191c-191e)
The second celebrated image of memory from the Theaetetus is that of the “aviary.”
According to Socrates,
Suppose a man were to hunt wild birds, pigeons or
something, and make an aviary for them at his house and
look after them there; then, in a sense, I suppose, we might
say he „has‟ them all the time, because of course he
possesses them. … But in another sense he „has‟ none of
them; it is only that he has acquired a certain power in
respect of them… Then using our image of possessing and
hunting for the pigeons, we shall say that there are two
phases of hunting; one before you have possession in order
to get possession, and another when you already possess in
order to catch and have in your hands what you previously
acquired. (Theaet 197c-198d)
That Plato has Socrates reject both of these accounts does not change the fact that these
metaphors continue to be celebrated in the contemporary literature. The metaphors are
similar in that they both account for the banal memory activities of encoding, storing, and
retrieving. Yet, the significant difference between these two accounts, regarding
memory, highlights the aviary‟s improvement over the block of wax. Whereas, the wax
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accounts only for the process of memory known as association, the aviary accounts for
the process of association and recollection.
So far, then, Plato has considered two different memory models – a wax model
with one memory process and an aviary model with two memory processes – and rejected
them both. I will now examine the celebrated metaphor of the chariot driver from the
Phaedrus. Plato has Socrates explain the following:
But since we have found that a self-mover is immortal, we
should have no qualms about declaring that this is the very
essence and principle of a soul, for every bodily object that
is moved from outside has no soul, while a body whose
motion comes from within, from itself, does have a soul,
that being the nature of a soul; and if this is so – that
whatever moves itself is essentially a soul – then it follows
necessarily that soul should have neither birth nor death.
That, then, is enough about the soul‟s immortality. Now
here is what we must say about its structure. … Let us then
liken the soul to the natural union of a team of winged
horses and their charioteer. … To begin with, our driver is
in charge of a pair of horses; second, one of his horses is
beautiful and good and from stock of the same sort, while
the other is the opposite and has the opposite sort of
bloodline. (Phaedr 245e-246b)
At this point we have an immortal soul which acts upon itself, and an image to describe
the soul as a chariot driver and two horses of hierarchically different natures, i.e. one is
more pure than the other. As the parable goes, the soul with the most god-like, i.e.
disciplined, horses is able to rise high enough after separating from its earthly body, i.e.
physical death, to glimpse “Reality” or what is really real. The undisciplined horse, of
course, pulls the charioteer back toward the earthly, spoiling the view. Once
reincarnated, i.e. returned into an earthly body, an (immortal) soul is capable of
recollecting the heavens of which it caught a glimpse. The goal here being to live a life
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good enough to escape the cycle of birth and rebirth – reincarnation. Hence, Socrates
explains,
For just this reason it is fair that only a philosopher‟s mind
grows wings, since its memory always keeps it as close as
possible to those realities… A man who uses reminders of
these things correctly is always at the highest, most perfect
level of initiation … He stands outside human concerns…
(Phaedr 249c&d)
Differing from the wax or the aviary metaphors, then, the charioteer brings forth another
difference.
What is the same across the three metaphors is that all three of them discuss
memory. Unquestioningly each metaphor accounts for encoding, storing, and retrieving
information. Yet, whereas the relationship between impressions and the wax in the wax
example seem to flatten the distinctions between encoding, storing, and retrieving, i.e. if
the impression is in the wax – so long as you have the wax – then you have all three of
the memory aspects, the aviary example seems to accentuate the distinctions amongst the
three aspects of memory – the aviary requires an agent and clearly separates between
encoding and storage (catching the birds and storing them in the aviary). What is more,
the charioteer example suggests these aspects of memory function in a way not discussed
in the other two examples. In other words, this third metaphor is introducing a third
process of memory. This process of memory “keeps the mind as close as possible to
those [most real] realities.” In the order in which I have examined them, then, the wax
metaphor is most dependent upon the earthly physical realm, the aviary metaphor
acknowledges a non-physical or less earthly realm, and the charioteer metaphor
acknowledges the least earthly, i.e. non-physical, realm. Though each of these realms
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calls for encoding, storing, and retrieving information, clearly memory is different in
each of the realms. Hence, Plato discusses memory as multiple.
Before briefly examining examples across three other Platonic dialogs, I want to
stress a few aspects of the hierarchical description which can be seen across the above
examples. First, recall how the wax example discussed the relationship between memory
and other psychic functions. Socrates described the wax as other than our “perceptions
and thoughts” and as taking “a stamp from them.” On the one hand, the physicality of an
impression in wax scarcely requires an agent to perform the act. What the wax comes
into contact with leaves an impression on the wax. On the other hand, Socrates gives no
justification of differences amongst the wax tablets across souls. It is as if the wax tablets
were just doled out, reminiscent of a lottery. Second, the aviary example seems to
require more agency than the wax example. More reminiscent of disciplining the horses
from the charioteer example than the passivity of the wax example, recall that the aviary
requires the man to “look after” the birds. He has “acquired a certain power” in relation
to the birds due to his care for the aviary – no aviary no power over the birds. Here, then,
a degree of separation between memory and that within which a memory is stored has
been achieved. Third, and lastly, another degree of separation has been achieved with the
charioteer. The concern has shifted to the proper organization, i.e. relations amongst, the
encoding, storing, and retrieving of perceptions and thoughts. And, whereas concern in
the aviary example provided for an awareness of agency, concern in the charioteer
example, beyond awareness, provides a benefit for the agent. Looking at the examples
from the other Platonic dialogs provides a clearer example of how memory accompanies
psychic activity, and memory processes appear almost like rungs on a ladder.
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§3 Plato’s Theory of Recollection – In regard to the following, the passage from
the Phaedo is relevant because it speaks of recollection and principles of organization
both of which point to passages in the Meno and Republic (Cf. Phaedo 70a-71a).
Socrates, delivering his swan song (Cf. Phaedo 84e) as it were, is awaiting the death to
which he has been sentenced. Discussing death with Cebes and Simmias, Socrates
touches upon the immortality of the soul and what Crombie has called the doctrine of
anamnēsis. Socrates ties these two topics together with a discussion of opposites, i.e.
opposing processes and the general form of the principle(s) with which to identify the
opposites as a unity.
I pick the passage up where Cebes is lamenting the difficulty involved in
believing “the soul still exists after a man has died and that it still possesses some
capability and intelligence.” As a result, Socrates agrees to examine the question:
“whether the souls of men who have died exist in the underworld or not.” Taking the
wheel of birth and re-birth as his point of departure, Socrates begins by noting,
We recall [my emphasis] an ancient theory that souls
arriving there come from here, and then again that they
arrive here and are born here from the dead. If that is true,
that the living come back from the dead, then surely our
souls must exist there… (Phaedo 70b&c)
After articulating this theory of the immortality of the soul, Socrates – examining the
reincarnation component of the theory – asks, “if something worse comes to be, does it
not come from the better, and the juster from the more unjust?” (Phaedo 71a) Along this
line of questioning Socrates concludes “all things come to be in this way, opposites from
opposites.” (Phaedo 71a) Socrates further explicates his theory of opposites noting that if
living and being dead “are opposites, they come to be from one another, and there are two
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processes of generation between the two.” (Phaedo 71c) The two processes, then, are
dying and being alive.
This discussion culminates in the following two points: first, “coming to life again
in truth exists, the living come to be from the dead, and the souls of the dead exist,” and,
second, “such is also the case if that theory is true that you [Socrates] are accustomed to
mention frequently, that for us learning is no other than recollection.” (Phaedo 72d&e)
For a proof of recollection readers are pointed to Meno (81e), and provided an example of
what – over 2000 years later – is often called “declarative memory,” or more specifically
a “cue dependent” “episodic memory.” Experiencing an object tends to remind, or bring
forth, information which may otherwise seem non sequitur. Socrates‟ example is akin to
the following: when you experience an object that reminds you of someone for whom
you care, you may experience thoughts and feelings associated with that person. In this
respect the object acts as a cue from which further information is declared (to you).
Since this information explicitly involves episodes from your life, the memory is
referred to as “episodic.” Had the information been of a less personal form, e.g. the
chemical composition of the object you are experiencing, the memory would have been
referred to as “semantic,” rather than episodic. Further, since a significant amount of
time may have passed from the time of the episode from which information was brought
forth, the activity in question is considered a function of the memory process called
“Long-term Memory.”597
An example pushed further should tie all the above on Plato together. Suppose
you were to go to the grocer‟s to acquire ingredients with which to prepare a meal. While
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at the grocer‟s you see someone who reminds you of the person for whom you are
preparing dinner, and you leave the grocer‟s following that person without acquiring any
food or returning home. 598 In some ways this example is absurd, but why? First, notice
there is a difference between the cue and that which it recalls. Though cues need not be
physical, in this case the cue is physical and what is recalled is not. Second, memories –
and memory cues – may be multiply instantiated. It seems correct to say that in some
ways we are reminded of what may be called “universals” across physical change. For
example, though your friend ages, and, accordingly, you perceive your friend differently,
you still recognize your friend. In this way, memory provides access to that which
persists despite physical change. Moreover, your friend‟s arm or a sporting event not
attended by your friend may both bring forth the same memory. Third, and lastly, Plato‟s
example of the charioteer – whatever else it may recall – seems to express an important
idea about memory. Namely, memory organizes, and experience is somehow structured
by this organization.
Were the unruly horse to pounce on every physical instance recalling the beloved,
the charioteer would be dragged into being more intimate with the multiple and physical
which changes than that which is recalled by the physical instances. Such would be the
absurd result, noted above, of wandering out of the grocer‟s. In fact, it is congruent with
the Long-term Memory (LTM) forgetting curves constructed by Hermann Ebbinghaus 599
to suggest that the reinforcing feedback loop created from the unruly horse‟s repeated
physical pouncing diminishes the reality of that which was previously remembered. In
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other words, taking the cue for that which is recalled diminishes the potency of intricate
recall because associations with the cue are replacing what the cue previously recalled
before such repeated exposure to the cue(s). To put it in a phrasing reminiscent of the
Euthyphro – Do I like this scent because it reminds me of her, or do I remember her
because I like this scent? By siding with the disciplined horse the charioteer obtains a
degree of freedom in relation to the flux of cues passing through experience. (Cf. Rep
479c & 485b) And, in the language of hierarchical organization – supported by the
experience of persistence across change, rather than being pulled toward constant change
and becoming – the charioteer seems now to be associated with a level higher up in the
organization of memory. (Cf. Phaedr 249c)
Though, of course, not made explicit by Plato, perhaps what anamnēsis might
ultimately reveal is merely the structure of being. In this way, anamnēsis might be
thought of as further using the structural revelation to move up the organization, as it
were. “And is not finding knowledge within oneself recollection?” (Meno 85d)600 Recall
this question from Plato‟s the Meno (85d). Whereas it is tempting to cite mathematics –
geometry, i.e. moving up a triangle or logic tree division, i.e. 4 to 2 to 1 – recall that this
trajectory is nowhere other than in memory. Hence, already anamnēsis speaks to the
importance of discerning memory in the relations amidst Being, Becoming, and NonBeing. “Let us not then enroll a forgetful soul among those adequate to pursue
philosophy. Let us require a good memory.” (Rep 2006, 486d)
In sum, I take my work on Plato in Part II to show, at least, the following: (1)
Plato discussed memory as multiple. In fact, Plato‟s dialogs nicely illustrate how
memory processes working in different realms and resulting in different products may be
600
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thought of as united – in a single power of memory. (2) Plato‟s discussion of memory
provides an example of how to think of memory as organized, and how to think of that
organization as intimately structuring experience throughout. (3) Plato‟s charioteer
example, at least, foreshadows – if not, to put it more strongly, indicates – the standpoints
from which modern and contemporary investigations of memory ensue. In Kant‟s
language, the unruly horse caricatures sensibility, the disciplined horse represents
understanding, and the charioteer illustrates the apperceptive I. (4) Ultimately I take
Kant‟s work on the sensibility standpoint and poststructuralism‟s work on the standpoint
of the apperceptive I to be not only improvements but necessary improvements for
recognizing the role of memory in experience, and the extent to which these
improvements deviate from Plato‟s position – given his dialogic style – is undecidable.
Inception of the Contemporary Memory Canon
“[H]ow odd are the connections; of human thoughts, which jostle in their flight!”601
~Lord Byron

§4 Punctuating Plato/Recollecting Footnotes – Looking at contemporary memory
research, one immediately senses its immensity. Imagine entering the term “memory”
into a search engine with access to every contemporary academically minded journal.
Yet, despite this immensity there are two aspects of memory about which after 1970 the
research would be in unanimous agreement. The first is that memory is multiple. The
second is reminiscent of Ludwig Wittgenstein‟s celebrated quote, “It is there – like our
life.”602 That is, memory, in one process or another, seems to be perpetually laboring, or
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– in more Nietzschean rhetoric – celebrating, along the trajectory of the structure of
experience.603
There are many ways to parse memory, as evidenced by the vast vocabulary
disseminated in contemporary memory research. Though some aspects of memory are
less relevant depending upon the focus of the research, organizing aspects of memory in
relation to the three main standpoints from which memory researchers tend to ground
their examinations is sufficient to exhaust the vast vocabulary involved across the
research. The three standpoints are (1) Experiential, (2) Recollective, and (3)
Performative.604 Indeed, there are ways in which these standpoints overlap. For
example, it is possible to think of (1) and (2) as a kind of (3) or (3) as a kind of (1) or (2),
etc. However, as I will show, from the perspective of (1) there are aspects of (2) and (3)
which generally do not get discussed, etc. mutatis mutandis, despite the fact that all of
these aspects are of memory. Hence, in this way, the common understanding of memory
seems far too narrow.605
The following table, then, represents the continuity of philosophical organization
from Plato to Kant with which I organize memory research. The table represents the tripartite idea with which I organize various historical discoveries and taxonomies
pertaining to memory. Notice, in this way, you can see how I have maintained Kant‟s
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idea of the structure of experience throughout, and in this part, i.e. Part II, of the
dissertation I will use contemporary memory research to correct Kant‟s structure of
experience by correcting his understanding of memory.
Platonic

Kantian

Contemporary

I

Dark (unruly) Horse

Sensibility (Experiential)

Experiential

II

Charioteer

Apperceptive “I”

Performative

III

Light (disciplined) Horse

Understanding (Conceptual)

Recollective

Figure 7.1
The value of following the above tri-partite idea, in large part, goes to maintaining
a dialog between the disciplines of philosophy and psychology (including neuroscience).
Memory research hangs together, of course, because memory is being researched.
However, there is often a distinction to be made by the types of journals which publish
the research, rather than the research‟s avowed link to an aspect, i.e. standpoint, of
experience. For example, journals dealing with “psychophysics” tend to address memory
at the experiential standpoint, and journals dealing with “cognition” tend to address the
recollective standpoint. In other words, as can be seen by examining the specializations
of a number of contemporary journals, memory research implicitly adheres to its
philosophical roots. Therefore, as I address the list of discoveries in memory research,
both leading up to and composing the “Contemporary Memory Canon,” I will seek to
remind you of the standpoint of experience to which each discovery pertains.
Lastly, an exhaustive treatment of the history of memory is, of course, beyond the
scope of my project. For an excellent account leading up to the 20th century, I
recommend W.H. Burnham‟s “Memory, Historically and Experimentally Considered”
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published in two parts by The American Journal of Psychology in 1888.606 Therefore, in
regard to my project, I have limited the historical treatment to texts which by way of their
introduction of a distinction regarding memory are relevant to my re-reading of Kant‟s
structure of experience. And, this is, of course, for the sake of solving the problem of
non-being and critiquing the solutions put forward by Kant, Derrida, and Deleuze.
§5 The claim that memory spans the trajectory of experience – François Maine de
Biran (1766-1824) is widely credited by contemporary memory theorists as the first
thinker to discuss memory as multiple. 607 Often referred to merely as Maine de Biran, he
was awarded a prize by the “Class of Moral and Political Sciences in the National
Institute” for his book titled: Influence de l’Habitude, published in Paris in 1803. 608 The
question which Maine de Biran‟s book was written to answer – and for which the prize
was offered – was: What is the influence of habit on the faculty of thinking? Further,
describing the philosophical climate within which Maine de Biran was writing, French
historian George Boas states, “The feeling that somehow or other the Idéalogues had
reduced man to a state of utter passivity was fairly widespread in France after Napoleon
had made it fashionable to ridicule them.” 609 Boas quotes Maine de Biran as saying in
1794, “I should like, if ever I were capable of undertaking anything continuous, to see
how far the soul is active, how far it can modify external impressions, augment or
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diminish their intensity by attention it gives them, examine to what extent it is master of
attention.”610
Maine de Biran is known, then, as a French philosopher of the will, and historians
situate him given his criticisms of Descartes, Étienne de Condillac (1715-1780), Pierre
Jean Cabanis (1757-1808), and Thomas Reid (1710-1796).611,612 Whereas Descartes said,
“Je pense, donc je suis,” Maine de Biran said, “Je veux, donc je suis,” quips the historian
Benjamin Burt.613 Championing the will against such reduction to “utter passivity,”
Maine de Biran promotes a model of experience divided into both active and passive
features dependent upon the involvement of the will, with memory spanning the model –
passive and active habitudes.614 He is credited with the following innovations: (1) He
considers memory – habits – to span the entirety of the model, and (2) he takes the
understanding to be an effect of habitude, i.e. the process of forming habits produces the
further capacity to understand.615 Lastly, Maine de Biran‟s emphasis, in particular, on the
will and the emergence of understanding from out of the power of memory nicely
illustrates – well before poststructural accounts of experience or identity – how both the
understanding and the even the “I” itself may emerge in such a way so as to make their
origin completely opaque to phenomenology.
§6 Canonical Prelude – At this point, then, I want to show a cluster of
reciprocally related texts by citing title, author, and year of publication. I take all of these
610
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texts to be precursors, in one way or another, to what I will refer to as the “Contemporary
Memory Canon.” What do I take to be the value of such a cluster of texts? I have
already shown a number of possibilities, considered historically, across the standpoints to
be that which unifies the standpoints. For example, I have considered the possibility of
the will, the apperceptive I, a.k.a. the transcendental ego, or a conceptual movement of
the understanding. Notice, each of these candidates champions the experiential,
performative, and recollective standpoints respectively. With the perhaps most obscure of
these standpoints being the experiential, a number of candidates other than the “will”
have also been historically considered. The value, then, of the following cluster of texts
is primarily to show the different candidates for unifying all of the standpoints by
pointing to the texts which champion the candidates. And, again, given the obscurity and
complexity of the experiential standpoint, I attend more to the experiential standpoint
than the other two. Lastly, the value of considering these different candidates can be seen
in the fact that depending upon that which performs the unifying, the question of the
thing-in-itself “beyond” or “outside” the standpoints is at stake.
As I mentioned above, memory researchers are quite concerned to note who was
the first individual to make a particular distinction, in what text, and when, regarding
memory. Therefore, the documentation is available, and I am able to indicate the major
memory distinctions, discoveries, etc. which contribute to the “Memory Canon.” Further,
I am able to organize the distinctions of the Memory Canon by way of the standpoints,
and thus constitute a taxonomy of memory. Recalling the Kantian standpoints of Chapter
2, for example, I might say Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Friedrich Wilhelm
Joseph Schelling (1775-1854), and G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831): Fichte with his
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Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge – Grundlage der gesamten
Wissenschaftslehre (1794/5), Schelling with his System of Transcendental Idealism –
System des transcendentalen Idealismus (1800), and Hegel with his Phenomenology of
Mind/Spirit616 – Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807) champion the performative,
experiential, and recollective memory standpoints respectively.
I begin here, then, with the experiential standpoint – the standpoint I will here
dwell upon most due to its obscurity. According to historian Mark Altschule, “It is
difficult – or perhaps impossible – to find a nineteenth-century psychologist or
psychiatrist who did not recognize unconscious cerebration as not only real but of the
highest importance.”617 Following the use of the unfortunate term “unconscious,” that
which is unconscious in experience may be thought of in many ways. Cerebral, i.e.
neuronal activity is certainly – to some degree – active without conscious awareness of
the activity as such.618 Other suggestions include the will, biological factors, hereditary
factors, or physiological factors. In fact, all of these other factors may be unconsciously
involved in an experience. Perhaps as exemplified by Caspar David Friedrich‟s (17741840) The Monk by the Sea – Der Mönch am Meer (1809) – or his Wanderer Above the
Mist – Der Wanderer über dem Nebelmeer (1818) – the nineteenth-century saw an
explosion of publications both regarding the obscurity of – and attempting to dispel the
obscurity from – the experiential standpoint.
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Providing witness to unconscious influence variously described the following
authors and texts populate what I referred to above as the “explosion” of publications in
the nineteenth-century. Under the standpoint heading with Schelling, then, may be
found, published in 1818, Arthur Schopenhauer‟s (1788-1860) World as Will and
Representation – Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. In 1831 Carl Gustav Carus (17891869) published his Lectures on Psychology – Vorlesungen über Psychologie. In 1859
Charles Darwin (1809-1882) published On the Origin of Species. In 1860 Gustav
Theodor Fechner (1801-1887) published Elements of Psychophysics – Elemente der
Psychophysik. In 1863 Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894) published On the
Sensations of Tone as a Physiological Basis for the Theory of Music – Die Lehre von den
Tonempfindungen als physiologische Grundlage für die Theorie der Musik. Also in 1863
Pierre Paul Broca (1824-1880) presented his findings regarding the left hemisphere of the
brain. In 1869 Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906) published The Philosophy of the
Unconscious – Philosophie des Unbewussten. In 1874 Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920)
published Principles of Physiological Psychology – Grudzüge der physiologischen
Psychologie. And, Carl Wernicke (1848-1905) published The Aphasic SymptomComplex – Der Aphasische Symptomencomplex – in 1874. In 1881 Théodule-Armand
Ribot (1839-1916) published The Diseases [Maladies] of Memory – Les Maladies de la
Mémoire.619
It was in such a textual climate that Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850-1909) – who is
considered the father of experimental memory research – published his On Memory –
Über das Gedächtnis in 1885. Around this time – between 1870 and 1906 – Karl Ewald
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Hering (1834-1918) delivered his lectures compiled and titled in English as Memory:
Lectures on the Specific Energies of the Nervous System. The first chapter and lecture of
which was titled, “Memory as a general function of organized matter” – Über das
Gedächtnis als eine allgemeine Funktion der organisierten Materie. It was in 1880, then,
that Samuel Butler (1835-1902) published Unconscious Memory in which he compared
Hering‟s writings on memory with that of von Hartmann‟s. Studying unconscious
perception, philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) and the psychologist
credited with the “Duck-Rabbit Illusion” Joseph Jastrow (1863-1944) published “On
small differences in Sensation” in 1884. It is perhaps too often overlooked that in the
midst of these publications Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) published The Cheerful
Science – Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (1882) – and Beyond Good and Evil – Jenseits von
Gut und Böse (1886). In 1887 Francis Galton (1822-1911) and Joseph Jacobs (18541916) published their respective works on “Prehension,” i.e. short term memory span.
Further, in 1890 William James (1842-1910) published his two volume: Principles of
Psychology where he discussed, inter alia, primary and secondary memory, i.e. short and
long term memory. In 1891 Jean-Marie Guyau (1854-1888) published Education and
Heredity – Education et Heredite. Also in 1891 Pierre Janet (1859-1947) published
“Study of a Case of Fixed Ideas and Aboulia” – “Etude sur un cas d'aboulie et d'idees
fixes.” He followed this in 1892 with The Mental State of Hysterics – L'état mental des
hystériques – where he discussed unconscious fixed ideas, and in the same year JeanMartin Charcot (1825-1893) presented the notion of unconscious fixed ideas in his
theatre at the Pitié-Salpêtière Hospital in Paris.
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In 1896 Henri Bergson (1859-1941) published Matter and Memory: Essay on the
relation of the body to the mind – Matière et mémoire: essai sur la relation du corps à
l’esprit. Though first published in 1950 Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) is credited with
writing Project for a Scientific Psychology in 1895 as a collection of correspondences
with Wilhelm Fliess, and in 1899 Freud published The Interpretation of Dreams – Die
Traumdeutung. In that same year – 1899 – Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926) published
Psychiatry: A Textbook for Students and Physicians – Psychiatrie: Ein Lehrbuch fur
Studirende und Aerzte. Reporting on retroactive effects within memory, Georg Elias
Müller and Alfons Pilzecker published Experimental Contributions to the Science of
Memory – Experimentelle Beiträge zur Lehre vom Gedächtnis – in 1900. I. P. Pavlov
reported his experimental work with dogs in 1903 which were subsequently published as
Conditioned Reflexes: An Investigation of the Physiological Activity of the Cerebral
Cortex. Lastly, in 1906 Alois Alzheimer (1864-1915) first presented the results of his
research concerning the malady which would eventually carry his name.
The following publications should also be noted. However, I see them as
championing a different standpoint than the experiential. In 1874 Franz Brentano (18381917) published Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint – Psychologie vom
Empirischen Standpunkte. In 1892 Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) published “On Sense and
Reference” – “Über Sinn und Bedeutung.” In 1910 Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961)
published “The Association Method.” Lastly, Edmund Husserl‟s (1859-1938) lectures
and sketches from 1898-1925 have been published posthumously as Phantasy, Image
Consciousness, and Memory. Hence, in one way or another, all the above publications
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speak to a concern perhaps best exemplified by Maine de Biran‟s words: “to see how
far”620 memory extends.
Before proceeding to the twentieth-century texts, and the “Contemporary Memory
Canon” in the next chapter, it is useful to make a few comments about the above.
Depending upon which standpoint privileged, a different approach to describing
experience ensues. Four approaches may be developed from the standpoints. Coinciding
with the recollective and experiential standpoints the approaches of structuralism and
poststructuralism may be developed. Further, if you think of agency along what may be
described as a continuum of will spanning from the experiential standpoint to the
apperceptive I, then broadly two approaches result. Following Wundt‟s Outlines of
Psychology – Grundriss der Pscyhologie – published in 1896, on the one hand,
“voluntarism” describes an approach which treats the will as spanning from apprehension
– which can be, at least, studied experimentally – through various depictions of ego “up,”
as it were, to apperception, i.e. the transcendental ego. This approach favors acts of will
in “decision” and “choice.” On the other hand, if you think of the will variously as
“down” the continuum, then the approach becomes that of a more involuntary nature akin
to that of Schopenhauer‟s will or Freud‟s unconscious. Yet, of these approaches, in my
opinion, it is poststructuralist thought that has best handled, and I might add taken
seriously, the un-graspable nature of the thing-in-itself.
Notice the unconscious, the will, physiological, biological, and hereditary factors
fit under the experiential standpoint since each is an attempt to explain aspects of
experience – of which you are aware – from aspects of experience of which you are not
aware. Further, these attempts share a concern to describe experience as unified by
620
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neither transcendental ego nor logical necessity. So, the work of Maine de Biran has
already shown the way to indicate, at least, the recollective standpoint as an effect of or
dependent upon the experiential standpoint. What is more, Kant himself – as emphasized
by the poststructuralists – has shown the way to indicate the transcendental ego as the
result of a performance or as an effect. With the concerns of the nineteenth-century,
then, the experiential standpoint can be thought of as permeated with memory – including
what aspects of the standpoint may be “unconscious.” Hence, in what follows, the
contemporary memory research will show the power of memory permeates the
standpoints to such an extent as to exhaustively account for the question of the thing-initself “beyond” or “outside” all standpoints. Summing these insights, as it were, I will
critique pure difference, i.e. there is no longer a need to posit – affirmatively or
negatively – a thing-in-itself or pure difference.
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“Memory is the thing you forget with.”621
~Alexander Chase
“[M]emory is not an instrument for exploring the past but its theatre.”622
~Walter Benjamin
“[W]hat Plato dreams of is a memory with no sign [Derrida‟s emphasis].”623
~Jacques Derrida

Chapter Eight: Memory as Play-Ground – Contemporary Memory Research
Introduction and Justification for Chapter 8 Sections and Objectives
This is the chapter in which I solve the problem of non-being. The previous chapter
provided the historical background to the memory research with which I solve the
problem, and the following chapter contemplates the value of the solution. This chapter
contains two sections. Further, each of the sections is divided in accordance to the theses
put forth. In other words, the first section of this chapter puts forth 20 theses derived
from contemporary memory research. The second section, then, shows how I apply
contemporary memory research to Kant‟s structure of experience and, thereby solve, the
problem of non-being.
I chose the theses in the second section of this chapter to make my solution to the
problem of non-being explicit. Put generally, Kant‟s structure of experience from the
Critique of Pure Reason required two corrections from the perspective of contemporary
memory research. The first correction involves the second of Kant‟s justifications for
positing the thing-in-itself. Because Kant believed sensibility‟s origin to be a “secret,” he
considered the grounding power available for negation to be imagination. This was a
focus of the Kant chapter above. Whereas Kant thought of productive imagination as an
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original source of the mind, contemporary memory research reveals productive
imagination as rooted in memory. Hence, the primacy of imagination regarding
experience in Kant should be replaced with memory.
The second correction to Kant‟s structure of experience pertains directly to the
ground of experience. For Kant, the ground of the structure of experience pertains to
sense, i.e. sensation grounds experience. Just as imagination is the second of Kant‟s three
original powers of the mind, “sense” is the first (CPR 1998, A 94/B 127). However,
because intuitions are blind prior to the application of concepts higher in the structure,
despite deeming the power “sense,” Kant cannot reveal the structure of experience‟s
secret origin. Yet, he was able to discern that the power is governed by “affinity.” Rereading affinity, then, by way of contemporary memory research discoveries such as
“priming,” provides evidence with which to reveal sensibility‟s secret origin. Hence, the
ground of the structure of experience is not “sense” but “sensory memory.”
First and foremost, this is the solution to the problem of non-being precisely
because it meets Plato‟s criteria for solving the problem. Secondly, this eliminates two
assumptions built into Kant‟s structure of experience – assumptions pertaining to aspects
which, for Kant, were avowedly “blind” and “secret.”624 And if we take what I refer to as
Plato‟s “dependency of reckoning with being upon reckoning with non-being” thesis
seriously, these assumptions, then, should be eliminated from our understanding of being.
The first assumption is that a thing-in-itself needs to be posited from the
experiential standpoint of the structure of experience when performing an ontological
negation. This pertains to his second justification for positing the thing-in-itself, i.e. his
mistake pertaining to imagination. At times above I stated this generally saying: Kant
624
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considered imagination more powerful than memory. By way of contemporary memory
research I argue you should think of it this way: We can say that what we experience is of
an “external world.” Yet, following the Kantian division of the structure of experience
into sensibility and understanding, we must remember that what we have of this external
world is either an idea from or the content of experience. And, in the experiencing itself,
the power which must be present to experience is ultimately memory, before, during, and
after imagination.
The second assumption is the assumption of ontological persistence. In other
words, the ground of experience as memory reveals ontological filled duration as illusory.
That is, sensory memory as the power at the ground – instead of sense – indicates a
cycling of memory as the structure of experience functions along a structurally ascending
trajectory of object formation. Hence, because the ground is memory, therefore cycling
(second correction to Kant noted above); notice memory‟s cycling functions tantamount
to Kant‟s negating of imagination (first correction to Kant noted above); because cycling,
therefore gaps in being; because gaps in being, therefore non-being.
Mnemo-Psychography: 20 Theses toward Sensibility‟s Secret Origin
Juxtaposing625 the two following quotes, one from 1792 and one from 2009,
provides a good point of departure for examining the major and lasting changes in the
study of memory across the 19th, 20th, and 21st centuries. In 1792 Dugald Stewart (17531828) wrote:
Memory itself is an ultimate and inexplicable fact.
[Stewart‟s emphasis] – It is hardly necessary for me to add,
that when we have proceeded so far in our inquiries
concerning Memory, as to obtain an analysis of that power,
625
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and to ascertain the relation in which it stands to the other
principles of our constitution, we have advanced as far
toward an explanation of it as the nature of the subject
permits. … Such, indeed, is the poverty of language that we
cannot speak on the subject without employing expressions
which suggest one theory or another…626
Now, published in 2009, Jonathan K. Foster in a chapter titled “You are your memory,”
from Memory: A Very Short Introduction quotes celebrated memory researcher and
neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga stating, “Everything in life is memory, save for the thin
edge of the present.”627 Have memory researchers in 2009 overcome the “poverty of
language” of which Stewart speaks? In what follows I hope to show the significant
innovations relevant to my project from the “analysis of that power” which the past two
centuries of memory researchers have been able to produce.
I will apologize at the outset for the list/textbook-like presentation of the
following material. This choice of stylistic approach seems justified in that when you
understand the following, you will understand my position, and the following is highly
technical. “In the twenty-first century, we know more about memory than ever
before.”628 And, my choice of stylistic approach squares the two needs of presenting a
large amount of technical information and structuring my argument for an audience
relatively unfamiliar with the contemporary memory research. Compounding the
difficulty, as three contemporary theorists put it, “Memory is a single term, but refers to a
multitude of human capacities … a universally accepted categorization scheme does not
exist. There is no periodic table for types of memory.”629 The purpose for this section of
626

Dugald Stewart. Philosophy of the Human Mind, (Boston: William H. Dennet, 1866), 261.
Jonathan K. Foster. Memory: A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 1.
628
Patrick H. Hutton. Memory, New Dictionary of the History of Ideas, vol. 4, Maryanne Cline Horowitz,
ed. (Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2005), 1419.
629
Henry L. Roediger III, Elizabeth J. Marsh, and Stephanie C. Lee. “Kinds of Memory,” Steven’s
Handbook of Experimental Psychology, Memory, and Cognitive Processes, Hal Pashler and Douglas L.
Medin, ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2002), 1.
627

446

the dissertation, then, is to show the major memory distinctions, features, and insights
which should be considered by, at least, philosophers concerned with issues in the
philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and experience in general. Since a
number of the following features of memory are, perhaps, best understood through a
relation or juxtaposition with other features of memory, I set out to be as reader friendly
as possible, i.e. clear without presenting too much or too little information.
Hence, I have organized this section in the following way: (1) and (2) describe the
major paradigms through which memory research was conducted post 1960 into the
1990s.630 I treat the current memory paradigm in the penultimate position (19). Next, (3)
through (16) are significant distinctions and discoveries widely acknowledged as major
contributions to the study of memory in the 20th century,631 (17) and (18) provide two
distinctions, not discussed above, from 20th century philosophy which will help me
articulate my thesis more concisely. Further, (19) indicates the widely acknowledged
current paradigm in regard to memory research. Lastly, (20) represents a phrasing of my
thesis in the wake of these above innovations. The contemporary paradigms of the 60‟s
and 70‟s are: (1) the Modal Model/Memory Stages Paradigm and (2) the Levels of
Processing Paradigm. The contemporary distinctions and features of memory include the
following: (3) Implicit v. Explicit Memory, (4) Verbal v. Nonverbal Memory, (5)
Episodic v. Semantic Memory, (6) Procedural v. Declarative Memory, (7) Chunking, (8)
Working Memory, (9) Context Dependence, (10) Mood and State Memory Dependence,
(11) Saccadic Memory, (12) Multiple Object Tracking, (13) Priming, (14) Automaticity,
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(15) Retroactively Effective Memory, and (16) Attention/Intention as a Process of
Working Memory. The contemporary philosophical innovations include the following:
(17) Qualia and (18) Satisficing and Bounded Rationality. The current contemporary
memory paradigm is referred to as (19) the Parallel Distributed Processing Paradigm.
Within the context of these innovations, then, my thesis may be described as (20) Being
Memory Bound.
§1 Modal Model/Memory Stages Paradigm (SM, STM, LTM) – I begin by
showing a shift across paradigms beginning in the 1960s. From the perspective of the
memory standpoints, the shift illustrates the trend toward diminishing agency and
increased automaticity. In other words, the shift indicates a poststructural coupling of the
will and the experiential standpoint. In fact this shift informed my discussion of the
performative standpoint. In 1968 Richard C. Atkinson and Richard M. Shiffrin published
“Human Memory: A proposed system and its control processes” 632 conceiving the
relation amongst sensory (SM), short-term (STM), and long-term memory (LTM) like
that amongst consecutive stages in the processing information. The shift from the 1960s
to the 1970s is characteristic of the shift in thinking about memory less narrowly, i.e. a
shift from thinking of memory solely as storehouse or for storage to memory as
processing and storage.
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Figure 8.1633
As an improvement over simply thinking of memory as a storehouse, Figure 8.1
illustrates a model of memory which spans the structure of experience. In addition,
Figure 5.2 illustrates an early version of the memory standpoints. As such, “sensory
registers” which include, of course, the five senses points to the experiential standpoint
and Kant‟s sensibility. The short term memory store (STS) functions as an early version
of working memory, and, thereby, indicates a version of the performative standpoint.
The more advanced version of the performative standpoint will think of the performative
as itself spanning the structure of experience – more on this below. The long term store
(LTS), then, points to the recollective standpoint and Kant‟s understanding broadly
designated. Notice – as the names “registers” and “store” indicate – the Modal
633
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Model/Memory Stages Paradigm still emphasizes the storage and encoding aspects of
memory over the manner in which retrieval is tied up with performance.
§2 Levels of Processing Paradigm – With the 1970s, the “Memory Stages
Paradigm” shifted into the “Levels of Processing Paradigm” (LOP) when in 1972 Fergus
I.M. Craik and Robert Lockhart published “Levels of Processing: A framework for
memory research.”634 Alan D. Baddeley puts the matter well.
Although the modal model [Memory Stages Figure above]
faded away largely through neglect, there was one major
precipitating factor, namely the development of what
appeared to be a very promising alternative framework, that
of Levels of Processing. The modal model was essentially
structural in nature; it did have functional aspects such as
control processes and encoding activities, but these were
conceptually subsidiary to the underlying structural
distinctions. Craik and Lockhart reversed this emphasis by
de-emphasizing structure and stressing processing,
suggesting that trace durability was a direct consequence of
the processes of encoding, with deeper and more elaborate
encoding leading to more durable memory traces. 635
With the paradigm shift came a shift in focus from storage to processing. Though
processing was involved in the early stage model, LOP thinks of memory along a
continuum of processing. In other words, LOP accounts for a memory‟s “location” in
SM, STM, or LTM depending upon the amount of processing the memory has
undergone, i.e. from maintenance to elaboration. In fact, consistent with my discussion
of memory as a “power,” the term “store” is often substituted in the research for the term
“memory” resulting in a different phrasing, e.g. discussion of the short-term store of
memory. Moreover, it should not escape the reader who has a good memory that the LOP
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continuum of memory is thoroughly Kantian. 636 Specifically, the trajectory of this
continuum of processing in memory moves from structural cognizance to term of store
(short or long) to semantic cognizance. This is accomplished across two stages – looking
conspicuously like sensibility and understanding – the processing from structure to store
is referred to as “maintenance rehearsal” and the processing from store to semantic
“level” is referred to as “elaboration rehearsal.” 637 The extent to which some memory
has been processed may be referred to as the extent of elaboration. As noted above, each
of these shifts further illustrates the trend toward diminishing agency and increased
automaticity, and with the LOP Paradigm theorists arrived at a way to describe some of
the control processes – intentional, voluntary, enactments of will – as automatic. See
Figure 8.2.

Figure 8.2638
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An improvement over the Memory Stages Model above, Figure 5.3 – as an
illustration of Levels of Processing Paradigm – better captures the connectedness of
memory spanning the structure of experience. On the one hand, the “processing” piece of
this paradigm is further acknowledging the performative power of memory. On the other
hand, the “forgetting” piece of this paradigm indicates the manner in which the organized
power traversing the structure can fall out, so to speak, at various points along the
trajectory. The “rehearsal” components indicate the manner in which – think of Kant and
Deleuze here – the sensory information is being (actively) elaborated into conceptual
content. In other words, Figure 5.3 matches the other figures regarding the structure of
experience above, i.e. from left to right sensibility to understanding.
The primary shortcoming with this model – in regard to what the current
contemporary model corrects – may be found by looking at the “retrieval” arrow. The
Levels of Processing Paradigm has yet to think the fullness of the power of memory
associated with sensibility, i.e. the experiential standpoint. Daniel Dennett in his
Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, notes “Any psychology
with undischarged homunculi is doomed to circularity or infinite regress.”639 Though the
term “homunculi” tends to be pejorative, for sake of staying with his terminology, it is as
if – within the Levels of Processing Paradigm – the discharge of the homunculus takes
place from Short-term memory “up.” As such the model is consistent with Kant‟s
blindness thesis. It does not attempt to look into the abyss of sensibility. Locating
retrieval as it does indicates the possibility of backward “looking” to the point of Short-
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term memory. That is, from the conceptual and apperceptive standpoints to as far as the
un-realing of imagination‟s filming can provide.
§3 Implicit v. Explicit – The distinction between implicit and explicit memory
speaks to a cluster of ideas about memory such as habit, habituation, and de-sensitization.
And, as I will use the implicit/explicit distinction as heuristic in what follows, I have
decided to begin with it. Now the progenitor of what was to be further specified in 20 th
century memory investigations as habituation and de-sensitization was Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz (1646-1716). In §33 of his Discourse on Metaphysics – Discours de
Metaphysique – published in 1686 Leibniz notes,
It is almost like the confused murmuring heard by those
who approach the seashore, which is the combined effect of
innumerable waves. Now if many perceptions fail to merge
into one, yet no one of them rises above the others and they
all make impressions about equally strong or equally
capable of holding the attention of the soul, they can be
perceived only confusedly. 640
Leibniz, here, provides an image of someone submerged in sensation – surrounded by a
constant and large amount of stimulation. Yet, these sensations are perceived confusedly.
Put another way, the sensations are not perceived as the “innumerable waves” which
Leibniz suggests they are. Using the term “liminal” in the sense of “threshold,” given
Leibniz‟s comment that no one of the perceptions rises above the others to become clear,
Leibniz may be interpreted as having provided a theory of subliminal perception. The
information in these subliminal perceptions is only implicit (confused) unless it rises
above the threshold and becomes explicit (clear).
What is more, despite the constancy of the subliminal confused perceiving, it does
not follow that the perceiver must be either constantly in a state of full confusion or
640
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unable to focus any of the confused perceptions into clear perceptions. These latter
aspects relate to what in the 20th century literature is called habituation and desensitization, both of which are involved in habit. De-sensitization refers to the fact that
though you are exposed to a large and constant amount of stimulation, you are not
“sensitive” to the stimulation. Habituation is often described as “The gradual diminution
of the response to a stimulus following the repeated presentation of the same, or a similar,
stimulus.”641 In this way, it is possible to be in the habit of “paying attention” to aspects
of the environment while ignoring others. Habituating to some aspects of the
environment does not mean you are not stimulated by them. Rather, habituation and desensitization point to the fact that memory is operable, i.e. functions, subliminally
buffering sensation.
Also, in New Essays on Human Understanding – Nouveaux Essaies sur
l'Entendement Humain – written circa 1704 Leibniz speaks directly in regard to memory.
In the form of a dialog between “Theophilus” and “Philalethes,” Leibniz, at §20, has
Philalethes suggest, “If there are innate ideas in the mind without the mind‟s being
actually aware of their presence, they must at least be in the memory.” 642 In response,
after invoking Plato‟s notion of anamnēsis and Locke‟s notion of tabula rasa, Theophilus
states, “And often we have an extraordinary facility of conceiving certain things, because
we formerly conceived them, without remembering them.” 643 These statements are taken
– for example, by the researcher credited with popularizing implicit memory in the 20 th
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century, Daniel L. Schacter – to represent the birth of implicit memory. 644 The
distinction between implicit and explicit memory, then, is determined by awareness.
Explicit memory is memory of which you are aware that you remember, and implicit
memory is memory of which you are not aware that you remember. Implicit memory
usually refers to habits and skills, both of which involve habituation and de-sensitization.
Lastly, of implicit memory qua implicit memory, Bergson‟s remark from Matter and
Memory regarding memory for habits and skills is appropriate: such memory has “upon it
no mark which betrays its origin.” 645 Hence, of implicit memory which has become
explicit, discussion of origins seems relevant, but the memories of which you are
unaware you remember do not yield to an interrogation regarding origins. 646
§4 Verbal v. Nonverbal– In 1971 Allan U. Paivio published Imagery and Verbal
Processes.647 This book is widely credited with the scientific distinction between verbal
and nonverbal memory. Paivio‟s distinction was given further clarification with his 1986
publication of Mental Representations: A Dual Coding Approach.648 According to the
latter text, Paivio distinguishes between two memory systems – verbal and nonverbal,
and three memory processes – representational, referential, and associative. The
nonverbal system of coding encompasses “other sensory modalities in addition to visual,
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and the “language-specialized system will be referred to as the verbal system.” 649
Considering the two systems to be structurally and functionally distinct, Paivio notes,
Structurally, they differ in the nature of representational
units and the way the units are organized into higher order
structures. Functionally, they are independent in the sense
that either system can be active without the other or both
can be active in parallel. 650
Yet, at the same time, the verbal and nonverbal memory systems are “functionally
interconnected” meaning activity in one system can invoke activity in another system.
Moreover, as Paivio indicates, these structural and functional differences “produce
qualitative differences,” and the qualitative differences account for the fact that the verbal
and nonverbal systems differ in the kinds of processes in which they specialize.
Now, “specialize” is Paivio‟s term, and it illuminates how the term “process,” e.g.
representational process, can be used in regard to both the verbal and the nonverbal
memory systems despite different representational products. Paivio explains,
there are always two sources of information that contribute
to performance in any memory task [my emphasis], one
external and one internal. The external source is the
memory material presented to a subject. The internal
source consists of the long-term memory representations
and processes that are activated by the presented material
and the context in which it occurs. … the internal source
“contains” (can make available) two types of
representational information, one being information that
cannot be attributed to a particular external episodic source
and the other, information that can be attributed to such a
source.651
I wish to briefly indicate the Kantian structure of experience implicated herein. On the
one hand, construction of an image(s) during an experience is produced within the
nonverbal memory system, and the image is produced by way of a representational
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process which, in Kantian terms, involves sensibility. This Paivio claims is “external.”
On the other hand, construction of meaning during an experience is produced within the
verbal memory system, and the meaning is produced by way of a representational process
which, in Kantian terms, involves understanding. This Paivio claims is “internal,” i.e.
verbal and nonverbal. Hence, Paivio provides one process across two systems yielding
qualitatively different products.
The other processes are similarly described. “Free verbal associating requires
verbal representational processing and then verbal associative processing, although it
could also involve referential processing (e.g. the word knife elicits an image of a knife,
which evokes a fork image as well, which then elicits the verbal referential response,
„fork‟).”652 The matrix of Paivio‟s processes may be worked out mutatis mutandis. More
important for my purpose here, notice the trajectory of experience is considered here as a
trajectory of memory. Further, this is considered a trajectory of memory despite the
products being images and thoughts or words. Put another way, the images and thoughts
or words developed in the structure of experience ride on a trajectory whose motor force
is memory. This is tantamount to replacing intensity in Deleuze‟s structure of experience
with memory.
§5 Episodic v. Semantic – In the year 397, Aurelius Augustinus, the Catholic
bishop of Hippo noted the following about memory in his Confessions,
I come to the fields and vast palaces of memory, where …
all the various things are kept distinct and in their right
categories. … And in memory too I meet myself – I recall
myself, what I have done, when and where and in what
state of mind I was when I did it.653
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Now it was not until over 1,500 years later that experimental psychology would reiterate
Augustine‟s comments in a more scientific register. A major step for experimentally and
scientifically describing Augustine‟s insights came in the form of the distinction between
“episodic” and “semantic” memory systems.
In 1972 Endel Tulving published a paper titled, “Episodic and Semantic
Memory.”654,655 This paper is widely considered the harbinger of the distinction between
episodic and semantic memory systems. Yet, Tulving himself credits the unpublished
PhD dissertation of M.R. Quilliann titled Semantic Memory as a major influence. 656 As
Tulving notes in his influential paper, “The distinction between episodic and semantic
memory systems should not be construed as representing the beginning of some new
theory of memory.” (OM 384) At the same time, Tulving‟s article makes use of a
number of elementary distinctions which I will discuss here with the help of Tulving‟s
article. These distinctions include the commonplace concepts of “encoding
(acquisition),” “storage,” and “retrieval” – often referred to as “phases” of memory –
found in nearly all contemporary discussions of memory. The differences between the
episodic and semantic memory systems largely reside in differences across the
conceptualization of these three phases. For example, Tulving thinks of the “taxonomic
distinction between episodic and semantic memory as two parallel and partially
overlapping information processing systems” (OM 401) which can variously receive,
retain, and send information from “perceptual or other cognitive systems.” (OM 385)
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Episodic and semantic memory processes are similar in that they are both
considered explicit rather than implicit processes. In contrast, Tulving notes, “The two
systems [episodic and semantic] differ from one another in terms of (a) the nature of
stored information, (b) autobiographical versus cognitive reference, [and] (c) conditions
of retrieval.” (OM 385) Furthermore, Tulving states, “Semantic memory is the memory
necessary for the use of language.” (OM 386) Beginning with (a), then, and quoting
extensively from Tulving, the episodic memory process storage is tied up with a person‟s
identity. According to Tulving,
A person‟s episodic memories are located in and refer to
his own personal past. Most, if not all, episodic memory
claims a person makes can be translated into the form: “I
did such and such, in such and such place, at such and such
time.” Thus, an integral part of the representation of a
remembered experience in episodic memory is its reference
to the rememberer‟s knowledge of his personal identity.
(OM 389)
Given the close tie to a meaningful identity, after the following Tulving comment
distinguishing the episodic from the semantic process, I will point to an area of overlap.
In regard to the semantic process,
Inputs into the semantic memory system are always
referred to an existing cognitive structure, that is they
always have some cognitive reference, and the information
they contain is information about the referent they signify
rather than information about the input signal as such. …
semantic memory information can, although it need not, be
recorded indirectly or in a piecemeal fashion. (OM 389)
The above quotes indicate a clear distinction between the kind of memory stored in the
episodic system and the kind of memory stored in the semantic system. By being
associated with existing information stored, it is as if the semantic memory system builds
a structure of meaning with experiences contributing to meaning both locally and
globally in the cognitive structure. This would be like interpreting AB in Bergson‟s
459

memory cone. In contrast, the episodic system incorporates information associated with
personal identity and, as such, offers an alternative way to make perception explicit. Yet,
the episodic and semantic processes cannot be fully distinct or without overlap, since it is
by way of semantic content in regard to personal identity that episodic content is
meaningfully organized. Hence, semantic memory will play a role in both the storage
and the retrieval of episodic memory.
The issue of episodic and semantic overlap may be elucidated by further examing
the process of encoding, especially in regard to episodic memory. According to Tulving,
A person not familiar with English is likely to organize
HAT, CAT, and MAT into a group, but not CAT, LION,
and TIGER. Since acoustic coding is less dependent upon
the semantic coding system than is semantic coding, it can
be considered to be more direct… [Moreover] acoustic
encoding requires less time. (OM 398)
The above example tangibly illustrates the difference between an episodic and a semantic
encoding strategy. History as relying on discursivity, that is meaningful or to be
explicitly stored as such. For example, “We drank wine in Paris before dancing in
Amsterdam,” relies upon the meaning of before and after, etc. in order to state a personal
history; similarly, “I have become de-sensitized to suicidal ideation.” So here you can
see the pattern perceiving associative power of the empirical sense perceiving subject as
episodic contrasted with the more semantically related apperceptive I.
What is consistent with the above and more, Tulving reports, “The episodic
memory system does not include the capabilities of inferential reasoning or
generalization.” (OM 390) However, “Inferential reasoning, generalization, application
of rules and formulas, and use of algorithms … represent important methods of utilization
of information stored in semantic memory.” (OM 390) In fact, reminiscent of Plato‟s
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anamnesis, Tulving notes, “By relying on his semantic memory, it is literally quite
possible for a person to know something he did not learn.” (OM 390) Lastly, recall the
memory stage paradigm with the Atkinson-Shiffrin Model of memory (Figure 8.1) The
model begins with sensory memory and moves toward long-term memory. Reading the
results of Tulving‟s experiment across the Atkinson-Shiffrin Model, it is as if semantic
memory favors long-term storage with its multi-associated structure, and episodic
memory favors short-term storage with its close tie to the sensory – acoustic, visual, and
haptic – register. Tulving‟s results corroborate this interpretation – “forgetting appears to
be more readily produced in the episodic than in the semantic system.” (OM 392)
At this point, I have discussed storage and encoding across episodic and semantic
memory. However, the differences in regard to retrieval are perhaps most interesting.
Two theses emerge in regard to retrieval. First, Tulving explains, “the act of retrieval
from either system may, and usually is, entered as an episode into episodic memory.
Retrieval as feedback [my emphasis] into the episodic system may lead to changes in the
contents, and the retrievability of these contents, of episodic memory.” (OM 391)
Second, Tulving provides two lists of sentences, the first pertaining to episodic memory,
and the second pertaining to semantic memory. Summarizing the first (episodic) list
Tulving says the sentences describe autobiographical events “describable in terms of their
perceptible dimensions or attributes and in terms of their temporal-spatial relations.” (OM
386-387) Summarizing the second (semantic) list Tulving writes, “Although some of
these statements refer to the speaker‟s „knowledge‟ rather than his „remembering,‟ all of
them can be regarded as memory statements in that their content clearly depends upon
information entered into the semantic memory [my emphasis].” (OM 387) In other
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words, “remember responses reflect retrieval from the episodic system and know
responses reflect retrieval from the semantic system.” 657 For ease of reference, I will
refer to the first thesis as the “retrieval as feedback thesis” and the second thesis as the
“all knowledge is grounded in semantic memory thesis.”
These two theses are worth a brief second look here. The “all knowledge is
grounded in semantic memory” thesis suggests that to set out looking for origins first
necessitates semantic memory for an awareness of “origins.” Yet, said semantic
memory, as evidenced by the “retrieval as feedback” thesis, itself stands upon a ground of
episodic memory. Though both episodic and semantic memory processes are considered
explicit, rather than implicit, it turns out episodic memory is more closely associated with
the dimension of sensory origins. Hence, “an analysis of the power of memory,” to
borrow Stewart‟s phrasing from above, discloses a difference in kind and a retrieval
process – with a sort of closure upon itself – that frustrates further examination into its
ground. Put another way, engaging episodic memory changes it, and, therefore,
attempting to represent it inevitably misrepresents it. This should remind you of
Derrida‟s logic of supplementation, i.e. the movement of Différance – I will further
explicate these associations below.
§6 Procedural v. Declarative – Related to each of the previous distinctions
discussed thus far is the distinction between procedural and declarative memory.
Whereas both episodic and semantic were explicit memory processes, the two “major
forms” of implicit memory are “priming” and “procedural memory.” I discuss
procedural memory here, and priming below. Procedural memory is often coupled with
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and distinguished from the explicit memory process called declarative memory.
Procedural memory “generally refers to memory for knowing how to do something. The
knowledge in procedural memories is not accessible to awareness, but rather is
manifested only through performance of a task.”658 Hence, as procedural memory is
implicit memory for knowing how, and declarative memory is explicit memory for
knowing that and what.
A relevant example from philosophy, the distinction between “knowing how” and
“knowing that,” was famously discussed by Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976) in his The Concept
of Mind. To begin with, then, perhaps Ryle is instructive in noting, “Efficient practice
precedes the theory of it.”659 Ryle‟s colorful example,
The cleverness of the clown may be exhibited in his
tripping and tumbling. He trips and tumbles just as clumsy
people do, except that he trips and tumbles on purpose and
after much rehearsal and at the golden moment and where
the children can see him and so as not to hurt himself. 660
Ryle is concerned to indicate a difference between “knowing how and knowing that”
where “knowing how” is skillful and “knowing that” is factual – “learning how or
improving in ability is not like learning that or acquiring information [Ryle‟s
emphasis].”661 Similarly, procedural memory pertains to how a task is performed and
declarative memory pertains to the task‟s identity. 662
Théodule Ribot, noted above, is credited with distingushing between skill
memory or procedural memory and declarative memory in his 1881 publication Les
Maladies de la Mémoire. According to Ribot, “In cases belonging to this morbid group
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neither the habits nor skill in any handicraft, such as sewing … disappears. The
destruction of memory in these cases affects only its highest and most instable forms,
those personal in character…”663 Seeking a physiological explanation and in discussing
the degeneration of memory and amnesia, Ribot – given its relevancy I quote him at
length – remarked,
This law, however universal it may be with regard to
memory, is but a particular expression of a still more
general law – a biological law. It is a fact well known in
biology that the structures that are latest formed are the first
to degenerate. … Hughlings Jackson [1835-1911] was the
first to prove in detail that the higher, complex, voluntary
functions of the nervous system disappear first, and that the
lower, simple, general and automatic functions disappear
latest. We have seen both these facts verified in the
dissolution of the memory: what is new dies out earlier than
what is old, what is complex earlier that what is simple.
The law we have formulated is therefore only the
psychological expression of a law of life. 664
A perhaps more familiar example, Brenda Milner, with her famous patient “H.M.” 665 who
was unable to form long-term memories also describes the distinction between procedural
and declarative memory. 666 Reminiscent of the clinical vignettes found in The Man Who
Mistook His Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical Tales published by Oliver Sacks in
1970,667 H.M. was able to learn skills without remembering the practice it took to require

663

Théodule Ribot, The Diseases of Memory, J. Fitzgerald tr. (New York: Humboldt Library of Popular
Science Literature, v. 46, 1883), 473.
664
Ribot, The Diseases of Memory, 482.
665
Brenda Milner. “The Memory Defect in Bilateral Hippocampal Lesions,” Psychiatric Research Report,
11 (1959), 43-58.
666
Suzanne Corkin. “Lasting Consequences of Bilateral Medial Temporal Lobectomy,” Seminar in
Neurology, 4.4 (1984), 249-259.
667
Oliver Sacks. The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical Tales, (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1970).

464

the skill. 668 Also, the disctinction was further popularized by John R. Anderson with his
The Architecture of Cognition published in 1983.669
To sum: analogously, the movement from knowing how to knowing that is like
the movement from procedural memory to declarative memory, and both involve a
change in register. Whereas procedural memory is implicit, declarative is explicit.
Furthermore, just as episodic memory – the retrieval as feedback thesis – resisted full
explication of its ground, the further requirement of register change makes procedural
memory even more resistant to explication. Lastly, it is worth noting, as its name should
imply, procedural memory is tied up with performance.
§7 Chunking – In 1956 George Armitage Miller published a now famous paper
titled, “The Magical Number Seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for
processing information.”670 Now, Miller‟s article seems most concerned with common
notions of memory or memory at higher levels of elaboration, e.g. long-term memory and
semantic memory. However, given the historical significance of Miller‟s publication, I
will mention two relevant notions which he discusses – recoding and chunking.
According to Miller, “The process of memorizing may be simply the formation of
chunks, or groups of items that go together.”671 He distinguishes between chunks and
bits; bits compose chunks. The distinction is important because it was in this way that he
was able to discuss recoding. Miller was concerned to understand how mnemonists are
able to remember and recall items in such large numbers. He notes,
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It is a little dramatic to watch a person get 40 binary digits
in a row and then repeat them back without error.
However, if you think of this merely as a mnemonic trick
for extending the memory span, you will miss the more
important point that is implicit in nearly all such mnemonic
devices. The point is that recoding is an extremely
powerful weapon for increasing the amount of information
that we can deal with. In one form or another we use
recoding constantly in our daily behavior [my
emphasis].672
Here, Miller is approaching what will 20 years later be known as a theory of elaboration
– noted above. Recoding, then, amounts to receiving bits of input – always already in the
form of a code – and changing the code by chunking the bits. Also, his comments on
recoding may be seen as a nascent form of the “Generation Effect,” which suggests
information is more easily remembered if it is generated – paraphrased/elaborated –
rather than simply encountered – heard/read.673,674
His paper receives its title because he suggests the optimal number of chunks is 7
± 2. Though recent research suggests Miller may have been overly optimistic with his
optimal number,675,676,677 his publication is still considered highly influential in
popularizing the notions of recoding and chunking and helping to usher in the Levels of
Processing Paradigm with its focus on levels of elaboration. More to the point, by way of
chunking and working memory, I will appropriate Derrida‟s movement of Différance as
shorthand reference.
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§8 Working Memory – Though there may be dispute as to who was the first
person in print to use the term “working” with the term “memory,” credit is given to Alan
D. Baddeley for congealing the first model of working memory and popularizing the
term. Together Baddeley and Graham J.L. Hitch published “Working Memory” in
1974.678 Subsequently in 2000 Baddeley added a component to his model of working
memory. 679 I provide illustrations below when dealing more extensively with working
memory. At this point, it is important to recognize the inception of the working memory
model, and the motivation which led to its construction. That motivation derived from
the need to incorporate ideas of agency, attention, and autonomy – in other words,
“control,” – into the memory models which were ever increasing in specificity. 680
According to Baddeley, he and Hitch were motivated to rethink short-term memory as
more than just a storage system.681
§9 Context Dependence – In 1932 Frederic Charles Bartlett published
Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology.682 In the “Introduction”
to the 1987 publication, professor of psychology and neuroscience Walter Kintsch notes,
“If I had to name the three historically most influential publications in the psychological
study of memory, I would pick Ebbinghaus‟s „On Memory,‟ in 1885, Bartlett‟s
Remembering in 1932, and [George Armitage] Miller‟s „Magical Number Seven‟ in
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1956.”683 Bartlett‟s studies of memory are largely considered influential given his
concern to look into everyday uses of memory. As such, Bartlett‟s reading of the relation
between “interest” and memory accentuated the everydayness of memory. According to
Bartlett,
[T]hough we may still talk of traces, there is no reason in
the world for regarding these as made complete, stored up
somewhere, and then re-excited at some much later
moment. The traces that our evidence allows us to speak of
are interest-determined, interest-carried traces. They live
with our interests and with them they change. 684
In this way, Bartlett provided an understanding of memory as “contextual” – context as
memory cue and memory as dependent upon context.685 This may be seen as part of the
general trend – which I am illustrating with this section of the dissertation – to think of
memory less in terms of its being stable than in terms of its being stabilizing. Put another
way, the trend has been since 1960 to think of memory less as stagnant storehouse and
more as a lively autonomic process.
At a higher level of abstraction, context dependence, like mood and state
dependence below, may be thought of under the rubric of cue dependence. In other
words, put generally, something – some cue – sparks memory‟s retrieval bringing forth
both implicit and explicit information in the form of senses, images, and symbols. Put
figuratively, it is “To see a world in a grain of sand, and heaven in a wild flower, hold
infinity in the palm of your hand, and eternity in an hour.” 686 Cue related retrieval may
be both involuntary and voluntary, and it may be conscious or unconscious.
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§10 Mood and State Memory Dependency – Though closely related to memory‟s
relation with context, it is worth noting memory‟s relation with moods and states. 687
Sometimes referred to as mood or state dependent memory, ideas regarding such memory
have been popular at least since the work of Ivan P. Pavlov and Sigmund Freud noted
above. 688 To employ a trope which will break down later, I might describe the difference
between context and mood or state dependent memory as one of degree relative to the
objective and subjective aspects of experience. It should be common knowledge that the
animals whom the behaviorists studied were kept in states of deprivation, i.e. starved.689
Pairing tones with the presentation of sustaining stimuli of which the subjects were
deprived – e.g. food or water – resulted in pleasure, among other things.690 In this way,
animals in the deprived states remembered what to do in order to reduce the
deprivation.691
Arguably, noticing that memories may persist dependent upon the episodes of
various moods and states to which they refer led Freud to hypothesize a mechanism
resembling an unconscious homunculus, i.e. “the Unconscious,” to control recall and
retrieval of memories. 692 For example, A.A. Sharp in 1938 published “An Experimental
test of Freud‟s doctrine of the relation of hedonic tone to memory revival.”693 Sharp
notes, “Freud assumes that unpleasant experiences are less likely to be revived than are
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neutral experiences and neutral experiences less likely than pleasant experiences.” 694
Sharp and his experimental results concurred with the idea that unpleasant memories may
be more difficult to recall than pleasant memories. 695 Hence, you can recognize the state
and mood dependent aspects of memory.
§11 Saccadic Memory – It is in understanding the physiological relation between
the fundamental elements of sensation and persistence that memory, perhaps, first
appears as a principle of animation. The term which captures those two fundamental
elements is “saccade.” Saccades are one of the two ways humans can voluntarily move
their eyes; the other being “smooth pursuit.”696 Smooth contrasts nicely with jerk or
twitch, and smooth pursuit, for example, can be noticed by following the trajectory of a
ball as it falls through the air. Otherwise, if you intend to move your eyes in an arching
trajectory through the air without an object to pursue, you will not be able to move them
smoothly. 697,698 That is, you will notice a twitching.
Historians Nicholas Wade and Benjamin Tatler credit the origin of the word to
Louis Émile Javal. 699 According to Wade and Tatler,
The word saccade derives from the old French saquer or
sachier meaning “to pull” and at the time of Javal,
translated as “jerk” or “twitch.” It was first used by
Rabelais in the 16th Century to refer to certain rapid
movements of a horse…700
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Saccadic eye movements, then, refer to twitches and jerks of the eye. Though sometimes
differently termed in the literature the three types of saccade are referred to as
“prosaccades,” “antisaccades,” and “memory-guided saccades.”701 The fact that one type
of saccade is named memory-guided seems to imply the other saccades are somehow
separate from memory. However, both of the two voluntary eye movements: smooth
pursuit and saccadic are rooted in memory, though in different ways – so too with all
three types of saccades. 702
Memory-guided saccades are referred to as such because they describe moving
the eye back to the location where the no longer present stimuli presented. In this way,
memory-guided saccades are rooted in memory since memory is required for the eye to
return to a previous location in the absence of the stimuli. Prosaccades refer to targeting
an object, especially when the object‟s trajectory is erratic or its velocity is too great for
smooth pursuit tracking. The perennial example is hitting a baseball.
Within less than half a second the batter has to judge the
trajectory of the ball and formulate a properly aimed and
timed stroke. The accuracy required is a few cm in space
and a few ms in time. Half a second gives time for one or
at the most two saccades, and the speeds involved preclude
smooth pursuit for much of the ball‟s flight. How do
practitioners of these sports use their eyes to get the
information they need? … anticipation. … The saccade that
effects this is interesting in that it is not driven by a
“stimulus,” but by the player‟s estimate of the location of
something that has yet to happen.703
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The anticipation involved strengthens with practice because the prosaccadic movement is
rooted in memory. 704 With the repetition of practice the memory of where and when to
jerk the eyes in anticipation strengthens and refines the movement.705 The same goes for
the prosaccadic movement in more everyday situations like washing hands. 706 For
example, when you wash your hands your eyes jerk about toward the soap, water, on/off
handle, etc. and not just before you reach for the entity in question, so while you lather
and perform one activity your memory is accumulating information for what might
eventually come next through prosaccadic eye movements. 707
Lastly, antisaccades correct for the reflexive twitching which would otherwise
occur, this is commonly seen in activities such as reading and scene recognition. 708
Reading shows a complex mixture of antisaccades, prosaccades, and memory-guided
saccades709 – e.g. focusing on a word or phrase,710 skimming a section,711 and returning to
an earlier passage. 712 Similarly, when we come to recognize a scene it is not as if we
stare straight ahead and the picture of the scene is wholly consumed for us to remember.
Rather, we construct the scene in our memory by combining a series of twitches – all
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three types of saccades again – and the recipe including which combination of saccades
to use is determined by the connection between your purpose for gazing at the scene and
the amount of practice you have at scene recognition.713 That is, memory is involved in
the task on multiple levels 714 – higher purpose driven recall and maintenance and lower
level twitching. And, both of these levels go toward illustrating the manner in which
memory controls eye function. 715
In fact, the constructed scene engages memory in yet another way. 716 The
constructed scene requires what is referred to as “transsaccadic memory.” 717 Just as its
name implies, transsaccadic memory is memory held across saccades constructing a
scene for perception out of the recipe of eye twitches involved. 718 Research shows that
following the eye movements of two different people, telling one to memorize as much as
possible in a scene for later recall, and telling the other to search for a specific object in
the scene yields different patterns of saccades. 719
§12 Multiple Object Tracking – Saccadic activity has both costs and benefits for
being alert and aware in the world. The cost is “change blindness” and the benefit is
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“Multiple Object Tracking (MOT).” Though I will discuss change blindness more
extensively below, it is valuable to note a few salient points here. According to Alva Noë
in Out of Our Heads: Why You are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology
of Consciousness, “Change blindness was first discussed in print in a series of articles”
from 1996 to 1997.720 The seminal article of which concluded: “Thus, just as the
perception of a scene is mediated by a rapidly-shifting fovea of limited area, so is it also
mediated by a rapidly-shifting attentional mechanism limited in the number of items it
can handle at any time.”721
There are two different types of change blindness. On the one hand, you are blind
to stimuli appearing between saccades. 722 On the other hand, if throughout the process of
saccadic scene recognition, aspects of the scene are changed faster than the eye can
attend to the changes, then you are blind to the changes. 723 The “flicker” phenomenon
being exploited here is the same which allows for a sense of flowing action when
watching a film or the sense of animation when flipping through a book which has
different images drawn on the pages.724 As this section on MOT and the above section
on saccades together should show, it is as if the speed of becoming is faster than your
memory can process, so you see a world (instead of becoming) and you are vulnerable to
change blindness.725 For a collection of excellent color graphics representing saccadic
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processes and discussing change blindness see “Visual Stability Based on Remapping of
Attention Pointers.”726
Now, a benefit indeed of saccadic activity is Multiple Object Tracking (MOT).
MOT has received attention in part because, easily noticeable in humans, MOT is
evidently difficult to reproduce in artificial intelligence, i.e. in a robot. 727,728 According
to Susan Carey, 729 MOT originated when in 1988 Zenon Pylyshyn and Ron W. Storm
published “Tracking Multiple Independent Targets.”730 In their publication, Pylyshyn
and Storm coin a key neologism. They speak of a FINST and FINSTing, and they
metaphorically describe a FINST as a “sticky index.” In my opinion, the best way to
understand MOT is to discuss FINSTs first, and an excellent account of FINSTing may
be found in Lana M. Trick‟s “A Theory of Enumeration that Grows out of a General
Theory of Vision: Subitizing, Counting, and FINSTs” found in The Nature and Origins
of Mathematical Skills.
Trick uses Pylyshyn and Storm‟s FINST model to explain an experimental result
which is – no doubt – commonly seen in everyday experiences. Examining the task of
“enumeration,” i.e. assigning a numerical value to describe the quantity of objects being
considered, Trick points out that it takes much less time, and you have a much higher rate
of accuracy, when enumerating a set of objects less than 5 in number. 731 For each object
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up to four enumerating takes between 40-120 ms increasing at a constant rate up to four.
In other words, one object may take 40 to 120 milliseconds; two objects may take 80 to
240 milliseconds; etc. However, once the quantity is higher than four, the rate remains
constant but the average time span becomes 250 to 350 milliseconds per object.732
Following a 1949 study,733 Trick called the faster process “subitizing” and the slower
process “counting.” (TEG 258-259) According to Trick FINST stands for “Fingers of
INSTantiation” which “are tokens that are used to individuate a small number of items
before the serial, area by area processing that characterizes spatial attention [emphases
added].” (TEG 257)
Whereas counting involves “moving the attentional focus from location to
location in the image,” subitizing is the enumeration that results from “moving up” the
trajectory of experience from iconic memory construction toward a semantic level of
processing. (TEG 257) The “fingers” metaphor is used here to capture the idea of
indexical “pointing,”734 the fingers are “sticky” in that the fingers seem to remember or
“stick” with the objects – in this case being enumerated up to 4 –, and “instantiation” in
that the fingers themselves are representative of the quantity in question. (TMI 181) Do
not forget what I said above about scene recognition. Certainly, there are many things in
your field of vision which may be enumerated, and it is in this way that FINSTs may be
seen as aspects of memory. Pylyshyn and Storm are careful to note the following,
FINSTing can occur independently and in parallel at
several places in the visual field. In this sense it is a
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preattentive operation, although the selection of some
subset of these automatically indexed places for further
processing or tracking may involve deliberate cognitive
intervention. … [Moreover, if] the hypothesis that we can
assign a limited number of “sticky” indexes (FINSTs) to
features in a visual display is correct, subjects should be
able to track a subset of visually identical and randomly
moving objects, providing the target subset is somehow
identified at the start of the trial [my emphasis]. (TMI 181)
In other words, memory must maintain that you are actually performing a task so that
your visual field may be pre-attentively organized for the purpose of tracking or
enumerating.735 Pre-attentively should be emphasized here because – as this chapter will
repeatedly indicate – these processes are implicit and bypass the need to hypothesize an
intending ego. This is tricky because it seems like intention is required to “go into” the
visual field and, for example, subitize. Yet, these pre-attentive activities cannot be
directly controlled by intention; though their efficiency can be enhanced, i.e. improved
with practice.736
I want to push this a little further before moving on. Imagine placing on your eye
a contact lens with a grid on it so that looking around would be like looking through
transparent graph paper. In so far as the contact lens would move with your eye, the
saccadic movements would jerk the graph along with it in a kind of “frame-dragging.”
Were you wearing glasses, however, with a grid on the lenses of the glasses, saccadic
movements could be tracked by numbering each of the grid boxes and indicating where
the retina – specifically the central line of sight, i.e. the fovea – passes at t1, t2, etc. An
interesting aspect of visual sensation may be described within this context. The grid on
the lenses, for example, would allow discussion of North, East, West, and South
735
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movements “within” the grid. What is more, researchers describe an inside and outside
of the grid. In other words, still maintaining this thought experiment of looking through a
grid, transsaccadic memory is capable of forming an “icon” either “inside” the grid or
“outside” the grid. This distinction is also referred to as retinotopic space v. nonretinotopic space or retinotopic v. spatiotopic. 737 Moreover, “[w]e might think of these
two alternative ways of representing the visual world as being either world centered, with
the map being invariant to where one fixates at any one moment, or eye centered, with
the map representing the moment-by-moment location of the item on the retina.” 738
Visual memory – implicit due to its operation below a threshold of awareness – tracks
object movement and organizes environmental shifting seamlessly between these “ways
of representing the visual world” in such a way that the object‟s actual appearance
alternates between these maps without your awareness. Referring to the trajectory of an
object alternating between maps Pylyshyn at times speaks of a “space-time worm.”739
In my opinion, here is where MOT is most interesting. MOT is capable of
tracking objects across the distinction between retinotopic and non-retinotopic space.
What is more, this level of sensation is more like raw memory than it is like sensation.
What I mean by this is that the memory of what to track needs to be maintained, and it is
not until after the tracking of multiple objects that the person, for example, tracking the
objects is able to perform certain other tasks on the objects, such as counting the number
of objects that were just being tracked. Such insights have led researchers such as John
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Kevin O‟Regan to discuss “The World as an Outside Iconic Memory.” 740 Hence,
consider the following example: while I was sitting in the Jardin du Luxembourg I
decided to attempt to see, so to speak, what these researchers are discussing. It was
possible for me to maintain visual contact with an area of flowers, track the flight of a
butterfly and the crawling of another insect all the while without fixing my fovea to any
of the moving “objects.” I report here, of course, on just the visions I was experiencing,
but I was also aware of the sounds, colors, smells, and feel, i.e. the breeze and the
pleasantness of being in the Parisian garden.
Another interesting feature of these micro-aspects of vision, despite the saccadic
activity across retinotopic and non-retinotopic space, movement sensed visually is not
“smeared.”741 Researchers have discovered what they believe to be a difference in time
signature between non-retinotopic and retinotopic space, and – most remarkably – these
time signature differences derive from the activity of the working short-term store of
visual memory, i.e. iconic memory. 742 In their words,
Although the visual system can achieve a coarse
classification of its inputs in a relatively short time, the
synthesis of qualia-rich and detailed percepts can take
substantially more time. If these prolonged computations
were to take place in a retinotopic space, moving objects
would generate extensive smear. However, under normal
viewing conditions, moving objects appear relatively sharp
and clear, suggesting that a substantial part of visual shortterm memory takes place at a non-retinotopic locus. …
[O]ur results indicate that the visual system can accomplish
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temporal integration of information while avoiding smear
by breaking off sensory memory into fast and slow
components that are implemented in retinotopic and nonretinotopic loci, respectively [my emphases].743
Notice, the association of visual short-term memory with the non-retinotopic space
corresponds to the space of FINSTing discussed above by Pylyshyn, Storm, and Trick.
Here, then, beyond the fact that repetition and practice – not intention – have the capacity
to strengthen within limits this aspect of sensation there is more evidence for the fact that
this process is a process of memory. It is in this way that memory is the condition for the
possibility of being aware and alert in the world. Despite the speed of things in the
world, the eye is able to buffer against smear by creating an icon through a twofold
process of – consistent with the Levels of Processing (LOP) Paradigm noted above –
slower maintenance coupled with faster elaboration in the formation of a visual icon
which is itself maintained by memory for the possibility of synthesis into a semantic
judgment. In sum, the physiology itself requires organization and direction. Whereas,
the latter of the two seems more difficult to recognize as a function of memory,
organization and direction are inseparable at the level of visual apprehension because
what is there and what is there for you to see are one and the same – a construction of
iconic memory.
§13 Priming – Priming is, in my opinion, one of the most fascinating aspects of
psychology and of the mind. Here, I will discuss different types of priming, indicate the
different aspects of memory in which priming occurs, and provide an example of
conceptual priming. In regard to breadth of publication, number of memory related
experimental discoveries, and influence, two of the most famous contemporary memory
743
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researchers are (in alphabetical order) Daniel L. Schacter and Endel Tulving.
Fortunately, of the five articles they have written together, two are on the topic of
priming. One could scarcely do better than these two articles in gaining an understanding
of priming. I will draw largely from their work, supplementing as needed with more
recent research, to describe priming. The first of these two articles was published in the
January 1990 issue of Science.744 The second article is an entry on priming in the
Encyclopedia of Neuroscience published in 1992.745 As noted above, priming is
considered one of the two major types of implicit memory – with procedural memory as
the other. According to Schacter and Tulving, “Priming is a type of implicit memory; it
does not involve explicit or conscious recollection of any previous experiences.” (P&M
301) As implicit it is best known by its effects, and may best be described
metaphorically as an aspect of memory “flowing” beneath the threshold of awareness.
This flowing implicit aspect of memory is influential in experience, and is sometimes
described as the “thread” in models which speak of “threaded” or “weaved” cognition. In
this way discussions of priming speak toward accounting for the contingent connections
which populate the flow of experience. 746
It is important to begin with a few terminological comments. According to
Schacter and Tulving, “The juxtaposition of its surmised ubiquity in human cognition and
the lateness of its discovery, together with its nonconscious nature, have inspired an
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intense experimental and theoretical interest in priming.”747 When discussing priming
which occurs outside of a laboratory setting or in a laboratory setting, the language may
slightly vary. Priming outside a laboratory setting may be referred to as “repetition
priming” or “automatic priming,” and priming in a laboratory setting may be referred to
as “repetition priming” or “direct priming.” 748 Generally speaking, repetition priming is
synonymous with practice. Now, the binary opposite of direct priming is “indirect
priming” or “subliminal priming.” 749 Whereas it is appropriate to speak of subliminal
priming occurring outside of a laboratory, subliminal priming is not the binary opposite
of automatic priming. 750 In regard to repetition priming, researchers speak of positive
and negative priming.751 Generally speaking, positive752 and negative priming753 are
synonymous with activation and inhibition respectively754 – I will clarify this further
below. Priming pertains to affection, 755 sensation, 756 perception,757 conation (desire or
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will), 758 conception,759 and semantic760 memory (P&M 304) – I will clarify any obscurity
as to why conception and semantic both appear here below. Moreover, “Priming effects
are ubiquitous in sensation, perception, comprehension, and action.” 761 In fact, priming
can also be used to impact decision-making processes. 762 Lastly, in a laboratory setting,
researchers speak of “forward” and “backward” priming. In particular, researchers speak
of “prime” and “target” when discussing conceptual and semantic priming experiments –
though the word “target” is used variously and loosely, especially in non-conceptual and
non-semantic priming experiments.763 Hence, there are different types of priming.
Before providing an example of semantic priming, it is useful to comment on the
conceptual/semantic distinction. On the one hand, conceptual refers to the distinction
between perceptual and conceptual, and in this way can describe the difference between
priming the perceptual shape of a word – e.g. as drawn with ink or captured in the font –
and the conceptual meaning of the word.764 Furthermore, “Conceptual repetition priming
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is largely unaffected by changes in the perceptual qualities of a stimulus between study
and test.”765 That is, presenting stimuli in different fonts, for example, alters the
perceptual, but not the conceptual, priming. On the other hand, the conceptual/semantic
distinction refers to the episodic/semantic distinction in that conceptual is the wider term
this is reminiscent of Kant‟s use of the term concept to refer to the understanding broadly
designated. So, conceptual encompasses both episodic and semantic, and the semantic
merely encompasses the semantic. 766 To familiarize the reader with priming, I discuss an
example here of semantic priming.
In a semantic priming experiment two words may be related as “prime” to
“target,” and the relation may be asymmetrical. That is, whereas A may tend to bring to
mind B, B may not tend to bring to mind A as often or as quickly. “Backward priming
refers to the situation in which the association from prime to target is weak, but the
association from target to prime is strong.”767 This may be changed through repetition
priming, i.e. practice. One is reminded here of the Pascal quote with which I began Part
II, “Habit is a second nature that destroys the first. But what is nature? Why is habit not
natural? I am very much afraid that nature itself is only a first habit, just as habit is a
second nature.”768 For example, when presented with the prime “baby” English speakers
may arrive at the target “stork.” However, the relation is stronger for the prime “stork” to
arrive at the target “baby.” In an asymmetically primed relation, then, when prime to
765
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target is weaker than target to prime (e.g. baby-stork v. stork-baby), the relation is
referred to as “backward priming,” and it is referred to as “forward priming” when prime
to target is stronger than target to prime (e.g. stork-baby v. baby-stork).769
Now, you might ask what the benefit of this distinction may be in so far as it is
relative to whichever term you take to be prime – why not just switch words? The
distinction is valuable because through repetition priming, the asymmetrical relation can
be made symmetrical, and the distinction helps in describing the change. What is more,
the asymmetry can even be reversed through repetition priming – turning backward
priming into forward priming. 770 In this way, given a specific prime-target relation, a
subject who enters a laboratory with backward priming can be primed to leave with
forward priming. 771 The process might involve training the subject to associate baby to
stork and stork to pork, for example. 772 Hence, you can see the relation with the Pascal
quote.
Whereas the above example uses one whole word as prime, word fragments or
strings of words may also be used. For example, when you see the following word
fragment: ele____, what word “comes to mind”? Without controlled priming before
being presented with the above word fragment, it is still appropriate to say that whatever
word comes to mind you were primed to see that word. No matter how many times you
769
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look at the word fragment, the word which comes to mind (unless of course for you “ele”
is a word, or has specific meaning, e.g. your initials, etc.) is not actually there. So, why
do some readers think of the word “element” and other readers think of the word
“elephant”?773 The answer has to do with the chain of events, perhaps both remote and
recent, prior to the encounter with the word fragment.774
A, perhaps, more explicit illustration of semantic priming then can be seen when
the prime is a string of meaningful words. For example, below you will find two lists of
words both of which contain the same number of words and both of which begin and end
with the same word. After each list of words ask yourself what word(s) or thought(s)
come to mind.
List 1: Apple, Teacher, Chalkboard, Recess, Yellow:
List 2: Apple, Grapes, Orange, Pear, Yellow:
Notice, the lists are not complete sentences. So, it would be artificial to speak here of
“predication,” and it would be artificial to speak here of “grammar.” Often after List 1,
respondents will say “bus.” Often after List 2, respondents will say, “banana” or
“lemon.” A less laboratory, or controlled situation, further illustrates the work of
priming: Imagine you are constantly trying to finish the sentence of the person who is
talking to you. Of course, you are not the one uttering the sentence. In other words,
some would differentiate between you and the speaker of the sentence by saying the
speaker of the sentence possesses an “intention” (to finish the sentence in some way), and
you are not aware of that intention, at least not in the same way as the speaker. Yet, at
times you certainly are able to finish the sentences of others.
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The above whole word, word fragment, string of words, and everyday sentence
completion activities are examples of positive priming, and are often accounted for by
discussing the manner in which – through memory – the targets were variously
“activated.”775 Sounding a bit like a “web of belief” expounded by Willard Van Orman
Quine (1908-2000),776 it may be suggested that given similar backgrounds (cultural or
otherwise), language exposure, etc. the metaphorically “underlying connections,”
labyrinths or webs of possible target words or sentences which might come next for you
or your interlocutor are similar enough to allow accurate predictions of the target in
question. It is as if a performative aspect of memory functions like a self-rearranging
organism variously activated. Across these webs or through these labyrinths, priming is
described as spreading activation or a cascade of activation where what is doing the
activating is the work of priming, and what is activated is memory. In this way, when
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) noted, “When a man thinketh on anything whatsoever, his
next thought after is not altogether so casual as it seems to be. Not every thought to
every thought succeeds indifferently,” 777 in his Chapter titled “Of the Consequences or
Train of Imaginations,” of Leviathan (1651), he was already aware of priming. However,
he was mistaken to deem the performance of such connecting to be an aspect of
imagination. As mentioned above, as this work of priming cascades toward a target, the
activation has an inhibiting effect referred to as negative priming.
Priming can be overt or covert, i.e. accomplished with the subject‟s awareness of
the prime or accomplished subliminally. Also, priming effects can be momentary, “they
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can last at least as long as a conversation, and … some contexts triggered by conscious
experience may last for years. … Even a single conscious experience may trigger a shortterm change in context [e.g.] in the case of traumatic experiences the effects can last for
years.”778 As early as 1988 Bernard Baars had the following to say about “conscious”
priming:
In general, a conscious priming event:
1[-] decreases reaction time to similar conscious events;
2[-] lowers the threshold for related material that is near the
perceptual threshold, or is ambiguous, vague, fleeting,
degraded, badly understood, or isolated from its surround.
…
3[-] a prime increases the likelihood of similar events
emerging in memory through free association, cued recall,
and recognition tasks; and
4[-] finally, a conscious prime increases the probability of
actions and speech related to the priming stimulus 779
Since 1988, as noted above, researchers now know the prime need not be “conscious.”
Subliminal presentation of a prime can still produce the target, i.e. though the subject
remains unaware of the prime, they become aware of the target.780 This is shown even in
the case of sensation where, “the presentation of an accessory stimulus facilitates
response activation processes because of the participants enhanced level of preparation
for stimulus processing.”781 Still more remarkable, subjects have shown priming effects
despite introduction of the prime during “anesthetic-induced unconsciousness” and “the
subject does not have any post-operative memory of the priming stimuli.” 782
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Hence, priming is an aspect of memory which is not equipped with an “off
switch.” In other words and in sum, priming spans all of the modes of memory, and
priming is the activity which accounts for fluency, automaticy, or flow. Priming may be
thought of then as a performative aspect of memory in so far as its “flowing” is also a
“pulling along.” Memory‟s feedback-control-loop is performed by priming across its
modes of coding, 783 storage,784 and retrieval, 785 running through its levels of implicit and
explicit memory – procedural, episodic, semantic, and autobiographical memory –
spanning the trajectory of experience, e.g. affection, conation, sensation, perception,
conception, and decision making. 786
§14 Automaticity – Fluency is generally taken to signify the faster or more
efficient processing of stimuli which seems to develop from repeated processing.
Considered a landmark study regarding memory and fluency, in 1981 Larry L. Jacoby
and Mark Dallas published, “On the Relationship between Autobiographical Memory and
Perceptual Learning.”787 Fluency, much like automaticity from which I will distinguish it
below, involves nonconscious aspects of memory and is found in various performances.
In other words, performing a piano piece, speaking a foreign language fluently, or
chewing bubblegum while riding a bike all entail a degree of nonconscious memory, and
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the performances may be referred to as “automatic” or “fluent.” Wittgenstein is perhaps
instructional here:
Isn‟t it like this? First of all, people use an explanation, a
chart, by looking it up; later they as it were look it up in the
head and finally they work without the chart, as if it had
never existed. In this last case they are playing a different
game. For it isn‟t as if the chart is still in the background,
to fall back on; it is excluded from our game, and if I “fall
back on it” I am like a blinded man falling back on the
sense of touch.788
Wittgenstein‟s description is just one of the ways in which we may describe how fluency
occurs. Yet, Wittgenstein‟s way is appealing in that it seems to be an ordinary
description of how people tend to think of developing a performance to the point of
fluency.
The development of one‟s performing ability up to and beyond the point of
fluency can be evaluated by looking for the “effects of fluency.” Summarizing research
regarding the effects of fluency on sensation and perception, Jeffrey P. Toth reports
fluency can increase the apparent fame of nonfamous
names (Jacoby, Woloshyn et al., 1989), can lengthen the
apparent exposure duration of a briefly flashed word
(Witherspoon & Allan, 1985), [and] can lower the apparent
loudness of background noise (Jacoby, Allan, Collins, &
Larwill, 1988).789
On the one hand, it seems, perhaps, odd to think of yourself or someone else as a fluent
seer of X. However, and keep in mind here what was said above about priming, memory
research seems to indicate given your various fluencies and primings you will experience
circumstances differently than someone else. On the other hand, this idea – minus the
technical terminology – seems to be almost commonplace. That is, your background
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experiences, e.g. cultural or socio-economical, will influence how you respond in
observably different ways in various situations from others who have had different
background experiences. Furthermore, considering tasks you perform repeatedly with
high frequency every day, not only are you a fluent seer of X, but you are also fluent in
performing many other tasks – tasks which it would require more effort for you to
enumerate than to perform. In fact the performance of these tasks may be considered
“automatic.”
The difference, then, between automaticity and fluency may be thought of as a
matter of degree ranging from performances least accessible to cognitive intervention to
performances most accessible to cognitive intervention; automaticity tending toward
performances with least potential intervention, and fluency tending toward performances
with a higher degree of potential intervention. Similar to Wittgenstein‟s description of
fluency acquisition above,
Automaticity is attained when a skill or procedure is
mastered so well that it no longer requires conscious,
effortful cognitive processing. The burden on working
memory is greatest in the early stages of skill
development… The principle of automaticity also applies
directly to working memory functions themselves. More
resources are freed up as working-memory routines and
strategies, such as subvocal rehearsal and chunking,
become automated. In fact, chunking may be the primary
process that underlies automaticity. 790
It is important to address fluency/automaticity because the distinction – as is illustrated in
the above quote – brings together three ideas: memory, performance, and control.
Working memory, as its name implies, involves the performance of tasks, and as such
indicates and illustrates a degree of agency pertaining to memory. Specifying this degree
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of agency pertaining to memory entails questions regarding control and questions
regarding fluency and automaticity of performance. Primed with the contemporary
vernacular, it is nearly impossible to broach the topic of automaticity and free-will
without mentioning intention and attention. Hence, recognizing memory‟s role in
conation and intention is tantamount to recognizing the performative standpoint. I will
address these issues below.
The perhaps most primarily philosophical issue involving fluency/automaticity
pertains to what I prefer to call the myth that automaticity entails determinism. In order
to address this myth, I will provide some examples to support my claim that automaticity
and free-will are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Hence, automaticity is not like
teaching your buddy to ride a bike and, then, having her deliver the newspaper for you.
Consider that just because you are fluent in English neither means your language abilities
are limitless nor does it mean that you cannot choose freely what next to say.
One way to characterize this issue, there seems to be a tension between limits and
rules on the one hand, and the ability to improvise on the other hand. I like
Wittgenstein‟s way of characterizing this issue in On Certainty, §464.
My difficulty can also be shown like this: I am sitting
talking to a friend. Suddenly I say: “I knew all along that
you were so-and-so.” Is that really just a superfluous,
though true, remark? I feel as if these words were like
“Good morning” said to someone in the middle of a
conversation. 791
It is not the case that if you attempt to say “Good morning” in the middle of a
conversation you will find yourself restrained by some invisible force as it were. Yet, it
is as if saying “Good morning” in the middle of a conversation is like breaking an
implicit rule or like taking an unusual route on a map. Perhaps the golden mean here can
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be found in Alfred Korzybski famous dictum, “The map is not the territory.” Hence,
your ability to control your utterances in a verbal exchange participates somewhere
between resisting the so-called (invisible) “force of habit” and remembering you are free,
i.e. able to make utterances independent of conventional rules.
Michael S. Gazzaniga addresses this issue specifically in his book The Ethical
Brain: The Science of our Moral Dilemmas, specifically in the section he titled, “My
Brain Made Me Do It.” According to Gazzaniga,
The time between the onset of the readiness potential and
the moment of conscious decision-making was about 300
milliseconds. If the readiness potential of the brain begins
before we are aware of making the decision to move our
hand, it would appear that our brains know our decisions
before we become conscious of them. 792
Now, even though Gazzaniga‟s use of technology is special, the argument involved here
is directly analogous to Wittgenstein‟s argument against William James in Zettel.
According to Wittgenstein,
William James: The thought is already complete at the
beginning of the sentence. How can one know that? …
[Perhaps] the intention of uttering the thought may already
exist before the first word has been said. [Wittgenstein‟s
emphasis] … I tell someone: “I‟m going to whistle you the
theme …”, it is my intention to whistle it, and I already
know what I am going to whistle. It is my intention to
whistle the theme: have I already, in some sense, whistled it
in thought?793
Here, then, it is as if, Scalambrino : Gazzaniga :: Wittgenstein : James. If it were the case
that the tune had already been “whistled in thought,” then an unconscious, or perhaps
“neuronal” determinism could ensue – “our brains know our decisions before we become
conscious of them.” Yet, Gazzaniga‟s term “readiness potential,” which may be
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retrospectively referred to as “intention,” betrays the non-deterministic sense of the
activation. Practice at whistling tunes or speaking languages leaves a speaker primed for
such activities, and readiness potential refers to the spreading activation by unconscious,
i.e. implicit procedural and priming, memory that prepares one for moving a hand,
whistling a tune, or uttering a phrase.
Because the sight of a soccer ball may activate and ready your feet instead of your
loins, a certain amount of selection and discrimination may be attributed to the
unconscious, i.e. implicit, activity of memory. However, readiness potential does not
mean the fully formed or polished product of the fingers or lips is somehow “in the
brain.” There are two fundamental problems resulting from the type of thinking
exemplified in the above James and Gazzaniga quotes. First, Gazzaniga and James may
be guilty of fallacious thinking on two counts. They may be guilty of what in “Is
Consciousness a Brain Process?” U.T. Place refers to as the “phenomenological fallacy,”
i.e. “the mistaken idea that descriptions of the appearances of things are descriptions of
the actual state of affairs in a mysterious internal environment.”794 And, they may be
guilty of the informal (linguistic) “fallacy of division.” In other words, they reason
mistakenly from the attributes of a totality to the attributes of the parts of the totality, and
in doing so they level the very real difference between implicit and explicit memory.
Second, their fallacy of division obscures the notion of agency sending us on a wild
“ghost in the machine” chase.
As if revealing the previously unlisted address for the homunculus family,
Gazzaniga bolsters his neuronal determinism by introducing what he refers to as the
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brain‟s “left-hemisphere interpreter.” Describing patients with a particular brain disorder,
i.e. a particular brain damage, and narrating for “the brain,” Gazzaniga explains,
The left-hemisphere interpreter would recognize that
damage to nerves of the limb meant trouble for the brain
and that the limb was paralyzed; however, in this case the
damage occurred directly to the brain area responsible for
signaling a problem in the perception of the limb, and it
cannot send any information to the left-hemisphere
interpreter. The interpreter, must, then, create a belief to
mediate the two know facts “I can see the limb isn‟t
moving” and “I can‟t tell that it is damaged.” When
patients with this disorder are asked about their arm and
why they can‟t move it, they will say “It‟s not mine” or “I
just don‟t feel like moving it” – reasonable conclusions,
given the input that the left-hemisphere interpreter is
receiving. The left-hemisphere is not only a master of
belief creation, but it will stick to its belief system no
matter what. (EB 149)
So, on the one hand, supposedly your brain is aware of the decision being made before
you, i.e. consciousness, the ego, intention, or whatever term generally taken to refer to
agency and control. On the other hand, the “brain creates belief,” according to
Gazzaniga, which complicates matters because the brain, in essence, covers for itself.
That is, Gazzaniga‟s model launches an attack on free-will by suggesting your brain
automatically determines your course of action, and then your brain produces lies to
protect itself from being blamed for the decision(s).
The counterpoint to this thought from Gazzaniga may be found in Gordon D.
Logan‟s Unintentional Thought. According to Logan,
The conclusion that automatic processing can be controlled
does not deny the existence of automaticity … Automatic
processing is often facilitative, providing a path of least
resistance, well worn by habit, for us to follow. The path
may be difficult to resist, and it may still influence us if we
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resist it, but we can resist it at will and minimize its
influence.795
The points I have decided to emphasize in Logan‟s quote involve his terms: “facilitative,”
“path of least resistance” and “at will” “resistance.” Logan‟s account, esp. his above
three terms, is reminiscent of Aristotle‟s discussion of “vice” in the Nicomachean Ethics,
esp. Bk. III and Bk. VII. Both Aristotle and Logan note the importance of habit in ethical
decision making. In fact, Logan‟s ideas pertaining to resistance nearly echo Aristotle,
and I would like to use Aristotle here along with Logan to counterpoint Gazzaniga and
argue against the myth that automaticity entails determinism – emphasizing the ground of
memory with each step.
In Book III Chapter I of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle provides a negative
definition of voluntary action. “Things that happen by force or through ignorance are
thought to be involuntary (NE 1110a).” Yet, in Chapter V Aristotle explains, “Not
everything that is voluntary is an object of rational choice (NE 1112a).” Squaring the
above two claims, Aristotle responds to a possible objection to his account of virtue and
vice as voluntary.
But suppose somebody argues: “Everyone aims at what
appears good to him, but over this appearance we have no
control; rather, how the end appears to each person depends
on what sort of person he is. So, if each person is in some
way responsible for his own state, he will also be in some
way responsible for how it appears. If he is not, however,
then no one will be responsible for his own wrongdoing,
but he will do these things through ignorance of the end…”
(NE 11141-b)
The possible objection highlights the notion of “character.” Whereas, Aristotle wants to
highlight that a vicious character does not appropriate a situation in such a way as to
provide a clear path to the virtuous action, he also wants to highlight that character
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formation is voluntary and itself worthy of praise or blame. Aristotle responds to the
possible objection noting,
virtues are voluntary (because we are in some way partly
responsible for our states of character, and it is by our being
the kind of people that we are that we assume such and
such as our end), vices also will be voluntary; they are on
the same footing. (NE 1114b)
Aristotle is able to maintain, then, that voluntariness of action is compatible with an
influential locus of tendency, i.e. character, by appealing to memory, i.e. habit. In this
way, virtue is not compelled; it derives from rational choice; and it proceeds from a
disposition, i.e. habit, to choose virtuously (NE 1105a) – one virtuous action does not a
virtuous person make.
Whereas, Logan speaks of “path of least resistance” and “at will” “resistance,”
Aristotle speaks of “continence” and “incontinence.”796 Yet, both acknowledge
automaticity as an influential ground determined by memory in regard to voluntary
actions. Moreover, the malleability of this automaticity and the effects of training
indicate though automaticity may range from obligatory to facilitative, it does not
necessitate determinism. Even the feeling of being “dragged about,” Aristotle suggests,
comes more from ignorance than from physical mechanisms beyond our control. It turns
out the philosophical study of ethics has value even if no ethical theory can be “proven
true.” As a sort of “way of seeing” defense for ethics, seeing a situation so as to be able
to consider a best possible ethical action requires the automaticity and priming which
come from the study of ethics. Hence, in experiencing a situation, automaticity provides
a path of least resistance; recollection of knowledge regarding such situations allows for
deliberation; and, performing – a voluntary action in relation to the situation – itself
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requires the synthesis of the perceived situation with the stored knowledge, and just as
children are not born rational deliberators, this synthesis requires practice.
Is it the case then, that there are no strict constraints, i.e. a constraint that you
cannot – upon encountering it – immediately overcome with will? No, in fact, the
constraint your will cannot immediately overcome, i.e. the, perhaps, most important
constraint, is the constraint of your memory. Stimuli do not speak for themselves, i.e.
“automaticity is not driven by stimuli separately from skills.” 797 If you are not trained or
prepared to perform an action, then your will cannot overcome the limit of your memory.
This may be thought of, for example, in terms of muscle memory and conceptual
memory. To hearken back to the Wittgenstein example, if you have never been exposed
to a foreign language, then though you can say “Good morning” in the middle of a
conversation, you cannot say, for example, “Guten Tag” or “Bon jour.” Hence, some
constraints can be broken, e.g. “Good morning,” others cannot, e.g. 非正 & 记忆.798
§15 Retroactive Change – Retroactive memory change is quite simple to describe,
and it is equally as easily overlooked as a mechanism of memory. Suppose you have
some experience, and if you remember it at all, you believe some account of your
experience to be true. You believe the account to be true because you learned it as such.
Or, perhaps you are ignorant of its actual truth value, but it “sounds” accurate to you. In
either case, suppose you later learn differently, either by experiencing for yourself or
being persuaded by a different account. For a concrete example, perhaps you experience
the failure of your telephone to work, and you arrive at some account of its failure to
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work. What is most important to note here is that, regardless of whether any of the
accounts in question are true or can even ever be proven true, the changes described
above occur within your memory. Furthermore, these changes are referred to as
“retroactive changes” because you are retroactively changing the content of your
memory. Whereas, more specifically it may be said you have discovered the truth or are
learning from your mistake, more generally, it should not be overlooked that the
retroactive changes take place in memory. Looking at the process with a more technical
lens uncovers the processes of “consolidation,” “retroactive inhibition” or
“perseveration,” and “retrograde facilitation.”
In 1900 Müller and Pilzecker, noted above, published Experimental Contributions
to the Science of Memory introducing the notion of perseveration to account for
“retroactive inhibition” when learning. What is important regarding retroactive inhibition
is what relates it to the notion of consolidation. Müller and Pilzecker showed
experimentally that memory continues to work beyond the intention to remember
information. In other words, what is referred to as a period of consolidation occurs after
the period of exposure to the information which was intended to be remembered.
Consolidation may be thought of, then, as the movement from short-term memory to
long-term memory, and, as such, may be enhanced with elaborative rehearsal. 799
Exerting an amount of effort during the period of consolidation toward other mental tasks
inhibits the consolidation, retroactively as it were, of the to-be-remembered information
from short-term memory to long-term memory. 800

799

Cf. G.A. Miller. “The Magical Number Seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for
processing information.” Psychological Review, 63.2, (1956), 81-97.
800
G. Keppel. “Consolidation and Forgetting,” Memory Consolidation: Psychobiology of Cognition, H.
Weingartner, E.S. Parker, eds. (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1984), 149-150.

499

Looking back to automaticity for a moment. Whereas, automaticity is tied up in
the notion of obligatory memory, i.e. encoding and retrieval, storage is dependent upon
rehearsal. This is tantamount to saying that to which you are exposed is always already
being taken up into short term memory, as if memory has this obligation, and has the
further potential to be stored long-term depending upon consolidation. Retroactive
inhibition, then, refers to the inhibition or disruption of consolidation; by continuing your
exposure, short-term and working memory may be overloaded and fail to consolidate
information to long-term storage. So, notice that memory continues to work beyond the
encounter with the to-be-remembered information, and memory consolidation may be
retroactively inhibited
In 1932, then, Edward Lee Thorndike (1874-1949) published The Fundamentals
of Learning. Thorndike was concerned not with inhibiting memory consolidation but
with enhancing it. In what hearkens back to the studies noted above regarding mood and
memory, Thorndike experimentally illustrated “retrograde facilitation” by providing
rewards during “the critical post-encoding period.”801 These rewards – emotions and
pleasures – helped facilitate consolidation. In other words, grammar school repetition
coupled with praise should lead to a further solidification of habits and long-term storage
of information. The rewards occur after the exposure to the to-be-remembered
information. Hence, the enhancing action is retroactive. The points I hope to stress most
of all by mentioning retroactive memory change: first, changes and corrections in beliefs
systems are changes taking place within memory; second, memory continues to work
beyond the intention to remember information.

801

Edward L. Thorndike. The Fundamentals of Learning, (New York: Columbia University, 1932), 638.

500

§16 Attention/Intention as a Process of Working Memory – A new reading is
emerging in the 21st century which thinks attention and intention as grounded in and
deriving from working memory. The claim is that working memory is the condition for
the possibilities of attention and intention. Wittgenstein states the problem roughly in his
Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (§837), “But where does memory belong, and
where attention [Wittgenstein‟s emphases]?” 802 To begin with, the idea of attention as a
spotlight into the world has been eroding for some time now. 803 The idea first gave way
to the idea of multiple spotlights into the world, and then to the idea of multiple spotlights
into an image known as the world that is maintained by memory. A number of the above
entries (theses) have highlighted the idea of the world as an image maintained, i.e.
constructed, by memory. 804,805 Notice, of the image being maintained, since a
comparatively small amount of possible contributions are retrieved, so to speak, from the
flow of possible sensation, it is correct to call the maintenance rehearsing of memory a
construction. Discussing attention as a function of memory, then, I will highlight here
two different ideas. First, I will discuss the idea of selective attention as a mechanism
functioning at the crossroads of working memory capacity limitations, procedural
routines, and “higher level” recollection, i.e. contributions from episodic and semantic
memory. Second, I will discuss how it is that what there is to pay attention to is already a
construct of memory. Put generally, “awareness is a prerequisite for intentional
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control,”806 and – as should have been firmly established at this point – awareness is
impossible without memory.
In The Principles of Psychology William James described attention in a way
which was unfortunately practical for 1890. According to James,
Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking
possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out
of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or
trains of thought. Focalization [;] concentration, of
consciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal
from some things in order to deal effectively with others,
and is a condition which has a real opposite in the
confused, dazed, and scatterbrained state…807
One of the things the 21st century can see, which James could not, is that this “taking
possession by the mind” is itself a procedure. As a procedure it may be separated from
the object, i.e. the object‟s construction, to which it contributes. Further, whereas James
discusses focalization as a kind of withdrawal, he implies an obscure notion of choice.
The tendency followed, of course, to look for the agent doing the choosing, and James
points to the agent by perpetuating another unfortunate tendency, i.e. talking about
“consciousness.” Of course, there is a difference between the formation of the object, on
the one hand, through sensation and perception and the judgment, on the other, which
bestows an identity to the object. Rather than either of these aspects of experience,
attention refers more to the performance which runs through object formation, judgment,
and the synthesis of the two. In other words, attention pertains to the performative
aspects of memory. Not to consciousness. However, James was little aware of
unconscious attention in the form of multiple object tracking or priming.
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It is insufficient, then, to think of attention as performing discrimination,
selection, or focus. On the one hand, it is insufficient because these activities are
sometimes performed without attention, i.e. unconsciously. I have already discussed how
memory is involved unconsciously in discrimination, selection, and focus in discussing
habituation/de-sensitization, FINSTing, and priming above. On the other hand, it is
insufficient to think of attention as performing discrimination, selection, or focus because
task performance is not one-dimensional. Rather,
When people hold several objects (such as digits or words)
in working memory and select one for processing,
switching to a new object takes longer than selecting the
same object as that on the preceding processing step.
Similarly, selecting a new task incurs task-switching
costs.808
The above quote from an article titled, “Selection of Objects and Tasks in Working
Memory,” highlights the multi-dimensional quality of task performance. Whereas,
memory can account for this difference of cost incursion, attention cannot. If task
performance were one-dimensional –involved performing a task upon whatever is being
attended – and attention were a spotlight peering into whatever the agent intended,
switching to a new object upon which the same task is to be performed should incur no
more cost than attending to the same object because the only process changing would be
the same in each case – attention. For example, look back at the word attention. Now,
look back at the word attention. It is not the case that the mind shuts down waiting only
to repeat the last task, e.g. it could not be sure the next task would be a repetition of the
last. Hence, if task performance were one-dimensional, the cost should be the same
whether attending to the same object or a different object, so long as the task is the same.
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However, because task performance is multi-dimensional, i.e. involving the spreading
activation of procedures applied to maintained objects in a current of priming moving
through a sea of sensitization, the selection of objects and tasks in working memory
incurs differing costs dependent upon the amount of memory activation required by
working memory. 809
Similar to a kind of frame-dragging, working memory is capable of dragging a
task-to-be-performed across stimuli maintained for the sake of potentially having the task
performed upon them. Or, put in a vocabulary more consistent with folk psychology, I
can pay attention to a number of things with which I can intend to do something.
Maintaining the task to-be-performed is the repeatedly retrieving, or repeating the
retrieval, from procedural memory of the procedure for performing the task. On the one
hand, priming and practice make activities more efficient even across tasks, e.g. practice
at juggling balls and bowling pins increases your ability to catch cups and containers
falling unexpectedly out of overstuffed cupboards as you open them. On the other hand,
task switching entails the performance of a procedure coded differently relative to the
different task. Hence, the task-switching cost noted above. The psychological literature
pertaining to “scripts” provides some useful insights and a useful vocabulary for
discussing attention as a function of memory.
When you have performed a routine enough times to have come to associate the
routine with cues which may be noticed, for example, within a context or a mood, were
you to transcribe the words and actions involved, you would have a “script” for the
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routine.810 Psychologists use this way of talking about repetitive human activities to
account for a number of predictable aspects regarding these activities. For example, you
may variously have scripts for “ordering a pizza for delivery,” “ordering food or drink at
a restaurant,” or “asking a question in a classroom.” The men credited with, at least,
popularizing the notion of scripts Roger C. Schank and Robert P. Abelson refer to the
“restaurant script.”811
Put generally, scripts are universalized and normalized in many cases to such an
extent that when amidst cues which may be appropriate for a range of scripts, if the script
employed sufficiently deviates from any of the scripts considered appropriate, the
activity, i.e. the employed script, will probably be considered deviant – thereby activating
a different range of scripts. Put more specifically, if you phone an establishment which
delivers pizzas, there is a numerical range of appropriate questions to ask and there is an
appropriate range of topics about which to ask before your interlocutor might think you
are a prank caller – thereby hanging up on you or calling the police, depending upon the
script they employ when, for example, they encounter the cues suggesting “prank caller.”
Consider another aspect of scripts. Suppose you recognize the cues you associate
with being thirsty and encountering a coffee shop. Though you have never been inside
the coffee shop you have encountered nor do you know any of the individuals inside the
coffee shop, entering the coffee shop and employing your script for ordering at a
restaurant you will most likely be successful at receiving a beverage to quench your
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thirst.812 I am attempting here to accentuate something akin to the surprise of Salvador
Dalí, “I do not understand why, when I ask for a grilled lobster in a restaurant, I am never
served a cooked telephone…”813 In a slightly more technical register, the individuals
involved may be described as participating in a process of anchoring upon the cues so as
to judge the situation and identify the possible scripts appropriate to employ. Though the
scripts involved and the process of recognition are ultimately learned – acquired through
practice – individuals involved may or may not be aware, i.e. conscious, of the process of
selection upon which the identity of the coffee shop and their respective identities as
employees or customers rest.
Beyond the identities, then, scripts may be deferred to in order to account for the
expectations of the individuals involved. Reminiscent of Nietzsche‟s insight from
Beyond Good and Evil, §138 “When we are awake we also do what we do in our dreams:
we invent and make up the person with whom we associate – and immediately forget it.”
(BGE 88) Hence, scripts are like learned procedures resulting in the selection of cues
upon which to anchor expectations and from which to further employ scripts, and within
this framework individuals self-regulate and “pay attention” so as to perform tasks. I
might summarize this by saying: globally, attention may be accounted for along the lines
of cue dependent recollection of scripts which dictate not only the identities involved but
also the expectations involved. Though these scripts are learned and need to be retrieved
from memory, as is the case with procedural memory, these scripts are employed without
812
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awareness – the agent lives into the script. Locally, attention may be accounted for along
the lines of applying a globally primed procedure in the performance of a task upon
objects maintained within a global framework by working memory – global expectation
means motivation regarding objects locally.
So far, then, in order to argue for rethinking the notion of attention as a function
of memory, I have discussed how memory is involved in the overarching framework
which dictates attention globally. I have discussed how memory is responsible for
providing the material which may be attended to locally. Further, I have discussed how
performance, for which attention is usually taken to be a prerequisite, can occur in the
absence of awareness – and therefore without attention. Also, I have discussed how
performance involves the application of a procedure selected from memory, and how
memory may be responsible for the selection of the procedure, e.g. by way of cues. A
nice example of this may be found in an article by Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers,
“The Extended Mind.” Though Clark and Chalmers are not explicitly making this point,
they provide an example of applying, i.e. remembering, a procedure to assist in the
performance of a task. According to Clark and Chalmers, “These may incorporate bodily
actions into cognitive processes, as when we use our fingers as working memory in a
tricky calculation.”814 In sum, what was taken to be attention seems bound by memory on
the one hand, and performed by memory on the other. And, now I will discuss one
further aspect of memory and attention regarding task-switching by referring to a series
of studies – related to scripts – on expectation and expertise.
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The majority of research on memory is concerned with recollective memory, and
specifically memory for events is often studied in relation to expectation. 815 As may be
expected, this inevitably brings into the conversation the work of Robert Rosenthal and
the “Pygmalion Effect.”816,817 The Pygmalion effect has been characterized as the selffulfilling prophecy embedded within or related to one‟s expectations. 818 In other words,
how do one‟s present expectations influence one‟s account of the past?819 Myriad
experiments have been conducted for the sake of understanding “eye-witness testimony,”
for example. 820 Elizabeth F. Loftus who has published numerous articles on the topic
interestingly had the following to say in 1978, “Almost two centuries ago, Immanuel
Kant spoke of the human tendency to merge different experiences to form new concepts
and ideas. That tendency has crucial implications for one‟s ability to report his or her
experiences accurately.”821 And, regarding accurate reporting, studies have shown that
subject‟s expectations may be influenced by features of the experiment in multiple ways:
the knowledge base of the observer,822 the wording, i.e. phrasing, of the questions
posed,823 the subjectively experienced relational aspects with the experimenters, 824 e.g. do
815
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the subjects want to see the experimenters succeed,825 etc. Barbara Tversky and Elizabeth
J. Marsh examined the effects of “post[-]event reorganization of events on memory for
the original events.” They hold, for example, that “When people retell events, they take
different perspectives for different audiences and purposes.”826 These factors then, among
others, related to experimenter bias or experimenter expectancy effect have been shown
to influence what subjects remember, i.e. recollect. It is important to note the subjects
need not be “lying.” In fact, many subjects, though influenced into providing inaccurate
accounts of what they have witnessed, believe they are providing an accurate account –
by way of recollection, of course.
I mention here these studies in relation to recollection to gesture by way of
analogy into the influence of expectation regarding experiential aspects of memory.
Recognizing the role of expectation in experience, and specifically task performance,
further indicates the functioning of memory within the putative purview of attention. 827
For example, when you compare the two tasks of setting a cup down or tapping a cup on
a flat surface, until the cup is either released or begins its ascent the two tasks are
indistinguishable, i.e. the difference is undetermined. Newtson, et al, refer to the aspects
of a task which accomplish a differentiation from other tasks as “breakpoints.” 828 Further,
when an individual is placed in a highly novel environment and situation, asked to
observe a task, and report the breakpoints, there is a high correlation between physical
824
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change and reported breakpoints. When an individual is placed in a highly non-novel
environment and situation, less breakpoints are reported, and the breakpoints tend toward
a higher level of abstraction, i.e. as opposed to tracking physical change. 829 Hence,
different participants parse action into meaningful segments differently, 830 and the
difference is related to (positively correlated with) the degree of prior instruction received
and the ability of the participants ability to predict the action sequence. 831 These results
are taken to suggest that individuals trained regarding the task “pay less attention” to the
task than those for whom the task is more novel. 832 In other words, experts, e.g. those
who are well practiced at a craft, pay attention differently.
Regarding these studies, then, there is the predictable and, yet remarkable, point
that expectations derive from – that is correct – memory. Given the influence of memory
by way of expectation, it is correct to speak of selective encoding, selective retrieval, and
selective reconstruction, for example, in discussing the biases of eye-witness reports in
recollective studies. Similarly, in paying attention differently than novices, the same may
be said of experts regarding the experiential (and recollective) aspects of task
performance and observance. Yet, the point of most relevance is the selective
construction – not reconstruction – of experts. In other words, pertaining to their purview
experts do not experience a situation the same as a novice, i.e. experts do not construct
the same experience. Now, it may be said – the differentiating factor – experts do not
pay attention to the same things to which novices pay attention. However, it should now
829
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be clear that what is meant here by attention is wholly a function of memory. On the one
hand, experts have different expectations, and derivatively, on the other hand, experts
select different breakpoints in action sequences by reading, as it were, the action
sequence from a higher level of abstraction, i.e. a different mapping. Not only does the
reduction in change tracking requirement “free up” experts to pay attention elsewhere,
but also experts may tend toward higher refinement and efficiency regarding relevant
scripts.
In recognizing, then, that it is insufficient to think of attention as performing
discrimination, selection, or focus, you can recognize attention as a privileged level of
memory processing. Memory differentiates experts from novices, and experts construct
their experience differently by paying attention differently. In fact, contemporary
researchers who regard attention as a function of memory processing tend to point
specifically to working memory. Operating between the memory processes of
maintenance and elaboration, the functions of working memory referred to as “selection
and enhancement” otherwise describe the activity of attention. Looking back, then,
across the, so to speak, different layers – think the structure of experience –, as I
mentioned above, attention names the processing of memory occurring at the crossroads
of working memory capacity limitations, procedural routines, and “higher level”
recollection, i.e. contributions from episodic and semantic memory. 833 And, unconscious
processing occurs “below” attention, e.g. at the level of sensory processing. In order to
discuss these different layers of experience, contemporary researchers sometimes split
working memory and refer to the lower portions as “perceptual store” and the upper
833
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portions as “executive control.”834,835 Processing that takes place below the threshold of
attention may be taken up into the perceptual store of working memory. However,
strictly speaking, working memory is not involved in the, e.g. sensory, processing which
contributes to its perceptual store. To focus, then, on attention in itself is to recognize
attention as a cluster of procedural routines. In paying attention to something, you
perform a procedure upon that image of the world selected, maintained, and enhanced by
memory.
Before concluding this section with a brief – non-exhaustive – tracing of my
claim‟s textual history, I want to remind the reader by returning to the sentiment with
which I started this section. I suggested above that a new reading is emerging in the 21st
century which thinks attention and intention as grounded in and deriving from working
memory. More specifically, the claim is that working memory is the condition for the
possibilities of attention and intention. As you will now see, such is actually a more
conservative version in comparison with the memory researchers who equate attention
and intention with working memory.
In studies examining human behavior and performance, “attention has been a
central topic since the publication of [Donald] Broadbent‟s Perception and
Communication in 1958.”836 Whereas, “Traditionally, selective attention has been seen as
a function of activation [emphasis by Houdé],”837 additionally in the 21st century
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“Attention has been described as the selection of stimuli for higher-level processing.”838
Beginning in 1990 and following the work with brain damaged patients regarding
procedural memory Michael I. Posner discussed the familiar notion that “Performance
can reveal successful storage when due to brain damage of various kinds a patient cannot
consciously retrieve information.”839 The innovative shift came by noting the role of
attention in performance. Procedures were learned; tasks were performed; recollective
memory was impaired, short-term and working memory systems were not; and, an intact
focus of attention allowed for the consideration of alternatives. How was this possible?
By 1993 Clifford R. Mynatt was discussing focus of attention as working memory. 840 In
1995 Nelson Cowan began referring to the “integrated framework” of “attention and
memory. 841 In 1996 Brian Ross referred to “attention as memory” 842 In 1998, Neil W.
Mulligan was concerned to investigate, “The Role of Attention During Encoding in
Implicit and Explicit Memory.” 843
Finally, in the year 2000, Nelson Cowan reported the following:
Given the usual strong distinction between attention and
memory, the suggested equivalence of the focus of attention
and the capacity-limited portion of STM [Short-Term
Memory] may require some getting used to by many
readers. [my emphasis] 844
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Referring to sensory memory as the “aspects of memory representation,” i.e. the lower
component of working memory, the perceptual store (noted above) determines “what
chunks will be most prominent (relative to the available retrieval context)” and the
capacity-limits of short-term memory “determine how many of the most prominent
chunks in the representation can be attended at once.”845 In this way, when “information
is activated it stays activated automatically for a short period of time … unless it is
reactivated during that period of time.” 846 component of working memory
In 2003, William J. Macken sought to distinguish the automatic procedures of
auditory sensory memory from attention by examining, “Evidence from attentional
selectivity in short-term memory.”847 In 2004, then, Patrick Cavanagh‟s publication,
“Attention Routines and the Architecture of Selection” pulls together the idea of attention
as composed of routines, and as grounded in memory these routines are meant to
encompass the work – mentioned above – of recognizing breakpoints, scripts, and
activating procedures. In this way, “Attention routines that begin and end with a
reportable state divide the flow of mental activity at its boundaries where the content of
awareness changes…”848 In 2005 Gustavo Deco can be seen referring to “A unified
model of attention and working memory,” 849 and, also in 2005, John Towse, et al, noted,
“A family of tasks known as working memory span are thought to capture the dynamic
between memory and ongoing mentation, in that they all require temporary maintenance
845
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of information during a processing activity such as counting, reading, or arithmetic.” 850
Re-inscribing the gains from experiments on retroactive memory inhibition, Jeffrey P.
Lozito, in 2006, confirmed the detrimental effects on attention of increased memory load
during encoding and retrieval noting, “Consistent with this view are the numerous studies
showing that dividing attention during memory encoding reduces later memory
performances.”851 Finally, in 2007 Martha Ann Bell follows the trend while looking at
the relation of memory and attention from the perspective of learning to self-regulate.852
Hence, though this list is not exhaustive it does indicate the textual history and indicate
the trend to think of attention and intention as functioning at the crossroads of sensory
memory, working memory, and implicit memory.853
§17 Qualia – Credit for coining “qualia” should go to C.I. (Clarence Irving)
Lewis (1883-1964) from his 1929 publication of Mind and World Order: Outline of a
Theory of Knowledge. In understanding qualia, it helps to keep in mind that C.I. Lewis‟
work is avowedly within the Kantian structure of experience. 854 I will have C.I. Lewis,
then, indicate what he meant by qualia.
There are recognizable qualitative characters of the given
[Lewis‟ emphasis], which may be repeated in different
850
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experiences, and are thus a sort of universals; I call these
“qualia.” But although such qualia are universals, in the
sense of being recognized from one to another experience,
they must be distinguished from the properties of objects.
Confusion of these two is characteristic of many historical
conceptions, as well as of current essence-theories. The
quale is directly intuited, given, and is not the subject of
any possible error because it is purely subjective [my
emphasis]. The property of an object is objective. 855
Lewis clarifies that by “universals” he does not mean the “„universals‟ of logic.” 856 Lewis
was also concerned to note that qualia “have no names.”857 Further, Lewis contrasts
qualia with properties, and in particular the property of time. So, “The qualia of sense as
something given do not, in the nature of the case, have such temporal spread.”858 In this
way, Lewis has indicated the Kantian domain for qualia is that of sensibility. Lastly, the
contemporary texts credited with maintaining the issues of qualia in the literature are
Thomas Nagel‟s 1974, “What is it Like to Be a Bat?” 859 Joseph Levine‟s 1983
“Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap,” 860 and Frank Jackson‟s 1986, “What
Mary Didn‟t Know.”861
The question of qualia, then, revolves around a sort of riddle: What is a product of
the subject, not a property of an object, and yet repeatable in experiences? Considered
still unsolved in 2009, this is not only a problem for the philosophy of mind; it is
regarded as “the hard problem [my emphasis],” to be contrasted with the easy
problems. 862 The answer? Well, you certainly have been primed for the correct answer:
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Memory(!). Though this problem is not the target of my dissertation, here is a powerful
example of the use of contemporary memory research – particularly, research on the
topics of sensory memory, automaticity, and attention as a working memory process – to
solve problems in the philosophy of mind.
In the philosophy of mind, thinkers who refuse to accept that the mind can be
reduced to physical brain states point to qualia as that which is untranslatable into the
register of whatever may be found in the physical brain states. Again, memory fits the
bill. No apparatus will ever be able to – in extracting across brains – account for the
(memory of the) smell of aunt Florence‟s pepper sandwiches, even if universally the
human brain section Z fiber P is activated when peppers are experienced. Hence, this
discussion of qualia is important, for example, because it need not divide neatly across
Deleuze‟s intensity extensity distinction. It can be seen as a more or less residual aspect
of the constructive power of memory spanning the trajectory from sensation to ideas.
Notice the Différance at work?
Given the conversion power of the working memory, in Kantian language you
could say it functions as the threefold synthesis of imagination. Rendering the nondiscursive discursive, working memory cannibalizes itself at a span rate of 7±2.
“Cannibalize” is a good word to use here because it captures the sense in which memory
spans do not appear to have gaps – memory eating memory. Through the language of
Deleuze‟s emphasis on intensity in Kant‟s structure of experience: you remember the last
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memory in such a way that the idea of flowing consecutiveness develops. Hence, I think
of this movement as following the logic of supplementarity, i.e. Derrida‟s Différance.
§18 Satisficing – The idea of satisficing is intimately related with the idea of
bounded rationality. What I am hoping to illustrate by discussing the idea of satisficing,
then, is the agent‟s relation with the choices she is contemplating in a satisficing
situation. By way of a theory of memory as play-ground cues from the environment,
cues from your mood, cues from your habits (ethos), cues from recollection, cues from
these aspects of the prior pulse of being and the cross-cuing involved as well – to name
just a few of the “connections” – the ground seems full from within the fullness.
However, there is a gap between the pulses of being to which the fullness is blind.
Being‟s capacities are bound by being itself. Non-being is none of the negations of
oppositions within being; hence, we say “non-being” to refer to the gap which we cannot
experience.
The idea of satisficing makes an excellent point of departure, then, because it
reminds you that your rationality is not total, i.e. boundless. And, it reminds despite the
seeming completeness or totality of options you can consider. On the one hand, it can
function analogously in regard to ontology. On the other hand, because your capacity to
recognize options is multiply grounded in memory, considering choices is both tied to
your prolêptic capacity in regard to outcomes, and to your capacity to experience the
environment in such as a way as to direct your agency at non-sensical and non-discursive
clusters and experience them as options. In other words, taking satisficing as a point of
departure, you are reminded that your capacity to experience, and to relate your current
experience with the past, is grounded in memory. I think this ground of experience
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discursively barred by a logic of supplementarity, and I think the play of this ground as
proof that the power is memory.
Suffice to say, then, in regard to satisficing as support for my analogy: according
to Michael Byron,
It is testimony to the breadth of thought of Herbert Simon,
the man who conceived the idea of „satisficing‟, that the
concept has influenced such a wide variety of disciplines.
To name a few: Computer science, game theory,
economics, political science, evolutionary biology, and
philosophy have all been enriched by reflection on the
contrast between choosing what is satisfactory and
choosing what is best.863
Therefore, I am warranted in applying this idea outside of economics, i.e. in regard to
ontology, epistemology, and (philosophy of psychology) memory. Though Herbert
Simon deserves the credit of coining such a “handy blended word [by] combing satisfy
with suffice,”864 in regard to an idea of bounds, in deontological terms Kierkegaard was
similarly seeking to be mindful of such a Kantian humility; “it is the duty of the human
understanding to understand that there are things which it cannot understand.” 865
Further Byron writes, “The fecund and appealing idea of choosing what is
satisfactory finds a place in the theory of practical reason, or thinking about what to
do.”866 Hence, just as the older paradigm, “granted homo œconomicus an absurdly
omniscient rationality,” 867 this omniscience is analogous to the belief that individual
being – despite the gap of ontological difference, the not-being of becoming, and the
pulsing of the force that animates you – is boundless, total, and complete. So, whereas
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satisficing emerges as a regulative idea of practical reason indicating practical reason‟s
limitedness, my idea of memory emerges as a regulative idea indicating memory‟s
incapacities as producing gaps in your being. These gaps, then, at the sensory memory
section of the structure of experience precisely point to non-being. The gaps are not the
gaps which allow for the flux upon which being floats and flows, i.e. Becoming. The
flowing occurs through and beneath the non-gaps, and this flowing is becoming. Rather,
these openings within being are the latches through which Plato‟s puzzle of the trinity is
solved.
§19 Parallel Distributed Processing Paradigm – With the 1980‟s, the Levels of
Processing Paradigm (LOP) shifted into the Parallel Distributed Processing Paradigm
(PDP) when in 1986 David Rumelhart and James L. McClelland published the collection
of articles they edited under the title: Parallel Distributed Processing: Exploration in the
Microstructure of Cognition.868 Regarding PDP, they suggest, “These models assume
that information processing takes place through interactions of large numbers of simple
processing elements called units, each sending excitatory and inhibitory signals to other
units.”869 Notice in Deleuze‟s language: take the differential elements resonating,
coupling and forcing a pulse up the structure of experience, then each unit includes the
differential elements the forced intensity and the developed extensity. Hence, though the
authors refer to these units variously as “scripts,” “frames,” “schemata,” or “knowledge
structures,” these units include the sensory elements upon which they depend if they are
to be experiential at all. In fact, including the experiential part of the structure does not
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hinder thinking the units collectively in a manner reminiscent of Pierre Bourdieu‟s (19302002) notion of “habitus,” 870 and John R. Searle‟s notion of “the Background.”871
Consider the following at length quotes which distinguish between PDP and the
older paradigms. Toward the purpose of modeling experiential processes, PDP has the
following to say explicitly about memory:
What is the stored knowledge that gives rise to that pattern
of activation? In considering this question, we see
immediately an important difference between PDP models
and other models of cognitive processes. In most models,
knowledge is stored as a static copy of a pattern. Retrieval
amounts to finding the pattern in long-term memory and
copying it into a buffer or working memory. There is no
real difference between the stored representation in longterm memory and the active representation in working
memory. In PDP models, though, this is not the case.872
The distinction I hope to highlight being the PDP paradigm‟s ability to overcome the
assumption of persistence. The conclusion of the quote speaks directly to this.
In these [PDP] models, the patterns themselves are not
stored. Rather, what is stored is the connection strengths
between units that allow these patterns to be re-created
[my emphasis]. … there is an instance unit assigned to each
individual, but that unit does not contain a copy of the
representation of that individual. Instead, it is simply the
case that the connections between [one unit] and the other
units in the system are such that activation of the unit will
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cause the pattern for the individual to be reinstated on the
property units. 873
These quotes directly address a primary support for the claim that experiencing being
does not suffer interruptions. In other words, it is possible to think that storage itself
means persistence. However, given the constraints on encountering and recognizing
evidence for persistence – as the quotes above point out – PDP thinks each sphere within
which to find the evidence as a creation. Hence, though the patterns or structures within
the creations – both discursive and non-discursive – are causally connected, between
these creations are gaps. Again, an easy way to think of this is to imagine an observer
watching you whose power of observation moves at a faster rate than you are
experiencing. That is, to a being observing at a faster rate than you, what you experience
as a full uninterrupted light by which you read, they experience as a strobe light. See
Figure 8.3.
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Figure 8.3874
Notice how the PDP paradigm attempts to show the experiential and the
performative as blended. On the one hand, this is not in violation of Kant‟s blindness
thesis. In fact, it actually approaches a way to articulate the excessivity of the nondiscursive. On the other hand, the PDP paradigm thinks the entirety of the trajectory as
discharged. In other words, the PDP paradigm is consistent with the researching
regarding priming, and it seeks to articulate the manner in which the excessivity of the
primed factors surge with the burst as the structure of experience itself is discharged.
This should remind you of an attempt to overcome the difficulties facing philosophers
who attempt to think of memory which Dugald Stewart expressed at the beginning of this
section. Hence, with the PDP paradigm, the experiential is performed just as much as the
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performance is experience. It is from within the recollective standpoint that this intimacy
gets muddled.
Collectively, then, and from standpoints higher up in the structure of experience,
the PDP paradigm contends these units interact with one another like a series of
cascades875 spilling over into the next pulse with various tributaries participating in the
falling flow. A movement supposedly captured in the term “spreading activation.” As an
agent continually adjusts in a diverse environmental feedback loop, a large amount of the
adjustment occurs below the discursive threshold of the structure of experience. A
favorite example in the literature: consider how kicking a soccer ball to advance to a
better position in relation to the goal while navigating defenders and overcoming field
conditions requires many adjustments which are agent specific without the agent‟s ability
to take the time required to make discursively informed decisions regarding these
adjustments. Moreover, that the non-discursive adjustments can occur; that nondiscursive adjusting can change, i.e. non-discursive learning happens; and, that these
adjustments and changes are not instantaneous together warrant the following two claims.
On the one hand, the power traversing the sub-discursive threshold section of the
structure of experience alternates between – being occupied and recovering – excitation
and inhibition, i.e. in regard to its non-discursive adjustment or engagement. On the
other hand, this power is never raw, i.e. this power is always a power of memory –
stabilized by memory; structured by memory; and, related across engagements and
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adjustments by memory. 876 Hence, from higher up in the structure, i.e. within the
cascade, experience seems complete, total, or full; yet, as considering the non-discursive
constraints reveals, experience depends upon a surging power the forced movement of
which traverses the structure of experience as the structure of experience.
§20 Being Memory Bound – Individual being is grounded in, and thereby
bounded by, memory. On the one hand, bursts into the structure of experience determine
the intensity and extensity along the trajectory of experience. On the other hand, because
memory spans – is distributed throughout – the structure of experience, individual being
is bounded producing a situation analogous to that of bounded rationality. Though being
appears to persist – from within the discursive cascade –, the resonating allowed for by
sensory memory results in the FINSTing-like forced movement, i.e. the pulsing power, of
memory ascending the structure of experience. Put another way, memory is that which
structures the structure of experience. Hence, following this description of the power of
memory animating the structure of experience as it traverses it, the gaps between pulses
is where to find non-being.
Being bound, and thereby within, the discursive cascade of the higher memory
functions, episodic, semantic, and verbal memory constitute an illusory panorama
propped up on the filming of working memory‟s un-realing. With the performance of
priming wielding a logic of supplementarity through working memory permeating the
standpoints correlative to its power and automaticity emerging as a mask of memory‟s
play, the illusion of a “filled duration” prompts you to posit being‟s persistence. Hence,
if there is to be a sign of non-being, it must occur within being and be the result of the
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non-surge, i.e. some degree of failure to bridge the gap, between surges of being.
Because the force animating the structure is the power of memory, the non-surge is
revealed when memory‟s capacity to cascading-ly cover, i.e. retroactively and otherwise,
the non-surge fails to some degree. In other words, the “Empty Object without Concept,”
the nihil negativum appears under the sign of “forgetting” as memory‟s surge fails to
produce a filled duration illusion.
Notice that forgetting moves along a trajectory of diminishing emptiness as
memory‟s cascade fills-in for “what is forgotten” – even if this cascade is primarily just
the automaticity or your script for coping with being forgetful. Recall, “Even critics
grant a role for automaticity or habit in the form of effects on performance without
awareness of the source of those effects.”877 Yet, make no mistake, there is no “what is
forgotten.” “What is forgotten” is supposed to stand in for what is missing. However,
like the results of the logic of supplementarity, within the stacked deck surge of memory
all expressions are positive as expressions, even when an expression expresses itself as
not a positive expression. Hence, there is no such thing as what is forgotten, and what is
forgotten is not something different than what is remembered.
Rather, what is forgotten is the attempt of what is remembered to cover over nonbeing. The experience of forgetting is an experience within being of being‟s failure to
fully cover over with memory the gap between the pulses of being. The gap is nonbeing; altering your regulative idea, altering your script in the way which I have
advocated for throughout this dissertation provides the necessary prolêptic for solving the
problem of non-being. So, the experience of forgetting is the indication of an individual
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being‟s pulsing, and the pulsing reveals non-being. Though I will be even more explicit
just below, at this point, I have taught you how to encounter non-being. Hence, I have
solved Plato‟s puzzle, i.e. the problem of non-being.
Scalambrino‟s Structure and Trajectory of Experience
“I cannot cognize as an object itself that which I must presuppose in order to cognize an object at all.”
~Immanuel Kant (CPR 1998, A 402)

Of all that could be said under the heading of this section, in order to understand
what I do say, consider that Part II of the dissertation is composed of Chapters 7, 8, and 9.
Whereas Chapter 7 provides background for my use of memory to solve the problem of
non-being, Chapter 8 provides the memory research with which I solve the problem, and
Chapter 9 discusses the solution of the problem. Since the first section of this chapter
stated the solution by way of contemporary memory research, in this section I discuss the
solution specifically as it relates to Kant‟s structure of experience. Hence, this section
should further clarify the solution to the problem by further explicating the philosophy of
the above presented psychology.
§21 Three interpretations of “not” as approaches to the problem of non-being –
The three interpretations of not at work in regard to the problem of non-being are the
following: (1) The idea of non-being via the idea of privation. (2) The idea of non-being
via the idea of binary opposition. (3) The idea of non-being via the idea of experiential
negation. Whereas the first two are conceptual, the third is experiential. Conceptual
means either in reflection or recognition, i.e. “upward” enough in the structure of
experience to be conceptual, and experiential refers to the (ontological) realization which
indicates a non-conceptual ontological emergence. I would like to note that though the
idea of privation allows for not to be meant along degrees, and thereby correspond with a
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spectrum of destruction – as it does in Aristotle via his matrix878 –, none of these
destructions need refer to non-being; just because all destruction is not the same does not
mean that one of those types of destruction solves the problem of non-being. Hence,
because the solution to the problem of non-being cannot be merely reflective or
cognitive, only the third interpretation of not can provide a solution to the problem of
non-being.
§22 The road up is the road down – so long as you’re on it – In regard to the
relations amongst Being, Becoming, and Non-Being and following the third
interpretation of not noted above, from Becoming to Being indicates a process of
ontological emergence. However, Being to Becoming – making way for the next
connectively originated burst of Being – produces a gap before the next emergence. So,
the road up the structure of experience is the road down the structure of experience as
long as the structure of experience is maintained within a particular ontological
emergence.
So, we can structurally freeze frame a being. Yet, in doing so, we engage the
procedure of grasping and maintaining a regulative idea – the structure of experience.
Being in this procedure, working memory can mask any gaps occurring in the
performance of the procedure. In fact, so long as the gaps are not too excessive, the gaps
may also be masked to the eye of an outside observer, i.e. a being‟s audience. Also, we
tend to have default, i.e. habitual, scripts with which to deal with any ontological ruptures
in our performance of a procedure. Notice, structural freeze framing, then, is made
possible by and re-emphasizes the value of distinctions such as those between logical and
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real negation and discursivity and non-discursivity. However, it itself – we must
remember – is the fruit of a procedure riding on an organization maintained by memory.
§23 Memory’s jurisdiction – If all at once I had a finger in Pittsburgh, a finger in
Paris, a finger in Chicago, and a finger in New Philadelphia, I would sense temperature
differently than I currently do with my hand. However, memory would, of course, be
required to maintain the different senses and allow for cognitive elaboration of the senses
in order to have said different sense of temperature. On a more subtle level, this is
precisely how you process a sense of “your” temperature currently. In other words, you
require memory. Hence, memory‟s jurisdiction includes the entirety of the structure of
experience from sense to ideas – even though you can cognitively isolate any aspect of
the structure and reflect upon it in a way such that memory seems to not be a part of your
concept of sensation.
Indeed, Kant was well aware of the difficulty here, i.e. discerning memory‟s
jurisdiction; it is the difficulty of thinking space without time. Connecting, i.e.
coordinating, space(s) means remembering one space with another space, proximal or
not. And though you might say that a “receptor” is required in physical space, such a
determination is retrospective. You did not strategically, i.e. cognitively or reflectively,
place your fingers on your body such that they are wherever they happen to be. Yet,
retrospectively you give credit to your fingers for growing strategically in such a place to
sense as they do. The problem with thinking of sensation in such a way is that it
overlooks the primordial connective power of memory, i.e. it reduces memory‟s
jurisdiction.

529

§24 Why call it “pulsing”? – As I discussed in both the Kant, the Derrida, and
the Deleuze chapters, in Kant‟s structure of experience space is prior to time such that
space contains infinities unthinkable because non-continual. Within the continuity of
time we can think of infinity. Also in Kant‟s structure of mind – I discussed this in the
Kant chapter when honoring Fichte for highlighting this – imagination is responsible for
the time dimension when ascending the structure, i.e. traversing the trajectory of the
structure. So, it is the sensory manifold that is responsible for space. Hence, the question
becomes: How should we think about a power of the mind that is located in space without
time.
The way to think of this power is to think of it as connective – recall Kant calls it
“coordinating” (B 112). Retrospectively we tend to speak of one space, and we tend not
to use Kant‟s language of space‟s infinities which are too excessive to think as such.
However, sticking with Kant – and I might add that this argumentative move I am
making, it seems to me, is a defining feature of post-structuralism – the ability to connect
either entails a constant grip on all of the infinities or it entails a disconnecting for the
sake of re-connecting differently. Despite the former being reminiscent of various
mystical doctrines which could be interpreted as involving memory, I do not follow it.
Rather, I follow the latter. Hence, at the structural level of space – in the structure of
experience – there is a connecting and disconnecting which allows for the coordinating,
and as the trajectory moves “up” such that an experience (in space and time) emerges out
of this connecting and disconnecting, the trajectory of the structure takes on the character
of a pulsing. The pulse in experience, then, is an experience in one space, and the next
pulse in experience is an experience in a different – ly connected – other one space.

530

Moreover, since space as the “bottom” of the structure of experience means the first
indication of ontological emergence, the ontological emergence pulses, i.e. being emerges
pulsing-ly.
§25 Why memory and not time – Keeping in mind what was just said about the
ontological binding which occurs in the performance of a task, when applied to the
performative aspect of the power of memory, each ontological burst has its own past, so
the idea of persistence or connectedness across these ontological bursts which emerge is
just that, an idea or a change in the weighting of a cue; both of these reveal – as you
should be able by now to see without me pointing it out – their roots in memory, though
in different ways. First, through storage, i.e. recollective or sensory. Second, through an
altered capacity for performance.
The connecting power of memory is not limited to linearity, as is the case with the
connective power of time. These connections at the structural level of space may be
thought of as excessively related to the structural level of time – remaining faithful to the
multiple-infinities aspect of space in Kant‟s structure of experience. It is difficult to think
of this level apart from memory, specifically memory‟s connective functions such as
“instantiating” and “priming.”
Instantiating refers to “connection weight” across spatial-level combinations. In
other words, increasing the frequency of the connection, say A-follows-B, increases the
weight of that connection while reducing the weight of others, viz. non-A-followed-by-B
connections. Priming‟s method is automatic and multi-layered. What is more, priming
can shuffle multiple types of input through instantiation, e.g. images, scents, textures,
tastes and ideas simultaneously. Notice this simultaneity refers to the unity of what
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emerges to the structural level of time. Depending, then, on the strength, i.e. weight, of
the cues involved in a particular connecting of space, various objects, moods, and
interpretations emerge to identify space – forgetting it is limited both physically and
psychically.
Consider the example of shaking dice. The power governing, i.e. binding, the
procedure of shaking dice is memory. On the one hand, if controlling the shake of the
dice helps influence the correctness of predicting the outcome of a dice throw, then notice
how memory must be involved to match each shaking of the dice across a number of
tosses. On the other hand, notice how shaking dice is itself a procedure. So, here too,
memory is intimately involved at every carnal movement to keep the shaking hand from
performing a different procedure such as throwing the dice, punching the table, squeezing
too tightly, etc.
In sum, it is as if each cue at the structural level of experience contains its own
past by way of being dragged along a network of cues and weighting its path. Whereas
memory in space is able to capture this amount of complexity, time cannot. The
trajectory‟s momentum from space to time is reflected in temporal infinity as a limit – an
already delimited expression of an emergent being. It is as if time were the structure‟s
awareness of its trajectory‟s delimiting momentum. This is why time does not solve the
problem of non-being.
Temporal negation seems as though it should apply to experience. Time seems to
overlay the conceptual and experiential levels of Kant‟s structure transparently.
However, notice that the negation involved is a type of not-being; it negates within the
ontological structure, it does not negate the structure. Only when thinking in time, do I

532

reason that time goes on infinitely – even without me to think it. And to say this is
essentially to repeat that space contains infinities too complicated to be reproduced in
time, since production itself requires selection amongst the infinities. Hence, temporal
negation is necessary but not sufficient for ontological negation.
Only a negating of the power that is allowing for and binding emergent being will
negate the emergent being. So, this is why negating memory solves the problem of nonbeing and negating time does not, i.e. the negation must include the structural level of
space. Whereas memory functions as a principle of organization, time is an aspect of the
experience being instantiated and primed by memory.
Lastly, Kant himself indicated in a footnote to the second Preface of the Critique
of Pure Reason (B xl),
Therefore this consciousness of my existence in time [my
emphases] is linked, by way of identity, with the
consciousness of a relation to something outside me; and
hence what inseparably connects what is outside [my
emphasis] me with my inner sense [i.e. time] is experience
rather than invention, sense rather than my power of
imagination [my emphasis]. (CPR 1996, B xl)
Whereas Derrida presses the “by way of identity” piece of this quote to suggest time is
discursive (cf. Ch. 4), I want to press “what inseparably connects what is outside me with
my inner sense,” and that – as the above Kant quote points out – is at the level of “sense”
in, i.e. at the bottom of, Kant‟s structure of experience. Of course, this level of the
structure of experience is supposed to be non-discursive, so there are two questions which
arise: Why call it “sense”? and What is Kant doing talking about the “outside”? I will
answer both of these questions in the next section. Hence, the next section is a
continuation of this discussion: Why memory and not time?
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§26 The cosmological concern of the “outside” – Having already assumed objects
must conform to our knowledge, i.e. the structure by which we come to know an object,
Kant refers to any concern for what is “outside” the structure by which we come to know
an object as a “cosmological” concern. Now, to be fair, solving the problem of non-being
does not require that I discuss the “outside.” However, discussing the outside is a faster
way of communicating the ramifications of the solution to the problem of non-being, and
it is also consistent with Kant‟s work. Hence, though I follow Kant in using the
problematic term of the “outside” for the sake of efficiency, solving the problem of nonbeing does not depend on explaining “the outside.”
In fact, discussing the outside is yet another way to highlight the illicit nature of
the reduction of Becoming, Being, and Non-Being to Becoming and Being. In the case
of the latter, the outside is forced to refer to Becoming. In the wake of my solution to the
problem of non-being, “outside” can be meant in at least two, if not multiple, ways. In
order to get a grip on this term “outside” it is perhaps best to return to the Critique of
Pure Reason. Kant repeatedly uses the term “outside” when discussing the mind
independent features of – what he contextualizes as – cosmology (Cf. A 672/B 700).
In the second Preface, Kant suggests the following clarification to the first edition
of his work:
[T]his persisting element cannot be an intuition in me. For
all the determining grounds of my existence that can be
encountered in me are representations, and as such they
themselves need something persisting distinct from them,
in relation to which their change, and thus my existence in
the time in which they change, can be determined. (CPR
1998, B xxxix)
Kant then supposes a counter response to his clarification: One “will perhaps say: I am
immediately conscious to myself only of what is in me, i.e. of my representation of
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external things [my emphasis]; consequently it still remains undecided [my emphasis; cf.
Derrida] whether there is something outside me corresponding to it [i.e. my
representation] or not.” (CPR 1998, B xxxix) Notice, this counter response which Kant
supposes is a critique of the “outside.” On the one hand, though I will merely refer
readers back to the Introduction, Chapter Three, and Chapter Five here to find support for
this claim, the problematic of the outside is itself tied up with the question of outside the
forms and outside the dialectic. On the other hand, Kant‟s subsequent clarification to his
supposed counter response accomplishes three goals: (1) it explains why the solution to
the problem of non-being – because it involves the ground of the structure of experience
– involves outer sense and not inner sense, i.e. space and not time; (2) it explains how
Kant thinks of the outside, outer sense, and inner sense as a chain of conditions, e.g. outer
sense as a condition for inner sense or space as condition for time; and (3) it legitimates
the use of the term “outside” in regard to cosmology, i.e. the relations amongst
Becoming, Being, and Non-Being.
Here, then, is Kant‟s subsequent clarification to his supposed counter response:
This consciousness of my existence is thus bound up
identically with the consciousness of a relation to something outside me, and so it is experience and not fiction,
sense and not imagination, that inseparably joins the outer
with my inner sense; for outer sense is already in itself a
relation of intuition to something actual outside me [my
emphasis]; and its reality, as distinct from imagination,
rests only on the fact that it is inseparably bound up with
inner experience itself, as the condition of its possibility.
(CPR 1998, B xl)
First, then, notice, despite the faculties lining the structure of experience in Kant‟s first
edition Transcendental Deduction, “sense and not imagination … joins the outer with my
inner sense.” Second, the area of overlap between outside and inside is space, i.e. outer
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sense. Kant claims, “outer sense is already in itself a relation of intuition to something
actual outside,” and the reality of outer sense is the condition for the possibility of “inner
experience.” This, of course, invokes three terms: the outside, outer sense, i.e. the
intuition of space, and inner sense, i.e. the intuition of time. Third, and lastly, these three
terms encompass an ontological emergence from Becoming to Being (Cf. A 478/B 506).
Hence, Kant will later say, “I am just as certainly conscious that there are things outside
me to which my sensibility relates, as I am conscious that I myself exist determined in
time.” (CPR 1998, B xli)
§27 Emergence with (retrospectively identified) contingency not correspondence
– The following two Kant quotes precisely show the trajectory along the structure of
experience for our being‟s ontological emergence. After sharing these two quotes with
you, I will discuss them. First, according to Kant,
The effect of an object on the capacity for representation,
insofar as we are affected by it, is sensation. That intuition
which is related to the object through sensation is called
empirical. The undetermined object of an empirical
intuition is called appearance [Kant‟s emphases]. (CPR
1998, A 20/B 34)
Second, “All our cognition starts from the senses, goes from there to the understanding,
and ends with reason, beyond which there is nothing higher to be found in us to work on
the matter of intution.” (CPR 1998, A 298/B 355) Hence, it is in this way that reason
“never applies directly to experience or to any object but instead applies to the
understanding.” (CPR 1998, A 302/B 359)
That reason does not apply directly to experience ensures that the identity of an
ontological emergence must relate contingently – and not correspond directly – to the
Becoming out of which it emerged. In my opinion, this is already contained in Kant‟s
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innovative discursive/non-discursive distinction; however, above is Kant deducing
contingency from the structure of experience itself. Notice it is not accurate to make the
logical quip here that – as Trendelenburg attempted with Kant (Cf. Ch. 2) – it may be
possible for Becoming and Being to “line up” so as to correspond to one another; this can
never be the case because the structure of experience, i.e. the ontological emergence is
already a delimiting. Hence, Becoming exceeds Being. So, Being‟s relation to
Becoming must be a contingent relation.
Now, it is possible to alter Kant‟s structure of experience by correcting his
misunderstanding of “affinity.” Following contemporary memory research, notice the
anticipations of procedurally organized activity are, necessarily, organized and
maintained by memory. Put another way, a being‟s dependence on memory can already
be seen by analyzing the notion of procedure. Further, even passively, sensory
identification can be controlled by way of practice to the point of inapprehension.
Beyond the point of inapprehension, of course, there is nothing to discuss. For example,
these observations do not deny skin‟s ability to transfer temperature, by Being in, i.e.
emergent out of, Becoming, you are immersed in temperature; rather these observations
suggest the organization of that in which you are immersed so as to allow for sensing
temperature depends on memory.
§28 That it is v. What it is – It might add clarification to invoke two perennial
philosophical sets of distinctions. The first distinction is between “that it is” and “what it
is,” and the second is the distinction between “subject” and “object.” Being in the wake
of Kant‟s Copernican revolution means the ground of the structure of experience is the
ground of the subject. Objects conform to mind. So, if the power at the ground of
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experience, i.e. at the ground of the subject, is non-discursive, then the question guiding
this clarification: Why call it memory – recall Kant calls it sense?
In order for us to say that an entity is for a subject, the subject must process an
experience of the entity in question. This does not deny that there are objects in the
world. There may be a chair in the kitchen; however, we are talking about experience,
and that the chair is for a subject means the subject is experiencing the chair. Hence, that
an object is for a subject requires the subject to process an experience of the object.
In order to say what an entity is for a subject, the subject must further elaborate
the experience of that the entity is for the subject. Notice this means maintaining that it is
in order to elaborate that into what. I emphasize these two terms because they are the
terms that contemporary memory researcher – discussed above – employ to discuss the
process of memory in experience. If you do not maintain that an entity is in experience,
it would be as if you would forget why you were trying to think of the word “chair.”
That is something I just bumped into. What is it? It is a chair.
So, there are objects in the world to be encountered that we refer to as “chairs.”
This does not mean that you are constantly experiencing a chair. In fact, even if you are
always sitting, it does not mean that you are constantly experiencing a chair. Hence, the
subject processes different objects through experience.
The object of experience, then, can be divided into that it is and what it is. The
object of experience can be divided as such because we are talking about experience, and
“experience” means an experiencing subject. We are not talking about the number of
chairs in the world at any given point in history. Rather, we are talking about the process
of experiencing what we conceptualize as a “chair.” The shorthand I have been using
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throughout the dissertation to discuss this is to say: encountering the – that it is – chair
engages the lower part of the structure of experience, and conceptualizing what it is, i.e. a
“chair,” engages a higher part of the structure of experience. I have Kant to thank for the
ability to talk about the process of experience in this way.
Keeping with the above discussion of the structure of experience as a “vertical”
process, e.g. “lower” or “higher” in the structure, there are, then, two major kinds of
change to discuss in regard to the subject of experience. First, there is the change which
moves from that it is to what it is or what it is to that it is regarding the same object – for
ease of reference call this “vertical change in regard to the subject of experience.”
Second, there is the change from either a that to a different that or a different what or the
change from a what to a different what or different that – for ease of reference call this
“horizontal change in regard to the subject of experience.” These then, in regard to the
experiencing subject, are the major kinds of change. Notice, I say “major” because the
difference between touching a chair and seeing the same chair belong to the that it is part
of the structure of experience.
Now that the distinctions are in place, we can use them to talk about the relations
amongst Becoming, Being, and Non-Being. When we say that it is, notice we are making
a type of ontological claim. We are saying that some entity is. Yet, whenever we invoke
change, it is essentially unanimous that we are invoking Becoming. So, does this mean
that discussing horizontal change in regard to the subject of experience is a discussion of
Becoming? And, if so, then what does this say about Being – recall horizontal change is
across different entities, i.e. beings? To answer both questions at once: Yes, Becoming is
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tied up with Being in regard to horizontal change. So, what about vertical change in
regard to the subject?
Because we are subjects, it is by way of vertical change that we can discuss
Becoming as not tied up with Being. In order to discuss Becoming as not tied up with
Being we must look to the that it is part of the structure of experience while keeping in
mind that the trajectory of experience, i.e. the upward direction in the structure, is a
narrowing trajectory. What I mean by “narrowing” is exactly what Kant meant. In other
words, that it is exceeds what it is because that it is can be multiple whats. For example,
a chair can also be a stepping stool, a family heirloom, kindling for a fire, a lion taming
device, a radio stand, etc. Hence, moving further upward, i.e. away, from the ground of
experience and deeper into conceptuality is a narrowing, and moving further downward,
i.e. toward the ground of experience is a broadening.
At the ground of the structure of experience, then, there is a large amount of
potential thats within sensible proximity to the subject. To think any cluster of this
potentiality is to zip it up the structure of experience and into the realm of whats. Hence,
were we able to think this ground of sensible proximity to the subject, we would be able
to think of Becoming that is not tied up with Being. Most philosophers, it seems to me,
forget to think about this ground of sensible proximity to the subject.
To conclude: In order for us to have an experience of that it is, aspects of this
Becoming, i.e. aspects of the ground of sensible proximity to the subject, must be
connected to one other. After all, you differentiate between the smell of the pie and the
feel of the chair, though they both occur in the kitchen. Further, once connected, these
aspects must be maintained in order to be elaborated from that it is to what it is. You
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might recall: Contemporary memory research suggests both that sensory memory is
instantiating by being connective and that the process of maintenance and elaboration
depend on memory. Moreover, this is how memory binds the being of the subject.
So: Why call it memory – recall Kant calls it sense; moreover it is a nondiscursive power? The answer: Memory accounts for, i.e. memory allows for, both the
processing at each level of the structure of experience and the continuity “up” the
structure of experience. The problem of Kant‟s Transcendental Deduction is precisely
the problem of the continuity of the structure of experience, i.e. how to account for the
structure‟s trajectory. Maintenance and elaboration – terms I borrow wholesale from
contemporary memory research – account for the structure‟s trajectory. Imagination does
not combine sensibility and understanding – imagination does not combine that it is with
what it is. Rather, memory‟s maintenance allows for the elaboration of that which is
maintained into what is maintained. This is why the power at the ground of the subject
should be thought of as memory.
Now, since memory allows for a movement from, i.e. a stabilization of,
Becoming, i.e. the ground of sensible proximity to the subject, into Being, we can focus
specifically on the connective aspect of the ground of experience. Notice, this precisely
overlaps with the discussion above regarding the coordinating – Kant‟s language – of
space‟s multiple infinities. Because the power (of memory) at the ground must be
connective, it must also be dis-connective. In other words, in order to connect some
aspects of the ground, i.e. unify some aspects into a that it is, it must disconnect other
aspects. Since, we tend to think in time, let me state it in temporal language for ease of
understanding: Connecting some aspects of the ground means disconnecting the
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previously connected aspects. The connecting and disconnecting constitute – voilà – the
beginning of an ontological burst for, i.e. of, the subject. Your being is not persisting; it
is pulsing.
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“In order to comprise all the preceding in one notion, it is first of all necessary to remind the reader that the
discussion here is not about the genesis of experience, but about that which lies in experience. The former
belongs to empirical psychology…” 879
~Immanuel Kant
“When I awoke … not knowing where I was, I could not even be sure at first who I was … but then
memory – not yet of the place in which I was … would come like a rope let down from above to draw me
up out of the abyss of non-being…”880
~Marcel Proust
“All is ephemeral, the one remembering and the one remembered.”881
~Marcus Aurelius, The Meditations, Bk IV, §35

Chapter Nine: Conclusion – A Critique of Pure Difference
Introduction and Justification for Chapter 9 Sections and Objectives
There are only two sections to Chapter 9. As promised at the beginning of this
dissertation, after presenting my solution I planned to discuss the different vista of being
the solution provides. I also suggested the perhaps largest impact of the solution might
pertain to ethics. Keeping in mind the material in this chapter is supplementary to the
work of solving the problem of non-being, then, there are two words I would use to
describe this chapter: figurative and indicative. Yet, this chapter should further
familiarize you with the solution to the problem since I will explicitly show you how my
solution meets Plato‟s criteria for solving the problem, i.e. how I overcome the two
impasses of the problem. Hence, in the first section of this chapter I provide a figurative
statement of the solution to the problem of non-being with explicit reference to meeting
Plato‟s criteria for solving the problem, and in the second section of this chapter I initiate
a discussion of what may be the value of solving the problem of non-being.
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Non-Being ex Priority of Being: Scalambrino‟s Solution to the Problem of Non-Being
“We are ourselves the beings to be analyzed.” 882
~Martin Heidegger

Think through this with me: On the one hand, memory is, of course, self-evident.
On the other hand, memory is a mask. Let me begin with “self-evident.” You should
know when you grasp an object that your practice at grasping objects and the technique
with which you grasp objects, including the floating identity of the object you grasp,
depend upon memory. I use the word “grasp” here to speak both parts of its double
entendre simultaneously, i.e. conceptual and experiential grasping. I use the word
“floating” here to remind you of the relational play-ground of the object‟s identity. In
other words, there are aspects of the object grasped which depend upon the dexterity with
which you grasp objects, and the other prerequisites for grasping an object can also be
ordered along the descending trajectory of experience. As such, these prerequisites
cluster around the respective memory standpoints of the structure of experience. Hence,
memory is intimately involved in all aspects of experience, and, as such, should be selfevident.
Yet, memory is also a mask because it operates according to the logic of
supplementarity. You simply cannot experience an object without engaging memory.
And, this is the correct context in which to regress an object to the thing-in-itself. The
regression “down” the trajectory of experience, in this context, then means regressing
down the memory standpoints. Recall Chapter two‟s quotes from Leibniz and
Malebranche and the failure of Kant‟s 18th century eyes to read “affinity” as a function of
memory. On the way down the trajectory of experience Derrida‟s Différance is
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encountered at the level of the working memory – a performative aspect located just
beneath the recollective/conceptual standpoint. Derrida provides an accurate account of
what happens when you try to lift the discursive mask riding memory‟s performance.
Recall, “Most of the cognitive and linguistic patterning and structuring of experience is
taken for granted rather than actively registered or interpreted. Our understanding and
our application of concepts, for example, are processes that generally occur „on
automatic.‟”883 In fact, Nietzsche‟s celebrated quote is appropriate here:
Alas, what are you after all, my written and painted
thoughts! It was not long ago that you were still so
colorful, young, and malicious, full of thorns and secret
spices – you made me sneeze and laugh – and now? You
have already taken off your novelty, and some of you are
ready, I fear, to become truths … What things do we copy,
writing and painting, we mandarins with Chinese brushes,
we immortalizers of things that can be written – what are
the only things we are able to paint? … always only birds
that grew weary of flying and flew astray and now can be
caught by hand … And it is only your afternoon, you, my
written and painted thoughts, for which alone I have colors,
many colors perhaps … but nobody will guess from that
how you looked in your morning, you sudden sparks and
wonders of my solitude, you my old beloved … thoughts!
(BGE 236-237, §296)
Taking “afternoon” to refer to the mid-point of the structure of experience –
constellations of Ideas occurring in ἐλαληίνλ‟s starry night – and “can” indicating
discursivity as the adjustment of waking from ἕηεξνλ‟s morning, Nietzsche‟s quote
colorfully echoes Kant‟s excessivity of non-discursivity as an epitaph for any
correspondence theories regarding experience. Hence, memory is also a mask; and,
beneath the mask? Another mask – this is why I stated numerous times above that
Derrida‟s innovation of Différance is valuable, but not in the way he intended it.
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Beyond memory‟s self-evidence and memory‟s logic of supplementarity, the
ground of experience is memory at play – memory as the play-ground of experience.
Without artificially confining the performance of memory, e.g. in laboratory settings,
memory‟s performance is too complexly primed to predict its bloom, e.g. think
retroactively effective memory and Multiple Object Tracking. Moreover, the priming is
intertwined with the other major aspect of implicit performative memory involved, i.e.
procedural memory.
What I mean is that, once activated, the performance of various procedures
influence further activations; recall my example of tapping a cup on the table – various
procedures activate other procedures with differing “break points.” 884 Complicating
matters to the point of seeming paradoxical, given the influence of context, mood, and the
agent‟s tendencies in regard to chunking, experience can seem as boundless as you wish
it to be. Yet, this seeming infinity is, of course, an aspect of finding another mask
beneath every mask. Hence, memory‟s self-evidence and putative boundlessness require
the play of memory from “beneath” 885 in order to be activated. Think of my rendition of
Deleuze‟s Baroque House graphic (Figure 5.6) and the PDP graphic above (Figure 8.3).
There are two aspects of what I am currently discussing which I will further flesh out
below: first, the extent to which what I am describing in regard to contemporary memory
research is a re-description of the work shown above by Kant, Derrida, and Deleuze, and,
second, the consequences of incorporating the play-ground of memory into a regulative
idea regarding memory‟s self-evidence.
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The factors which function in the play of memory, then, make non-discursive
memory too excessive to be regressively identified. This is the same problem that Kant,
Derrida, and Deleuze acknowledge, and it is also the perplexity associated with the
second impasse of the problem of non-being. On the one hand, how can you accurately
depict excessive non-discursive functioning occurring beneath the threshold of
discursivity? On the other hand, if such non-discursive functioning cannot be depicted,
then how can you indicate the (real) negation of the functioning so as to solve the
problem of non-being? Hence, Gorgias‟ strategy enhanced by Kant, Derrida, and
Deleuze can advance only this far – as exemplified by the above two questions.
Deleuze‟s innovation was to think of the ground – the play of memory from
beneath, in this case – as expressing a power which could – depending upon its intensity
– traverse the structure of experience. I do not take issue with this aspect of Deleuze‟s
innovation. Rather, I take issue with Deleuze‟s assumption of persistence. So, by
thinking memory as the power traversing the structure of experience, and the higher
aspects of the power as expressly connected with the lower – I, of course, mean higher
and lower here in regard to the structure of experience –, then, each expression, each
burst can be thought of as a solidified expression of being memory bound. Further,
notice that this speaks directly to the importance of changing the regulative idea, i.e. the
memory script, involved when encountering memory‟s self-evidence – recognizing that
your recognizing depends on memory is not yet sufficient. Rather, a distinction must be
made between what is not the agent and what is the agent, in order to see experience as
bound by memory and experience as memory “all the way down.” Hence, Deleuze‟s
innovation accounts for a power spanning the trajectory of experience, and Deleuze‟s
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extensity intensity distinction can be coupled with a distinction between the physicality of
the environment886 and the physicality of the agent to conclude the list of necessary
distinctions.
Contemporary memory research teaches that memory systems function differently
than physical systems. The idea you have of how an object interacts with another object
in physical space does not provide an accurate account of the interactions between
“memories.” First and foremost, the physical account cannot accurately account for the
activity of memory because it is merely convention (a language game) to speak of
“memories” as such. In other words, there are no isolated “memories” which can be
placed in storage and retrieved intact later. The easy justification here would be the
verifiability, or lack thereof, factor; however, the justification that the memory in
question is not a physical object should be just as clear. These two justifications pertain
to the conceptual standpoint. Moreover, in regard to the apperceptive standpoint, the
“you” who “looks back” is either looking at images and ideas predicated upon
experiential factors or is in a mode of reflection. Hence, the conceptual and apperceptive
standpoints may be seen depending upon memory‟s complicated cuing, i.e. not like a
physical system of correspondences.
Yet, the sliding from solidified sphere of experience to solidified sphere of
experience is certainly constrained, e.g. image to image, thought to thought perception to
perception, etc. What is more, the constraints cannot be reduced to the physical. The
most relevant difference here, then, between the two types of accounts: you cannot look
to the content of the memory system in order to discover its constraints. The constraints
of the memory system derive from the play which, though producing the “memory,”
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eludes the content of the memory. Recall, memory is the power stabilizing the physical
factors involved regarding the agent‟s experiential standpoint, e.g. saccadic sensory
memory.

Hence, the constraints pertain to the power producing the content of

experience.
Finally, then, combine the constraints piece with the solidified sphere piece. I use
the term “solidified sphere” of experience in order to refer to the bound content whatever
that content happens to be. Recall that from within the bound content, the sliding from
content to content – burst to burst – appears seamless. Contemporary memory research
refers to the appearance of seamlessness as “the filled duration illusion.”887 Moreover,
recognition takes place within the bound content. However, since the constraints do not
appear as such within the content, the constraints pertain to the non-discursive power of
memory – from experiential standpoint “up” – binding the content. Recall, according to
contemporary memory research, the traversing of the structure was referred to as the
“maintenance” of the power, and the upward movement referred to as the power‟s further
“elaboration.” Lastly, as countless examples illustrate,888 even in regard to the nondiscursive automaticity and fluency, the power of memory is not perpetual. Yet, the gaps
between memory’s discharge and recovery are concealed by the bound content. Hence,
each (non-discursive) gap (non-discursively) constitutes the (non-discursive) absence of
being.
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Thus I have been describing the regulative idea with which to recognize nonbeing, i.e. providing you with a prolêptic. The solution to the problem of non-being is
found in the gaps between memory‟s bindings. Yet, these gaps cannot be a part of
experience. So, as I explained in Chapter 8 above, you must look for a sign within a
bound memory experience indicating the failure of memory to fully recover from the gap
of non-being. By “fully” here I mean sufficiently such that you do not notice the
seemingly seamless sliding has been interrupted. Since the power involved here is
memory, the indication of the gap comes with the adjustment within a memory bound
experience to forgetting. Forgetting – as such and in regard to shifting and cycling of
procedures – functions as an indication of memory‟s failure to fully recover from the gap.
Not the idea of forgetting as non-being, and not the idea of non-being as non-being;
rather, it is the regulative idea which recognizes forgetting as being‟s coping with a glitch
in its coping with non-being that allows for the proper relation, i.e. anticipation, to
encounter non-being (with/while being). I will show you, then, in regard to Plato‟s
puzzle of the Sophist, that I have solved the problem of non-being.
In the Introduction I summarized that a successful strategy for solving the
problem of non-being would: involve looking for non-being in experience, and would
involve an awareness of the (experiential) structure which allows for being. This is
precisely what I have done by critiquing Derrida and Deleuze in regard to pure
difference. I have incorporated their innovations in regard to the experiential standpoint,
i.e. experience, and I have critiqued their thoughts regarding the aspect of experience
which they supposed to indicate non-being. Ultimately the downfall of their attempts can
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be traced to Kant, and his excusable mistake of not recognizing affinity as an indication
of the power of memory.
Also in the Introduction I indicated that following Gorgias the inapprehension
occurring within experience which indicates non-being would need to be described so as
to make it clear what this inapprehension might look like in experience. I have succeeded
in making this inapprehension clear without falling victim to the other impasse. In other
words, notice my solution to the problem of non-being does not violate Plato‟s criteria:
[W]e maintain that you may not and ought not to attribute
being to non-being? … Do you see, then, that not-being in
itself can neither be spoken, uttered, or thought, but that it
is unthinkable, unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable?889
(Soph 1895, 238c)
[Σπλλνεῖο νὖλ ὡο νὔηε θζέμαζζαη δπλαηὸλ ὀξζῶο νὔη‟
εἰπεῖλ νὔηε δηαλνεζῆλαη ηὸ κὴ ὄλ αὐηὸ θαζ‟αὑηό, ἀιι‟
ἔζηηλ ἀδηαλόεηόλ ηε θαὶ ἄξξεηνλ θαὶ ἄθζεγθηνλ θαὶ
ἄινγνλ;]890
I too maintain being cannot be attributed to the gap between memory‟s bursts which bind
being. Also, I maintain that the gaps of which I speak are non-discursive, i.e. unutterable,
unspeakable, and indescribable. Notice, I am not describing the gaps directly. This is
why I used the language of “indirectly” in the Introduction. I am describing the way the
regulative idea needs to be constructed in order to accurately depict the power allowing
for and traversing the structure of experience. Making the further distinction between the
physicality of the environment, at the command of your being, and the non-physical
power of memory, I was able to describe the power – not the gap – as pulsing. After you
incorporate this thinking into your regulative idea, you can then notice a difference within
your being indicating the lingering of the inapprehension. Once this is a part of your
memory script, then, from within being you can recognize “your” non-being. The
889
890

Taking non-being for κὴ ὄλ.
Plato, Theaetetus and Sophist, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 342.

551

recognition is not non-being; the recognition is of the inapprehension in experience from
the gap in memory, i.e. non-being. In this way I have solved the problem of non-being.
Non-Being & Memory: Your being is not persisting; it is pulsing
“in the scent of chrysanthemums,
climbing through the dark
at festival time”891
~Bashō, Hokku, §713
“Thence we came forth once more to see the stars.”892
~Dante Alighieri, Inferno, Canto XXXIV

So what might the value of solving the problem of non-being be? I believe the
consequences of solving the problem of non-being are wide reaching. On the one hand,
in regard to the philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology, I hope to have shown
the value of discussing memory, not mind. I am reminded of Ed Casey‟s comment here:
the rooting of the word “memory” in memor- (mindful) –
and ultimately of “remembering,” “reminding,” and
“reminiscing” in mens (mind) – bespeaks the same
ingrediency, as does the striking fact that gemynd in Old
English means equally “memory” or “mind. 893
Elsewhere I pursue these insights more fully. On the other hand, I believe the solution to
the problem of non-being should be employed toward rethinking a number of our
ontological and epistemological commitments – these may be explored by further
examining the way my solution critiques the solutions put forward by Aristotle, Kant,
Hegel, Derrida, and Deleuze. However, the commitments I am interested in discussing
here are the ethical ones.
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In the attempt to announce my approach to discussing the ethical consequences, I
might suggest the consequences generally pertain to death and the connection between
being and history. If my solution to the problem of non-being is correct – and given
Plato‟s criteria, it is correct –, then your being is not persisting; it is pulsing. What this
means is that an incorrect valuation has become attached to the physical vessel for your
being. A number of thinkers attempt to confront this overvaluation by attacking the issue
of identity. However, the issue of identity does not sufficiently address the heart of what
is at stake, i.e. being. The solution to the problem of non-being shows your being
entering and leaving, so to speak, its physical vessel894 repeatedly throughout what
appears to be a continuous, i.e. seamless, life.
In regard to death, the solution to the problem of non-being seems, at least, to
suggest that physical death will not be the first time you cease to be. I am reminded of
Epicurus: “Death is nothing to us.”895 The extent to which you think this speaks to the
immortality of your being may be the extent to which you think of your being as a nonpersonal force of change in the physical world. However, to ask the question of “where”
in regard to this pulsing should seem like a misplacement of discursivity. 896 Recall, a
significant amount of maintenance and elaboration must occur in order to traverse from
the play-ground of memory to the recollective standpoint and the emergence of personal
identity. Hence, perhaps history need not be tied to individual being in such a literal, or
even physical, way.
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If I think that my life is my history from birth to death, then goals such as
extending my life and enhancing the narrative of that history may seem reasonable. If I
think of my life as the pulsing of a power into a physical realm, then goals such as better
preparing this realm for the return of being(s) may seem satisfactory and sufficient. The
link between being and the narrative regarding the course of physical change may be
more tenuous than we would like to admit. Since, per my view, memory goes “all the
way down” the rupture called “forgetting” is truly an opening “all the way down.” 897
Experientially, the loss in forgetting is total.
If you never remember “again,” then from the perspective of others, “you are
gone.” It is as if without the sufficient escape velocity (from non-being “back” into
being), you do not even get the chance to say “good bye.” Yet, what I take to be one of
the best aspects about this view is that it is impossible to be Romantic about the loss.
What I mean is that despite my descriptive use of metaphors, in light of the solution to
the problem of non-being, solidarity revolves around being itself. Other individual
beings should not look upon your non-return to being as something to fill them with
anxiety because it too will someday happen to them – à la existentialism. Rather, they
should recognize it is already happening to them.
Arguably Plato and Kant both attempted to think ethics as inseparable from
ontology. A recurrent obstacle to thinking ethics and ontology together seems to be the
question of how to account for difference across agents. In other words, if an ethics is to
hold universally across beings in virtue of their being, then how do we account for the
seemingly vast difference across agents in regard to their ethical comportment?
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Following physical difference, some ontological accounts – sometimes called
“naturalistic” – embrace difference and find it impossible to then arrive at universality.
Indeed, it is perhaps not unlike a shell game. Aristotle‟s virtue ethics seemed to have
negotiated a compromise between biological diversity and universality by invoking the
process of disposition predicated upon training, i.e. the learning of ethical principles early
in life. Notice Aristotle‟s implicit reliance there upon memory. 898 Yet, the problem, of
course, remained in that being vicious is still an ethics, so such an account of difference
across agents deems the virtues relative – not universal. My diagnosis: Aristotle did not
fully realize the value and the role of memory in regard to ontology.
In the wake of my solution to the problem of non-being, perhaps it is possible to
both have a universal ethics grounded in being and account for the lack of necessity that
agents recognize the universality. Even if the so called naturalists remain committed to
attributing mindlessness to the physical by seeking a physical account of mind as
“information processing,” the information processing – per my vista – becomes an aspect
of being – accounted for by memory – not an aspect of, what per my vista would be the
idea of, the physical. Hence, the solution to the problem of non-being may, in fact, have
an impact on ethics, e.g. regarding agency.
The solution to the problem of non-being does not suddenly make pleasure nonpleasure. Yet, it should make you aware that forgotten pleasure is no pleasure at all.
And, forgotten power is no power at all. The time frames involved regarding these
statements are precisely the time frames involved regarding the experience of pleasure
and power. Extending your life does not expand the cycling frame of opportunity for
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being to indulge its individual physicality. And outside the – already limited because
cycling – frame of experience sends one further removed into the recollective standpoint.
Hence, perhaps Plato thought the solution to the problem of non-being could work toward
removing the impediments to justice and goodness.
Your being is suspended in non-being by the power of your memory. That is all.
It is not that you die if you forget – Alzheimer‟s patients continue to wander hallways;
but your being vanishes with the diminishing power of your memory. (Your) Memory is
the ground of (your) being. There is not a group of people looking over your shoulder
with whom you confer to determine the meaning of this sentence, and it is impossible to
separate memory out from the process of indication – sensual, perceptual, linguistic, or
otherwise. Yet, adjustments being made due to the inability to perpetually maintain an
experience reveal the pulsing character of being despite the illusion of (filled-duration)
persistence. When we consider the consequences of this realization, then that which “is
there – like our life”899 looks different. Due to the waxing and waning of the power of
memory, being pulses within becoming. Hence, non-being is not the not-being of
becoming; rather non-being, as the ontological, i.e. what Kant calls “real,” negation of
being, is neither being nor becoming. 900
Lastly, here is yet another way to put the solution to the problem of non-being. I
would like to state it one more time in visual terms for those who feel as though
Heidegger‟s Being and Time helped them gain an appreciation of individual being, i.e.
Being-in-the-world. The working memory (of Dasein) is like a film projector running on
the logic of supplementarity. At the limit of the subject‟s being is non-discursive sensory
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My emphasis. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §559, 73.
Thus Plato‟s trinity is completed. Aristotle‟s paradigm shift has been overcome; you no longer must
consider just being and becoming.
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memory. So, rather than call this aspect of the subject a “receptor” which would commit
us to re-positing a thing-in-itself, the memory research supports calling this an abysmal
ground governed by play, i.e. the limit of the subject as memory maintaining the playground such that a (non-physical) swelling overflows as a groundless fountain. And,
“play” is the correct word to use here because, whatever the logic according to which the
fountain is running, the source of the fountain is discursively inaccessible. Further, it is
inaccessible – the fountain seems groundless – because accessing it would be tantamount
to applying all the apparatuses for accessing it merely within an enclosed vision. 901
What this means is that whatever you can imagine or think is, on the one hand,
dependent upon the power which provided (1) the images or thoughts and (2) the context
with which they are correlated.902 On the other hand, the power providing both these
aspects of experience is the power of memory which – continuing with the language of
this figurative statement – composes the fountain itself, i.e. the fountain is a fountain of
memory. So, when the source of the fountain pulses, the fountain itself pulses – like
shutting it off and then turning it back on again –, and a new self enclosed vision arises.
In this way, then, to think in one enclosed vision of its relation to another “enclosed
vision” is to merely engage the relationality within rationality. Despite using the
relationality of rationality, it would be amphibolous – taking place merely within
reflection – to relationally think the “outside” of an enclosed vision. In other words,
doing so would be measuring within a vision correlative to the context constructed and
propped up – along with and within a particular enclosed vision – by the power of
901

This idea can then be used to think ethics as inseparable from ontology because ontology no longer need
be grounded an idea of the physical. Yes, it‟s still an idea, but it is the correct idea because it solves the
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Cf. Larry L. Jacoby. “On interpreting the effects of repetition: Solving a problem versus remembering a
solution,” Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 17 (1978), 649-667.
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memory. Hence, the way to notice the pulse, or (as I sometimes refer to it) the flicker, is
to notice how the power of memory itself pulses or flickers, i.e. the flicker of the power
providing the vision.
In other words, noticing the flickering Grundkraft of memory derives neither from
the conceptual standpoint nor from reason. Rather, the flickering derives from – think of
Gorgias‟ strategy here – the negation of the power which conditions sense perception, i.e.
memory. It is as if awareness of the flicker comes when you “wake up,” so to speak, in a
vision having the experience of forgetting what usually leaps over from the previous
pulse – the “previous” flicker of the power of memory. Think about how you react to not
being able to think of “what you were going to say.” Your reaction is itself a procedure,
i.e. an automatic engagement of procedural memory covering over the “gap.” The power
is attempting to recover from a lapse, and since discursivity is secondary to the power,
i.e. higher up in the structure of experience, the terms used to describe a lapse of the more
primary power of memory necessarily always fail to function as an appropriate
signification.
Yet, you do not spontaneously engage in the procedure of reacting to forgetting
unless you enter into a mode of recovery. Hence, ask yourself: From what are you
recovering? You are recovering from the forgetting, i.e. the gap in the power of memory,
and with memory as the ground of the structure of experience, the experiential
inapprehension referred to here as a “gap” is the solution to the problem of non-being.
Plato‟s criteria are met. Though you still cannot say non-being, i.e. your enunciation of
non-being is a part of memory‟s recovering, and this recovering derives from default
procedural memory engaging your habitual scripts, i.e. eclipsing memory‟s “gap” of non-
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being with discursivity, the solution to the problem of non-being – think Plato‟s
dependency of reckoning thesis here – provides a different vista of being.
Put another way, this is how you feel the break of the connection – sensory
memory as a psychic circuit breaker – and recognize the gap between being in the pulses.
Previous and gap – just like “what you were going to say” – must be in quotes above, but
you need not runaway with Derrida and “refuse to accept the terms.” For example,
consider what is referred to as being blindsided, i.e. struck from behind by a large
speeding object. On the one hand, if you are never able to identify the object which
struck you, you still engage in a struggle to identify whatever happened precisely because
you were in fact struck. Identifying the object is a separate issue, and it cannot have
primacy over being blindsided. That is, not being able to identify the object which struck
you does not mean that you therefore were not struck. On the other hand, though postblindsided deliberation will use terminology relative to what may be terminologically
undecidable, the motor force of the deliberation itself does not involve a decision.
Decisions take place within the automatic response which you notice because – and that
means after – it has already been engaged. So, of course, decisions regarding origin are
thrice removed taking place within memory‟s cascading recovery from non-being.
Therefore, I avoid the Derridean fate of having the terms involved deconstructed because
the meaning of these terms is generated – thank you Deleuze – not relative to the stacked
deck of discursivity but relative to the non-discursivity necessitating the occurrence of the
discursive construction.
Yes discursivity falls short of signifying the “gap,” but discursivity is directed as
such, i.e. toward the gap, because of the “gap” or whatever term we language users agree
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to use in responding to memory‟s failure. I am not concerned with the fool‟s errand of
naming it. Rather, what I am concerned to show you is that this is the solution to the
problem of non-being. And, since the duration of being or, in more Heideggerian
terminology, a “vision” depends upon the power maintaining it, the duration – across
gaps, as it were, – is not filled. The power waxes and wanes even when the gap is
unnoticeable. Hence, your being is not persisting; it is pulsing.
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Appendix II: Transcription of Dissertation Defense
The following is a transcription of the Dissertation Defense which took place on April
15th 2011 in the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center of Duquesne University‟s
Gumberg Library beginning at 1:30pm.
The transcript is divided into the following four sections: §1 Introductory
Comments; §2 Twenty-Minute Presentation of Dissertation; §3 Questions from the
Committee; §4 Questions from the Audience.
§1 Introductory Comments –
Dr. Selcer: Welcome to Frank Scalambrino‟s dissertation defense. Frank has written an
extremely ambitious project that sets out to do not just what his title indicates: critiquing
the idea of pure difference in Derrida and Deleuze through attention to the problem of
non-being and the structure and function of memory, but also to, I would say: (a) solve
what he takes to be the most important problem of all of ontology; (b) develop an entirely
new philosophical psychology; (c) justify all this historically with respect essentially to
the entire history of philosophy, specifically Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant,
Hegel, Heidegger, Bergson, Hyppolite, Derrida, Deleuze, and a slew of cognitive
psychologists and scientists; and (d) develop what is essentially an entirely new
philosophical account of memory. All in one dissertation – so, it‟s a really ambitious
project that deals very rigorously with a really wide range of figures and texts and
philosophical problems.
The way we usually proceed is with around a 20 minute presentation of the person
defending the dissertation, then questions from the committee, and then questions from
everyone else. So, take it away Frank.
Mr. Scalambrino: Thank you. Thank you all for being here. Also, I would like to say, I
feel as though Dr. Wurzer is here with us in spirit, and I am thankful for that as well.
§2 Twenty-Minute Presentation of Dissertation –
Mr. Scalambrino: I picked the problem of non-being to work on; and, the problem of
non-being is a very difficult problem, a very perplexing problem, in so far as there are a
large number of philosophers who suggest it is not even a real problem.
So, the way in which I thought I would begin would be to quickly contextualize
the problem both historically and, then by contextualizing it, logically; I will have
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already begun dealing with the problem. There are a good number of philosophers that I
either touch on or devote a chapter to, and that‟s primarily because of the perplexing
nature of the problem. I wanted to further legitimize the fact that this is a real problem.
And looking at Plato, and a number of these other philosophers as well, it seems as
though it is important in regard to ontology, in so far as until you solve the problem of
non-being, you do not fully understand being.
After solving the problem of non-being, then, I put forward an attempt to
paraphrase the solution. I do this to suggest how we might think differently about being
in the wake of having solved this problem.
So, historically, there are a large number of respected Ancient scholars who have
commented on and discussed the problem of non-being. For example, and this is just to
name a few, G.E.L. Owen, Francis Cornford, Stanley Rosen, G.E.M. Anscombe, Martha
Nussbaum, Ronald Polansky, and John McDowell. These individuals have all
commented on this problem.
Also, some philosophers who avowedly attempt to solve this problem are Plato;
Aristotle, you might recall the numerous comments about this in the Metaphysics, i.e.
Aristotle‟s Metaphysics; Kant, for example, one of the things I found very interesting
about the Critique of Pure Reason that tends to be overlooked is that Kant devotes a
section and a graphic to what he calls, “The Table of Nothing” – the Table of Nothing:
What‟s Kant doing talking about the Table of Nothing in the Critique of Pure Reason? In
addition, then, to Kant we have: Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Derrida, Deleuze,
Lacan, and Badiou. Just to name a few.
Also, I, of course, took Dr. Evan‟s Difference & Repetition class, and the paper I
wrote for that class was on Deleuze and Badiou on non-being. And, when I took Dr.
Polansky‟s Metaphysics class, I wrote some of the shorter papers on non-being in there as
well. I can say my reading of non-being in Aristotle has changed drastically since the
days of taking Metaphysics with Dr. Polansky.
Okay, so then in order to contextualize the problem logically, then, what I put
together here [pointing to Dissertation Defense Handout] – because the dissertation is a
large document; as I moved through this problem, I continued to step back in order to get
a better look at the problem. It increased the number of philosophers I was looking at; I
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did not want to spend so much time with Aristotle, and then I just felt that if I did not
spend enough time with Aristotle, I wouldn‟t do this problem justice – so what I‟ve done
[pointing again to the dissertation handout] is put together a very fast moving, a very
quick, flowchart of what Kant might refer to as the regulative idea I‟ve constructed for
you, in order to solve the problem of non-being. So, if I could pass this out to you
[dissertation handout]… There‟s really only – if you count the starting point as a step –
there are really only 8 steps to this, and I think it actually moves pretty fast. And, that
should help you get a handle on it, as opposed to getting through so many pages [in the
dissertation].
Alright, so we start off here with the problem of non-being, and I‟ve already told
you that what I take to be at stake, what I take to be the value of solving the problem of
non-being, is, according to Plato in the Sophist, to get a better understanding of being
itself. So, if we just have these three steps here [within the first step of the flowchart], the
first being the question:
What is non-being? And when you attempt to answer that question you move to
what I refer to as the first aporia or the “complicated nature” of the problem of non-being.
For example, when you move over here to beta from alpha we have: Non-being cannot be
thought, experienced, or described. So, some people are content with that, and the way I
read this is that if they are content to take that as an answer to the problem of non-being,
then they really haven‟t overcome that aporia – they haven‟t overcome the first aporia.
When we follow through the Sophist, for example, the Eleatic visitor is talking to
Theaetetus and between the two of them they seem to offer up this as a response to the
problem of non-being: well, non-being cannot be thought, experienced, or described. If
you‟re actually reading the dissertation I take a look at this in the Parmenides, as well,
and provide a logical rendition of it too.
So, after Theaetetus seems to agree to this, to assent to this, then the Eleatic
visitor complicates matters even further by moving to the next aporia. And, showing
Theaetetus the next aporia, which is: If it is the case that non-being cannot be thought,
experienced, or described, then: what is it that we are asking about? Then, what are we
even asking about? Isn‟t it the case that we have thought of something or that we are
describing something when we were providing this answer? I refer to this second aporia
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as the “paradoxical nature” of the problem of non-being. So, that‟s the start. This is the
start.
We move to step one then. If you follow Plato and Kant, it seems as though their
attempt to resolve this problem is to move by way of the structure of experience and to
distinguish between two types of opposition. Okay. This means distinguishing between
participation in the form of difference. And, here is where we start talking about
difference now. So, we have participation in the form of difference, enantion, and
difference in itself or heteron. Okay. So we have this distinction, and then what I have
here is this conceptual v. experiential [distinction], if you‟re following along here
[pointing to the flowchart] you can see it moves along with the Critique of Pure Reason:
Ideas and Concepts in the Understanding broadly designated and Perception and
Sensation pertaining to experience.
Step two, then, would be [pointing to flowchart] one of the ways to keep this
straight and make it move faster. Hence, we could say not-being with a “t” and nonbeing with an “n” respectively. So, not-being pertains to logical negation, and non-being
pertains to experiential negation. It seems as though, then, if we are going to solve the
problem of non-being, then it has to be something other than the use of just logic or ideas.
So, this is helping us figure out where we are going to look. Somehow we have to look
in experience to solve this problem.
Moving to the third step, then, I analyze this problem in the dissertation both
logically and historically by looking at the way in which a number of philosophers have
attempted to solve this problem. And, so, here are six different positions in relation to
this problem [pointing to flowchart].
Let‟s move to step four. In step four, what are the solutions from step three? So,
as quickly as possible as I tried to state what I take each one of these thinkers to be
putting forward as a solution to the problem of non-being. So, we have this notion of
hypokeimenal destruction or death, and this is where I believe that non-being gets
incorrectly equated with death. If it‟s the case that non-being is incorrectly equated with
death in Aristotle, then, it makes this solution all the more interesting, in my opinion.
With Kant, Kant posits a non-entity, the Undinge, the nihil negativum of the thing-initself, and here in a moment you‟ll see what he means by nihil negativum. Hegel, of
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course, talks about non-being as an internal moment in a dialectical movement. Now
both Derrida and Deleuze talk about pure difference, and it is by way of talking about
pure difference that you can extract their solutions to the problem of non-being. For
Derrida, we have pure difference and the logic of supplementarity, and ultimately we end
up with Différance. And, with Deleuze, difference as Being becoming active versus “?being.” Deleuze explicitly puts forth question mark being as his solution to the problem
of non-being. My solution: as you‟ll see this won‟t make full sense until I reach the last
step [in the flowchart], there are gaps between the memory that is at the ground of
experience. So, I‟m following Plato and Kant in making this distinction between two
types of opposition, looking into experience, and suggesting that it is possible to
recognize these gaps, after the fact, in experience; and, that these gaps constitute the
solution to the problem of non-being. Okay.
The fifth step, then, in order to deal with this massive amount of information is to
group these solutions. So, I‟ve grouped these solutions into two groups. In the first
group I put Kant, Deleuze, and my attempt to solve this problem. In the second group I
put Aristotle, Hegel, and Derrida. My suggestion here is that – and again I tried to
thoroughly support these claims in the dissertation – Aristotle, Hegel, and Derrida are
unable to overcome the first aporia. This is because they don‟t follow this broadly
distinguishing between two types of opposition. Those in the first group overcome the
first aporia.
Second to the last step, then, the sixth step, says this is a further fleshing out of the
solutions, [i.e.] the attempts to solve the problem of non-being. I‟m grouping together
Aristotle‟s hypokeimenal logic, what I refer to as Hegel‟s “metaphysical shell game,” and
Derrida‟s Différance. And if you notice, this is again for group two, there is a
dependence of identifying the first step here [pointing to the flowchart] “L” on the next
step whether it be “M” or “N.” So, Aristotle takes the destruction of this underlying
hypokeimenon or “L” – there‟s a significant amount of references that I make in the
dissertation to all of these responses, so, if you‟d like I can flip it open (I have the page
numbers written down) and we can look at the text if you like – this is where I‟m
suggesting that Aristotle takes non-being to be death. You especially find this when you
look at his difference kinds of change. Again, Hegel takes non-being to be a moment
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within this dialectical movement of identification. And, Derrida takes the being or nonbeing of the hypokeimenon as pure difference to be undecidable – ultimately [pointing at
the flowchart]. So, ultimately he takes it to be undecidable, and this, of course, is due to
the logic of supplementarity. So, by saying that something is “not,” you‟re merely just
adding – you‟re supplementing – that being. You‟re supplementing its being to begin
with. Hence, there is a sense in which you could say that whatever the underlying
undifferentiated first moment in the dialect might be that for all of these thinkers it is
always already being, i.e. always already a being. In that sense, I read them as not
overcoming the first aporia of the problem. Okay.
So, now we move to the bottom of this page. So, the group one thinkers … We
can see this with Kant‟s Table of Nothing – I‟ve reproduced Kant‟s Table of Nothing for
you. You can see it comes from A 292 in the Critique of Pure Reason. You can notice
that when you look at Kant‟s Table the Table follows the division of the structure of
experience that I noted in steps one and two on the first page [of the flowchart]. What I
mean by that is: the conceptual negation moves from – in this Table of Nothing – from
numeral I to numeral II; experiential negation moves from III to IV. In this way, now we
have a way to use this other type of opposition, this other type of negation, and notice we
are zeroing in on non-being [(Cf. A 575/B 603)]. Okay.
If you flip over, then, to the last page, i.e. the last step of this movement. With
this step, then, what I want to do is to differentiate my attempt to solve this problem from
their attempts to solve this problem, and when I say “their attempts to solve this
problem,” I mean Kant and Deleuze. Okay, so, from the Critique of Pure Reason – again
– Kant emphasizes a passive, i.e. apprehension of synopsis, relation to the ground as
abyss. And, just as the second of Kant‟s justifications for positing the thing-in-itself
depends on imagination, so he derives nihil negativum through an experiential negation
involving imagination. Now, even when you look at the Table of Nothing, you already
see this. You can already see this just by looking at the Table of Nothing.
Despite suggesting that nihil negativum is arrived at by an experiential negation
which involves imagination, Kant claims that the ground of being involves sense, and it is
governed by what he calls “affinity.” Okay. So, now… In the twenty-first century, when
we look at this contemporary memory research, it seems pretty clear and straight forward
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that they now think of affinity as pertaining to memory. So, affinity is an aspect of
memory. You‟ll see this as we get a little further down, how this makes sense.
Now, concerning Deleuze, Deleuze emphasizes the ground as active, as intensive
expressive abyss; this is as opposed to Kant. And, following a model of ontogenesis or
ontological emergence from Becoming, I read Deleuze … Deleuze considers difference
as Being, i.e. as Becoming‟s being active, and question mark being as non-being, i.e.
Becoming‟s being reactive. This is largely coming out of Nietzsche & Philosophy and
Difference & Repetition – where he is talking about this being active and being reactive.
In this way, Deleuze follows Bergson, and he considers the problem of non-being to be a
pseudo problem. So, here I suggest that Deleuze reconvenes with group two, and that he
ultimately reduces Being, Becoming, and Non-Being to Becoming and Being. Hence, he
misses non-being, and he considers it ?-being; and, by considering it ?-being, you can
already see he thinks of non-being as a type of being. This is why I say he reconvenes
with group two.
So, all throughout the dissertation, I continue to return to this comment that I like
to make that it seems to me Kant was the person who advanced the furthest on the
problem of non-being. So, then, my hope was to … I had always – as some of this past
stuff shows you – been interested in the problem of non-being, and I thought that I was
leaving it behind; and I was going to do some work on memory instead, and as I‟m
looking at all these memory articles, suddenly it just hit me. I was like, “Oh, this is the
way to solve the problem of non-being.”
So, then, looking again at the ground of being by way of the Critique of Pure
Reason, I am emphasizing that the abyss or the ground of being is actually a play-ground;
it is governed by play. It is the play-ground of memory, i.e. memory as being‟s playground. So, following Deleuze in a sense, I have ontological emergence from an active
ground, and this is accounted for in the contemporary memory research by sensory and
procedural memory. Then, following and aspect of Différance from Derrida, there are
projective and retrojective gap masking effects, and this is one of the reasons … this nonbeing – as Plato indicated initially – is unable to be at all. Let‟s see. And, if you‟d care
for me to elaborate on priming, for example, I‟d be happy to do so.
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So, then, rounding this off… No longer being at all; the gaps between the pulses
of ontological emergence, they constitute my solution to the problem of non-being. To
round this off: I‟m following contemporary memory research regarding the experiential
ground of being, and that means the second of the two oppositions, that the experiential
ground of being is governed by memory. It is a ground of memory. Sense is, then,
grounded in sensory memory. Productive imagination … I‟m following along with the
Critique of Pure Reason, by the way, right now. Sense is grounded in sensory memory;
productive imagination is grounded in working memory; reproductive imagination is
grounded in short term and long term memory; and, then, this is a point of contention I
thought I would just make explicit, contemporary memory research does not deny an
outside world, rather it suggests that the flowing change of Becoming is too fast and
excessive to effect being directly. In other words, memory is a buffer – we could say.
Memory is the buffer because of which there is an ontological emergence, and then
connective and instantiating – these are buzz words in the memory research – memory
allows for ontological emergence. I‟m using a couple quotes here [cited in flowchart and
dissertation]: “Stimuli do not speak for themselves.” “Automaticity is not driven by
stimuli separately from skills.” “These patterns themselves are not stored. What is stored
is the connection strengths,” this is another buzz word, “connection strengths between
these units that allow for the patterns to be recreated.” And, notice my emphasis that it is
a continual re-creation.
Though of all the people I do deal with, I do not deal with Nietzsche [in the
dissertation]. But, for those of you versed in Nietzsche, you can‟t help but hear Nietzsche
in the background here. Lastly, then, the trajectory of experience is grounded in an
engagement of procedural memory, and the gaps between memory‟s cycling and shifting
engagements of procedural memory are covered over by priming and habitual scripts.
So, then, these … It is my suggestion that these gaps solve the problem of non-being. So,
one of the ways I would paraphrase this to you in order to suggest what is the value of
this … I turn this phrase: Your being is not persisting; it is pulsing.
Lastly, if you just want to look at this last page. I tried to give you a graphic
representation [chuckle chuckle]. On the left hand side, it follows along with the Critique
of Pure Reason really, and I borrowed this [portion of the] graphic from contemporary
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memory research. You have the Necker cube. The Necker cube emerging within being,
we could say. The Necker cube emerging within being. I like the use of the Necker cube
because you can see it in different ways. Then, underneath we have Becoming, and
between the flickering, we might say, the flickering of being, you have these gaps. So,
you can see I have the null symbol there in order to indicate where one would locate nonbeing. So …
So, that‟s the flowchart of the regulative idea that I constructed in order to try to
solve the problem of non-being.
[Pause for applause.]
§3 Questions from the Committee –
Dr. Selcer: So Frank, I‟m going to start. I have some general questions, and then I have
Kant on the brain these days, so I‟m going to proceed that way.
My first and most general question about your dissertation is one I‟ve been asking
you since you first came to me with a version of a proposal for this. So, let me ask it in a
longer way than I initially asked it. You make in the dissertation a distinction between
not-being as logical negation, as I understand it, and non-being as an ontological
negativity that you explain in terms of this problem of the ground of experience.
And, I think that was very clear in your dissertation and, in fact, you managed to
successfully translate that out of the Platonic Aristotelian context into the rest of the
history of philosophy very well.
Mr. Scalambrino: Thank you.
Dr. Selcer: But what you mean, I still think, by non-being remains a bit of a mystery to
me. So, as far as I can tell, the closest you come in the dissertation to actually stating
what you take the problem of non-being to be, which is a problem your dissertation
presents as having fundamentally structured the entirety of the history of metaphysics and
philosophical psychology from Plato to Deleuze and Derrida is when you claim that even
asking what the problem is invokes a kind of paradox. Right? At some point you say,
since when you answer the question what is non-being, an answer is being given, the
answer cannot refer to non-being – as you went through today also in your chart.
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You said in the dissertation several times, and you said earlier today, we shouldn‟t
make the mistake of thinking that this renders the problem of non-being a pseudo
problem, and I guess my question is: Why not?
Why isn‟t it a terminological conundrum with which maybe Plato‟s Sophist and
then your project falls because you want to insist that we do in fact have to ask what your
dissertation seems to actually argue is an unanswerable question. Right? That is to say, a
question that could only be framed in terms of logical negation, but that wasn‟t supposed
to be about logical negation at all. Instead it was supposed to be this experiential
negativity.
So, let me put this a different way. It‟s one thing… And I think you provide a
good argument that we ought to resist giving a direct answer to the question: What is
non-being? You have to give an indirect answer that takes a series of detours through
memory and so on and so forth. So, it‟s one thing to resist that by arguing the nature of
the question makes a direct answer impossible and requires instead this indirect detour
through the problem of memory. But it seems like it‟s another thing in the wake of that
response to claim that the problem of non-being is one you can‟t explain. And, that the
whole of the history of philosophy has grappled with it. Right? So, I‟m not asking you
to provide an answer to the question: What is non-being. But, I do want you to answer
the question: What is the problem of non-being?
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. So, it seems to me, and again, I would follow along through the
dialog between the Eleatic visitor and Theaetetus to get a solid feel for this. It seems to
me that if it‟s the case that we understand what being is. And, I would go so far as to
suggest that this engages Heidegger [also]. So, even if we want to take some sort of
analogous to a ready-to-hand engagement such that being is non-discursive, or something
like that, still there is a sense in which we then think we understand being. And, so, it
seems to me, again this is the value of – and, I‟m answering your question – the value of
non-being is that if we think we understand being, we don‟t really understand being until
we understand non-being. And, so, then this gives birth to the problem of non-being, and
the problem of non-being is just: What is non-being? What is non-being, then, because
we think we understand being, and we set out to understand being; but, until we
understand non-being we don‟t really understand being.
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Dr. Selcer: And, we can‟t understand non-being directly. That‟s the problem?
Mr. Scalambrino: No, I‟m saying that the problem is: What is non-being? And that in
order to understand being we must understand non-being. So, I‟m saying that‟s the
problem. So, the perplexity, we would say, of the problem is that when you actually step
in and try to solve the problem of non-being that‟s when you find yourself sort of running
in circles.
Dr. Selcer: Okay. So, then, why … To use an example that you actually pointed to
earlier today: What‟s wrong with the reductive solutions? What‟s wrong with the
solutions that essentially neutralize – right – the problematic of trying to give a direct
account of non-being by reducing it – as you argue Deleuze does – to Being and
Becoming? Why is that not a solution to what you identified as the problem of nonbeing? If that is a path to actually being able to think Being as Becoming, or to think
Being as pure difference, for Deleuze, what‟s wrong, then?
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. So, there are two parts to this. What I think is really wrong
with that is that it follows Aristotle too much. This is why I stepped back, and I had to
write so much about Aristotle. I didn‟t really want to do that, but I just thought that this
is coming out of Aristotle‟s reading of non-being. So, in reducing Being to Becoming,
and this is why start off with [in the dissertation] this [section titled]: What is the
relationship between Being, Becoming, and Non-Being? We would say something like
both Becoming and Non-Being are non-discursive. However, the difference between the
two might be that you can have an idea of Becoming that is not directly in
contradistinction to becoming as non-being is [to any idea of Non-Being].
So, it seems to me, the problem is that when you reduce the relationship between
Being, Becoming, and Non-Being to just Being and Becoming, suddenly it does seem as
though the assumption of persistence is carried in, and you become committed to
persistence. This is why, for example, even in the philosophy of mind, it seems to me
that there is a sort of naïve reading of Physicalism. A naïve reading of Physicalism in so
far as my being becomes equated with – what would have to be the idea of – my physical
being, and so then non-being ends up being death.
Dr. Selcer: But I have to ask, this may be just too big a question for a project this big, but
what is the ground and what is the consequent here? It seems like sometimes you‟re
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arguing that the thesis of the persistence of being is false, therefore my solution to the
problem of non-being is true. And, other times, you‟re arguing my solution to the
problem of non-being is true, therefore the thesis of the persistence of being is false.
Which is it? Do you begin by asserting the punctual pulsating nature of being, and then
develop your solution to the problem of non-being on that ground? Or is it the other way
around?
Mr. Scalambrino: I gotta tell ya. Sincerely, I think that‟s a fabulous question. And, I
asked myself that question over and over again because I was sincerely asking the
question: Am I begging the question? So, am I begging the question?
But really, the way I approached this problem was sort of: Hey, what‟s Plato
doing talking about this? That‟s how I came to this. So, I had always been told, the
Parmenides and the Sophist are really difficult dialogs. So, then, I was like: I want to go
read those dialogs and see what‟s being said in there. Then, you come to those dialogs,
and… Why are they talking about non-being? And, so it seemed to me that… So, here‟s
this problem, this problem of non-being, and what happens if we were to meet the criteria
for solving that problem. And, it seems to me that when you meet the criteria for solving
the problem, it really highlights the sense in which persistence is merely an assumption.
So, that‟s how I came to it. Because I asked myself several times… over and
over… but I really don‟t think that I am because… Plato‟s putting forward this problem,
and I‟m trying to meet the criteria for solving it; but, not just fantasizing a solution.
Rather, for example, all these contemporary memory research articles that I‟m looking
at… They‟re talking about the ground of being in such a way that, for example… So,
there are several different ways that we could talk about this.
It‟s a naïve version of Physicalism to think that your eyes are open, and then
you‟re just taking in the physical world as it is. That‟s a naïve version of Physicalism.
It‟s rather the case – I like to talk about this with a poetical reference to Dionysian – that
your eyes are “shooting” around. Your eyes are “shooting” around. What they refer to as
“scene recognition” in the contemporary memory research, it‟s not the case that your eyes
are open and you‟re just taking in the room. Rather, your eyes are shooting all over the
place, and you‟re constructing the scene. But in order for you to be able to construct the
scene, you have to hold it in memory. So, what I‟m saying is that there is sort of all this
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change occurring. What I try to fall back into this Ancient stuff as talking about this
flowing flux of Becoming, all this change. And, there is this jutting around going on, if
we‟re just talking about vision, and out of that emerges the scene. And, that‟s just one
way to do it.
They also talk about the difference between spatiotopic and retinotopic in order to
track multiple objects and in order to stabilize – if you will – to stabilize all this change
and to sort of “hold it” in being. So, yeah …
Dr. Selcer: This is just sort of speculative on my part, it isn‟t something I‟ve prepared,
but would it be right to say that you‟ve essentially proposed a strangely Kantian
Copernican revolution with respect to a Bergsonian account of perception. I mean:
Bergson‟s got a pretty well established critique of the kind of cinematographic account of
perception, in so far as it implies a set of ontological premises about the nature of the
external world. And, it‟s as if you‟ve taken that Bergsonian critique but moved it away
from the question of objects, and you‟ve moved it to the interior of the subject such that a
cinematographic form of perception constructs continuous flux or continuous flow in a
external world; but, that perceptual construction gives rise to exactly what you want to
talk about in your dissertation as being. Does that make sense?
Mr. Scalambrino: I think it does. I guess what I would add to it is that: Ultimately, this is
Kantian, as I follow through it here [pointing to flowchart]. And then, what I‟m asking is
that Kant seems to have the ground of being, the ground of the structure of experience,
for example, is sensory, so the question is really… What I‟m trying to show is that
contemporary memory research is talking about this as suggesting that really… When
they talk about FINSTing and the difference between subitizing and counting… So,
just…quickly … If there are a number of objects that you are trying to count and it‟s
under five, then you‟re able to count much quicker, just by looking at it, and they are
suggesting that it is in this way that memory is instantiating. So, I can‟t follow that, it
would take me too far afield.
So, what I‟m doing, is just taking that as evidence for my claim that the ground of
the structure of experience is memory. It‟s not sensation, or that would lead us into a
naïve Physicalism.
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Dr. Selcer: Alright, let me ask you a couple questions about Kant, and then I‟m going to
turn it over to the other folks on the committee. So, the first one might be not a serious
question. Because it may just be a question of how you‟re using a certain bit of
terminology. Or, it may be central to your argument. I‟m not sure.
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.
Dr. Selcer: So, already today, and throughout the dissertation, one of the major sets of
terminological distinctions on which your argument is built is the distinction between the
discursive and the non-discursive. This is particularly the case when you‟re discussing
Kant. But it‟s not clear to me whether you‟re using discursivity in the sense that Kant is
using discursivity, or if you‟re taking a post-Kantian notion of discursivity and using it to
interpret the Kantian project.
Kant‟s really explicit about his distinction between concepts as discursive
cognitions or mediate representations in distinction from intuitions as non-discursive,
immediate representations. But, when you talk about the non-discursive, you seem to
want it to refer to everything that is not constructed as a concept through the application
of the categories to what‟s given intuitively through the pure forms of space and time.
So, for Kant, the non-discursive is not the thing-in-itself, it‟s the Gegenstand, it‟s the
object of experience formed by spatiality and temporality as the a priori structures of
intuition – but not yet cognized, because not yet constructed as conceptual.
In Kant‟s distinction, intuitions are non-discursive and conceptuality is discursive.
For you it seems like, anything that is an object, either of intuition or conceptuality is
discursive, and the non-discursive is whatever got apprehended. Whatever was given to
sensibility and understanding in the first place. My question is: Are you deriving your
sense of discursivity and non-discursivity from Kant? And, if so, can you talk a little bit
more about how it maps on to Kant‟s distinction between concepts and intuitions. Or, are
you deriving it from somewhere else and using it, if you like, as an interpretive lens
through which to read the Kantian account of the relationship between sensibility and
understanding – in your very nice readings of the A and B Deductions?
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. Thank you.
So, if I could start by saying that, again, I believe that Kant got closest – we could
talk about whether or not I take Plato to have provided a solution at all, or to have solved
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this problem – and the reason I think Kant got closest is because he was able to suppose
this non-entity, the thing-in-itself. So, really what I‟m most interested in doing is just
stressing the value of this distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive.
By stressing the value of the distinction between the discursive and nondiscursive this is one of the ways in which we can keep in mind the, what I would refer to
as the, “excessive nature” of both intuition but also the sense in which Becoming exceeds
Being. So, there is a sense in which the ontological emergence is already a delimiting or
a limiting.
So, let‟s see… Yeah… So, this would be one of the way in which we could also
account for things like [quoting Leibniz] there‟s something always “still sleeping in the
abyss.” Right? So, really I wanted to stress the distinction between discursivity and nondiscursivity is one of the ways in which I engage the perplexity of the problem of nonbeing in order to try to stress this sense in which I think Kant is right to make the
conceptual experiential distinction.
Dr. Selcer: I‟m still not clear whether you take the non-discursive to be what‟s given to
intuition or intuitive representations themselves. So, for Kant, intuitive representations
are non-discursive. The non-discursive doesn‟t refer to, the way I understand it anyway,
the non-discursive does not refer to the noumenal and does not refer to what is given,
what appears in appearance. Immediate intuitive representations are non-discursive;
mediate conceptual cognizable representations are discursive. But, you seem to want to
broaden the sphere of non-discursivity to include both the operations of the faculties of
sensibility, and the objects…
Let me put it a different way, because there is another question I wanted to ask
you, and it was bound up in the kind of answer you gave here. Not just in the chapter
which is explicitly on Kant, but throughout the dissertation when you refer back to the
Kantian project – and I will say that I really appreciate your hyper-Kantian reading of …
especially Deleuze, which I think is right…
Mr. Scalambrino: Thank you.
Dr. Selcer: But, what exactly do you mean in the dissertation when you repeatedly claim
that Kant posits the thing-in-itself?
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So, as you rightly point out, he‟s careful not to endow ding-an-sich with
existence, and he‟s certainly not a philosopher who would endow something we‟re forced
to think about with truth value. Otherwise, the Transcendental Dialectic would be a
logical truth and not a logical illusion. So, on your reading, if Kant‟s thing-in-itself
neither exists nor is the object of a true judgment, then what do you mean when you say
he “posits” it.
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. Thank you.
Your second phrasing of the question helped me get a grip on it. When we are
talking about the structure of experience, it depends if we are talking about the object of
experience and regressing backward or talking about the structure of experience on the
way up from Becoming. So, we could say, on the way up from Becoming, the sensory
manifold is non-discursive, certainly. But, then, on the way down, what I want to say is:
what is non-discursive is even more than the sensory manifold because Becoming must
be non-discursive as well. So, perhaps, it depends upon which angle you‟re approaching
non-discursivity from (Cf. A 685/B 713). And, let‟s see… Forgive me… The last bit of
your second question…
Dr. Selcer: Positing…
Mr. Scalambrino: Yes, positing. That‟s right. Thank you…
Okay. I feel as though is paying the debt for the Copernican revolution, in a
sense, with this sort of “positing” of the thing-in-itself. So, what we end up with is this
idea that since in the beginning, we have assumed: Objects don‟t conform to mind; mind
conforms to objects… The Copernican revolution…
Dr. Selcer: It‟s the other way around.
Mr. Scalambrino: Oh, yeah… Right, help me out here... Yeah. You‟re right; it‟s the
other way around. For Kant, the mind doesn‟t conform to objects, objects conform to
mind. So, if it‟s the case that objects conform to the mind, then there is a sense in which
we can‟t know these things, of course, things. But at the same time, we‟re going to have
to talk about them –right? – because we made this move. So, we have to pay that debt.
So, in order to pay that debt, there are two ways to pay it. We can pay it from the
conceptual aspect of the structure of experience, or we can pay it from the experiential
part of the structure of experience. When you pay it from the conceptual, this is when
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you posit the distinction between phenomena and noumena, but this is a logical situation.
However, from the experiential we have to pay that debt. In order to pay that debt from
the experiential, Kant can’t say what it is, but at the same time he still has to somehow be
able to pay that debt.
So, in order to do this, we are really pressing the A Deduction of the Critique of
Pure Reason. And, what we have then, if you just follow through the list of faculties that
are lining the structure of experience, when we start to get a representation we have the
threefold synthesis of imagination. This is the apprehension of the synopsis. So, because
the threefold synthesis is a synthesis of imagination – and, again, I think this is the one
place where, well, if Kant could have seen it the way these twenty-first century memory
researchers can see it, Kant wouldn‟t have said these things – because the ground of the
representation is the threefold synthesis of imagination, somehow we need to negate
imagination in order to pay the debt for the Copernican revolution. Kant explicitly says,
it must be an image of something. It has to be an image of something. So, that‟s why I
say he posits the thing, because there has to be an image of something. Now, of course,
it‟s excessive; it‟s non-discursive; it‟s the sensory manifold; etc.
Dr. Selcer: But… This will be my last question…
Mr. Scalambrino: Oh, that‟s okay. These are great questions. Thank you.
Dr. Selcer: There‟s a sense in which what really does the work of connecting the way you
seem to be framing the realm of discursivity and the realm of non-discursivity in Kant is
not, if you like, the result of the threefold synthesis but instead the schematism where
Kant explicitly says schemata are not images but rather rules – rules for the production of
images of concepts. So, it‟s really that schematization of the categories with respect to an
attempt to conceptualize the pure forms of intuition from sensibility that would get you
the non-discursive in the way… Getting you the non-discursive is the Kantian version of
solving the problem of non-being, right? So, why is that not right?
You really want to emphasize the role of… the tight connection between images
and imagination partly because it allows you to argue on the basis later of contemporary
memory research and what Derrida and Deleuze have done to Kant that it should have
been memory here and not imagination. Right?
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Mr. Scalambrino: Right. However, what is actually going on here is that it should have
been memory at the level of the sensory…
Dr. Selcer: Ah.
Mr. Scalambrino: At the level of the sensory manifold. So, this is why in step seven [of
the flowchart] I say, Kant emphasizes a passive apprehension of synopsis relation to the
ground [of experience] as abyss. So here we have the ground as abyss, and then the
passive relation is the “bottom of,” I‟ll use “bottom” so as to not confuse the terminology,
the bottom of the threefold synthesis of imagination. And, so, in so far as it is the bottom
of the threefold synthesis of imagination, Kant thinks that in order to pay the debt for the
Copernican revolution he has to negate imagination.
What I would suggest is that Deleuze actually has this right. Deleuze suggests we
need to go right from the ground. And, he‟s right, in my opinion. And, also, the ground
is active; it‟s an active abyss. This again… So, Nietzsche, “When you stare into the
abyss, the abyss stares into you.” There is a sense in which Kant is suggesting that we
are abysmal beings … that when we try to see into our very ground, we are looking into
an abyss.
So, then, my question is: What governs the activity of that abyss? And, if it‟s the
case, as it seems as though contemporary memory research actually suggests, if it‟s the
case that the activity of the abyss at the ground of being is governed by memory, then
there might be a way in which – though, again, it‟s not the idea of it – there might be a
way in which we can notice the movement of this ground such that we can actually
provide a solution to the problem of non-being.
Dr. Selcer: Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Scalambrino: Thank you.
Dr. Evans: Some of my stuff will follow up on Dan‟s. Although actually I wanted to
start with a question on Plato, first I wanted to say in terms of the pros and cons in a
general way of the dissertation: In terms of the pros, it‟s an incredible amount of
scholarship that you put into this Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Derrida, Deleuze, and also the
empirical memory research. I think it really shows a strong knowledge of the history of
philosophy and of psychology; there were some lovely graphs; and, there were some nice
turns of phrase throughout; and, clarity, on pretty much everything that you were
636

articulating in there, you did it in a very clear way; then, second of all, your originality.
You use all of this to come up with your own theory. And, I think that‟s very good and
remarkable thing to do, as well. Seconding pretty much what Dan said here.
In terms of problems: in the most general sense, now, I‟m thinking of when you
want to turn this into something you want to publish. And, of course, the immediate
thing that comes to mind is that it‟s very very long. And most publishers, unless you
already have a big name, they‟ll have problems with that. More important, it isn‟t so
much the length. I thought at times there was almost too much complexity. It wasn‟t
whether all of it fit one way or the other, but there was so much of it that some of it
seemed unnecessary for the major points were going to make. And, therefore, it meant
the reader has to battle through that to get to those major points. I thought of it as kind of
underbrush. It‟s a very good underbrush, but nonetheless underbrush in the sense that it
blocked the person from getting to the points as quickly as they might have.
This shows up in a particular way, there are a huge number of recalls. You‟re
asking your reader almost every other page to recall what was said a little earlier, a little
earlier. When you do revise it to cut it down to get it into something you can publish, one
little test you can do is to ask how many of those recalls can I get rid of and have it still
seamlessly flow to the points that I‟m making. … So, that, just in terms of… but, it‟s a
really excellent work.
Mr. Scalambrino: Thank you.
Dr. Evans: What I wanted to start out with… You‟ve already summarized very well the
question of non-being and why you‟re at it. In Plato, you use his form of Difference, and
you want to say his form of Difference points to non-being, right? And, it is as if it itself
– Difference – is beyond Being, right? The form of Difference in itself is non-being?
Mr. Scalambrino: I suggested the form of Difference in itself is one of the ways we could
point beyond the forms. So, for example, unless we want to say that the form of Being is
being itself, then there must be a way in which we can somehow point outside of the
forms. And, so what I am trying to do here is to explicate why Plato is saying we need to
solve this problem anyway, and it seems as though it‟s because when you are just
considering the form of Being itself, then there is a sense in which it [being] is sort of
eclipsed, right. So, you can‟t see outside of the forms that way.
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So, when you‟re considering Difference in itself, there is a sense in which
Difference in itself is different from itself, and we get what I refer to in Deleuze as this
recursive fractal version. Following this recursive fractal out gets you outside the forms.
But, I ultimately suggest I don‟t think the answer is difference because I think Derrida
and Deleuze are attacking heteron and trying to rewrite heteron in order to say that well,
difference is the answer, but you must understand difference in this way. But I don‟t
think that is actually the right way to approach it. I think that Kant actually had the right
way to approach it, and we just needed to clear up how he thought of the ground.
Dr. Evans: Well, for this question, I‟m going to follow up a bit on it, and the next one
will be on Deleuze. But, I‟m mainly just trying to get clarified on this idea of the
problem of non-being and the possible solutions to it. And, my last questions will be on
your answer to it; and, those will be, perhaps, a little more critical.
What I was wondering is that Plato also says the Good is not being but something
yet beyond and superior to it in rank and power. You were using the form of Difference
to point to what might be non-being or indicate in the direction. In a sense Plato is also
saying, the Good is beyond Being too. So, how would that enter into the problematic that
we‟re setting up here about non-being?
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. In the Republic, and I had tried to make reference to the
Republic; but I didn‟t want to make this thing any bigger than it was already, but I do
think you can make reference to the Cave Allegory here. During this discussion in the
Republic, non-being is this extremely dark place but being is too bright, so just like our
eyes must adjust on the way up and back down… What I found interesting was…
Forgive me; I keep jumping to Deleuze with you… What I found interesting was Deleuze
tried to turn this upside down, so that it was a sense in which by going deeper into the
cave we are going into greater and greater being as opposed to going out of the cave. So,
if I‟m understanding your question correctly…
Dr. Evans: Plato says that the Good is beyond Being. Is that the same as saying it‟s nonbeing?
Mr. Scalambrino: That‟s an excellent question.
Dr. Evans: Let me add one more thing to it. If we want to talk about whether you can
describe the Good, Plato says, well, you have to go through the child of the Good, you
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have to do it through the analogy of the Sun. So, would that be indirect enough, then that
you‟d be describing the Sun, but you‟d be using that indirectly – like those pulses you‟re
going to talk about – to point to something that‟s related to them; but, you‟re not saying
what it is directly, the Good in this case. You‟re just talking about the Sun Analogy the
same way you‟re talking about pulses that indirectly point to, in an inapprehensible way,
the gaps.
Mr. Scalambrino: That‟s very interesting. If I could paraphrase this, is it the case that
solving the problem of non-being, in so far as it helps us get an understanding of being,
does it also help us get an understanding of the Good? That‟s a really interesting
question. Now, in so far as I didn‟t pursue that in order to solve the problem of nonbeing, I don‟t know that I addressed it in there. But, it‟s an excellent question.
Dr. Evans: It‟s an offering for the book.
Mr. Scalambrino: Yeah, right. That‟s great. I‟m definitely going to think some more
about that. That‟s an excellent question.
Dr. Evans: A similar thing comes up with respect to Deleuze in a way. What I sort of
understood in the end is that the particular way that Deleuze himself talks about nonbeing, where he converts it into question mark being or non in parentheses being, in that
case you criticism as well is that you‟re really not giving us non-being, you‟re giving us
becoming. With Plato we have Being, Becoming, and Non-Being, and that‟s really the
basic criticism you have against his own offering.
Mr. Scalambrino: Yes.
Dr. Evans: What I want to do is to say, maybe there‟s another way – just like we did with
Plato there – that with Deleuze we can get another avenue into non-being that fits the
criteria you‟ve set up for what has to constitute a good proper answer, a solution to nonbeing question.
Deleuze also makes the distinction between Cosmos, Chaos, and Chaosmos.
Cosmos consists of series that are ordered by the Same. For instance, say the unmoved
mover in Aristotle, Plato‟s form… So, Cosmos is basically order. Then there is Chaos,
and the way he puts it here is Chaos is absolute divergence in the sense that any series of
elements that we might be talking about completely exclude one another – hence,
diverge; but also, they in no sense communicate with one another and in no way compose
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a unity. And, if we could think of Cosmos as Being, and we could think, perhaps here, of
Chaos as non-being. Now we go to Chaosmos which is going to be Becoming.
And here Deleuze says we have the divergent series again, but they do
communicate with one another. Now the problem is that when we say they do
communicate doesn‟t that mean you need some sort of Sameness that makes them
communicate? His answer is no. The communication is always the production of
difference – always another difference. So, we‟ve got these three. Couldn‟t we say, then,
that non-being, Chaos, and because we live in Chaosmos – that‟s what‟s around us, that‟s
what we experience – that it indicates Chaos; and Chaos is ineffable in the sense that
when we do give this description that there are these series that absolutely diverge from
one another and in no way communicate, we‟ve given something that really doesn‟t make
much sense. It‟s indicated; it‟s a bit like those gaps again. So, would this be a way that
we could have Deleuze using his notion of difference give us a solution to the problem of
non-being?
Mr. Scalambrino: I like that.
You know, when Dr. Polansky and I were talking about this project, I said, my
suggestion to people would be [echoing Dr. Polansky‟s suggestion from years prior],
because I think it‟s a good suggestion, that they should write a commentary for their
dissertation. And, he asked me: Well, what book would you write a commentary on?
And without even taking a breath, I said, “Difference & Repetition.” You know, when I
took your Difference & Repetition class it was the first time I ever really engaged
Deleuze, and I just went wild for Deleuze. I think Deleuze is great. I‟d like to see us
right up there with the University of Edinburgh.
But, in either case, yes. I think that‟s excellent. So, I guess I would say
something like: If it‟s the case that being emerges from becoming, perhaps there‟s some
way that by paying attention to these things we are sub-merging back into the chaotic
nature of the self, or something like that. And, that by sub-merging back into the chaotic
nature of the self we are able to start recognizing these gaps. Yeah… Yeah. That‟s
neat… That‟s neat.
Dr. Evans: By the way, in reading this it really caused me to do a lot of thinking, so I
have a lot of thank you for it too.
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Mr. Scalambrino: Well, thank you… Thank you.
Dr. Evans: Going to the last part now – memory itself… Well, I‟ll tell you where I want
to go to. I want to suggest memory isn‟t as foundational as you say, but time actually is
more foundational.
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.
Dr. Evans: And time always involves the future, and that‟s the thing. But, let me build
up to it a little bit. Although I think actually what I was going to do, you already did for
me [pointing to the flowchart] when you summarized your view. I was going to go
through it step by step with you to make sure I understood it correctly, but I think what I
have here pretty much paralleled what you were saying, so maybe I can cut a lot of that
out because you‟ve already done it for us.
We‟ve already talked about the gaps and the pulses and the way the gaps are the
solution to the problem of non-being in your theory. And, you want to say that these
pulses are really memory, and you can describe them; but that‟s describing the power of
memory, and it‟s not describing the gaps. You only get the gaps because… In a sense
actually built into the notion of pulse there‟s going to be a gap because the pulse is
[snapping fingers], so it‟s just built into it you‟ve already got gaps. So, there is a sense in
which… Or you want to claim you‟re not apprehending the gaps, that they are
inapprehensible. I‟m not so sure about that, but let that one dangle for the moment.
Now, what I want to claim following both Derrida and Deleuze, Merleau-Ponty
and a lot of other thinkers. I want to say, isn‟t time more basic than memory? Time
always involves both the future and the past because the present, as the present,
disappears at the same time that it opens itself to the future. It has already always
happened and is not yet. It is becoming, rather than being. In a sense time is becoming.
And, everything which embodies time, which is pretty much everything – maybe
everything in life –, then is going to be becoming.
Deleuze fits into this nicely where he talks about the three stages of time. You
went through those nicely in your dissertation. He basically wants to claim that the
Eternal Return which is the third synthesis of time – of the three syntheses of time. He
claims the Eternal Return makes a condition out of the past, a past that never was present.
In other words, this is what he calls memory. And, it makes an agent out of the present or
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an imminent future. He says this empty form of time, the Eternal Return, effaces the
latter two determinations – the memory and the present, the past and the present – in its
and the event‟s becoming. So, only a new becoming, or difference, returns.
So, it‟s clear in Deleuze that with the Eternal Return that this time which involves
the future is more basic than memory itself because after all it effaces them and makes a
condition out of them. So, they serve, you might say, at its orders. And, this is exactly
what being itself does as a becoming. Being as becoming is the production of difference,
as a continuous division of itself, a differentiating of itself. So, either the pulses and
memory are future oriented, in which case memory is subordinate to time, or they are not,
in which case they are not time; and, hence, can‟t qualify as memory, so long as the latter
– memory – has any temporal meaning at all. That‟s sort of the argument, and I wanted
to have you respond to that.
That‟s a lot. We can break this down…
Mr. Scalambrino: No, that‟s good stuff. That‟s good stuff.
When I was leaning on Derrida a little bit in the Derrida chapter, I was trying to –
and this brings up the distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive – to press
this idea of time as discursive. So, in so far as time is discursive, we could ask ourselves,
are we talking about the concept or the notion of time, or are we talking about time as a
force. And so, for me, what I‟m trying to get at is more this idea that it‟s memory that is
accounting for a pulse out of becoming, or we could say from becoming, rather than
memory as merely storage.
I don‟t know if that gets right at the heart of what it is you‟re saying there.
Dr. Evans: It depends on the character of that pulse. Does it have past, present, and
future? Is it a pulse that is like the Eternal Return?
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. Interesting. Yeah. Alright. Forgive me, this is bringing up so
much. I wanted to say something like… I wanted to keep Nietzsche out of this. I‟m
trying to keep Nietzsche out of this for now. In so far as we have being that lacks
identity. So, that we are being, and then we don‟t gain an identity until we are higher up
in the structure of experience. But, still we might want to say my being is participating in
this entire pulse – or sometimes I refer to it as a fountain out of becoming – then there is a
sense in which prior to arriving at an identity, or prior to the content of the identity I
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arrive at, then there is a sense in which it is just the repetition of being. And, so if we ask
this question of Sameness in regard to the structure of experience it seems as though we
could say that it is the repetition of being so that once we add identity to it, then we might
slide into questions of things like reincarnation. I don‟t know if that‟s where you‟re
headed with this.
Dr. Evans: No.
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. But, we‟re asking, is the being the Same? Is the being the same
within each pulse?
Dr. Evans: For me, more it‟s, is this pulse temporal?
Mr. Scalambrino: Is this pulse temporal?
Dr. Evans: Is it time? And if it‟s time does that mean that you have the future, the
present, and the past?
Mr. Scalambrino: If I press the structure of experience, and in so far as time comes after
space, and space is coming out of the bottom of the pulse, then I would say it …
This is going to get us… I hear the paradox coming: Does the pulse take time to
get to the intuition of time, but I what I would say about that is that we are doing this
within conceptuality. So, we have to think about this conceptually. I want to say that it‟s
not… How about, I would say that perhaps the best way to get at it is not through time.
Whether or not the pulse itself is occurring within time, it seems as though you
must be within the pulse and, perhaps, even higher up within the pulse in order to be able
to make a claim like that.
Dr. Evans: But wouldn‟t that then also apply to all the claims your making about memory
and the pulses too – that you‟re doing it conceptually, if I‟m doing it conceptually?
Mr. Scalambrino: No, that‟s true. Yes, that would be true as well. So, for example, I
would fall back on this memory research. They certainly use time. They say things like,
if it‟s the case that the eye is “shooting around,” i.e. the difference between the
antisaccades and the prosaccades, they say, you only have so much time to hit a baseball.
So the baseball‟s coming in, you see the baseball, and you need to be able to project your
eyes out in front of it to be able to hit the baseball, etc. And, they certainly use time
because they are using time in order to measure movements of the eyes and the objects
that are moving as well. However, it seems as though they are talking about time as an
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after the fact because memory is required in order to provide the organization. So, if I
were to fall into some Aristotelian language, I would say memory functions as the
principle of organization.
Dr. Evans: Memory? And, then, would it be memory more, or would it just be, in fact, a
structure that we don‟t call memory or anything else, it‟s just a structure? Because if its
memory doesn‟t it have to involve time in some way to even call it memory? And if it
does involve time, then, we have the future coming back in, again.
Mr. Scalambrino: Oh, okay; I see what you‟re saying. So, this power at the ground of
experience, should we really even call it “memory”? That‟s an excellent question. It
seems like we‟re committed to saying something like, it‟s non-discursive. It‟s got to be a
non-discursive power. If it‟s the power that is the – I don‟t want to say – “the condition
for the possibility of,” but if it is the power that is allowing for the emergence of being,
then certainly we‟d have to say in so far as it‟s a condition… I won‟t go there it would
take too much time, but there is an excellent quote in the Critique of Pure Reason, where
Kant says, “I cannot cognize as an object itself that which I must presuppose in order to
cognize an object at all.” (A 402) So, then, if that‟s the case, then why call it “memory”?
Dr. Evans: Yeah.
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.
Dr. Evans: One other thing. If we‟re going to look at memory research, there‟s a bigger
question that comes up. Think of all the philosophy of science that‟s been done around
scientific experiments. In other words, when the scientist does their work, when they set
up their problematic, their problematic is a particular way of viewing the world from the
get go. For one thing, you‟re doing experimental stuff, you have to be able to divide up
your terrain into independent and dependent variables, or else you won‟t be able to
conduct an experiment and use that as a way of proving one hypothesis over another.
So, already from the beginning there is a way of conceptualizing the field. I call it
“analytic discourse” as opposed to “organic discourse” that we get in phenomenology and
other ways. So, already there is a prior question as to the value of all that research. If it‟s
working within a particular framework, there is a prior question of whether that
framework should be the framework or not. And, that was one thing I thought, too, you
might have to deal with when you justify… I mean you can use the scientific research
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that you did to say this is suggestive, but I‟m actually making my point on philosophical
grounds not empirical grounds. I‟m not using it to prove my hypothesis; I‟m using it,
rather, to illustrate it, and it‟s suggestive. And, it does make some interesting
differentiations that I can pull out of it and include in my philosophical articulations.
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. So, forgive me. Let me see if I can paraphrase this: What I hear
is… Well, I‟ll just go right to it. The language that you use in Psychology & Nihilism
against the equating of the mental with the computer model, I feel as though there is a bit
of that in the background. And, I‟m actually on board with that. In fact, what I‟m
suggesting is something like: let‟s take their research, right? Let‟s take their research,
and let‟s show them that their research actually provides a result that, therefore, they‟re
not going to be able to get where they want to go with their research.
There is a level of automaticity. They love talking about fluency and
automaticimy, automaticity. It seems as though… And, I‟m only moving this fast
because of time, so forgive me. Yeah, because of time, right?
Dr. Evans: You hope.
Mr. Scalambrino: Yeah, right.
So, because there is this level of automaticity and priming at the level of
automaticity such that, [to the crowd] if you don‟t know what “priming” is, you should
definitely look it up. Priming is an amazing idea. It‟s an amazing concept, in my
opinion. But, in either case, what we find is that there is a sense in which it‟s automatic,
so to speak, the power at the ground is automatic, and it‟s at play. So, it seems to me,
that – and I‟m speculating here, right – if they want to make a computer model of the
mind, then they‟re going to have to make a computer that just has a whole bunch of
thoughts that only some of them, then, it grabs hold of.
One way we could argue: are they creating a sense of desire? Because, I might be
sitting here – I‟m not sitting here – but, I might be standing here and having all sorts of
thoughts about the pizza I might have later or how well I slept last night, and all these
things are just “shooting around” inside my head, but I don‟t organize them or grab hold
of them. So, I would suggest we take their research and actually head them off at the
pass.
Dr. Evans: And, I agree with that.
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Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.
Dr. Evans: Thanks.
Mr. Scalambrino: Thank you. Yeah. Yeah.
Dr. Polansky: So, I‟ll just ask some picky sort of things. You say: Aristotle equates nonbeing with death. Why‟d you do that?
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay [looking up a passage in the dissertation].
Dr. Polansky: One would assume only living things can die.
Mr. Scalambrino: Right. I specifically wrote this down – there it is. I specifically wrote
this down in case we‟d have to go there. On pages 53 & 54 of the dissertation, yeah.
What I suggest is that, looking at a couple different Aristotle texts here… Forgive for
quickly paraphrasing, and sort of reading this to you:
Whereas at Categories §14 Aristotle distinguished between “six kinds of change”
(15a14-15) – those being: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, and
change of place –, in On Generation and Corruption, Aristotle distinguishes between
“unqualified” and “qualified” “coming-to-be and passing-away” (318b13-318b17). The
first two of the six kinds of change, then, from Categories §14 pertain to unqualified
coming-to-be and passing-away, and the last four kinds of change pertain to qualified
coming-to-be and passing-away. And, in Physics Book I §7 (190a33) since he is
discussing “becoming,” Aristotle brackets destruction and separates the other kinds of
change into “absolute becoming” which is generation or “coming into existence,” and the
other kinds of change as “coming to be this or that.”
So, there‟s a sense in which, if it‟s coming to be this or that, then it already is. So,
we have to fall back into this other grouping of generation and destruction, in order to get
at this unqualified not-being. And so, in that way, it‟s not generation, so it would be
destruction.
Dr. Polansky: So, all destruction is death?
Mr. Scalambrino: Oh. Okay. No. I‟m not trying to suggest that all destruction is death.
Dr. Polansky: In the discussion of Being, Becoming, and Non-Being – are you familiar
with the Timaeus at all?
Mr. Scalambrino: A little bit. Not as well as you.
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Dr. Polansky: Yeah, but Plato, when you do Being, Becoming, and then the third thing
would seem to be necessity or receptacle. Or…
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. Khôra?
Dr. Polansky: Khôra. So, is that non-being? Or non-being? Sorry.
Mr. Scalambrino: I take this to be a question similar to the question that Dr. Evans asked.
How do we want to interpret the gap? So, I can‟t make an argument with you right now
about the Timaeus. I could take a look at the Timaeus again later, and try to make that
argument with you about the Timaeus. However, in the Derrida chapter I talk about
Khôra. The question is: To what extent can we equate Différance with Khôra? And, it
seems to me that… How to interpret these gaps… My mission here was just to indicate
that there are gaps.
I‟d have to re-read the Timaeus to see if I would want to go so far as to say that
Plato is talking about these [gaps] when he‟s talking about Khôra. [Waving to Mr.
Cimakasky who had just arrived] Maybe we can ask Joe.
May I ask you a… Do you think that Plato already had… Do you think that Khôra
is Plato‟s solution to the problem of non-being?
Dr. Polansky: It‟s possible.
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. Alright.
Dr. Polansky: Well, in the Sophist that you‟re talking about, non-being seems not to be
absolute non-being but otherness or difference, as you called it. And the Khôra just
seems to be difference at the level of sensible things … that Becoming is in.
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. So, if I could go to this graphic [pointing to graphic from
flowchart]. If we would say that this is [point to inverted cone part of the flowchart
graphic] the receptacle, and that the receptacle is Becoming where being is emerging out
of, then I would have to say that non-being is not the Khôra because non-being is outside
the receptacle.
Dr. Polansky: Okay. Yeah, so then, my next question is about all your talk about the
“outside.” That‟s strange talk. Outside the forms; outside the dialectic; you have outside
all over the place. What‟s that mean?
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Mr. Scalambrino: Yeah. Right. This is the problem with… We could push this into the
philosophy of mind and the mind/body problem; this is going on in Hegel, and this
“There is no outside the text,” is going on with Derrida as well. Yeah.
In so far as non-being can‟t be thought, then I wouldn‟t say that I‟m saying that
non-being is the “outside.” Because, to go back to something I had said earlier, that
would be to handle it in a conceptual way with the assumption that that exhausts it, and I
don‟t think that that exhausts it. So, if we take it as the caveat that is non-being outside
of being? I mean, I would assent to something like that, but the real work needs to be
how do you interpret the use of “outside”?
Just like we would want to say: It is actually true, for example, at the very
beginning here [pointing to first step of the flowchart] when we say non-being cannot be
thought experienced or described, we would want to assent to that actually. But, that
doesn‟t solve the problem. We can overcome that aporia, but we must go to the next
aporia also and ask: Well then, what are we talking about?
So, if I want to say it‟s “outside,” well then, how could it be outside because
aren‟t I inside, right now? Yeah, right. That‟s problematic.
Dr. Polansky: Okay. So on this [pointing to flow chart] and in here [pointing to the
dissertation] you do ἐλαληίνλ. That seems to be contrary, but you seem to treat it fairly
peculiarly. On this chart you have ἐλαληίνλ is difference, and then difference in itself is
ἕηεξνλ. That seems strange. What do you understand contrariety to be? Because you
say somewhere that: “contrariety is the greatest opposition”…
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. That‟s a direct quote out of Aristotle (Metaphysics X §4,
1055a5). So, if we‟re doing Aristotle here, I was trying to look at the different types of
opposition that Aristotle talks about, and then to actually look [further] to see what he
was doing with enantion and what he was doing with heteron in the actual text.
But I would say, first and foremost, this enantion/heteron business I‟m borrowing
from Heidegger. So, Heidegger‟s commentary on the Sophist… I‟m borrowing
Heidegger‟s reading of the Sophist in order to make this move a little faster, but it does
seem as though, for example, in the Aristotle quotes that I provided [in the original
Greek], it does seem as though it pertains in so far as Aristotle seems interested more in
conceptual contrariety. Which is why immediately with Aristotle, if we‟re talking about
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non-being, then suddenly we‟re talking about the principle of non-contradiction. But see,
this is why I didn‟t want to do Aristotle because I don‟t … I wouldn‟t follow him there. I
don‟t think that necessarily I‟m trying to refute the principle of non-contradiction or the
law of non-contradiction.
Dr. Polansky: Okay. Let‟s let the audience ask questions.
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. Thank you.
§4 Questions from the Audience –
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. So, [to the audience] what questions do you have?
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. Jim.
Mr. Bahoh: Well, I haven‟t read your dissertation, so I don‟t understand the details of it.
But, several years ago we had many conversations about memory and your interest in the
topic of memory. And, I want to ask you or provide a prompt for you to expand on that a
little bit. I‟m curious about the role that concept of memory is playing in your overall
project. I‟m interested in what your concept of memory is but especially in what its role
is.
Particularly in so far as you mentioned that Nietzsche is in the background. And
you also mentioned that you don‟t want to engage Nietzsche at this point. So, I want to
ask you to engage with Nietzsche, and you don‟t have to, you can tell me my question …
Mr. Scalambrino: No. No. I appreciate it.
Dr. Selcer: Before you start to answer that, because I‟m going to have to go catch a plane
fairly soon, we‟re just going to go deliberate in the other room. While you continue to
take questions and answer them.
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Bahoh: So, this is my question. You‟re saying in the outline you gave us all that you
use this concept of the abyss being the play-ground of being. And, I like this image. I
like this way of phrasing it. And, the image immediately invokes childhood.
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. Yes, and the Nietzschean Child.
Mr. Bahoh: Right. So, Nietzsche brings Zarathustra with the Three Metamorphoses, and
the third metamorphosis is the child. And, the child is specifically the one who can
forget.
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Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. Interesting, yeah, I think this was Fritz‟s initial reading as well
[from Dr. Wurzer‟s Graduate Seminar on Nietzsche].
Mr. Bahoh: So, I‟m curious as to what the role of memory is in your project, particularly
with respect to this idea of play-ground of being, memory being the play-ground of being
or the abyss – because in the Nietzschean context, the ability to really play or the ability
to do the Gay Science is contingent upon the ability to forget.
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. Right. Excellent question. Okay. Let me share this with you
because this is an example of “priming.” I‟m answering your question.
So, priming, it‟s essentially unanimous, go look this stuff up on your own, I truly
encourage you: the suggestion is that priming permeates memory. So, there are all
different types of priming. There‟s conceptual priming; there‟s semantic priming; and
there‟s even perceptual and sensory priming. Okay, so let me give you an example of
conceptual priming, so that analogously you can recognize what else is going on.
I‟m going to give you five words. I‟m just going to say five words to you, and
watch what is at play here. There are two different sets of five words. The first set goes
like this:
Apple, Teacher, Chalkboard, Recess, Yellow
And, when people are asked: What is it that you‟re thinking of? Usually it‟s pretty close
to being a school bus. Right? Apple, Teacher, Chalkboard, Recess, Yellow; usually
people respond with “School Bus.” Now let me give you the second list:
Apple, Grapes, Orange, Pear, Yellow
Most people say “Lemon” or “Banana.” Now, what‟s interesting about these two lists:
They both start with “Apple,” and they both end with “Yellow.” There‟s only three in
between that are different, and what this means is that we are “primed” to arrive at a
certain target.
Well, if you do this analogously, to suggest on a sensory level: Well, if I‟m
sensing this; I‟m sensing that; then, I‟m primed in my sensory pursuit of what it is I‟m
going to gain out of the environment next. I‟m primed for that. And, we could say on a
Nietzschean level: [I‟m primed as to] how I‟m going to interpret that [what comes next].
So, that‟s a conceptual example, but when you look at it on the level of
perceptual, it seems to me that it‟s an example of how it is a play-ground. It‟s an
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example of how it is a play-ground because it‟s moving on its own. And I should have
used this when he [Dr. Evans] was talking with me. It’s moving on its own, and it must
be memory because it’s being altered as it moves. So, just like both lists start off with
“Apple,” then once they go to either “Teacher” or “Grapes,” it‟s starting to move. Now,
it‟s playing on its own, but it is remembering the ground that it is covering. So, it‟s in
that way that I would say the ground is governed by play.
Now, when you read the Critique of Pure Reason there is really only a page on
what Kant calls “affinity.” So, there is a sense in which he just blows right by this, and
doesn‟t spend much time on it. But he suggests, somehow at the level of the sensory
manifold – the synopsis of the sensory manifold – somehow the connection between
the… What is unfolded in the sensory manifold, somehow these things are connected to
one another. And, he claims that it‟s governed by “affinity.” This is all in the
Dissertation Abstract. He says it‟s governed by affinity, but he thinks that affinity is
ultimately an aspect of sense, of just pure sensation. But see, that leaves too much up to
chance in the sense that we just don‟t understand how it works. But, when you ground it
in memory governed by priming, then, suddenly you‟re able to understand how it plays.
Any other questions? Okay, Chris.
Mr. Mountenay: I keep thinking of, and it‟s either in the end of the first or the beginning
of the second book of The World as Will and Representation by Schopenhauer, where he
brings up the problem that… He‟s separated the world into will and representation, and I
think he‟s one of the first philosophers who exists at a time when science is saying, you
know on the grand scale of things, human existence hasn‟t been that long. We‟ve been
around for just a fraction of geologic time, and so he asks the question, is there
representation before there is something to be represented to?
I think he says, it was probably some primal creature, 500 million years back or
so… So, I guess my question – a truncated version: Is there such a thing as pre-Cambrian
non-being? I mean, before there are creatures who have enough going on to have
memory, cause let‟s say memory goes back to vertebrates – let‟s say vertebrates were
able to have memory – is there non-being before that, or is that even a non-question?
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. So, this is invoking one of the Skeptical Tropes or the Skeptical
Modes.
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Mr. Mountenay: It‟s the first one.
Mr. Scalambrino: Right. And, I was expecting Dr. Polansky to throw this at me as well.
So, the way I would respond to this via Schopenhauer is that Schopenhauer is a good
example of an attempt to solve this problem post-Kant. What Schopenhauer is
suggesting that the ground is actually “Will.” He comes right out and says it, and he even
points back to the Sophist; he says the solution to the problem of non-being is the denial
of the will.
So, you see how this works. The people who are trying to solve this problem say,
there is the structure of experience, and whatever it is that is governing the ground of
experience, we must deny [i.e. negate] that. Then we get a solution. He says, it‟s will,
and I say, it‟s memory.
Mr. Scalambrino: Good question. Patrick.
Mr. Reider: I actually wanted to return to the question that Dr. Evans posed earlier. I was
curious about this question of time. Are we talking about an ontological question? Or,
are we talking about what is logically prior? It seems to me that if we are going to
address this problem from what is logically prior, in the sense that we are dealing with
this question of how we can arrive at a resolution of it, we need to start with what factors
are available to us, and that‟s not going to immediately be the ontological question. It‟s
going to be memory, which seems to me to allow for the experience of time. And, so, in
that sense, could say that memory is primary, rather than time – as being logically prior
but not ontologically prior?
Mr. Scalambrino: Yeah, so, again, I take this to be a heavy heavy paradoxical response.
This idea, for example, I think this hearkens back to: Does God create in time? Did it
take God time to create the world, etc? Is God in time or outside of time? That sort of
stuff… That‟s heavy. That‟s very heavy.
I, again, I tried to follow the path that these other philosophers were following, in
order to solve this problem. So, for example, as Chris brings up, Schopenhauer is another
good example because he‟s post-Kant. And, so, [the path seems to be] let‟s look at the
structure of experience – this is why the flowchart is set up as it is – what‟s at the ground
of the structure of experience? How would we negate that? What would it look like if
we were to negate it?
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So, when I follow that path, and I arrive at the ground as memory, then the
negation is providing us with this gap. And, it meets the criteria.
I would have to go back and look to see, if we worked with this idea of time, does
it meet the criteria? And, to what extent would it be different from Heidegger‟s Being &
Time? Or, to what extent is there an overlap between my project and Heidegger‟s.
Dr. Evans: If we‟re talking ontologically, then we‟re saying ontologically time exists,
time is the unfolding of everything, and memory is just part of it. And, if memory is
taken apart from that, then do we still call it “memory” anymore? If we are talking about
experiential time, then “memory” is a bit misleading; it‟s reifying because really remembering is what‟s going on, and remembering does involves time.
Mr. Scalambrino: So, briefly, one of the ways we could do this is to say: Within the
pulse, it is as if within the pulse you are remembering from inside the other pulse, but
really it‟s the case that the pulse contains memory. So, that you‟re really remembering
within the pulse, but it seems like you‟re remembering within the “prior” pulse. Then,
once we try to start talking about it, you have to use time, because I have to start saying
the “prior,” the “next,” etc.
It‟s a good question. Again, though, I still think following the path of these other
philosophers, really the last key was: What is the ground? And, then, looking at the
empirical memory research in order to enunciate the ground, if in fact it is memory this
would be the outcome. Does that outcome meet the criteria? I think it does.
Dr. Selcer: Frank, I‟m going to have to go.
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. Cheers.
Dr. Selcer: I just wanted to say: Congratulations, we signed off on the paper.
[Pause for applause]
Dr. Scalambrino: Thank you. Thank you very much.
Dr. Selcer: So, there‟s no reason the conversation can‟t continue, but unfortunately I
won‟t be here for it.
Dr. Scalambrino: Thank you. Thank you everyone for being here.
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